SPINOSA (Spinoza, d'Espinosa) Benedict (Baruch) (1632-77), Dutch philosopher, pantheist. The world, according to Spinoza, is a natural system that can be fully understood by the geometric method. Nature, pantheistically identified with God, is a single, eternal and infinite substance, the cause of itself; thinking and extension are attributes (inherent properties) of substance; individual things and ideas are its modes (individual manifestations). Man is a part of nature, his soul is a mode of thinking, his body is a mode of extension. The will coincides with the mind, all human actions are included in the chain of universal world determination. Works: “Theological-Political Treatise” (1670), “Ethics” (1677).

SPINOSA (Spinoza, d'Espinosa) Benedict (Baruch) (November 24, 1632, Amsterdam - February 21, 1677, The Hague), Dutch pantheistic philosopher.

Life and works

Born into the family of a wealthy Jewish merchant, Michael d'Espinoza, who fled from Portugal from persecution by the Inquisition. He studied at a Jewish school, where he studied the Hebrew language, the Old Testament, the Talmud, their commentators and medieval Jewish philosophers (Ibn Ezra, Maimonides, etc.). Spinoza was influenced by the Jewish freethinker Uriel Acosta. The leaders of the Jewish community had high hopes for young Baruch, seeing in him a future rabbi and Jewish theologian. Spinoza attended the school of Francis van den Enden, where he studied ancient literature and philosophy, Latin, natural science and became acquainted with through the works of modern philosophers, becoming an adherent of Descartes and Cartesian philosophy.The French philosopher attracted him with his free-thinking and the requirement to doubt everything generally accepted, to check and justify everything with his own mind.

In 1654, after the death of his father, Spinoza continued his work for some time, but, choosing philosophy as his path, he moved away from commerce and renounced his share of the inheritance.

Having found contradictions between the Old Testament and Jewish theology, Spinoza expressed doubts about the dogmas about the creation of the world, about the soul and the afterlife, about the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. Orthodox community leaders demanded that Spinoza renounce his “heretical” way of thinking, but, faced with his inflexibility, they tried to bribe him, promising him a large annual pension if he agreed and remained committed to the rituals of Judaism. But Spinoza remained adamant, for which he was physically attacked. In 1656 he was excommunicated from Judaism and expelled from the Jewish community and from Amsterdam.

Having moved to the countryside, he continued to study philosophy. He mastered the craft of grinding optical glass (lenses) to make a living from it, and at the same time taught Cartesian philosophy to a narrow circle of like-minded people. For them, Spinoza composed his first work, “On God, Man and His Reason” (1658-60). He gained the reputation of a freethinker and an atheist, and he earned hostility and enmity from the Protestant Dutch Church. For a long time he wandered around the Netherlands, moving from place to place, until he settled in The Hague.

In 1663, the only work published under the name of Spinoza, “The Fundamentals of the Philosophy of Descartes, Proved by a Geometric Method,” was published, which was a statement of the principles of Cartesian philosophy.

In 1670, The Theological and Political Treatise was published in The Hague, published anonymously and with a false place of publication. This work, written at the suggestion of the ruler of the Netherlands, Jan de Witt, who patronized Spinoza, was directed against Jewish and Calvinist clerics. In his treatise, Spinoza defended freedom of speech and thought and asserted the independence of philosophy from religion. This work marked the beginning of the scientific study of the Bible. Having undertaken a scrupulous analysis of its text, he, in particular, systematically criticized the dogma of the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. In this work, Spinoza acted as a strong supporter of the republican system. Anonymity was revealed, Spinoza was persecuted; in 1674 (after the murder of Spinoza's patron De Witt in 1672), the treatise was classified by the authorities as prohibited books, as containing "many impious, blasphemous and godless teachings."

Spinoza's main philosophical work is Ethics Proved in Geometric Order. This work was completed in 1675 (published posthumously).

In the last years of his life, Spinoza worked on the "Political Treatise", which was conceived by him as a continuation of the "Ethics", but the work was not completed. Died of tuberculosis.

Basic principles of Spinoza's philosophy

The sources of the thinker's teachings, along with the rationalistic philosophy of Descartes and medieval Jewish philosophy, were the pantheistic doctrine of Giordano Bruno, as well as the philosophical teachings of Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes.

Following Hobbes and other philosophers of this era, considering geometry to be the most perfect science, Spinoza gave his main work - Ethics - the form of a geometric treatise, constructing it as a system of definitions, axioms, theorems and lemmas (with proofs), corollaries (conclusions) and scholia (notes).

The basis of Spinoza's ontology is the position of the identity of God and nature. He viewed nature as a single, eternal and infinite substance that is the cause of itself. Diverse individual things are manifestations of substance or its modes. Substance appears as a generating nature, opposed to the infinity of individual things. Substance has an infinite number of inherent properties (attributes) that make up its essence, but only two are accessible to the human mind: extension and thinking. Movement was seen as one of the modes of things.

Spinoza acted as a consistent and radical opponent of teleology and a supporter of determinism, which understood mechanistically and fatalistically: he understood chance as a subjective category. The whole world appeared in Spinoza's philosophy as a system of strict and rigid determination.

In the field of knowledge, the philosopher took the position of consistent rationalism, as evidenced by his classification of cognitive abilities. He attributed to the first type of knowledge, on the one hand, “cognition through disordered experience”, based on feelings, and on the other hand, knowledge through the use of analogies. Spinoza calls this kind of knowledge “opinion or imagination.” Its result is inadequate, that is, distorted and confused ideas; it is the only cause of false knowledge. Reason, which generates general concepts and adequate ideas about the properties of things, represents the second type of knowledge. The third kind is intuition, which is aimed at adequate knowledge of the essence of things. Reason and intuition provide adequate, true knowledge. Necessity, clarity and distinctness served as criteria of truth.

Considering the human body as a mode of extension, and his soul as a mode of thinking, that is, subordinate to necessity, Spinoza denied free will. Affects (passions) reveal a person’s enslavement, his slavery. At the same time, Spinoza substantiated the idea of ​​compatibility of necessity and freedom, which is achieved through knowledge, which is the strongest of human drives and clarifies affects. Freedom, according to Spinoza, is opposed not to necessity, but to coercion and violence. The position of free necessity is the cornerstone of Spinoza's ethics. The philosopher-sage, recognizing necessity and experiencing “intellectual love for God,” becomes free.

Benedict Spinoza (born Baruch Spinoza, Hebrew: שפינוזה‎; Latin: Benedictus de Spinoza). Born November 24, 1632 in Amsterdam - died February 21, 1677 in The Hague. Dutch rationalist philosopher, naturalist, one of the main representatives of modern philosophy.

Baruch de Spinoza was born into a family of Sephardic Jews, whose ancestors settled in Amsterdam after being expelled from Portugal. The family of Michael (Gabriel Alvarez) and Hannah Deborah de Spinoza had five children: Isaac, Rebecca (both from Michael's first marriage), Miriam, Baruch and Gabriel.

His mother died very early from tuberculosis - in 1638, when Baruch was only 6 years old. His father (until his death in 1654) ran a successful family business trading in southern fruits. Spinoza attends the elementary religious school "Etz Chaim", where he studies Hebrew, the Torah with Rashi commentaries, the Talmud and other rabbinic literature, as well as the basics of Jewish theology and rhetoric. Already here he becomes acquainted with the works of Averroes and in the medieval interpretation of Maimonides. Later he takes Latin lessons. Spinoza spoke Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch and some French and Italian, and spoke literary Hebrew; the spoken language in the family was probably Ladino.

Spinoza's first teachers were the rabbis - hakham and preacher Isaac Aboab da Fonseca (later, apparently, participated in the excommunication of Spinoza), Menashe ben Israel and Moses Moiteira.

At this time, Spinoza studied the works of such Jewish philosophers as Abraham ibn Ezra and Maimonides, Gersonides, and was also familiar with the treatise “The Light of the Lord” (“Or Adonai”) by Hasdai Crescas and the book “Puerta del Cielo” (“Gate of Heaven”) religious philosopher Abraham Cohen Herrera. To these authors it is necessary to add the Neoplatonist Yehuda Abarbanel with his “Dialogues on Love” (“Dialoghi d'Amore”) and the works of Arab-Muslim philosophers: al-Farabi and Averroes.

After the death of his father, Baruch and his brother Gabriel take over management of the company. Spinoza’s expressions of “unorthodox” views, his rapprochement with sectarians (Collegians, a movement in Protestantism) and the actual departure from Judaism soon lead to accusations of heresy and exclusion from the Jewish community (herem in 1656).

Spinoza takes the name Benedict (diminutive of Bento), sells his share in the company to his brother and leaves for the Amsterdam suburb of Overkerk. However, he soon returns and (while he is still allowed to stay in Amsterdam) becomes a student at the private college of the ex-Jesuit “jolly doctor” van den Enden, where he improves Latin, teaches Greek, philosophy (Greek, medieval and modern, including Hobbes, Gassendi , perhaps), natural sciences, learning to draw and grind optical glasses (teaching Hebrew). Here he gets acquainted with the works, which will expand the horizon of his creative activity, but will not affect his “true faith” (as he speaks about philosophical views). Although Descartes lived in Amsterdam for a long time, apparently he and Spinoza never met - Spinoza was still too young at that time.

Bento is surrounded by a circle of devoted friends and students - Simon Joosten de Vries, Jarig Jelles, Pieter Balling, Lodewijk Meyer, Jan Rieuwertsz, von Schuller (von Schuller), Adriaan Koerbagh, Johannes Koerbagh, Johannes Bouwmeester and others.

In 1660, the Amsterdam synagogue officially asked the municipal authorities to condemn Spinoza as a “threat to piety and morality,” and the latter was forced to leave Amsterdam, settling in Rijnsburg (then the center of the collegians), a village near Leiden. Grinding lenses gives him enough income to live on. Here he writes “A Short Treatise on God, Man and His Happiness”, “A Treatise on the Improvement of Reason”, most of “The Foundations of Descartes’ Philosophy” and the first book of “Ethics”. From time to time, students from nearby Leiden visit him. In 1661, Spinoza was visited by one of the chairmen of the Royal Scientific Society of London, Heinrich Oldenburg, with whom correspondence then continued for many years.

In June 1663, Spinoza moved to Voorburg, near The Hague, where he met the physicist and mathematician Christian Huygens and the philologist Voss. In 1664, he published in The Hague “The Principles of Descartes’ Philosophy” (the only work published under Spinoza’s own name during his lifetime) together with “Metaphysical Meditations.” Published anonymously in Amsterdam, The Theological-Political Treatise (1670) creates a strong impression of Spinoza as an atheist. Spinoza was saved from serious persecution by the fact that the de Witt brothers, who were favorable towards the philosopher, were at the head of the state (Jan de Witt was a Cartesian). In parallel with the treatise (and in many ways for it), he writes “Jewish Grammar”.

In May 1670, Spinoza moved to The Hague (since 1671 he lived in a house on the Paviljoensgracht canal; now this house bears the Latin name Domus Spinozana), where he remained until his death. In 1673, Spinoza refused the invitation of the Elector of the Palatinate to take the chair of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, arguing that he was afraid of losing freedom to express his thoughts. In 1675, he completed “Ethics” - a work that in a systematized form contains all the main provisions of his philosophy, but after the de Witt brothers “lost power” in 1672 (they were killed in a coup d’etat), he did not dare to publish it , although handwritten copies circulate among closest friends. In 1675, Spinoza met the German mathematician Ehrenfried von Tschirnhaus, and in 1676, Gottfried Leibniz, who was staying in The Hague, visited Spinoza several times.

On Sunday, February 21, 1677, Spinoza died of tuberculosis (a disease from which he suffered for 20 years, unwittingly aggravating it by inhaling dust when grinding optical lenses, smoking - tobacco was then considered a remedy), he was only 44 years old. The body is provisionally buried on February 25 and is soon reburied in a common grave. An inventory of the property (which includes 161 books) is made and it is sold, some of the documents (including some of the correspondence) are destroyed. Spinoza's works, in accordance with his wishes, were published in the same year in Amsterdam Rieuwertsz with a preface by Jelles without indicating the place of publication and the name of the author under the title (lat. B. d. S. Opera Posthuma), in 1678 - in a Dutch translation ( Nagelate Schriften). Also in 1678, all works of Spinoza were prohibited.

Spinoza's philosophy:

Spinoza builds his metaphysics by analogy with logic in the Ethics, his main work. What it involves:

1.assignment of the alphabet (definition of terms),
2.formulation of logical laws (axioms),
3. derivation of all other provisions (theorems) through logical consequences.

This form guarantees the truth of the conclusions if the axioms are true.

In relation to Spinoza's Ethics, it should be mentioned, however, that while clearly focusing on this ideal, it does not always fully satisfy it (this applies to the proof of individual theorems).

Substance for Spinoza, that which “exists in itself and is represented through itself.” Substance (aka “nature”, aka “god” and spirit - “Deus sive Natura”) there is only one, that is, it is everything that exists. Thus, Spinoza’s God is not a personal being in the traditional religious understanding: “neither mind nor will have a place in the nature of God.” Substance is infinite in space and eternal in time. Substance, by definition, is indivisible: divisibility is only the appearance of finite things. Any “finite” thing (a specific person, a flower, a stone) is a part of this substance, its modification, its mode.

Attribute- what constitutes the essence of a substance, its fundamental property. We know only two attributes - “extension” and “thinking”, although there can be an infinite number of them. The attributes are completely independent, that is, they cannot influence each other. However, both for the substance as a whole and for each individual thing, the expression of existence through the attribute of extension and thinking is consistent: “The order and connection of ideas are the same as the order and connection of things.”

Stretch is the defining feature of the body; all “physical” characteristics of things are reduced to it through the “infinite mode of movement and rest.”

However, the world is not only extended, it has at least one more attribute - thinking.

Spinoza uses the term “thinking” to designate an infinite thing that is the cause ( Nature Creating) the entire content and processes of consciousness (Created Nature), as in itself: sensations, emotions, the mind itself, etc. Characterizes substance as a whole as a thinking thing "Mode of Infinite Reason". And since thinking is an attribute of substance, then any individual thing, that is, any modification of substance, possesses it (not only humans, and not even only “living” things) are conscious: all things “albeit in different degrees, however, everyone is animated.” At the same time, Spinoza calls a specific modification of the attribute of thinking an idea.

At the human level, extension and thought constitute body and soul. “The object of the idea that constitutes the human soul is the body, in other words, a certain mode of extension that acts in reality (actually) and nothing more,” therefore the complexity of the human soul corresponds to the complexity of the human body. Naturally (this follows from the independence of attributes), “neither the body can determine the soul to thinking, nor the soul can determine the body either to movement, or to rest, or to anything else.”

Such a “structure” also makes it possible to explain the process of cognition: The body changes - either as a result of the influence of external agents (other bodies), or due to internal reasons. The soul as an idea of ​​the body changes with it (or, which is the same thing, the body changes with the soul), that is, it “knows” in accordance with a certain state of the body. Now a person feels, for example, pain when the body is damaged, etc. The soul has no verification of the acquired knowledge except for the mechanisms of sensation and reactions of the body.

Causality. Causality is what many call “the will of God,” since it is eternal and unchangeable. Everything must have its causal explanation, “nam ex nihilo nihil fit (for nothing comes from nothing).” Individual things, acting on each other, are connected by a rigid chain of mutual causation, and there can be no breaks in this chain. All of nature is an endless series of causes and effects, which in their totality constitute an unambiguous necessity, “things could not have been produced by God in any other way and in no other order than they were produced.” The idea of ​​randomness of certain phenomena arises only because we consider these things in isolation, without connection with others. “If people clearly understood the order of Nature, they would find everything as necessary as everything that mathematics teaches”; “God’s laws are not such that they can be broken.”

At the human level (as well as at the level of any other thing), this means the complete absence of such a phenomenon as “free will”. The opinion about free will arises from the imaginary, apparent arbitrariness of people’s actions, “they are aware of their actions, but they do not know the reasons by which they are determined.” Therefore, “the child is convinced that he is freely seeking milk, the angry boy is convinced that he is freely seeking revenge, the coward is convinced of flight. A drunk is convinced that he, by the free determination of his soul, says what a sober person would later wish to take back.”

Spinoza contrasts freedom not with necessity, but with coercion or violence. “A person’s desire to live, love, etc. is by no means forced upon him by force, and, however, it is necessary.” Human freedom is a manifestation of man's desire to act in accordance with the order and connection of things. Human slavery is the absence of this desire. Only a thing that is the cause of itself, a substance, God, the Creator, is truly free. The desire to live in accordance with the order and connection of things is the love of God, which brings salvation to man, or a human measure of freedom. Religious commandments (the commandments of Moses) can be directly or indirectly considered as the same eternal laws, or as the same order and connection of things in nature (Theological-Political Treatise). The concept of causality is intended primarily to indicate the source of human happiness and unhappiness (to a lesser extent for the sake of promoting the development of physics).

In relation to human freedom, the concept of “external help of God” and “internal help of God” is very important. External - when the order and connection outside a person (the material world) does not conflict with a person’s desire to perform any action (which can be called “in accordance with the order of things” regardless of knowledge); Internal - when knowledge helps a person to perform an action in accordance with the order and connection of the things themselves. The absence of both is human misfortune.

Affects. By affects, Spinoza understood the states of the body and the ideas of these states, which increase or decrease human activity.

He identified three types of affects - attraction or desire as a manifestation of the essence of human nature and the desire for self-preservation. There are three main affects experienced by a person: pleasure, displeasure and desire. In addition to passive, natural passions, Spinoza identified the affects of pleasure and desire associated with the active state of the soul, its desire to know true or adequate ideas. Since the limitation of the soul’s ability to think or know causes displeasure, knowledge as a manifestation of the activity of the soul is associated only with the affects of pleasure and desire. According to Spinoza's teaching, man is subject to affects because he is part of nature. He cannot disobey its orders and laws and is powerless before them. Natural desires are a form of slavery. We don't choose to have them. Our action cannot be free if it is subject to forces outside of us. Reason and intuition (clear, immediate comprehension) are called upon to direct a person’s intentions to the love of God.

Spinoza is sometimes called baroque philosopher for the unity of the most diverse elements in his philosophy. Spinoza's philosophy combines Cartesian metaphysical and epistemological principles with elements of ancient Stoicism, medieval Jewish rationalism, the ideas of humanist philosophers of the Renaissance and the concepts of natural science of his time.

Some researchers have found the influence of Kabbalah in Spinoza (sometimes to substantiate criticism of Spinozism). The interpretation of Spinozism as an occult doctrine began with the German philologist I. G. Wachter. In Kabbalah he saw “Spinozism before Spinoza.” Spinoza himself admitted that he was familiar with the writings of the Kabbalists, but spoke of them with contempt as “idle talkers” (nugatores): “I also read and, in addition, knew some chatterbox Kabbalists, whose madness I could never be sufficiently amazed at.” In modern historical and philosophical literature, the topic of the connection between Spinoza and the mystical Jewish tradition is discussed relatively rarely, and Spinoza’s ideas are not made dependent on any occult doctrines.

SPINOZA, BENEDICT(Spinoza, Benedictus) (1632–1677), or Baruch d'Espinoza, famous Dutch philosopher, one of the greatest rationalists of the 17th century. Born in Amsterdam on November 24, 1632. Spinoza's parents were Jewish emigrants who moved from Portugal, and he was raised in spirit of Orthodox Judaism. However, in 1656, after a conflict with the city authorities, Spinoza was subjected to the “great excommunication” by the Jewish community for heretical views (mainly related to Christianity - the community feared a deterioration in relations with the authorities), and in 1660 he was forced to leave Amsterdam and moved to several years to the village of Rheinsburg near Leiden, where he continued to maintain connections with the circle of collegians - a religious brotherhood that later united with the Mennonites. From Rheinsburg he moved to Voorburg - a village near The Hague, and from 1670 until his death on February 21, 1677 he lived in The Hague itself. Spinoza earned made his living by making and grinding lenses for spectacles, microscopes and telescopes, and by giving private lessons; in subsequent years his income was supplemented by a modest pension, which was paid by two noble patrons. Thanks to this, he led an independent lifestyle and could afford to study philosophy and correspond with leading scientists of the time. In 1673, he was offered a position as a professor in the department of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, but Spinoza refused the offer, citing hostility towards him from the official church. His main works are Theological-political treatise (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus), published anonymously in Amsterdam in 1670, and Ethics (Ethica), begun in 1663 and completed in 1675, but published only in 1677 in Latin in a book Posthumous works (Opera Posthuma) together with unfinished treatises on the scientific method ( Treatise on the Improvement of the Mind, Tractatus de Emendatiae Intellectus), about political theory ( Tractatus Politicus), Hebrew grammar ( Compendium Grammatics Linguae Hebraeae) and letters. The only book published during Spinoza's lifetime and under his name was the work The Principles of Rene Descartes' Philosophy, Parts I and II, Proved Geometrically (Renati des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae Pars I et II, More Geometrico Demonstratae, per Benedictum de Spinoza, 1663).

The years of Spinoza's life coincided with the beginning of the modern era. In his work, he carried out a synthesis of scientific ideas of the Renaissance with Greek, Stoic, Neoplatonic and scholastic philosophy. One of the difficulties faced by researchers trying to comprehend the ideas of his most famous work is Ethics, is that Spinoza often uses scholastic terms in a completely different sense, not accepted in scholasticism. Therefore, in order to understand the real meaning of this work, it is necessary to take into account the significantly new scientific and ontological premises on which the philosopher relied.

Spinoza's main area of ​​interest is philosophical anthropology, the study of man in his relation to society and the entire universe. The originality of his ideas lay in his attempt to extend the “Copernican revolution” to the fields of metaphysics, psychology, ethics and politics. In other words, Spinoza considered nature in general and human nature in particular objectively and impartially - as if they were geometric problems, and tried, as much as possible, to exclude the humanly understandable desire for wishful thinking, for example, to assume the existence of ends or final causes in nature. “Geometric method”, which sets out Ethics, is nothing more than an attempt to avoid accusations of partiality to certain views. Following Giordano Bruno, Spinoza viewed the cosmos not as a finite but as an infinite system and adhered to the heliocentric rather than the geocentric hypothesis adopted in scholasticism. Nature, according to Spinoza, is the cause of itself (causa sui). Spinoza considered man to be a part of the natural order, and not a special creation not subject to the universal laws of nature. God is a dynamic principle immanent in nature as a whole (natura naturans , generative nature), rather than some transcendent creator of the natural order. As a dynamic principle, Spinoza's God is essentially the impersonal God of science - a God who is the object of "intellectual love" (amor Dei intellectualis), but, unlike the biblical God, does not reciprocate human love and is not particularly concerned with well-being individuals under his care.

Starting from Cartesian dualism, Spinoza put forward a theory of parallelism between body and consciousness, according to which consciousness, like the body, also obeys certain laws. Unlike Descartes, Spinoza considered “extension” and “thought” as attributes of a single substance. He considered consciousness to be a kind of “spiritual automaton” that obeys its own necessary laws, just as the body obeys the laws of motion. In addition, Spinoza, along with Hobbes, was one of the first to apply Galileo's law of inertia to psychology and ethics, expressing the idea that, by the nature of things, every form of life strives to remain in its existence and maintain it indefinitely, until it encounters an obstacle in the form of some superior strength. Spinoza's introduction of the concept of the primacy of the conatus for self-preservation - later developed by Darwin from an evolutionary biological point of view - marked a complete break with the theory of the scholastics, who believed that all natural forms are directed towards predetermined goals, or final causes, and that human nature exists for the sake of some transcendental, supernatural goal.

IN Ethics Spinoza attempts to construct a psychology of emotions as dynamic forces subject to laws that can be logically deduced from the three primary affects or emotions, namely pleasure (joy), displeasure (sadness) and desire. Spinoza's idea that emotional life is subject to a certain logic, and emotions are not simply irrational forces or illnesses that must somehow be suppressed or overcome, found recognition only after the emergence of psychoanalysis.

In ethics, Spinoza's originality was manifested in his revaluation of traditional moral values ​​- a fact later recognized by F. Nietzsche - and the interpretation of virtue as a state of freedom. Spinoza's moral theory is naturalistic and appeals to this world; it opposes religious transcendentalism, which claims that earthly life is only a preparation for the afterlife. Not sadness and feelings of sin or guilt, but joy and peace of mind are the main motives of Spinoza’s philosophy of life. In his entire psychological and ethical theory, a central role is played by the idea that we must understand human nature in order to learn how to manage it (an idea that F. Bacon expressed in relation to all of nature as a whole).

In Spinoza's teaching, ethics and religion are interconnected. His philosophy of life represents a classic modern attempt to build a rational, universal system, dispensing with supernatural sanctions and any appeal to biblical revelation. This approach made Spinoza's views especially attractive to people of science, such as Einstein, poets - Goethe and Wordsworth, who were looking for unity with nature, and many free-thinking people who did not accept the dogmatism and intolerance of official theology. Spinoza's views had a huge influence on the development of philosophical thought of the New Age, in particular on German classical philosophy.

(Benedict) (1632-1677) - great Dutch philosopher - materialist and atheist; According to his political views, he is an ideologist of the democratic strata of the bourgeoisie. Spinoza's worldview developed during a period of intense development of capitalist relations in the Netherlands. These were the years of the struggle of the Dutch people against encroachments on the freedom of Holland by Spain and other states of Western Europe, the struggle of the bourgeoisie against the feudal foundations of society. Reflecting the interests of the rising bourgeoisie, Spinoza preached the freedom of scientific knowledge and advocated enlightenment, seeing in it a remedy for all social ills. His philosophical system was supposed to be a theoretical justification for bourgeois freedoms.

Spinoza rejected God as the creator of nature, believing that nature itself is God. By calling nature God, Spinoza thereby emphasized that nature is the cause of itself, that it is the cause of the existence and essence of all things. Engels highly appreciated Spinoza's famous principle (“the cause of itself”). “We must admit,” wrote Engels, “the greatest merit of the philosophy of that time... that, starting from Spinoza and ending with the great French materialists, it persistently tried to explain the world from itself, providing a detailed justification for this to the natural science of the future.”

Having sharply criticized dualism (see), Spinoza created a monistic system in which thinking and extension are declared attributes (essential properties) of a single substance - nature. Recognizing thinking as an attribute of all matter, Spinoza thereby erroneously defended the idea of ​​the universal animation of matter. Spinoza understood movement as the mechanical movement of bodies in space and, not considering it an attribute of substance, attributed movement only to individual things. According to Spinoza's philosophy, only individual things change, but nature as a whole always remains unchanged, existing outside of time. Spinoza resolved metaphysically not only the question of movement and development, but also the question of causality, necessity and chance.

Strict determinism, according to Spinoza's views, is incompatible with the recognition of chance. From his point of view, everything that happens in nature is necessary. This was a metaphysical understanding of necessity and chance. In reality, one does not exclude the other, for chance itself is a form of manifestation of necessity. However, elements of dialectics also take place in Spinoza’s philosophical theory. For example, Spinoza’s principle “causa sui” expresses the interaction, connection, and interdependence of things. Spinoza also approached the question of freedom and necessity dialectically, believing that freedom is a conscious necessity. In Spinoza's psychological teachings, the theory of affects (pleasure, displeasure, etc.) occupies a significant place.

Once conscious, affects turn into desire. Spinoza calls man's powerlessness to limit and tame emotions slavery. On the contrary, mastery over affect is freedom. The affect of reason must prevail over all other affects. In the theory of knowledge, Spinoza was a continuator of Descartes' rationalism and believed that true knowledge is achieved by reason itself, without the help of the senses. In his philosophical studies, Spinoza used the geometric method. The overwhelming majority of bourgeois historians of philosophy incorrectly consider Spinoza a pantheist; in reality, he was an atheist and sharply criticized religion, for which he was cursed by the Jewish community in 1656 and expelled from it.

In his understanding of society, Spinoza is an idealist and metaphysician. He makes the organization of a “reasonable” society dependent on the “purification” of the intellect, on knowledge of the “true” nature of man. Spinoza's materialism had a great influence on French materialists and the German enlightenment of the 18th century. His main works: “Treatise on the Improvement of the Intellect”, “Theological-Political Treatise” (1670), “Ethics” (1662-1675). He worked on “Ethics,” which sets out the core of Spinoza’s philosophical views, for over 12 years. It was published after the death of the thinker by his friends and formed the central part of his “Posthumous Writings.” In 1678, “Posthumous Writings” were banned for “blasphemous and godless teachings.”

Heresy and herem

After the death of his father (1654), Baruch and his brother Gabriel took over management of the company. Spinoza’s statements of “unorthodox” views, his rapprochement with sectarians ( colleagues, a movement in Protestantism) and the actual departure from Judaism soon led to accusations of heresy.

In early 1656, Spinoza's heretical views, which were shared by the physician Juan de Prado (1614–1672?) and the teacher Daniel de Ribera, attracted the attention of the community leadership. Spinoza questioned, among other things, that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch, that Adam was the first man, and that the law of Moses had superiority over "natural law". Perhaps these heretical views reflected the influence of the French freethinker Marrano I. La Peyrera (born 1594 or 1596 - died 1676), whose work The Preadamites (People Before Adam) was published in Amsterdam in 1655 G.

J. de Prado was forced to renounce his views. Spinoza refused to follow his example, and on July 27, 1656, a herem was imposed on him. The herem document was signed by S. L. Morteira (see above) and other rabbis. Members of the Jewish community were prohibited from any communication with Spinoza.

After his excommunication, Spinoza apparently studied at Leiden University. In 1658–59 he met in Amsterdam with H. de Prado. About them, in a report from Amsterdam to the Spanish Inquisition, it was indicated that they rejected the law of Moses and the immortality of the soul, and also believed that God exists only in a philosophical sense.

According to contemporaries, the Jewish community's hatred of Spinoza was so strong that attempts were even made to kill him. The hostile attitude of the community prompted Spinoza to write an apology for his views (in Spanish; not preserved), which, apparently, formed the basis of the “Theological-Political Treatise” he later wrote.

Spinoza took the name Benedict (the Latin equivalent of Baruch, a diminutive of Bento), sold his share in the company to his brother and left for the Amsterdam suburb of Overkerk. However, he soon returned and (while he was still allowed to stay in Amsterdam) became a student at the private college of the ex-Jesuit “jolly doctor” van den Enden.

Spinoza was familiar with the works of such philosophers as Abraham ibn Ezra and Maimonides, Gersonides, as well as with the treatise “The Light of the Lord” (“ Ohr Adonai") by Hasdai Crescas. He was particularly influenced by the book Puerta del Cielo (Gate of Heaven) by the cabalist Abraham Cohen Herrera, who lived in Amsterdam and died when Spinoza was very young. To these authors it is necessary to add Leon Ebreo (that is, Judah Abarbanel with his “Dialoghi d'Amore”), al-Farabi, Avicenna and Averroes. S. Dunin-Barkovsky also pointed out the existing connection between the “strange”, as he put it, work of Ibn Tufail “Hayy ibn Yaqzan” and the concept of Spinoza.

Grouped around Bento was a circle of devoted friends and students - Simon de Friis ( Simon Joosten de Vries), Jarikh Yelles ( Jarig Jelles), Pieter Balinh ( Pieter Balling), Lodewijk Mayer ( Lodewijk Meyer), Jan Reuwertz ( Jan Rieuwertsz), von Schuller ( von Schuller), Adriaan Kurbach ( Adrian Koerbagh), Johannes Kurbach ( Johannes Koerbagh), Johannes Bouwmeester ( Johannes Bouwmeester) and etc.

In 1670, Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise was published anonymously, containing a critique of the religious idea of ​​revelation and a defense of intellectual, religious and political freedom. This rationalistic attack on religion caused a sensation. The book was banned everywhere, so it was sold with false title pages. Due to constant attacks, Spinoza refused to publish the Treatise in Dutch. In a lengthy letter to one of the leaders of the Sephardi community in Amsterdam, Orobio de Castro (1620–87), Spinoza defended himself against accusations of atheism.

Published anonymously in Amsterdam, The Theological and Political Treatise (1670) created a strong impression of Spinoza as an atheist. Spinoza was saved from serious persecution by the fact that the de Witt brothers, who were favorable towards the philosopher, were at the head of the state (Jan de Witt was a Cartesian). In parallel with the treatise (and in many ways for it), he wrote “Jewish Grammar”.

In May 1670 Spinoza moved to The Hague (from 1671 he lived in a house on the Paviljunsgracht canal ( Paviljoensgrachts); now this house has a Latin name Domus Spinozana), where he remains until his death.

Social upheaval and Spinoza

Although Spinoza tried not to interfere in public affairs, during the French invasion of Holland (1672) he became involuntarily drawn into political conflict when Spinoza's friend and patron, Jan de Witt (the de facto head of the Dutch state), was killed by an angry mob who considered him and his brother was responsible for the defeat. Spinoza wrote an appeal in which he called the inhabitants of The Hague “the lowest barbarians.” Only thanks to the fact that the owner of the apartment locked Spinoza and did not let him out into the street, the philosopher’s life was saved.

In 1673, the Elector of the Palatinate offered Spinoza the chair of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, promising complete freedom of teaching on the condition that he would not attack the dominant religion. However, Spinoza rejected this proposal, wanting to preserve his freedom to express his thoughts and peace of mind.

Spinoza also refused the offer to dedicate his work to the French king Louis XIV, transmitted along with an invitation to Utrecht on behalf of the French commander, Prince L. de Condé. Dedication to the king would have guaranteed Spinoza a pension, but the philosopher preferred independence. Despite this, upon returning to The Hague, Spinoza was accused of having connections with the enemy; he managed to prove that many of the state dignitaries knew about his trip and approved of its goals.

In 1674, Spinoza completed his main work - “Ethics”, which in a systematized form contains all the main provisions of his philosophy. An attempt to publish it in 1675 ended in failure due to pressure from Protestant theologians who claimed that Spinoza denied the existence of God, although handwritten copies circulated among his closest friends. Having refused to publish his work, Spinoza continued to lead a modest life. He wrote a lot, discussed philosophical issues with friends, including G. Leibniz, but did not try to instill his radical views in anyone.

In 1675, Spinoza met the German mathematician E. W. von Tschirnhaus, and in 1676, G. W. Leibniz, who stayed in The Hague, often visited Spinoza.

On Sunday, February 21, 1677, Spinoza died of tuberculosis (a disease from which he suffered for 20 years, unwittingly aggravating it by inhaling dust when grinding optical lenses, smoking - tobacco was then considered a remedy), he was only 44 years old. The body was provisionally buried on February 25 and was soon reburied in a common grave.

They made an inventory of the property (which includes 161 books) and sold it; some of the documents (including some correspondence) were destroyed. The works of Spinoza, in accordance with his wishes, were published in the same year in Amsterdam Rieuwertsz with a preface by Jelles, without indicating the place of publication and the name of the author, under the title B. d. S. Opera Posthuma (in Latin), in 1678 - in a Dutch translation (Nagelate Schriften). Also in 1678, all of Spinoza's works were banned.

Historical significance of Spinoza

Spinoza was the first modern thinker who did not belong to any church or sect. Spinoza's Ethics was published for the first time in the book Posthumous Works (in Latin, 1677; simultaneously in Dutch translation). The “Posthumous Works” also included the unfinished work “Treatise on the Improvement of the Human Mind” (written in Latin around 1661), “Political Treatise” (completed shortly before the author’s death), “A Brief Exposition of the Grammar of the Hebrew Language” (unfinished) and selected letters.

Non-philosophical works of Spinoza

Most researchers admit that although Spinoza differed with Descartes in his views on a number of the most important issues of philosophy, he adopted from him the ideal of building a unified philosophical system based on clear and distinct “self-evident” knowledge - modeled on the principles of mathematics; From Descartes he learned the basic concepts of his system, although he gave them new, original content.

Metaphysics

Spinoza builds his metaphysics by analogy with logic in the Ethics, his main work. What it involves:

• (1) setting the alphabet (definition of terms),
• (2) formulation of logical laws (axioms),
• (3) derivation of all other provisions (theorems) through logical consequences.

This form guarantees the truth of the conclusions if the axioms are true. The goal of metaphysics for Spinoza was for man to achieve peace of mind, contentment and joy. He believed that this goal could be achieved only through man's knowledge of his nature and his place in the universe. And this, in turn, requires knowledge of the nature of reality itself. Therefore, Spinoza turns to the study of being as such.

This study leads to the primary being from both ontological and logical points of view - to infinite substance, which is the cause of itself (causa sui).

In relation to Spinoza's Ethics, it should be mentioned, however, that while clearly focusing on this ideal, it does not always fully satisfy it (this applies to the proof of individual theorems).

Substance

Substance in Spinoza, that which “exists in itself and is represented through itself” (E:I, def.). Every finite thing is only a particular, limited manifestation of an infinite substance. Substance is the world or nature in the most general sense. Substance (aka “nature”, aka “god” - “Deus sive Natura”) there is only one, that is, it is All existing.

Thus, Spinoza’s God is not a personal being in the traditional religious understanding: “neither mind nor will have a place in the nature of God” (E: I, sch. to v. 17). Substance is infinite in space and eternal in time. Substance, by definition, is indivisible: divisibility is only the appearance of finite things. Any “finite” thing (a specific person, a flower, a stone) is a part of this substance, its modification, its mode.

There is one substance, since two substances would limit each other, which is incompatible with the infinity inherent in substance.

This position of Spinoza is directed against Descartes, who asserted the existence of created substances along with the substance of their Creator.

Attribute

Created substances" of Descartes - extended and thinking - are transformed by Spinoza into attributes of a single substance. Attribute - what constitutes the essence of a substance, its fundamental property. According to Spinoza, substance has an infinite number of attributes, but only two of them are known to man - extension and thinking.

Attributes can be interpreted as real active forces of the substance that Spinoza calls God. God is a single cause, manifesting itself in various forces expressing His essence.

The attributes are completely independent, that is, they cannot influence each other. However, both for the substance as a whole and for each individual thing, the descriptions through the attribute of extension and thinking are consistent: “The order and connection of ideas are the same as the order and connection of things” (E: II, vol. 7).

This interpretation brings the relation of God-substance to attributes closer to the relation of the transcendental Deity (see Ein-sof) to His emanations (see Sephiroth) in Kabbalah. The paradox of the relationship of the infinite Divinity to the extra-divine world is overcome in Kabbalah with the help of the concept of God’s self-limitation (tzimtzum).

Evidence for the Existence of God

The three proofs of the existence of God given by Spinoza are based on the so-called ontological proof, which Descartes also used. However, Spinoza's God is not the transcendent God of theology and theistic philosophy: He does not exist outside the world, but is identical with the world. Spinoza expressed this pantheistic view in the famous formula “Deus sive Natura” (“God or Nature”).

Spinoza's God cannot be ascribed any personal properties, including will. Although Spinoza says that God is free, he means that God is subject only to his own nature, and therefore in God freedom is identical with necessity. Only God, as causa sui, has freedom; all finite beings are conditioned by God.

The fact that out of the infinite number of attributes of God we know only two - extension and thinking - follows exclusively from the limitations of our mind. Each individual thing is a partial revelation of substance and all its attributes; the infinite mind of God knows them completely. According to Spinoza, every thought is only a part or mode of an attribute of thinking. It follows that every single thing - not just the human body - has a soul. Every material thing finds expression in the attribute of thought as an idea in the Divine mind; this expression is the mental aspect of the thing, or its “soul.”

God also has the attribute of extension, but this attribute is not identical to the material world, since matter is divisible, and the infinite God cannot be divided into parts. God has extension in the sense that He is expressed in the very fact of the existence of the material world and in the pattern to which this world is subject. A different pattern prevails in the field of thinking. Each of these areas is infinite in its own way, but both of them are equally attributes of the one God.

The result of dividing attributes into parts is modes. Each mode is a separate thing in which a certain final aspect of a single substance finds expression. The set of modes is infinite due to the infinity of substance. This multitude is not external to God, but abides in Him. Each individual thing is a partial negation within an infinite system. According to Spinoza, "every determination is a negation." Attributes are divided into modes of varying degrees: direct and indirect.

In God, or substance, Spinoza distinguishes two aspects: creative nature (Natura naturans) and created nature (Natura naturata). The first is God and His attributes, the second is the world of modes, infinite and finite. Both natures, however, belong to a single substance, which is the internal cause of all modes. In the realm of modes, strict determinism reigns: each finite mode is determined by another mode of the same attribute; the entire set of modes is determined by substance.

Stretch

Stretch is the defining feature of the body; all “physical” characteristics of things are reduced to it through the “infinite mode of movement and rest.”

Thinking

However, the world is not only extended, it is characterized by at least one more attribute - thinking.

The term “thinking” Spinoza designates the entire content of consciousness: sensations, emotions, the mind itself, etc. Substance as a whole, as a thinking thing, is characterized by the “mode of infinite reason.” And since thinking is an attribute of substance, then any individual thing, that is, any modification of substance, possesses it (not only humans, and not even only “living” things) are conscious: all things “albeit in different degrees, however, all are animated” (E:II, sketch to volume 13). At the same time, Spinoza calls a specific modification of the attribute of thinking idea.

At the human level, extension and thought constitute body and soul. “The object of the idea that makes up the human soul is the body, in other words, a certain mode of extension that acts in reality (actually) and nothing more” (E:II, vol. 13), therefore the complexity of the human soul corresponds to the complexity of the human body. Naturally (this follows from the independence of the attributes), “neither the body can determine the soul to thinking, nor the soul can determine the body either to movement, or to rest, or to anything else” (E: III, vol. 2).

Such a “structure” also makes it possible to explain the process of cognition: The body changes - either as a result of the influence of external agents (other bodies), or due to internal reasons. The soul as an idea of ​​the body changes with it (or, which is the same thing, the body changes with the soul), that is, it “knows” about the changes in the body. Now a person feels, for example, pain when the body is damaged, etc. The soul has no verification of the acquired knowledge except for the mechanisms of sensation and reactions of the body.

Causality

Spinoza's extreme determinism excludes free will; the consciousness of freedom is an illusion arising from ignorance of the causes of our mental states. Spinoza's determinism also excludes chance, the idea of ​​which is also the fruit of ignorance of the causes of a particular event. Spinoza builds his ethics on the basis of strict determinism.

Causality . Everything must have its causal explanation, “nam ex nihilo nihil fit (for nothing comes from nothing).” Individual things, acting on each other, are connected by a rigid chain of mutual causation, and there can be no breaks in this chain. All of nature is an endless series of causes and effects, which in their totality constitute an unambiguous necessity, “things could not have been produced by God in any other way and in any other order than they were produced” (E: I, vol. 33). The idea of ​​randomness of certain phenomena arises only because we consider these things in isolation, without connection with others. “If people clearly understood the order of Nature, they would find everything as necessary as everything that mathematics teaches”; “God’s laws are not such that they can be broken.”

At the human level (as well as at the level of any other thing), this means the complete absence of such a phenomenon as “free will”. The opinion about free will arises from the imaginary apparent arbitrariness of people’s actions, “they are aware of their actions, but they do not know the reasons by which they are determined” (E: III v. 2). Therefore, “the child is convinced that he is freely seeking milk, the angry boy is convinced that he is freely seeking revenge, the coward is convinced of flight. A drunk is convinced that, by the free determination of his soul, he says what a sober person would later wish to take back” (E:III, vol. 2). Spinoza contrasts freedom not with necessity, but with coercion or violence. “A person’s desire to live, love, etc. is by no means forced upon him by force, and, however, it is necessary.”

Anthropology (the study of man)

Man, according to Spinoza, is a mode revealed in two attributes; soul and body are different aspects of one being. The soul is the concept of the body, or the body as it is conscious. Every event in the world is simultaneously a mode of the attributes of extension and thought. The material system - the body - is reflected in the system of ideas - the soul. These ideas are not only concepts, but also different mental states (feelings, desires, etc.).

Man, like all other creatures in the Universe, has an inherent desire (conatus) for self-preservation. This desire expresses the infinite Divine power. The only criterion for evaluating phenomena is the benefit or harm they bring to humans. It is necessary to distinguish between what is really useful to a person and what only seems useful. Ethics is thus made dependent on knowledge.

Theory of knowledge

Spinoza's theory of knowledge is based on the position that human thinking is a partial revelation of the Divine attribute of thinking. Spinoza considers the criterion of the truth of thinking not to be the correspondence of a concept to an object, but its clarity and logical connection with other concepts. The correspondence of a concept to its subject is ensured only by the metaphysical doctrine of the unity of all attributes in a single substance. The error lies in separating the concept from the whole.

Spinoza distinguishes three stages of knowledge: opinion (opinio), based on idea or imagination; rational knowledge (ratio) and intuitive knowledge (scientia intuitiva). The highest level of knowledge is intuitive comprehension, which considers reality “from the point of view of eternity” (sub specie aeternitatis), that is, in a supra-temporal logical connection with the whole - God, or nature. However, even the highest level of knowledge does not in itself ensure the deliverance of a person from passions and suffering; to achieve this, cognition must be accompanied by a corresponding affect (affectus).

Psychology: affects

Spinoza's teaching on the affects, which occupies more than half of his Ethics, is based on the concept of the desire (conatus) for existence, expressed in parallel in the bodily and mental spheres. To prove the ability of the mind to resist affects is the main task of Ethics.

Affect refers to both the state of the human soul, which has vague or unclear ideas, and the associated state of the human body. There are three main affects experienced by a person: pleasure, displeasure and desire.

Affects-passions can fill a person’s entire consciousness, persistently pursue him, to the point that the person under their influence, even seeing the best in front of him, will be forced to follow the worst. Spinoza calls man's powerlessness in the fight against his passions slavery (E: IV preface).

Affects, having arisen from one reason or another, can be combined with each other in numerous ways, forming more and more new varieties of affects and passions. Their diversity is caused not only by the nature of this or that object, but also by the nature of the person himself. The power of affects over people increases due to the general prejudice that people freely control their passions and can get rid of them at any time.

Natural desires are a form of violence. We don't choose to have them. Our desire cannot be free if it is subject to forces outside ourselves. Thus, our real interests are not in the satisfaction of these desires, but in their transformation through knowledge of their causes. Reason and intuition (clear direct comprehension) are called upon to free a person from submission to passions.

Affects are the expression of this desire in the mental sphere. Spinoza subjects various affects to analysis (which in many ways anticipates modern psychology). Man emerges in this analysis as a largely irrational being, to whom most of his motives and passions are unknown. Knowledge of the first stage leads to a clash of different aspirations in a person’s soul. This is the “slavery of man,” which can only be overcome with the help of affects stronger than those that dominate him.

Purely theoretical knowledge is not enough to change the nature of affect. But the more a man uses the power of his mind, the more clearly he understands that his thoughts flow necessarily from his essence as a thinking being; this strengthens his specific desire for existence (conatus), and he becomes freer.

Good for a person is what contributes to the disclosure and strengthening of his natural essence, his specific life aspiration - reason. When a person recognizes the affects that enslave him (which are always accompanied by sadness or suffering), when he recognizes their true causes, their power disappears, and with it sadness disappears.

At the second stage of knowledge, when affects are recognized as necessarily arising from the general laws prevailing in the world, sadness gives way to joy (laetitia). This stage of cognition is accompanied by an affect that is stronger than the affects characteristic of sensuality, since the subject of this affect is the eternal laws of reality, and not the private, transitory things that constitute the objects of the first stage of cognition.

The highest good is known, however, at the third stage of knowledge, when a person comprehends himself in God, “from the point of view of eternity.” This cognition is associated with the affect of joy that accompanies the concept of God as the cause of joy. Since the strength of the joy that love brings depends on the nature of the object of love, love for an eternal and infinite object is the strongest and most constant.

At the intuitive stage of knowledge, a person knows himself as a private mode of God, therefore the one who knows himself and his affects clearly and distinctly loves God. This is the “intellectual love of God” (amor Dei intellectualis). Spinoza uses the language of religion: he speaks of the “salvation of the soul” and the “second birth,” but his views are far from the traditional position of the Jewish and Christian religions. Spinoza's God is identical with eternal and infinite nature. He does not have personality traits, so a person cannot expect reciprocal love from God.

Intellectual love for God, according to the teachings of Spinoza, is the property of the individual; it cannot have the social or moral expression that characterizes historical religions. Spinoza recognizes the immortality of the soul, which he identifies with a particle of God's thought. The more a person comprehends his place in God, the more part of his soul achieves immortality. Man's self-knowledge is part of God's self-knowledge.

Once we know that we are part of the system of the world and are subject to rational necessary laws, we realize how irrational it would be to want things to be different from what they are - "all things are necessary... there is neither good nor evil in nature" . This means that it is irrational to envy, hate and feel guilty. The existence of these emotions presupposes the existence of distinct, independent things acting in accordance with free will.

Affect is a reflection of feeling. The definition of “Absence of affect” is used in psychiatry.

Political philosophy

Political philosophy is expounded in Spinoza's Ethics, but mainly in the Theological-Political Treatise and the Political Treatise. To a large extent, it follows from the metaphysics of Spinoza, but it also reveals the influence of the teachings of T. Hobbes. Like the latter, Spinoza distinguishes between the state of nature, in which no social organization exists, and the state of government.

Social contract

According to Spinoza, there are no natural rights except one, which is identical with force or desire (conatus). In the natural state, people are like fish: the big ones devour the small ones. In the state of nature, people live in constant fear. To save themselves from constantly threatening danger, people enter into an agreement with each other, according to which they renounce their “natural rights” (that is, the ability to act as they please in accordance with their natural forces) in favor of state power.

This agreement does not, however, have a morally binding force - agreements should be respected as long as they are useful. Therefore, power depends on its ability to force people to obey. The identification of law with opportunity or ability, which was characteristic, according to Spinoza, of the natural state of people, is recognized as characteristic of the relationship between state power and subjects.

The subject must submit to authority as long as it enforces social order by force; however, if the government forces its subjects to commit unseemly acts or threatens their lives, rebellion against the government is a lesser evil. A reasonable ruler will try not to lead his subjects to rebellion. Spinoza considers the best form of government to be a republic based on the principles of reason. This form is the most durable and stable, since the citizens of the republic submit to the authorities of their own free will and enjoy reasonable freedom.

In this Spinoza differs from Hobbes, a supporter of absolute monarchy. In a reasonably structured state, the interests of an individual coincide with the interests of the entire society. The state limits the freedom of action of a citizen, but cannot limit his freedom of thought and freedom to express his opinions. Independent thinking is an essential property of a person. Thus, Spinoza defends the idea of ​​freedom of conscience, which predetermined his entire fate.

Religion and State

However, he makes a distinction between the theoretical and practical sides of religion: faith is a personal matter for everyone, but the fulfillment of practical instructions, especially those relating to a person’s relationship with his neighbors, is a matter of the state.

According to Spinoza, religion should be state; any attempt to separate religion (practical) from the state and create a separate church within the state leads to the destruction of the state. State authorities have the right to use religion as a means of strengthening public discipline.

Exploring the relationship between religion and state, Spinoza critically describes the Jewish state during the First and Second Temple eras. Some researchers believe that Spinoza's criticism was actually directed against attempts by the Protestant clergy to interfere in Dutch state affairs. Others, however, believe that the object of Spinoza's criticism was the leadership of the Jewish community, as a result of the conflict with which the free thinker was placed outside the framework of Judaism.

According to Spinoza, the Jewish state in ancient times was the only attempt of its kind to put into practice the idea of ​​theocracy, in which God is given the place occupied in other government systems by the monarch or the aristocracy. God could not rule the Jewish people except through His messengers.

The legislator and supreme interpreter of the will of God was Moses, and after his death two systems of power arose - spiritual (priests and prophets) and secular (judges, later kings). The first temple fell due to the struggle between these authorities, the second - due to attempts by the clergy to subordinate state affairs to religious considerations. Spinoza comes to the conclusion that theocracy cannot exist at all, and that the seemingly theocratic regime is in reality the disguised domination of people who are considered messengers of God.

TANAKH study and its results

Spinoza is generally considered the founder of biblical criticism. He tried to find in the text of the Bible evidence that it is not a revelation from God that surpasses the powers of human reason. Spinoza believes that the Bible does not contain evidence of the existence of God as a supernatural being, but it shows how to instill beneficial fear in the hearts of ordinary people who are incapable of abstract thinking.

The impetus for critical study of the Bible came from Spinoza's acquaintance with the writings of Abraham Ibn Ezra, who for the first time (albeit in the form of a hint) expressed doubt that Moses was the author of the entire Pentateuch. Spinoza claims that certain parts of the Bible were written after the death of Moses by another author. According to Spinoza, other books of the Bible were written not by the people to whom their authorship is attributed, but by those who lived later.

In his research, Spinoza relies on biblical, talmudic and other sources (for example, on the writings of Josephus). Spinoza's research was far ahead of its time and did not evoke a response from his contemporaries - Jews did not read the works of the “heretic,” and Christians were not ready to accept his ideas.

The first and for a long time the only author who drew ideas from Spinoza's book was the French Hebraist, Catholic monk R. Simon. His work “A Critical History of the Old Testament” (1678) caused heated controversy and brought persecution on the author by church authorities; however, his critical study of the Bible is not deep enough compared to Spinoza's.

The direct or indirect influence of Spinoza on the critical study of the Bible was felt much later. The difference discovered by Spinoza in the names of God found in the books of the Bible became one of the main postulates of biblical criticism and formed the basis of the so-called documentary hypothesis of the composition of the biblical text.

Biblical criticism also adopted Spinoza's idea of ​​​​the special character of Deuteronomy, although it attributed the publication of this book to the era of Joshua, and attributed to Ezra the compilation of the so-called priestly code (Priestercodex). Spinoza's rationalistic approach to the Bible, consistent with his philosophical views, made him the founder of a new scientific discipline - biblical criticism.

Spinoza and Kabbalah

Solomon Maimon, who studied Kabbalah in his youth, drew attention to the closeness of Spinozism to it: “Kabbalah is only an expanded Spinozism” (“erweiterter Spinozismus”). Subsequently, K. Siegwart, A. Krochmal, J. Freudenthal, G. Wolfson, S. Dunin-Borkowski, I. Sonn, as well as G. Scholem, were very attentive to the Kabbalistic traces in Spinoza’s philosophy.

As the Jewish researcher Isaiah Sonn noted, in the 17th century. Spinoza's opponents argued that the philosophical content of his "heretical" philosophy was drawn from the Kabbalah, while its mathematical form was inherited from the philosophy of Descartes. Spinozism is thus “Kabbalah in geometric clothing.” At that time, Spinozism's connection with Kabbalah was used as a basis for its severe criticism. For example, the Cartesians believed that Spinoza distorted the philosophy of Descartes due to his dependence on Kabbalistic ideas, and even such an outstanding thinker as N. Malebranche agreed with this accusation.

One of the first and most famous attempts to connect Spinoza's philosophy with Kabbalah was announced by two books by I. G. Wachter, published at the very beginning of the 18th century. The first - “Der Spinozismus im Judenthums, oder, die von dem heutigen Judenthumb und dessen Geheimen Kabbala, vergoetterte Welt, an Mose Germano sonsten Johann Peter Spaeth von Augsburg geburtig befunden under widerleget” - appeared in Amsterdam in 1699. In it, Wachter took a very negative position towards Kabbalah, and thereby also condemned the heretic Spinoza and the atheistic philosophy supposedly stemming from Kabbalah. However, in the second book - "Elucidarius Cabalisticus sive reconditae Hebraeorum philosophiae recensio" (Romae, 1706) - Wachter gives a brief outline of Jewish occult philosophy and its connection with Spinoza. In this book, he argues that Kabbalah is “Spinozismo ante Spinozam,” and thereby exonerates Spinoza from his previous accusations.

Leibniz was also interested in this problem. In “Theodicy” he writes: “One German, a native of Swabia, several years ago became a Jew and spread his dogmatic teaching under the name of Moses Germanus, mixing this teaching with the views of Spinoza, thought that Spinoza revived the ancient Kabbalah of the Jews; It also seems that one scholar [Wachter], who refuted this Jewish proselyte, shared this opinion about Spinoza.”

Spinoza himself admitted that he studied Kabbalistic books, but expressed an extremely negative attitude towards them: “I also read and, in addition, knew some chatterbox Kabbalists, whose madness I could never be sufficiently amazed at.” However, Dunin-Borkowski correctly commented on this passage: “Contrasts are sometimes a source of incitement and excitement.” Spinoza's disparaging remark in the Theological-Political Treatise was directed at the Kabbalistic exegesis of the Bible; it has nothing to do with the question of the influence of Kabbalah on his philosophy, for example, on the concept of immanence. (See: Nechipurenko V.N. Spinoza in the mirror of the Jewish philosophical and mystical tradition // News of higher educational institutions. North Caucasus region. Public Sciences, 2005, No. 1, pp. 13-21).

Spinoza's philosophy and Israel

Some Jewish thinkers considered Spinoza the first Jew to adhere to secular, national and even Zionist views (Spinoza wrote about the possibility of restoring a Jewish state in the Land of Israel). N. Sokolov called for the abolition of the herem once imposed on Spinoza; his opinion was shared by I. G. Klausner and D. Ben-Gurion.

In 1977, an international philosophical congress was held in Jerusalem, dedicated. 300th anniversary of the death of Spinoza. A scientific center for the study of Spinoza's philosophy was established at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In modern philosophy, interest in Spinoza does not wane: the studies of the English philosopher S. Hampshire (“Spinoza”, Harmondworth, 1951), the Israeli philosophers S. Pines (“Theological and Political Treatise” of Spinoza, Maimonides and Kant”, Jer., are devoted to him). 1968) and J. Yovela (born in 1935; “Spinoza ve-kofrim acherim” - “Spinoza and other heretics”, T.-A., 1989) and others.

Philosophy of Spinoza in Russia

Such Russian authors as Feofan Prokopovich, Alexander Galich and Nikolai Nadezhdin were interested in Spinoza’s philosophy and mentioned it in their works.

N. N. Strakhov, V. S. Solovyov, A. I. Vvedensky, L. M. Lopatin, N. Ya. Grot, B. N. Chicherin, V. S. Shilkarsky, V. N. devoted their research to the philosophy of Spinoza. Polovtsova, S. L. Frank, E. N. Trubetskoy, L. M. Robinson, S. N. Bulgakov, L. Shestov and others.

V. Solovyov, polemicized with the neo-Kantian A. Vvedensky, who wrote about the “atheism of Spinoza.” Soloviev viewed Spinoza's teaching as a philosophy of unity, which in many ways anticipated his own religious philosophy. L. Shestov saw in Spinoza's rationalism and objectivism a perfect example of traditional philosophy, generated by the Fall and expressing the enslavement of man by abstract truths.

Currently, such Russian scientists as T. A. Dmitriev, N. V. Motroshilova, S. V. Kaidakov, K. A. Sergeev, I. S. Kaufman, A. D. Maidansky are studying the philosophy of Spinoza in Russia. It should be noted that the number and breadth of topics of Russian Spinoza studies is still inferior to foreign ones (since the late 1960s, the “Spinozian renaissance” has led to quantitative and qualitative growth in all major European and world languages ​​- English, Spanish, Italian, German and French).

Translators of Spinoza into Russian

• Brushlinsky, Vladimir Konstantinovich
• N. A. Ivantsov
• V. I. Modestov
• M. Lopatkin
• G. Polinkovsky
• Polovtsova, Varvara Nikolaevna
• S. M. Rogovin
• E. V. Spectorsky

Essays

• OK. 1660 “About God, Man and His Happiness”
• 1662 "Treatise on the Improvement of the Mind"
• 1663 “The Foundations of Descartes’ Philosophy, Proved Geometrically”
• 1670 "Theological-Political Treatise"
• 1677 "Political treatise"
• 1677 "Ethics Proved in Geometric Order and Divided into Five Parts"
• 1677 "Hebrew Grammar"

Literature

• Kovner S. R. Spinoza, his life and writings. Warsaw, 1897.
• Dittes F. Critical studies on the moral philosophy of Spinoza. St. Petersburg, 1900.
• Dittes F. Ethics of Spinoza, Leibniz and Kant. St. Petersburg, 1902.
• Robinson L. Metaphysics of Spinoza. St. Petersburg, 1913.
• Kechekyan S. F.. Spinoza's ethical worldview. M., 1914.
• Luppol I.K. Benedict Spinoza. M., 1924
• Mankovsky L. A. Spinoza and materialism. M., 1930
• Belenky M. S. Spinoza. M., 1964.
• Konikov I. A. Spinoza's materialism. M.: "Science", 1971. - 268 p.
• Sokolov V.V. Spinoza. - M.: Mysl, 1973. - (Thinkers of the past).
• Maidansky A. D. Geometric order of proof and logical method in Spinoza’s Ethics // Questions of Philosophy. M., 1999. No. 11. P. 172-180.
• Kaufman I. S. The philosophy of Spinoza in Russia. First part. 1774-1884. // Historical and philosophical yearbook 2004. M., 2005. P.312-344.
• Lunacharsky A.V. Spinoza and the bourgeoisie 1933 Notification: The preliminary basis for this article was the article by SPINOZ Baruch in EEE

  Notification: The preliminary basis for this article was a similar article in http://ru.wikipedia.org, under the terms of CC-BY-SA, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0, which was subsequently changed, corrected and edited.
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