Which officers served in the 37th Airborne Brigade? History of airborne troops. Mail and addresses for parcels

Airborne troops (Airborne Forces) are a branch of troops intended for combat operations behind enemy lines. They are usually part of the ground forces, less often - part of the air force (navy), but can also be an independent branch of the armed forces.

Designed for air landing behind enemy lines or for rapid deployment in geographically remote areas. The main method of delivering airborne forces is parachute landing; they can also be delivered by helicopter; During the Second World War, delivery by gliders was practiced.

At the end of 1930, near Leningrad, a Soviet airborne unit was created - an airborne detachment. In December 1932, he was deployed to the 3rd Special Purpose Aviation Brigade, which in 1938 became known as the 201st Airborne Brigade.

The first use of airborne assault in the history of military affairs occurred in the spring of 1929. In the city of Garm, besieged by the Basmachi, a group of armed Red Army soldiers was landed from the air, which, with the support of local residents, defeated a gang that had invaded the territory of Tajikistan from abroad. However, Airborne Forces Day in Russia and a number of other countries is August 2, in honor of the parachute landing at a military exercise of the Moscow Military District near Voronezh on August 2, 1930.

In 1931, on the basis of a directive dated March 18, a non-standard, experienced aviation motorized landing detachment (airborne landing detachment) was formed in the 1st aviation brigade of the Leningrad Military District. It was intended to study issues of operational-tactical use and the most advantageous organizational forms of airborne (airborne) units, units and formations. The detachment consisted of 164 personnel and consisted of:

  • one rifle company;
  • separate platoons: engineer, communications and light vehicles;
  • heavy bomber aviation squadron (air squadron) (12 aircraft - TB-1);
  • one corps aviation detachment (air squadron) (10 aircraft - R-5).

The detachment was armed with:

  • two 76-mm Kurchevsky dynamo-reactive guns (DRP);
  • two wedges - T-27;
  • 4 grenade launchers;
  • 3 light armored vehicles (armored vehicles);
  • 14 light and 4 heavy machine guns;
  • 10 trucks and 16 cars;
  • 4 motorcycles and one scooter (apparently, they meant a bicycle).

E.D. Lukin was appointed commander of the detachment. Then, in the same air brigade, a non-standard parachute detachment was formed.

In 1932, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR adopted a resolution on the deployment of detachments into special purpose aviation battalions (BOSNAZ). By the end of 1933, there were already 29 airborne battalions and brigades that became part of the Air Force. The Leningrad Military District was entrusted with the task of training instructors in airborne operations and developing operational-tactical standards. By the standards of that time, airborne units were an effective means of disrupting enemy command and control and rear areas. They were to be used where other types of troops (infantry, artillery, cavalry, armored forces) could not currently solve this problem, and were intended to be used by the high command in cooperation with troops advancing from the front; airborne assaults were to assist in the encirclement and defeat the enemy in this direction.

Staff No. 015/890 1936 of the “airborne brigade” (ADBR) in wartime and peacetime. Name of units, number of wartime personnel (number of peacetime personnel in brackets):

  • management, 49 (50)
  • communications company, 56 (46)
  • musician platoon, 11 (11)
  • 3 airborne battalions, each 521 (381)
  • Junior Command School, 0 (115)
  • services, 144 (135)

Personnel:

  • Total: 1823 (1500)
  • Command staff, 107 (118)
  • Commanding staff, 69 (60)
  • Junior command and management personnel, 330 (264)
  • Enlisted personnel, 1317 (1058)

Material part:

  • 45 mm anti-tank gun, 18 (19)
  • Light machine guns, 90 (69)
  • Radio stations, 20 (20)
  • Automatic carbines, 1286 (1005)
  • Light mortars, 27 (20)
  • Passenger cars, 6 (6)
  • Trucks, 63 (51)
  • Special vehicles, 14 (14)
  • Cars "Pickup", 9 (8)
  • Motorcycles, 31 (31)
  • Tractors ChTZ, 2 (2)
  • Tractor trailers, 4 (4)

In the pre-war years, a lot of effort and money was allocated to the development of airborne troops, the development of the theory of their combat use and practical training. In 1934, 600 paratroopers were involved in Red Army exercises. In 1935, during the maneuvers of the Kyiv Military District, 1,188 paratroopers were parachuted and a landing force of 2,500 people with military equipment landed. In 1936, 3,000 paratroopers were landed in the Belarusian Military District, and 8,200 people with artillery and other military equipment were landed. The invited foreign military delegations who attended these exercises were amazed by the size of the landings and the skill of the landing.

31. Parachute units, as a new type of air infantry, are a means of disrupting the enemy’s control and rear. They are used by high command.

In cooperation with troops advancing from the front, air infantry helps to encircle and defeat the enemy in a given direction.

The use of air infantry must be strictly consistent with the conditions of the situation and requires reliable support and compliance with measures of secrecy and surprise.

Chapter two "Organization of the Red Army troops" 1. Branches of troops and their combat use, Field Manual of the Red Army (PU-39)

The paratroopers also gained experience in real battles. In 1939, the 212th Airborne Brigade took part in the defeat of the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol. For their courage and heroism, 352 paratroopers were awarded orders and medals. In 1939-1940, during the Soviet-Finnish War, the 201st, 202nd and 214th airborne brigades fought together with rifle units.

Based on the experience gained, in 1940 new brigade staffs were approved, consisting of three combat groups: parachute, glider and landing.

In preparation for the operation to annex Bessarabia to the USSR, occupied by Romania, as well as Northern Bukovina, the command of the Red Army included the 201st, 204th and 214th airborne brigades in the Southern Front. During the operation, the 204th and 201st ADBR received combat missions and troops were sent to the area of ​​Bolgrad and Izmail, and after the closure of the state border to organize Soviet control bodies in populated areas.

By the beginning of 1941, on the basis of the existing airborne brigades, airborne corps of over 10 thousand people each were deployed. On September 4, 1941, by order of the People's Commissar, the Directorate of the Airborne Forces was transformed into the Directorate of the Commander of the Airborne Forces of the Red Army, and formations and units of the Airborne Forces were removed from the subordination of the commanders of the active fronts and transferred to the direct subordination of the commander of the Airborne Forces. In accordance with the same order, the formation of ten airborne corps, five maneuverable airborne brigades, five reserve airborne regiments and an airborne school (Kuibyshev) was carried out. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Airborne Forces constituted an independent branch of the Red Army Air Force.

In the counteroffensive near Moscow, conditions were created for the widespread use of airborne forces. In the winter of 1942, the Vyazma airborne operation was carried out with the participation of the 4th Airborne Corps. In September 1943, an airborne assault consisting of two brigades was used to assist the troops of the Voronezh Front in crossing the Dnieper River. In the Manchurian strategic operation in August 1945, more than 4 thousand personnel of rifle units were landed for landing operations, who successfully completed the assigned tasks.

In October 1944, the Airborne Forces were transformed into a separate Guards Airborne Army, which became part of long-range aviation. In December 1944, this army was disbanded, and the Airborne Forces Directorate was created, reporting to the commander of the Air Force. The Airborne Forces retained three airborne brigades, an airborne training regiment, advanced training courses for officers and an aeronautical division.

Since 1946, they were transferred to the ground forces of the Armed Forces of the USSR, and were directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense of the USSR, being the reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

In 1956, two airborne divisions took part in the Hungarian events. In 1968, after the capture of two airfields near Prague and Bratislava, the 7th and 103rd Guards Airborne Divisions were landed, which ensured the successful completion of the task by formations and units of the United Armed Forces of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact during the Czechoslovak events.

Paratroopers in the cargo compartment of the An-12.

In the post-war period, the Airborne Forces carried out a lot of work to strengthen the firepower and mobility of personnel. Numerous samples of airborne armored vehicles (BMD, BTR-D), automotive vehicles (TPK, GAZ-66), and artillery systems (ASU-57, ASU-85, 2S9 Nona, 107-mm recoilless rifle B-11) were created. Complex parachute systems were developed for landing all types of weapons - “Centaur”, “Reaktaur” and others. The fleet of military transport aircraft was also increased, designed for the massive transfer of landing forces in the event of large-scale hostilities. Large-body transport aircraft were created capable of parachute landing of military equipment (An-12, An-22, Il-76).

In the USSR, for the first time in the world, airborne troops were created, which had their own armored vehicles and self-propelled artillery. At large army exercises (for example, "Shield-82" or "Friendship-82"), the landing of personnel with standard equipment of no more than two parachute regiments was practiced. The state of the military transport aviation of the USSR Armed Forces at the end of the 80s made it possible to parachute 75% of the personnel and standard military equipment of one airborne division in one general sortie.

Organizational and personnel structure of the 105th Guards Airborne Division, as of July 1979.

By the fall of 1979, the 105th Guards Vienna Red Banner Airborne Division, specialized for combat operations in mountainous desert areas, was disbanded. Units of the 105th Guards. The Airborne Forces were stationed in the cities of Fergana, Namangan and Chirchik of the Uzbek SSR and in the city of Osh of the Kyrgyz SSR. As a result of the disbandment of the 105th Guards. The Airborne Forces formed three separate air assault brigades (35th, 38th and 56th) and the 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment.

Following the disbandment of the 105th Guards. The Airborne Forces in 1979, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan showed the deep error of the decision taken by the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces - the airborne formation, specially adapted for combat operations in mountainous desert areas, was thoughtlessly and hastily disbanded, and was ultimately sent to Afghanistan 103 Guards Airborne Forces, whose personnel had no training to conduct combat operations in such a theater of operations:

“...in 1986, the Commander of the Airborne Forces, Army General D.F. Sukhorukov, came and said then what fools we were, disbanding the 105th Airborne Division, because it was intended to conduct combat operations in mountainous desert areas. And we were forced to spend huge amounts of money to transport the 103rd Airborne Division to Kabul by air..."

By the mid-80s. The airborne troops of the USSR Armed Forces included 7 airborne divisions and three separate regiments with the following names and locations:

Organizational and staffing structure of the 351st Guards Parachute Regiment, 105th Guards Airborne Division as of July 1979.

  • 7th Guards Red Banner Order of Kutuzov II degree airborne division. Stationed in Kaunas, Lithuanian SSR, Baltic Military District.
  • 76th Guards Red Banner Order of Kutuzov, II degree, Chernigov Airborne Division. Stationed in Pskov, RSFSR, Leningrad Military District.
  • 98th Guards Red Banner Order of Kutuzov II degree Svir Airborne Division. It was stationed in the city of Bolgrad, Ukrainian SSR, Kodvo, and in the city of Chisinau, Moldavian SSR, KodVO.
  • 103rd Guards Red Banner Order of Lenin Order of Kutuzov II degree airborne division named after the 60th anniversary of the USSR. She was stationed in Kabul (Afghanistan) as part of OKSVA. Until December 1979 and after February 1989, it was stationed in the city of Vitebsk, Belarusian SSR, Belorussian Military District.
  • 104th Guards Red Banner Order of Kutuzov II degree airborne division, specialized for combat operations in mountainous areas. Stationed in the city of Kirovabad, Azerbaijan SSR, Transcaucasian Military District.
  • 106th Guards Red Banner Order of Kutuzov II degree airborne division. Stationed in Tula and Ryazan, RSFSR, Moscow Military District.
  • 44th training Red Banner Order of Suvorov II degree and Bogdan Khmelnitsky II degree Ovruch airborne division. Stationed in the village. Gaizhunai, Lithuanian SSR, Baltic Military District.
  • 345th Guards Vienna Red Banner Order of Suvorov III degree parachute regiment named after the 70th anniversary of the Lenin Komsomol. Stationed in Bagram (Afghanistan) as part of OKSVA. Until December 1979, he was stationed in the city of Fergana, Uzbek SSR, after February 1989 - in the city of Kirovabad, Azerbaijan SSR, Transcaucasian Military District.
  • 387th separate training parachute regiment. Until 1982 it was part of the 104th Guards. VDD. In the 80s, the 387th training ODDP trained young recruits to be sent to airborne and air assault units as part of OKSVA. In the cinema, in the film “9th Company”, the training unit means exactly 387 OUPDP. Stationed in Fergana, Uzbek SSR, Turkestan Military District.
  • 196th separate communications regiment of the Airborne Forces. Stationed in the village. Bear Lakes, Moscow Region, RSFSR.

Each of these divisions included: a directorate (headquarters), three parachute regiments, one self-propelled artillery regiment, and combat support and logistics support units.

In addition to parachute units and formations, the airborne troops also had air assault units and formations, but they were subordinate to the commanders of military districts (groups of forces), armies or corps. They were no different in anything except their tasks, subordination and general education system. Methods of combat use, combat training programs for personnel, weapons and uniforms of military personnel were the same as those of parachute units and formations of the Airborne Forces (central subordination). Air assault formations were represented by separate air assault brigades (ADSB), separate air assault regiments (ADAS) and separate air assault battalions (ADSB).

The reason for the creation of air assault formations in the late 60s was the revision of tactics in the fight against the enemy in the event of a full-scale war. The emphasis was placed on the concept of using massive landings in the enemy's near rear, capable of disorganizing the defense. The technical capability for such a landing was provided by the significantly increased fleet of transport helicopters in the army aviation by this time.

By the mid-80s, the USSR Armed Forces included 14 separate brigades, two separate regiments and about 20 separate battalions. The brigades were stationed on the territory of the USSR according to the principle - one brigade per one military district, which has land access to the State Border of the USSR, one brigade in the internal Kiev Military District (23 ADSB in the city of Kremenchug, subordinate to the Main Command of the southwestern direction) and two brigades for groups of Soviet troops abroad (35 ADShBR in the GSVG in Cottbus and 83 ADShBR in the SGV in Bialogard). 56th Guards The ODSBR in OKSVA, stationed in the city of Gardez of the Republic of Afghanistan, belonged to the Turkestan Military District in which it was formed.

Individual air assault regiments were subordinate to the commanders of individual army corps.

The difference between the parachute and airborne assault formations of the Airborne Forces was as follows:

  • Standard airborne armored vehicles are available (BMD, BTR-D, self-propelled guns “Nona”, etc.). In the air assault units, only a quarter of all units were equipped with it - in contrast to 100% of the airborne units.
  • Subordinate to the troops. Airborne assault units, operationally, were subordinate to the command of military districts (groups of forces), armies, and corps. The parachute units were subordinate to the command of the Airborne Forces, whose headquarters were in Moscow.
  • In the assigned tasks. It was assumed that the airborne assault units, in the event of the outbreak of large-scale hostilities, would be used to land near the enemy's rear, mainly by landing from helicopters. The parachute units were supposed to be used deeper behind enemy lines with parachute landing from military air transport aircraft. At the same time, airborne training with planned training parachute landings of personnel and military equipment was mandatory for both types of airborne formations.
  • Unlike the guards parachute units of the Airborne Forces deployed at full strength, some air assault brigades were squadroned (special staff) and were not guards. The exception was three brigades that received the name Guards, created on the basis of the 105th Vienna Red Banner Guards Airborne Division, disbanded in 1979 - the 35th, 38th and 56th.

In the mid-80s, the Airborne Forces of the USSR Armed Forces included the following brigades and regiments:

Organizational and staffing structure of the 56th Guards Separate Air Assault Brigade, as of December 1986.

  • 11 ODShBR in the Trans-Baikal Military District (Trans-Baikal Territory, Mogocha and Amazar)
  • 13 Special Airborne Brigade in the Far Eastern Military District (Amur Region, Magdagachi and Zavitinsk)
  • 21 Special Airborne Brigade in the Transcaucasian Military District (Georgian SSR, Kutaisi)
  • 23 ADSB of the South-Western direction (on the territory of the Kyiv Military District), (Ukrainian SSR, Kremenchug)
  • 35th Guards ODSBR in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (German Democratic Republic, Cottbus)
  • 36 ODShBR in the Leningrad Military District (Leningrad region, Garbolovo village)
  • 37 separate airborne assault brigade in the Baltic Military District (Kaliningrad region, Chernyakhovsk)
  • 38th Guards ODShBR in the Belarusian Military District (Belarusian SSR, Brest)
  • 39 ODSBR in the Carpathian Military District (Ukrainian SSR, Khyrov)
  • 40 ODShBR in Odessa Military District (Ukrainian SSR, Nikolaev)
  • 56th Guards ODSBR in the Turkestan Military District (formed in the city of Chirchik, Uzbek SSR and introduced into Afghanistan)
  • 57 Special Airborne Brigade in the Central Asian Military District (Kazakh SSR, Aktogay town)
  • 58 ODShBR in the Kiev Military District (Ukrainian SSR, Kremenchug)
  • 83 ADSB in the Northern Group of Forces, (Polish People's Republic, Bialogard)
  • 1318 ODShP in the Belorussian Military District (Belarusian SSR, Polotsk) subordinate to the 5th separate army corps (5 UAC)
  • 1319 ODShP in the Trans-Baikal Military District (Chita region, Kyakhta) subordinate to the 48th separate army corps (48 UAC)

These brigades included a command and control unit, 3 or 4 air assault battalions, one artillery battalion, and combat support and logistics support units. The personnel of the deployed brigades reached 2,500 military personnel. For example, the regular number of personnel is 56 Guards. As of December 1, 1986, the ODSBR numbered 2,452 military personnel (261 officers, 109 warrant officers, 416 sergeants, 1,666 soldiers).

The regiments differed from the brigades by the presence of only two battalions: one parachute and one air assault (on BMD), as well as a slightly reduced composition of the units of the regimental set.

Participation of the Airborne Forces in the Afghan War

Organizational and staffing structure of the 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment, for the summer of 1988.

In the Afghan War, the airborne and air assault formations of the USSR Armed Forces included one airborne division (103rd Guards Airborne Division), one separate airborne assault brigade (56th Guards Special Airborne Brigade), one separate parachute regiment (345th Guards Airborne Regiment). OPDP) and two air assault battalions as part of separate motorized rifle brigades (in the 66th Motorized Rifle Brigade and in the 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade). In total, in 1987 these were 18 “line” battalions (13 parachute and 5 air assault), which amounted to a fifth of the total number of all “line” OKSVA battalions (which included another 18 tank and 43 motorized rifle battalions) .

In almost the entire history of the Afghan war, no situation arose that would justify the use of parachute landing for the transfer of personnel. The main reasons for this were the complexity of the mountainous terrain and the unjustification of the material costs of using such methods in guerrilla warfare. The transfer of personnel of airborne and air assault units to mountainous combat areas impassable for armored vehicles was carried out exclusively by landing from helicopters. As in all motorized rifle, tank and artillery units within the OKSVA, up to half of all units of the airborne and air assault formations were assigned to guard duty at outposts, which made it possible to control roads, mountain passes and the vast territory of the country, thereby significantly constraining enemy actions. For example, the 2nd parachute battalion from the 345th Guards. The OPDP was dispersed among 20 outposts in the Panjshir Gorge near the village of Anava. With this, 2 PDB 345 OPDP (together with the 682nd motorized rifle regiment of the 108th MSD, stationed in the village of Rukha) blocked the western exit from the gorge, which was the enemy’s main transport artery from Pakistan to the strategically important Charikar Valley.

The most massive combat airborne operation in the USSR Armed Forces in the period after the Great Patriotic War should be considered the 5th Panjshir operation in May-June 1982, during which a mass landing of troops in Afghanistan was carried out for the first time: only during the first three days , over 4 thousand people were landed from helicopters. In total, about 12 thousand military personnel of various military branches took part in this operation. The operation took place simultaneously throughout the entire 120 km depth of the gorge. As a result, most of the Panjshir Gorge was taken under control.

In the period from 1982 to 1986, all OKSVA airborne units systematically replaced standard airborne armored vehicles (BMD-1, BTR-D) with armored vehicles standard for motorized rifle units (BMP-2D, BTR-70). First of all, this was due to the low security and low motor life of structurally lightweight armored vehicles of the Airborne Forces, as well as the nature of combat operations, where the tasks performed by paratroopers were not much different from the tasks assigned to motorized riflemen.

Also, in order to increase the firepower of the airborne units, additional artillery and tank units were introduced into their composition. For example, the 345 ODDP, modeled on a motorized rifle regiment, was supplemented with an artillery howitzer division and a tank company, in the 56 ADSB the artillery battalion was deployed to 5 fire batteries (instead of the required 3 batteries), and the 103rd Guards. The airborne division will be reinforced with the 62nd separate tank battalion, which was unusual for the organizational structure of airborne units on the territory of the USSR.

Training of officers for airborne troops

Officers were trained by the following military educational institutions in the following military specialties:

  • Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School - commander of an airborne (airborne) platoon, commander of a reconnaissance platoon.
  • Airborne Faculty of the Ryazan Higher Military Automotive Engineering School - commander of an automobile/transport platoon.
  • Airborne Faculty of the Ryazan Higher Military Command School of Communications - commander of a communications platoon.
  • Airborne Faculty of the Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined Arms School - deputy company commander for political affairs (educational work).
  • Airborne Faculty of the Kolomna Higher Artillery Command School - commander of an artillery platoon.
  • Airborne Faculty of the Leningrad Higher Anti-Aircraft Missile Command School - commander of an anti-aircraft missile platoon.
  • Airborne Faculty of the Kamenets-Podolsk Higher Military Engineering Command School - commander of an engineering platoon.

In addition to graduates of these educational institutions, the Airborne Forces often appointed graduates of higher combined arms schools (VOKU) and military departments that trained to become motorized rifle platoon commanders to positions of platoon commanders. This was due to the fact that the specialized Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School, which graduated on average about 300 lieutenants every year, was not able to fully meet the needs of the Airborne Forces (at the end of the 80s there were about 60,000 personnel in them) platoon commanders. For example, the former commander of the 247th Guards. PDP (7th Guards Airborne Forces), Hero of the Russian Federation Em Yuri Pavlovich, who began his service in the Airborne Forces as a platoon commander in the 111th Guards. PDP 105 Guards Airborne Forces, graduated from the Alma-Ata Higher Combined Arms Command School.

For a long time, military personnel of units and units of the Special Forces (now called army special forces) were mistakenly and deliberately called paratroopers. This is due to the fact that in the Soviet period, as now, in the Russian Armed Forces, there were and are no special forces, but there were and are special forces units and units of the GRU of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. In the press and in the media, the phrases “special forces” or “commandos” were mentioned only in relation to the troops of a potential enemy (“Green Berets”, “Rangers”, “Commandos”).

Starting from the emergence of these units, the USSR Armed Forces in 1950 until the end of the 80s completely denied the existence of such units and units. To the point that conscripts only learned about their existence when they were recruited into these units and units. Officially, in the Soviet press and on television, units and units of the Special Forces of the GRU of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces were declared either units of the Airborne Forces - as in the case of the GSVG (officially in the GDR there were no units of the Special Forces), or as in the case of OKSVA - separate motorized rifle battalions (OMSB). For example, the 173rd separate special forces detachment (173 OOSpN), stationed near the city of Kandahar, was called the 3rd separate motorized rifle battalion (3 OMSB).

In everyday life, military personnel of units and units of the Special Forces wore the dress and field uniforms adopted by the Airborne Forces, although neither in terms of subordination nor in terms of the assigned tasks of reconnaissance and sabotage activities they belonged to the Airborne Forces. The only thing that united the Airborne Forces and the units and units of the Special Forces was the majority of the officers - graduates of the RVVDKU, airborne training and possible combat use behind enemy lines.

Domestic airborne vehicles had many problems, both internal and external. One of these third-party problems that directly and most strongly influenced the combat effectiveness of the airborne assault forces was the provision of their aviation component, in other words, helicopters.

The “second wave” airborne units formed en masse in 1979 consisted only of a ground component – ​​i.e. Unlike their older brothers - the “first wave” brigades - they did not have helicopter regiments. This situation can be explained by several theses.

Firstly, this was contrary to the doctrine for the use of helicopters. The Soviet military command believed that helicopter regiments were a means of operational and operational-strategic unification (armies and fronts). This means that organizationally they must be part of them for centralized management of them with a concentration of efforts to use them in the chosen direction. Theoretically, the apparently correct desire to give each formation helicopter forces, in reality led to the dispersion of helicopters among very numerous formations in view of the overall enormity of the SA. Here it was necessary to either liquidate unnecessary (or not unnecessary?) formations, or deprive some of them of a significant number of helicopters, or speed up the production of helicopters in order to saturate the troops with them to the maximum.

Secondly, the production of helicopters, like any other type of weapon, depends on the currently dominant doctrine. As mentioned above, the “volumeists” who advocated for the creation of the lifting of part of the ground forces into the air, and therefore for a sharp increase in the number of air transport vehicles necessary for this, were defeated in the fight against supporters of the traditional doctrine. And although the production of helicopters increased by the beginning. 80s, however, this was rather a consequence of objective preconditions, the objective course of development of the country’s armed forces, and not a doctrinal stage-by-stage revolution.

Third, The very fact of combining air and ground components in a tactical formation apparently raised objections among many military leaders - and not only subjective, but also completely justified. Being part of such a formation, the helicopters would actually be withdrawn from the reserve of the commander of the operational formation, being “tied” exclusively to supporting the operations of the airborne units. As it seems to the author of the article, the high military command incorrectly assessed the dependence of airborne troops on helicopter support, considering it similar to the support of airborne forces by military aviation aircraft, without paying attention to the specifics expressed in a much closer and obligatory symbiosis of the landing force with helicopters, without which the effectiveness of the first decreases. Moreover, according to operational calculations and exercise experience, it turned out that about 70% of the resource of transport helicopters was supposed to be used for landing missions in any case. And what could prevent the use of these helicopters if they do not participate in the ADS/DSD?

Finally, fourthly, As is commonly believed, the number of helicopters themselves was also insufficient to, like, for example, the Americans, equip all the formations with which they could be useful, and even have a reserve. However, it seems to me that there is a lot that is unclear here. Namely. Let's look at the production of Mi-8 helicopters in the USSR. According to official data, 11,000 units were manufactured between 1962 and 1997. Moreover, the absolute majority (up to 90%) in the period 1966-91. According to the author’s calculations, this means that at least 5,500 of these helicopters should have been delivered to the Armed Forces during this period, only counting transport and transport-combat modifications. There is no official domestic data on the Mi-8 fleet in the open press. The authoritative magazine "Military Balance" for 1991 gives the number of transport and transport-combat modifications of the Mi-8 for 1990/91. respectively 1000 and 640 units. Let the losses in Afghanistan and in disasters amount to 400 units, let 1000 vehicles with exhausted service life be disabled, but where did the remaining 2500 units go? In general, as they say, the topic is waiting for its researcher.

So, theoretically, air assault brigades, being an ideal means, with the focal (non-linear) nature of combat operations, due to the lack of an aviation component in their composition that imparts maneuverability, sharply reduced their potential capabilities, becoming, in fact, units of light infantry. A fundamental way out of this situation could be the creation of special operational-tactical formations - air assault corps of brigade-regimental composition - subordinated to front-line commands in wartime. This formation would include a ground component (DShCH from the ground forces or airborne forces) and an air helicopter component (from the DIA). Such a construction scheme would allow achieving high combat effectiveness and at the same time all interested departments “staying with their sheep.”

Let's look at an example of how helicopters were supposed to be distributed for the airborne helicopters. We take standard conditions as initial conditions - a front-line offensive operation of four armies. The group consists of one transport combat helicopter regiment (tbvp), six combat helicopter regiments (obvp), as well as one department. air assault brigade (3 battalion) and three departments. air assault battalion. In addition, in each of the combined arms divisions, one motorized rifle battalion was trained to operate as part of the TakVD. An analysis of the possible content of the operation and the tasks typical for airborne assaults during it show that within the framework of the airborne assault forces, in 10 days it may be necessary to land an airborne assault brigade as a tactical airborne assault force and eight to ten airborne assault forces as part of an airborne infantry assault battalion and reinforced small and medium infantry fighting forces. The average standards for the allocation of transport and landing helicopters are: airborne assault helicopters - up to four regimental sorties (regimental sorties) airborne assault helicopters *; TakVD as part of the odshb - one p/v otbvp; reinforced SME - one p/v otbvp without a squadron (ve). In addition, a squad of combat escort helicopters is required. Crew composition: air defense - 40 Mi-8T/MT, 20 Mi-6A; air defense - 40 Mi-24V/P and 20 Mi-8T/MT.

* Here it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the presence of one of the battalions with armored vehicles in the airborne brigade sharply increased the required number of helicopters for transportation, especially heavy Mi-6A. Transport approx. 60 units BTT occupied the lion's share of the total number of Mi-6A helicopter sorties, and in reality the Mi-6 squadrons would need to make more sorties. Only mass production of Mi-26 helicopters capable of carrying 2 units. The BMD/BTRD class BTT (only 1 unit for the Mi-6A) changed the situation for the better. In general, the author doubts the possibility of transferring the entire armored personnel carrier of the DShB by Mi-6A helicopters.

There is no need to prove that disembarking OTTV on three flights, let alone four, is tantamount to suicide. It is necessary to ensure the transfer of no more than two flights (echelons). And here it is impossible to do without removing transport and combat helicopters from the air defense forces for the period of its operations (in total by 1-2 military units), i.e. they will have to be left without the Mi-8T/MT aircraft.

The duration of an OTTV disembarkation in two flights is, as a rule, 12-16 hours. Taking into account the subsequent training of the helicopters, only after a day can we count on their repeated actions (in Afghanistan, for example, helicopters made much more conclusions, but calculations were made based on only two sorties per day). During the specified time, the air defense forces remain without Mi-8 aircraft and support the troops without their participation. If during the same day it is necessary to land at least one or two more TakVDs as part of a battalion, then almost all airborne assault forces are left without transport and landing helicopters. Taking into account the duration of the operation and the time it takes to restore the combat effectiveness of the airborne assault brigade, a repeated landing of the airborne assault forces is practically impossible. In the remaining nine days of the operation, it is possible to land eight or nine more TakVDs as part of the odshb/us.msb. However, modern experience shows that up to 30% of the flight life of transport helicopters will have to be spent on solving problems not related to landing. Consequently, only armies in the direction of the main attack will be able to use landing forces. This was considered an acceptable norm for the decentralized application of TAC. Although not entirely. Nevertheless, it was also necessary to attract transport aircraft of the VTA Air Force - mainly An-12 - to land the DShV. This created additional inconvenience. Thus, the infantry fighting vehicle on the BTT had to independently follow to the initial landing area, where there were airfields capable of ensuring the rise of aircraft with troops on board.

Quality

A certain problem was the adaptability of domestic helicopters of the Mi-8 and Mi-6 families to airborne assault operations and, more broadly, to airborne landings in general. This problem has already been discussed on the pages of the VIF-Almanac in the article "What kind of helicopter does special forces need". In the future, a separate article will be devoted to this.

RESULTS

As mentioned earlier, in 1989-90, in connection with the transfer of airborne units to the Airborne Forces, major changes were made. Most air assault brigades are being reorganized into airborne brigades that are greatly lightened in armament (the actual process of lightening was started earlier); At the same time, several brigades are disbanded (57th and 58th), and the 39th is transformed into the 224th Airborne Training Center. It was decided to disband all of the individual air assault battalions. In the summer of 1990, all major transformations had already been completed. The brigades were reorganized, and most of the battalions were disbanded. As of November of this year, only 5 battalions remained from the former ones. The general picture of the transformations can be seen in the tables below.

Brigades and regiments in the period 1988-91:


Number


Transformations

11 odshbr

Mogocha and Amazar (Chita region)*

In 1988, the helicopter regiment was withdrawn from service. And by Aug. 1. 1990 transferred to air-des. states. brigades.

13 odshbr

Magdagachi (Amur region)*

In 1988, the helicopter regiment was withdrawn from service.

21 odshbr

Kutaisi and Tsulukidze (Georgia)



23 odshbr

Kremenchug (Ukraine)

In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to air-desert states. brigades.

35th Guards odshbr

Cottbus (GDR)**

In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to air-desert states. brigades.

36 odshbr

urban-type settlement Garbolovo (Leningrad region)

In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to air-desert states. brigades.

37 odshbr

Chernyakhovsk (Kaliningrad region)

In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to air-desert states. brigades.

38th Guards Vienna Oshbr

Brest (Belarus)

In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to air-desert states. brigades.

39 odshbr

Khyrov (Ukraine)

In the spring of 1990, it was reorganized into the 224 Airborne Troops Training Center.

40 odshbr

With. Great Korenikha - Nikolaev (Ukraine)

In the summer of 1990, she was transferred to the airborne staff. brigades. And completely redeployed to Nikolaev.

56th Guards odshbr

village Azadbash (district of Chirchik, Uzbekistan) ***

In the winter of 1989, it was withdrawn from Afghanistan to the city of Yolotan (Turkmenistan). In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to air-desert states. brigades.

57 odshbr

village Aktogay (Taldy-Kurgan region, Kazakhstan)

Transferred to the village. Georgievka, Semipalatinsk region. (Kazakhstan) and disbanded there in 1989.

58 odshbr

Kremenchug (Ukraine)

Disbanded in December 1989.

83 odshbr

Bialogyard (Poland)

Transferred to the city of Ussuriysk (Primorsky Territory) in 1989. In the summer of 1990 transferred to the air-desert states. brigades.

128 odshbr

Stavropol (Stavropol AK)

Disbanded at the beginning. 1990.

130 odshbr

Abakan (Khakassian Autonomous Okrug)

Disbanded at the beginning. 1990.

1318 odshp

Borovukha-1 – Borogla (Polotsk district, Belarus)

Disbanded in August 1989.

1319 odshp

Kyakhta (Chita region)

Disbanded in March 1988.

The individual battalions were dealt with as follows: in 1989 (maximum, early 1990) all battalions with PPD on the territory of the USSR were disbanded, simultaneously redeploying those in groups of troops in Europe to the USSR. Then, before the beginning. 1991 they were disbanded too. Only the 901st battalion survived.

Individual battalions in the period 1988-91:


Number

Point of permanent deployment at the beginning of transformations

Transformations

139 odshb

Kaliningrad (Kaliningrad region)



145 odshb

village Sergeevka (Primorsky Territory)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

899 odshb

Burg (GDR)

In 1989 he was transferred to the village. Bear Lakes (Moscow region). Disbanded no later than early 1991.

900 odshb

Leipzig – Schinau (GDR)

Brought to the territory of the USSR in 1989 and disbanded.

901 odshb

in the region of the village Riečki (Czechoslovakia)

In 1989 he was transferred to Aluskene (Latvia). In the beginning. 1991 disbandment began, but soon the battalion was redeployed* and in May 1991 transferred to Abkhazia (Gudauta).

902 odshb

Kecskemét (Hungary)

In 1989 he was transferred to Grodno (Belarus).

903 odshb

Grodno (Belarus)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

904 odshb

Vladimir-Volynsky (Ukraine)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

905 odshb

Bendery (Moldova)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

906 odshb

village Khada-Bulak (Chita region, district of Borzya)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

907 odshb

Birobidzhan (Jewish Autonomous Region)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

908 odshb

village Goncharovo (Ukraine, Chernigov region)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

1011 odshb

Art. Maryina Gorka - Pukhovichi (Belarus)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

1044 odshb

Neuss-Lager (GDR, in the region of Königsbrück)

Transferred in 1989 to Tuarage (Lithuania). Disbanded no later than Jan. 1991.

1156 odshb

Novograd-Volynsky (Ukraine, Zhytomyr region)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

1179 odshb

Petrozavodsk (Karelia)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

1151 odshb

Polotsk (Belarus)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

1185 odshb

Ravensbrück (GDR)

Transferred in 1989 to Võru (Estonia). Disbanded no later than Jan. 1991.

1604 odshb

Ulan-Ude (Buryat Autonomous Okrug)

Disbanded no later than 1989

Notes:

* By this time it was already called a separate parachute battalion.

Thus, at the beginning of 1991, the former airborne assault units within the Airborne Forces were represented by eleven separate airborne brigades.

In 1989, it was decided to transfer the main part of the helicopters from the Air Force to the Army and, thus, significantly improve the capabilities of the air assault troops. However, following this, at the beginning of December 1989, an order was issued to reassign the DShV to the command of the Airborne Forces, thereby neutralizing the formation of army aviation, which was positive for the DShV. Coordination between the air assault formations and the command of combined arms formations in the interests of which they were supposed to act was disrupted. The reasons for the transfer of the Airborne Forces to the administrative and operational subordination of the Airborne Forces are not clear. Without a doubt, the existing similarities in recruitment and training do not explain everything. It is possible that the reason lies (as often happens) in non-military issues. The inattention of the Airborne Forces command to the development of the doctrine of using helicopter landings in the early and middle stages (60s-early 80s) resulted in a kind of “envy” of the “competitor”; Moreover, the successes of the “helicopter landing” doctrine were evident both for us and for the NATO members. In principle, the logical (and theoretically correct) decision to concentrate all airborne forces under one administrative command was unjustifiably supplemented by their operational unification. The command incorrectly assessed the dependence of airborne forces on helicopter support, considering it similar to the support of airborne forces by military air transport aircraft and not paying attention to the mandatory symbiosis of landing forces with helicopters, without which the effectiveness of the landing force drops sharply. Dnepropetrovsk December 2003 – July 2004, additions and changes – as of February 2005.

Private-K

Official historical information of the unit:
I. HISTORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION

The 56th Guards Separate Order of the Patriotic War, first degree, Don Cossack Air Assault Brigade originates from the 351st Guards Landing Airborne Regiment, formed from June 3 to July 28, 1946 on the basis of units of the 351st and 355th th Guards Rifle Regiments and the 38th Guards Airborne Vienna Corps, which became part of the 106th Guards Airborne Division.
The annual holiday of the brigade set the date for the formation of the 351st Guards Rifle Regiment - January 5, 1945.
In 1949, the 351st Guards Landing Airborne Regiment was renamed the 351st Guards Parachute Regiment.
In 1960, the 351st Guards Parachute Regiment was transferred from the 106th Guards Airborne Division to the 105th Guards Airborne Division.
In 1979, the 351st Guards Parachute Regiment was reorganized into the 56th Guards Separate Air Assault Brigade.
In 1989, the 56th Guards Separate Order of the Patriotic War, First Class, Airborne Assault Brigade was reorganized into the 56th Guards Separate Order of the Patriotic War, First Class, Airborne Brigade.
In 1997, the 56th Guards Separate Order of the Patriotic War, First Class, Don Cossack Airborne Brigade was re-formed into the 56th Guards Order of the Patriotic War, First Class, Don Cossack Air Assault Regiment, which became part of the 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division.
In 2009, the 56th Guards Order of the Patriotic War, first degree, Don Cossack Air Assault Regiment was reorganized into the 56th Guards Separate Order of the Patriotic War, first degree, Don Cossack Air Assault Brigade.
On July 1, 2010, it was reorganized into the 56th Guards Separate Order of the Patriotic War, First Class, Don Cossack Airborne Assault Brigade (light).

II. PARTICIPATION IN CAMPAIGNS, BATTLES, OPERATIONS

From February 20 to 25, 1945, the 351st Guards Rifle Regiment as part of the 106th Guards Rifle Division of the 38th Guards Rifle Corps was transferred to Hungary, where it fought as part of the 9th Guards Army of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.
On March 30, 1945, pursuing retreating enemy units, the regiment crossed the Austro-Hungarian border. Acting on the left flank of the corps, in cooperation with other parts of the corps, he captured several cities and took part in the battles to capture the capital of Austria, the city of Vienna.
On April 23, 1945, the regiment was replaced by units of the 4th Guards Army and was sent to rest on the outskirts of Vienna.
On May 5, 1945, the regiment entered Czechoslovakia by forced march and participated in the encirclement and defeat of a significant group of Germans.
On May 11, 1945, the regiment reached the bank of the Vltava River (Czechoslovakia), where it met with American troops. The unit's combat path in the Great Patriotic War ended here.
During the fighting, the regiment killed 1,956, captured 633 enemy soldiers and officers, destroyed 26 tanks, 255 self-propelled guns and guns of various calibers, 11 armored personnel carriers, 1 aircraft and 18 enemy vehicles. 10 tanks, 16 self-propelled guns and guns of various calibers, 3 aircraft, 4 armored personnel carriers, 115 vehicles, 37 warehouses with military equipment were captured.
From June 1945 to November 1979, the regiment (brigade) did not take part in campaigns, battles, or operations.
1979 opened a new page in the military path of the formation: Soviet troops entered Afghanistan to provide military assistance to the Afghan government in the fight against rebel gangs.
On December 28, 1979, the 4th infantry battalion brigade as part of the 40th Army was introduced into Afghanistan with the task of guarding and defending the Salang pass and the Salang-Somali tunnel to ensure the advance of Soviet troops into the southern regions of Afghanistan.
In January 1980, the entire brigade was introduced into Afghanistan. It is stationed near the city of Kunduz, conducting combat operations throughout Afghanistan.
During the period from January 1980 to December 1981, about 3,000 rebels, 3 guns, 6 mortars, 12 vehicles, 44 pillboxes were destroyed during the fighting. Over 400 rebels were captured and more than 600 small arms were captured.
From December 1 to December 5, 1981, the brigade was redeployed to the area of ​​the city of Gardez, from where it continued to conduct combat operations throughout Afghanistan.
During the period from January 1982 to June 1988, during the fighting, about 10,000 rebels, over 40 fortified areas and strong points, more than 200 guns, rocket launchers and mortars, 47 vehicles, 83 pillboxes, 208 warehouses with military equipment, 45 caravans. Over 1,000 rebels were captured, more than 1,200 small arms and grenade launchers, about 40 guns and mortars, 7 vehicles, 2 tanks, and 85 warehouses with military equipment were captured.
From June 12 to June 14, 1988, the brigade returned to its homeland after fulfilling its international duty.
For the successful completion of combat missions, many paratroopers were awarded government awards by the Soviet government and the leadership of the Republic of Afghanistan, and the commander of the parachute company of the guard, senior lieutenant Sergei Pavlovich Kozlov, was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.
From July 1988 to December 1989, the brigade did not take part in campaigns, battles, or operations.
During 1990, the brigade carried out special tasks in a state of emergency: from January 12 to March 26 - to maintain order in the cities of Baku, Meghri, Lenkoran, Kurdamir of the Azerbaijan SSR; from June 5 to August 21 - to maintain order in the city of Uzgen, Kirghiz SSR.
From September 1990 to November 1994, the brigade did not take part in campaigns, battles, or operations.
From December 11, 1994 to October 25, 1996, the battalion tactical group of the brigade carried out combat missions to restore constitutional order in the Chechen Republic.
From November 1996 to July 1999, the brigade (regiment) did not take part in campaigns, battles, or operations.
From August 1999 to June 2000, the regiment, and from June 2000 to November 2004, the battalion tactical group of the regiment carried out combat missions during the counter-terrorist operation in the Chechen Republic.
For courage and heroism shown during combat missions, three servicemen of the unit were awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation:
squad commander of the reconnaissance company of the guard, Sergeant Vornovskoy Yuri Vasilievich (posthumously);
deputy commander of the parachute battalion of the guard, Major Alexander Leonidovich Cherepanov;
commander of the reconnaissance company of the guard, captain Sergei Vasilievich Petrov.
From November 2004 to the present, the regiment (brigade) has not taken part in campaigns, battles, or operations.

III. AWARDS AND HONORS

The name "Guards", previously assigned to the 351st Rifle Regiment, when it was reorganized into the 351st Landing Airborne Regiment, was retained for this regiment.
By order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces No. 034 of November 21, 1984, the brigade was awarded the Challenge Red Banner of the Military Council of the Ground Forces for high results in combat and political training and strengthening of military discipline.
By a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated May 4, 1985, for great services in the armed defense of the Socialist Motherland, success in combat and political training, and in connection with the 40th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, the brigade was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree.
By order of the USSR Minister of Defense No. 0139 dated July 11, 1990, the brigade was awarded the Pennant of the USSR Minister of Defense for the courage and military valor shown in carrying out the tasks of the Soviet government and the USSR Minister of Defense.
By Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 353-17 of April 22, 1994, the brigade was given the name Don Cossack.

IV. DISLOCATION CHANGES

From January to March 1945 - metro station Starye Dorogi of the Belarusian SSR (Belarusian Military District).
From March to June 1945 - Pisek, Czechoslovakia.
From June 1945 to January 1946 - Budapest, Hungary.
From March to May 1946 – Teykovo (Obolsunovo camp), Ivanovo region (Moscow military district).
From May to October 1946 - camp Tesnitskoye, Tula Region (Moscow Military District).
From October 1946 to August 1960 - Efremov, Tula Region (Moscow Military District).
From August 1960 to December 1979 - Chirchik, Tashkent region, Uzbek SSR (Turkestan Military District).
From December 1979 to January 1980 - Kokaity airfield, Jarkurgan district, Surkhan-Darya region, Uzbek SSR (40th Army).
From January 1980 to December 1981 - Kunduz airfield, DRA (40th Army).
From December 1981 to June 1988 - Gardez, DRA (40th Army).
From June 1988 to October 1992 - the city of Yolotan, Mary region of the Turkmen SSR (Turkestan Military District, Airborne Forces).
From October 1992 to June 1993 - Art. Zelenchukskaya, Karachay-Cherkessia (VDV).
From June 1993 to August 1998 - Volgodonsk, Rostov Region (Airborne Forces, North Caucasus Military District).
From August 1998 to the present - Kamyshin, Volgograd Region (North Caucasus Military District).

The main purpose of the light airborne assault brigade is a combined arms reserve. To increase mobility and speed of movement, the team has been completely re-equipped with automotive equipment. The main method of movement is the transfer of personnel and light weapons by air (helicopters), while equipment arrives under its own power. If there are a sufficient number of heavy-duty helicopters, it is also possible to transport equipment by air. In particular, this method of transportation was tested in 2008 during exercises at the Ashuluk training ground, when Mi-26s transported GAZ-66 vehicles and D-30 howitzers.
The issue of assigning helicopters to the brigade is being considered.
The main type of equipment is UAZ cars
2.

There is no automatic wheel inflation
46.

Side door
47.

Let me remind you once again that the car underwent trial operation, the task of which was to identify shortcomings that would then be corrected. One of the main problems is the awning: cool in winter and dusty in summer. At the beginning of this year, the next batch of Scorpio hard-top vehicles is expected to be delivered to the brigade for trial operation. They couldn’t tell me what specific model it would be.

Almost all of the brigade's vehicles are new, received in 2009-2010.
KAMAZ-5350 with additional protection kit
48.

Staff vehicle based on KAMAZ-5350
49.

With staff trailer for officers' rest
50.

Internals of the headquarters module
51.

52.

Staff recreational trailer
53.

To the left at the entrance is a washbasin
56.

Technical assistance vehicle MTP-A2
57.

Mechanical repair workshop MRM-MZR
62.

In the foreground is an MTO-AM maintenance vehicle.
67.

HF 74507 - 56th Air Assault Brigade is located in the city of Kamyshin, located in the Volgograd region. The brigade does not belong to the ground forces and is subordinate to the Airborne Forces Directorate under the Ministry of Defense.

56 ODSBR does not have an official website. You can get up-to-date information about the procedure for completing conscript service, living conditions, reviews of conscripts and other information here.

The formation was created in 1943, then it was transferred to the Moscow region, then to the Mogilev region, and from there it continued to move through European countries. The next destination was Hungary, Budapest. The military unit took part in the Vienna operation, fought with the 11th German division, and liberated the Hungarian city of Mor. During the entire period of its implementation, the personnel fought about 300 km, sometimes military personnel had to overcome up to 25 km. per day.


The military unit took part in the Prague operation, crossing the border of Czechoslovakia and capturing the city of Znojmo. The military route of the formation ended in the village of Oleshnya.

In 1979, servicemen of the brigade performed international duty in Afghanistan, then in Chechnya. In 1998, the formation was transferred to Kamyshin.

Awards

  • For the capture of Mor and the defeat of the 11th Division, the brigade was awarded the Order of Kutuzov, 2nd degree, as well as the gratitude of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
  • Guards Battle Banner;
  • Order of the Red Banner;
  • Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree.

Dislocations


There is only one military station, but there are two military camps located in different parts of the city:

  • Petrovskaya Street - “Red Roofs”. Airborne and NBC protection units are stationed there;
  • Gorokhovskaya Street - “Gray Roofs”. Only airborne units are located there.

Accommodation



Conscripts live in cubicles, each of which is designed for four. During the course of a young soldier’s course, recruits are housed separately from the “old-timers”, then everyone is united in one barracks. The conditions are no different, except that at first the shower may be on the floor and not in the cockpit.

The room has a standard set of furniture: beds (above each there is a socket), bedside tables, a desk, a wardrobe for uniforms. The cockpit has its own bathroom.

Meals are served in the canteen prepared by civilian staff. There is also a shop on site. According to reviews, prices there are a little higher than in the city, but the range is varied. You can have additional food or hygiene items, as well as other things.

Service


Those who served in the unit note the presence of intense physical training. Considering that the unit is an airborne unit, all military personnel are required to be trained to parachute jump from an airplane or helicopter. Contract soldiers jump more often than conscripts.



In addition to physical training, military personnel receive other skills. For this purpose, trips to the test site are organized. The exercises take about a month and are held quite often. Accommodation during the period at the test site is in tents, meals are organized by the field kitchen. According to reviews from military personnel, the food is of decent quality and taste, there are borscht, various soups, even kebabs.

Contentment

The allowance is standard, since there are no special conditions. For contract soldiers and officers, you can increase your salary by passing excellent physical training.

Mail and addresses for parcels


Medicines cannot be sent in a parcel. If they see it, they will take it away for obvious reasons. Only an inhaler is allowed. If vitamins are required, they are donated and then received every day in the prescribed dosage.

It is recommended to track parcels using the track number and notify you when it arrives at the department. Most often, notifications are not brought to the unit, so in order to receive the shipment, the soldier must be notified that it is ready for delivery. After which the conscript negotiates with the contract soldier to be escorted to the department, where he receives his parcel.

In the “Grey Roofs” the post office is located in the unit, in the “Red Roofs” you will have to go with a contractor to pick up the parcel.

Postal addresses:

  • "Gray Roofs" on the street. Gorokhovaya: 403880, Volgograd region, Kamyshin-10, military unit 74507, division, battery, platoon, full name.)
  • "Red Roofs" on the street. Petrovskoy: 403871 Volgograd region, Kamyshin-1. Full name upon request.

Telephone communications


The phone may be taken away, or it may be left behind. If the soldier does not abuse the telephone connection, then no one will notice and will not confiscate it. It is recommended not to call yourself, it is better to write messages. When there is time and opportunity, the serviceman himself will make the necessary call.

If the phone is taken away, then it is given out twice: once during the week, the second on the weekend. If unauthorized use of the phone is detected, it may be taken away or even broken. There is no need to be outraged about this, because telephones are not allowed in the military unit.

Visit


Soldiers are allowed on leave only with their parents; they may not be allowed to go with girlfriends or friends. Arrival must be coordinated with management.

Oath


The oath is usually held on weekends, usually on Sunday. The time for this event is chosen in the morning - 8-9 hours. Then they give you leave for a day; if an agreement is reached, communication can be extended until Tuesday.

How can I get to

Kamyshin is located between Saratov and Volgograd. The distance from both cities is approximately the same (about 200 km). Therefore, you can go to any of them. Each has a train station and an airport.

Having arrived in Kamyshin, you can take a taxi to the unit or hotel so as not to have to deal with local city routes.

  • +7 84457 55-555;
  • +7 84457 45-555.

Bus



There are many buses from Volgograd to Kamyshin, both passing and going only to Kamyshin. Buses run quite frequently, several times an hour. Ticket availability can be checked on the bus station website or by calling +7 8442 377-228. The central bus station in Volgograd is located on Balonina Street, 11.


Buses also run frequently from Saratov. You can buy a ticket for a passing bus going to Volgograd, Rostov-on-Don, Elista. There are two routes going to Kamyshin. You can get information about flights and available seats on buses on the bus station website, order a ticket there, or by calling +7 8452 246-222. The bus station is located on the street. Moskovskaya, 170.

Accommodation


Finding an apartment in Kamyshin is not difficult. To do this, you can contact the relevant websites that post advertisements for apartments for rent (such as Avito). However, you should be careful not to fall for scammers. There are situations when the owner of an apartment, having promised housing, disappears.

It is safer, but more expensive, to book hotel accommodation. There are enough hotels and hostels in Kamyshin:

  • “Easily”, st. Proletarskaya, 49;
  • "Gloria", st. Kranostroiteley, 3;
  • "Opava", st. Oktyabrskaya, 4.

The unit has its own dormitory. For questions about living there, it is better to clarify in the section itself.

History of formations and units of the 40th Army

56th Guards Separate Air Assault Brigade
(56th Guards Brigade)
Military formation of the Airborne Forces of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the Russian Armed Forces.
The formation's birthday is June 11, 1943, when the 7th and 17th Guards Airborne Brigades were formed.
The combat path during the Great Patriotic War On the 4th Ukrainian Front, a strong group of airborne forces was deployed, consisting of the 4th, 6th and 7th Guards Airborne Brigades. It was planned to be used during the liberation of Crimea.
In December 1943, the 4th and 7th Guards Airborne Brigades were redeployed to the Moscow Military District.
By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief No. 0047 of December 18, 1944, the 16th Guards Airborne Division was reorganized into the 106th Guards Rifle Division of the 38th Guards Rifle Corps. The 4th Guards Separate Airborne Brigade was reorganized into the 347th Guards Rifle Regiment, the 7th Guards Separate Airborne Brigade into the 351st Guards Rifle Regiment, and the 17th Guards Separate Airborne Brigade into the 355th. 1st Guards Rifle Regiment.
The 106th Guards Rifle Division included:
347th Guards Rifle Regiment;
351st Guards Rifle Regiment;
356th Guards Rifle Regiment;
107th separate guards anti-aircraft artillery division;
193rd separate guards communications battalion;
123rd separate guards anti-tank division;
139th separate guards engineer battalion;
113th separate guards reconnaissance company;
117th separate guards chemical company;
234th separate guards medical battalion. The division also included the 57th artillery brigade of three regiments:
205th Cannon Artillery Regiment;
28th Howitzer Artillery Regiment;
53rd Mortar Regiment. In January 1945, the division as part of the 38th Guards Rifle Corps was redeployed by rail to Hungary, by February 26 it was concentrated east of the city of Budapest in the area: Szolnok - Abony - Soyal - Teriel and in early March became part of 3rd Ukrainian Front.
On March 16, 1945, having broken through the German defenses, the 351st Guards Rifle Regiment reached the Austro-Hungarian border.
In March-April 1945, the division took part in the Vienna operation, advancing in the direction of the main attack of the front. The division, in cooperation with formations of the 4th Guards Army, broke through the enemy’s defenses north of the city of Székesfehérvár, reached the flank and rear of the main forces of the 6th SS Panzer Army, which had penetrated the defense of the front forces between lakes Velence and Lake Balaton. At the beginning of April, the division struck in a northwestern direction, bypassing Vienna and, in cooperation with the 6th Guards Tank Army, broke enemy resistance, advanced to the Danube and cut off the enemy’s retreat to the west. The division successfully fought in the city, which lasted until April 13. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated March 29, 1945, the division was awarded the Order of Kutuzov, II degree, for its participation in the defeat of eleven enemy divisions southwest of Budapest and the capture of Mor.
For breaking through the fortified defense line and capturing the city of Mor, all personnel received the gratitude of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated April 26, 1945, “for participation in the capture of Vienna,” the division was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Since then, April 26 has been considered the unit's annual holiday.
On May 9, the division continued combat operations to pursue the enemy and successfully developed an offensive towards Retz and Pisek. The division marched, pursuing the enemy, and in 3 days fought 80-90 km. At 12.00 on May 11, 1945, the forward detachment of the division reached the Vltava River and, in the area of ​​​​the village of Oleshnya, met with troops of the American 5th Tank Army. Here the division's combat path in the Great Patriotic War ended.
History 1945-1979 At the end of hostilities, the division from Czechoslovakia returned to Hungary under its own power. From May 1945 to January 1946, the division was camped in the forests south of Budapest.
Based on Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1154474ss dated June 3, 1946 and Directive of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces No. org/2/247225 dated June 7, 1946, by June 15, 1946, the 106th Guards Rifle Red Banner Order of Kutuzov division was reorganized into 106th Guards Airborne Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Division.
Since July 1946, the division was stationed in Tula. The division was part of the 38th Guards Airborne Vienna Corps (corps headquarters - Tula).
On December 3, 1947, the division was awarded the Guards Battle Banner.
Based on the directives of the General Staff of September 3, 1948 and January 21, 1949, the 106th Guards Airborne Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Division as part of the 38th Guards Airborne Vienna Corps became part of the Airborne Army.
In April 1953, the Airborne Army was disbanded.
Based on the directive of the General Staff of January 21, 1955, by April 25, 1955, the 106th Guards Airborne Division withdrew from the 38th Guards Airborne Vienna Corps, which was disbanded, and transferred to a new staff of three regimental personnel with personnel battalion (not full strength) in each parachute regiment. The 137th Guards Airborne Regiment was transferred from the disbanded 11th Guards Airborne Division to the 106th Guards Airborne Division. Deployment point: Ryazan.
The personnel of the 351st Guards Parachute Regiment participated in military parades on Red Square in Moscow, took part in large military exercises and in 1955 landed near the city of Kutaisi (Transcaucasian Military District).
In 1956, the 38th Guards Airborne Vienna Corps was disbanded and the division became directly subordinate to the commander of the Airborne Forces.
In 1957, the regiment conducted demonstration exercises with landings for military delegations from Yugoslavia and India. Based on the directives of the USSR Minister of Defense dated March 18, 1960 and the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces dated June 7, 1960 to November 1, 1960:
the 351st Guards Airborne Regiment (the city of Efremov, Tula Region) was accepted into the 105th Guards Airborne Vienna Red Banner Division from the 106th Guards Airborne Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Division;
The 105th Guards Airborne Division (without the 331st Guards Parachute Regiment) was redeployed to the Turkestan Military District in the city of Fergana, Uzbek SSR;
The 351st Guards Parachute Regiment was stationed in the city of Chirchik, Tashkent region. In 1961, after the earthquake in Tashkent, the personnel of the 351st regiment provided assistance to city residents affected by the disaster and helped local authorities maintain order.
In 1974, the 351st regiment parachuted into one of the regions of Central Asia and participated in large-scale exercises of the TurkVO. Being the leading part of the Airborne Forces of the Central Asian region of the country, the regiment participates in parades in the capital of Uzbekistan in Tashkent.
Based on the Directive of the General Staff of August 3, 1979, by December 1, 1979, the 105th Guards Airborne Vienna Red Banner Division was disbanded.
What remained from the division in Fergana was the 345th Separate Guards Parachute Airborne Regiment of the Order of Suvorov, which was significantly larger than the usual one, and the 115th Separate Military Transport Aviation Squadron. The rest of the division's personnel were sent to fill the gaps in other airborne formations and to supplement the newly formed air assault brigades.
On the basis of the 351st Guards Parachute Regiment of the 105th Guards Airborne Vienna Red Banner Division in the village of Azadbash (district of the city of Chirchik), Tashkent region of the Uzbek SSR, the 56th separate guards air assault brigade was formed.
To form a brigade, reserves liable for military service - the so-called “partisans” - were urgently mobilized from among the residents of the Central Asian republics and the south of the Kazakh SSR. They will subsequently make up 80% of the brigade’s personnel when troops enter the DRA.
The formation of brigade units will simultaneously be carried out at 4 mobilization points and will end in Termez:
Wars, stories, facts.:
“...formally the brigade is considered formed in Chirchik on the basis of the 351st Guards Regiment. However, de facto, its formation was carried out separately in four centers (Chirchik, Kapchagai, Fergana, Yolotan), and was brought together into a single whole just before the entry into Afghanistan in Termez. The brigade headquarters (or officer cadre), as formally its cadre, was apparently initially stationed in Chirchik...”
On December 13, 1979, units of the brigade loaded into trains and were redeployed to the city of Termez, Uzbek SSR.
Participation in the Afghan War In December 1979, the brigade was introduced into the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and became part of the 40th Combined Arms Army.
On the morning of December 25, 1979, the 4th Airborne Battalion Brigade was the first to enter Afghanistan as part of the 40th Army.
to protect the Salang pass.
From Termez, the 1st infantry battalion and the 2nd infantry battalion by helicopter, and the rest in a column, were redeployed to the city of Kunduz. The 4th infantry battalion remained at the Salang pass. Then from Kunduz the 2nd infantry battalion was transferred to the city of Kandahar where it became part of the newly formed 70th separate guards motorized rifle brigade. In January 1980, the entire composition of the 56th Guards was introduced. odshbr. She was stationed in the city of Kunduz.
In Gardez
From the moment the 2nd infantry battalion was transferred to the 70th separate motorized brigade, the brigade was actually a three-battalion regiment.
The initial task of the brigade's units was to guard and defend the largest highway in the Salang Pass area, ensuring the advance of Soviet troops into the central and southern regions of Afghanistan.
From 1982 to June 1988, the 56th Air Assault Brigade was deployed in the Gardez area, conducting combat operations throughout Afghanistan: Bagram, Mazar-i-Sharif, Khanabad, Panjshir, Logar, Alikhail (Paktia). In 1984, the brigade was awarded the Challenge Red Banner of the TurkVO for the successful completion of combat missions.
By order of 1985, in mid-1986, all standard airborne armored vehicles of the brigade (BMD-1 and BTR-D) were replaced with more protected armored vehicles with a long service life (BMP-2D for the reconnaissance company, 2nd, 3rd and 4th battalions and BTR-70 for the 1st battalion 2 and 3 pdr) the 1st pdr still had BRDM. Also a feature of the brigade was the increased staff of the artillery battalion, which consisted not of 3 fire batteries, as was customary for units stationed on the territory of the USSR, but of 5.
4.5.1985 - by decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces, the brigade was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree, No. 56324698.
From December 16, 1987 to the end of January 1988, the brigade took part in Operation Magistral. In April 1988, the brigade took part in Operation Barrier. Paratroopers blocked the caravan routes from Pakistan in order to ensure the withdrawal of troops from the city of Ghazni.
The number of personnel of the 56th Guards. The Oshbr on December 1, 1986 was 2,452 people (261 officers, 109 warrant officers, 416 sergeants, 1,666 soldiers). After fulfilling its international duty, on June 12-14, 1988, the brigade was withdrawn to the city of Yolotan, Turkmen SSR.
Regarding the organizational structure. The picture shows that the brigade had only 3 BRDM-2 units, which were available in the reconnaissance company. However, there was another BRDM-2 in the chemical platoon and 2 more units. in the OPA (propaganda and agitation unit).
From 1989 to the present At the end of 1989, the brigade was reorganized into a separate airborne brigade (airborne brigade). The brigade passed through “hot spots”: Afghanistan (12.1979-07.1988), Baku (12-19.01.1990 - 02.1990), Sumgait, Nakhichevan, Meghri, Julfa, Osh, Fergana, Uzgen (06.06.1990), Chechnya (12.94-10.96, Grozny, Pervomaisky, Argun and since 09.1999).
On January 15, 1990, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, after a detailed study of the situation, adopted a decision “On declaring a state of emergency in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region and some other areas.” In accordance with it, the Airborne Forces began an operation carried out in two stages. At the first stage, from January 12 to 19, units of the 106th and 76th airborne divisions, the 56th and 38th airborne brigades and the 217th parachute regiment landed at airfields near Baku (for more details, see. article Black January), and in Yerevan - the 98th Guards Airborne Division. The 39th separate air assault brigade entered Nagorno-Karabakh.
Since January 23, airborne units began operations to restore order in other parts of Azerbaijan. In the area of ​​Lenkoran, Priship and Jalilabad, they were carried out jointly with the border troops, who restored the state border.
In February 1990, the brigade returned to its place of permanent deployment.
From March to August 1990, brigade units maintained order in the cities of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
On June 6, 1990, the 104th Parachute Regiment of the 76th Airborne Division, the 56th Airborne Brigade began landing at airfields in the cities of Fergana and Osh, and on June 8 - the 137th Parachute Regiment of the 106th airborne division in Frunze. Having made a march on the same day through the mountain passes of the border of the two republics, the paratroopers occupied Osh and Uzgen. The next day, the 387th separate parachute regiment and units of the 56th airborne brigade took control of the situation in the area of ​​​​the cities of Andijan and Jalal-Abad, occupied Kara-Suu, mountain roads and passes throughout the conflict territory.
In October 1992, in connection with the sovereignization of the republics of the former Soviet Socialist Republic, the brigade was redeployed to the village of Zelenchukskaya, Karachay-Cherekessiya. From where they marched to the place of permanent deployment in the village of Podgory near the city of Volgodonsk, Rostov region. The territory of the military camp was a former shift camp for the builders of the Rostov Nuclear Power Plant, located 3 kilometers from the nuclear power plant.
From December 1994 to August - October 1996, the brigade's combined battalion fought in Chechnya. On November 29, 1994, an order was sent to the brigade to form a consolidated battalion and transfer it to Mozdok. The brigade's artillery division took part in the operation near Shatoi at the end of 1995 - beginning of 1996. In October-November 1996, the combined battalion of the brigade was withdrawn from Chechnya.
In 1997, the brigade was reorganized into the 56th Guards Air Assault Regiment, which became part of the 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division.
In July 1998, by order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, in connection with the resumption of construction of the Rostov Nuclear Power Plant, the regiment began redeployment to the city of Kamyshin, Volgograd Region. The regiment was stationed in the buildings of the Kamyshinsky Higher Military Construction Command and Engineering School, which was disbanded in 1998.
On August 19, 1999, an air assault detachment from the regiment was sent to reinforce the consolidated regiment of the 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division and was sent by letter military echelon to the Republic of Dagestan. On August 20, 1999, an air assault detachment arrived in the village of Botlikh. Later he took part in hostilities in the Republic of Dagestan and the Chechen Republic. The battalion tactical group of the regiment fought in the North Caucasus (place of deployment - Khankala).
In December 1999, units of the regiment and the FPS DShMG covered the Chechen section of the Russian-Georgian border.
On May 1, 2009, the air assault regiment again became a brigade. And on July 1, 2010, it switched to a new staff and became known as the 56th separate air assault brigade (light).
It should be noted that over all these years, the Battle Banner of the 56th separate air assault brigade, despite all 4 renamings and 4 reformations of the regular structure, remained the same. This is the Battle Banner of the 351st Parachute Regiment
Previously, the 11th, 56th and 83rd air assault (airborne) brigades were operationally subordinate to the military districts (Southern Military District and Eastern Military District), but on October 21, 2013 they became part of the Russian Airborne Forces.
Famous fighters and commanders
Leonid Vasilyevich Khabarov - battalion commander 4 from the creation of the brigade until April 1980. NS of the brigade from October 1984 to September 1985. Years of service 1966-1991
Rank Colonel of the USSR Air Force
Commanded the 100th ORR of the 105th Guards. Airborne Division, 1st Infantry Battalion, 351st Guards. PDP 105th Guards VDD,
4th DSB 56th Guards. odshbr,smp (k) TurkVO
Battles/wars War in Afghanistan
State awards:
Order of Military Merit
Order of the Red Banner
Medal for Distinction in Military Service, 1st degree
Medal for Distinction in Military Service, 2nd degree
Medal "Veteran of the Armed Forces of the USSR"
Medal "60 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR"
Jubilee medal "70 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR"
Departmental awards and insignia:
Medal "Army General Margelov"
Medal for Strengthening the Military Commonwealth (Ministry of Defense)
For impeccable service, 1st class
For impeccable service, 2nd degree
For impeccable service, 3rd degree
Badge for two serious wounds
Skydiver-instructor (over 400 parachute jumps)
Honorary Worker of Higher Professional Education of the Russian Federation
Regional awards:
Badge of honor “For services to the city of Yekaterinburg”
Awards from other countries:
Medal “From the Grateful Afghan People” (Afghanistan)
Public awards:
Order of Merit (RSVA)
Retired
from 1991 to 2010 leads in turn:
Military Department;
Faculty of Military Education;
Institute of Military-Technical Education
Ural State Technical University.
Evnevich, Valery Gennadievich Chief of Staff, and since 1987 - brigade commander.
Awards and titles
Hero of the Russian Federation
(October 7, 1993) - “for courage and heroism shown during a special task”

Order of Military Merit
Order of the Red Banner
2 Orders of the Red Star
Medal "For Military Merit"
Zhukov Medal
Medal “Participant in emergency humanitarian operations” (EMERCOM of Russia)

56th Separate Guards Air Assault Order of the Patriotic War, First Class Don Cossack Brigade ( 56th OGDSBR) - military formation of the Ground Forces of the USSR Armed Forces, the Ground Forces of the Russian Armed Forces and the Russian Airborne Forces. The formation's birthday is June 11, 1943, when the 7th and 17th Guards Airborne Brigades were formed.

Combat path during the Great Patriotic War

On January 15, 1944, in accordance with the order of the commander of the Airborne Forces of the Red Army No. 00100 dated December 26, 1943, in the city of Stupino, Moscow Region, on the basis of the 4th, 7th and 17th separate guards airborne brigades (the brigades were stationed in the city of Vostryakovo, Vnukovo, Stupino) the 16th Guards Airborne Division was formed. The division had a staff of 12,000 people.

In August 1944, the division was redeployed to the city of Starye Dorogi, Mogilev region, and on August 9, 1944, it became part of the newly formed 38th Guards Airborne Corps. In October 1944, the 38th Guards Airborne Corps became part of the newly formed separate Guards Airborne Army.

On December 8, 1944, the army was reorganized into the 9th Guards Army, and the 38th Guards Airborne Corps became the Guards Rifle Corps.

On March 16, 1945, having broken through the German defenses, the 351st Guards Rifle Regiment reached the Austro-Hungarian border.

In March-April 1945, the division took part in the Vienna Operation, advancing in the direction of the front's main attack. The division, in cooperation with formations of the 4th Guards Army, broke through the enemy’s defenses north of the city of Székesfehérvár, reached the flank and rear of the main forces of the 6th SS Panzer Army, which had penetrated the defense of the front forces between lakes Velence and Lake Balaton. At the beginning of April, the division struck in a northwestern direction, bypassing Vienna and, in cooperation with the 6th Guards Tank Army, broke enemy resistance, advanced to the Danube and cut off the enemy’s retreat to the west. The division successfully fought in the city, which lasted until April 13.

For breaking through the fortified defense line and capturing the city of Mor, all personnel received the gratitude of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated April 26, 1945, “for participation in the capture of Vienna,” the division was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Since then, April 26 has been considered the unit's annual holiday.

On May 5, the division was alerted and marched to the Austro-Czechoslovak border. Having come into contact with the enemy, on May 8 she crossed the border of Czechoslovakia and immediately captured the city of Znojmo.

On May 9, the division continued combat operations to pursue the enemy and successfully developed an offensive towards Retz and Pisek. The division marched, pursuing the enemy, and in 3 days fought 80-90 km. At 12.00 on May 11, 1945, the forward detachment of the division reached the Vltava River and, in the area of ​​​​the village of Oleshnya, met with troops of the American 5th Tank Army. Here the division's combat path in the Great Patriotic War ended.

History 1945-1979

At the end of hostilities, the division from Czechoslovakia returned to Hungary under its own power. From May 1945 to January 1946, the division was camped in the forests south of Budapest.

Based on Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1154474ss of June 3, 1946 and the directive of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR No. org/2/247225 of June 7, 1946, by June 15, 1946, the 106th Guards Rifle Red Banner, Order of Kutuzov Division I was reformed to the 106th Guards Airborne Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Division.

Since July 1946, the division was stationed in Tula. The division was part of the 38th Guards Airborne Vienna Corps (corps headquarters - Tula).

Based on the directives of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of September 3, 1948 and January 21, 1949, the 106th Guards Airborne Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Division as part of the 38th Guards Airborne Vienna Corps became part of the Airborne Army.

The personnel of the 351st Guards Parachute Regiment participated in military parades on Red Square in Moscow, took part in large military exercises and in 1955 landed near the city of Kutaisi (Transcaucasian Military District).

  • the 351st Guards Parachute Regiment (the city of Efremov, Tula region) was accepted into the 106th Guards Airborne Red Banner, Order of Kutuzov Division;
  • (without the 331st Guards Parachute Regiment) was redeployed to
The appearance of airborne helicopters is strictly linked to the appearance of helicopters, or more precisely, to the creation of models with the necessary set of properties. This has already happened in military history, when technological progress brought new branches and types of armed forces into the battle arena. However, there was another forerunner, which consisted in the peculiarities of the forms of combat use of the Airborne Forces, expressed in their use as an integral part of operations on an operational-tactical scale.

... Alas, it seems worth recognizing that the first airborne assault operations (actions) associated with the landing of relatively small landing forces were carried out by the Germans during the Second World War. Here is a list of some of them: Vordingborg Bridge (Denmark, 1940), Fort Eben-Emael (Belgium, 1940), bridges over the Albert Canal (Belgium, 1940), complex of bridges over the Meuse (Holland, 1940), bridges via Zap. Dvina and Berezina (USSR, 1941). All of them fully fall under the definition of airborne assault operations, although they were carried out by German airborne forces and special forces. All of them were carried out within the framework of a macro goal - to ensure the fastest possible advance of one’s ground troops, to block (detain) enemy troops in their positions, etc. The methods of landing were very different: parachute, landing on gliders, landing on airplanes. But in the subsequent years of the war, such landings were actually not used. The warring parties became interested in larger-scale VDOs, which, in themselves, are capable of influencing the overall operational-strategic situation at the front. Post-war development continued in the same direction, incl. and Soviet theory of the use of airborne forces.

The reasons why the Soviet military command did not conduct tactical airborne assaults during the offensive of 1944-45. are not clear. There are likely three main factors at play here.

Firstly, the failures of large-scale airborne operations somewhat undermined faith in the effectiveness of landings in general (in any case, given the existing material and technical base and the general level of organization).

Secondly, the very idea of ​​small landings probably seemed incorrect; their possible results were not seen as effective (although such were provided for in the “Instructions for the Combat Use of Airborne Forces” of 1943*).

Third, the command simply did not consider it necessary to use them - i.e. believed that it was better to use proven and verified purely ground-based methods.

But these are all just assumptions. Personally, to the author, it seems quite possible to single out several dozen vehicles from the many hundreds (in 1945 more than 1000 units) of excellent military transport aircraft Li-2 and S-47 that already existed by 1944 and throw several dozen vehicles along the parachute battalion on the same routes supplies or to capture river bridgeheads - this could in some cases significantly facilitate the actions of ground troops. But what happened, happened.

In the late 1940s, unexpectedly for everyone, helicopters burst onto the scene - a new class of aircraft. The helicopters (which by this time had reached a level of technical sophistication sufficient for combat use) had successfully proven themselves in the Incheon Naval Landing Operation (MAO) and in the subsequent operations of American troops in Korea. The domestic designers who came to the rescue present a rather successful car - the Mi-4 - which began in 1953. enlist en masse into the troops.
Already in 1954, the first large experimental landing was carried out from 36 infantry helicopters with vehicles and artillery. A number of experimental exercises (including those with the actual use of nuclear weapons) were also conducted to land battalion- and regimental-scale helicopter landings behind enemy lines... However, that’s where the matter stalled. That is, no organizational measures were taken to create specialized units.
Causes:

Firstly, the “Khrushchev-missile” factor played a negative role.

Secondly, oversize of the Airborne Forces - they were in the first half of the 1950s. number as many as 15 divisions; and to have any more airborne units is already arrogance, especially since the “Khrushchev-era” general reduction of the armed forces began.

Third, the nuclear paranoia that had finally struck the world by this time did not leave any place in the battle formations for pure infantry shooters (without the protection of armored personnel carrier armor); the helicopter was seen as too “fragile” compared to the armored personnel carrier.

Fourthly, in addition to the parachute landing units of the Airborne Forces, until 1957 there were also rifle divisions, units of both, in abundance, which, if such a task was set, could be parachuted from helicopters behind enemy lines.

Fifthly, brought up on the power of tank armored fists, Soviet military commanders, clumsy, slow and poorly protected flying cuttlefish with a propeller on the top of their heads (this is in the age of “jet speeds” and fast, sleek aerodynamics!) did not seem to be a means that could give the troops new, hitherto unseen capabilities.
^

The capitalists


In general, the Americans had a similar situation with the VDO theory. The best illustration is the following phrase by American Airborne General James Gavin from his book “Airborne Warfare”: “... troops should be used in mass, not in small groups, and only where their actions can have a decisive impact, and not at many points , where they are only able to achieve local tactical successes." However, their experience of war in what later became known as a “poorly equipped theater of operations,” i.e. on the Korean Peninsula, forced the American command to think about it and act more flexibly. The helicopter showed itself to be a very promising means of transportation in mountainous, wooded areas and the absence of roads. The number of helicopters jumps dramatically - by the end of the war, the army aviation already had 1,140 units, whereas at the beginning there were only 56 units. The American command is also creating an experimental unit - the 11th Air Assault Division. On its basis and on the basis of two more formations (10th Air Transport Brigade and 2nd Infantry Division), in July 1965 the 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) Division - Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was created (more precisely, reorganized from the existing one). A significant innovation was that helicopters were first introduced into its combat units as a transport and combat vehicle with a total number of up to 434 (428 according to other data) units. The division was transferred to Vietnam at the end of the same month. And even despite the lack of proper theoretical study of airmobile (helicopter landing) operations, not to mention the corresponding practical exercises, it showed its best side. Of course, not only this division had helicopters. All American divisions in Vietnam had a large number of helicopters. So if in mid. 1967 was approx. 2000 units, then in 1968 their number reached 4200 units!

Generally speaking, if in Korea helicopters only announced their existence and their prospects were quite vague, then the Vietnam War elevated the helicopter to the zenith of fame and popularity. Until this time, they were still perceived rather as some kind of exotic purely auxiliary purpose. Americans fell in love with helicopters so much that some hotheads began to argue about the decline of parachute (from airplanes) landing as such.

In Russia

Such an active and successful use of helicopters also impressed the Soviet command. The idea is being revived - during the strategic exercises "Dnepr-67", mainly on the basis of the 51st year, an experimental combined 1st airborne brigade is being formed under the command of the beginning. Combat Training Department of the Airborne Forces Directorate, Major General Kobzar. It is used to seize a bridgehead across the Dnieper, where a motorized rifle battalion with attached self-propelled guns, transported by helicopters, also participates. Theoretical developments and experiments are carried out in a specially created working group under the General Staff. And so, based on the results of these works, no later than the end of 1967. a decision is made to form completely new military formations for the Soviet Army - separate air assault brigades. Based on the General Staff directive of May 22, 1968. in June 1968, the formation of the 11th (ZBVO) and 13th (DVO) brigades began. By mid-July, the brigades had already been formed. (According to other sources, the 13th brigade was finally formed only in July-August 1970). In 1973, a third brigade was added to them - the 21st in Kutaisi (WKVO).

The brigades were formed, as they say, from a “clean slate.” Officers and soldiers from the districts were sent to staff them, and officers from the Airborne Forces were appointed only to the positions of specialists in the airborne service (Airborne Service) and to the positions of brigade commanders.

But even here, a number of subjective factors of the characteristics of Soviet military thought played a role. Due to the distrust of the Soviet military leadership in the infantry and underestimation of its combat capabilities, especially on an operational scale, such brigades were considered not strong enough for operations in the Eurotheater of Operations. That is why they were deployed in directions with less threat, compared to the western one - it was considered advisable to have them only for operations in mountainous, wooded (taiga) terrain, difficult for ground vehicles, where the focal nature of hostilities was inevitable. Both Far Eastern brigades were intended not so much to carry out landings behind enemy lines according to the usual pattern, but to cover a large section of the Soviet-Chinese border. (There was even a visual propaganda poster with a somewhat surreal inscription: “Assault paratrooper – hourly border.”) The aviation component of each brigade was represented by an air group consisting of two full-time helicopter regiments. At the same time, the air and ground components had different administrative subordination: the ground component - to the High Command of the Ground Forces, and the air component - to the High Command of the Air Force; which inevitably created a number of serious problems in organizing interaction.

To carry out airborne operational-tactical and tactical landings at EuroTV, it was planned to attract conventional parachute or motorized rifle units (companies and battalions), pulling them out of the airborne and combined arms divisions.

Here we should say a little about terminology. It is not appropriate to use terms created by capitalists, and by 1971, domestic names and terminology were selected; brigades and their battalions; as well as the methods of their combat use were renamed air assault. Thus, the American terms “air assault” and “airmobile” gradually ceased to apply to Soviet airborne units and began to be mentioned in official documents only in relation to foreign formations of this type.

By the end of 1971, all existing brigades were reorganized into air assault brigades with changes in the organizational and staffing structure (OSS).


Number

Formation date

Operational subordination

Permanent station

11 odshbr

July 1968

Zabaikalsky VO

gg. Mogocha and Amazar (Chita region)*

13 odshbr

July 1968

Far Eastern Military District

Magdagachi (Amur region)*

21 odshbr

1973

Transcaucasian Military District

gg. Kutaisi and Tsulukidze (Georgia)

35th Guards odshbr

December 1979

Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

Cottbus (GDR)**

36 odshbr

December 1979

Leningrad Military District

village Garbolovo (Leningrad region)

37 odshbr

December 1979

Baltic Military District



38th Guards Vienna Oshbr

December 1979

Belarusian Military District

Brest (Belarus)

39 odshbr

December 1979

Prykarpattsky VO

Khyrov (Ukraine)

40 odshbr

December 1979

Odessa Military District



56th Guards odshbr

December 1979

Turkestan Military District



57 odshbr

December 1979

Central Asian VO



Number

Formation date

Operational subordination

Permanent station

48 odshb

December 1979

Turkestan Military District,
1st AK / 40th OA (*)

unknown

139 odshb

December 1979

Baltic Military District,
11th Guards OA



145 odshb

December 1979

Far Eastern Military District,
5th OA



899 odshb

December 1979

20th Guards OA

Burg (GDR)

900 odshb

December 1979

Group of Soviet troops in Germany,
8th Guards OA

Leipzig – Schinau (GDR)

901 odshb

December 1979

Central Group of Forces



902 odshb

December 1979

Southern Group of Forces

Kecskemét (Hungary)

903 odshb

December 1979

Belarusian Military District,
28th OA

Brest (Southern), since 1986 – Grodno (Belarus)

904 odshb

December 1979

Prykarpattia VO,
13th OA



905 odshb

December 1979

Odessa Military District,
14th OA

Bendery (Moldova)

906 odshb

December 1979

Transbaikal Military District,
36th OA



907 odshb

December 1979

Far Eastern Military District,
43rd AK / 47th OA

Birobidzhan (Jewish Autonomous Region)

908 odshb

December 1979

Kyiv Military District,
1st Guards OA

Konotop, since 1984 – town. Goncharovo (Ukraine, Chernigov region)

1011 odshb

December 1979

Belarusian Military District,
5th Guards TA



1044 odshb

December 1979

Group of Soviet troops in Germany,
1st Guards TA



1156 odshb

December 1979

Prykarpattia VO,
8th TA



1179 odshb

December 1979

Leningrad Military District,
6th OA

Petrozavodsk (Karelia)

1151 odshb

December 1979

Belarusian Military District,
7th TA

Polotsk (Belarus)

1185 odshb

December 1979

Group of Soviet troops in Germany,
2nd Guards TA

Ravensbrück (GDR)

1604 odshb

December 1979

Transbaikal Military District,
29th OA

Ulan-Ude (Buryat Autonomous Okrug)


.

In 1984, 83 airborne brigades and two separate regiments were formed - the 1318th and 1319th airborne regiments for regular Operational Maneuver Groups (OMG) - they are also the so-called. Separate Army Corps (UAC). And in 1986, several more brigades were formed - the 23rd, 128th and 130th.


^ Newly formed parts and connections
(as of 1984)

Number

Formation date

Operational subordination

Permanent station

23 odshbr

1986

High Command of the South-Western Direction (GC YuZN)

Kremenchug (Ukraine)

58 odshbr

1986 (estimated)

Kyiv Military District

Kremenchug (Ukraine)

83 odshbr

1984

Northern Group of Forces

Bialogyard (Poland)

128 odshbr

1986 (estimated)

High Command of the Southern Direction (GC YUN)



130 odshbr

1986 (estimated)

High Command of the Far East Troops (GK Airborne Forces)

Abakan (Khakassian Autonomous Okrug)

1318 odshp

1984

Belarusian Military District,
5th Guards UAC



1319 odshp

1984

Transbaikal Military District,
Nth UAC

Kyakhta (Chita region)

Thus, at the end of 1986 there were 16 brigades, 2 regiments and 20 divisions in the Soviet Army. battalions. The total staffing level of the DShCh during wartime was 65-70 thousand people. However, in peacetime, the units were kept in a greatly reduced composition - on average approx. 31-34 thousand people. At the same time, along with well-equipped brigades and battalions, many had only personnel for mobilization deployment.

Subordination

Many people are interested in the question: were the DShCh part of the Airborne Forces? In short, no, they were not included. The DShCh were part of the High Command of the Ground Forces (GK SV). Does this mean in this case that the DShCh military personnel are not airborne paratroopers? Does not mean. The organizational and administrative affiliation of the DShCh to the Ground Forces Civil Code is simply a feature of the existing Soviet military organization. Being subordinate to the Civil Code of the Army, the DShCh were directly subordinate to the command of combined arms formations - corps, armies, fronts in wartime, military districts and groups of troops - in peacetime. Moreover, the same situation repeated with them as with the special forces units - there were such combat units, but there were no such troops. There was a command for the commander of tank forces and motorized rifle forces, but there was no command for the commander of the airborne assault forces. Formally speaking, there were no such troops themselves, just as there were no special forces. This situation affected the DShV in the most unfavorable way. They became the stepson of two stepmothers at once - on the one hand, the Airborne Forces, and on the other hand, the Civil Code of the North. The “second-class” (this was especially true in the first years of its existence) position in the unspoken intra-army hierarchy also led to corresponding unpleasant consequences: worse attention to problems, worse supplies, less attention to recruitment and training, etc. In the minds of officers of both the Airborne Forces and the Ground Forces, their assignment to the Airborne Forces was often considered a “exile” (perhaps except for units in groups of troops - there, of course, all places were valued higher).

In operational terms (combat use), DShV units were subordinate to the command of combined arms formations - armies and fronts (districts, groups of forces). The development of methods and forms for their combat use of airborne troops units and their training was managed by the combat training department of the Ground Forces Civil Code together with the BP department of the Airborne Forces Command. The general principles of the combat use of DShV lay on the conscience of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

In December 1989, a decision was made to transfer the airborne units to the administrative and operational subordination of the Airborne Forces command.
This had two consequences of opposite importance.
On the one hand, this had a positive effect in the sense that the children’s children thus found a “natural father” instead of a suspicious stepfather and an evil stepmother, and their status immediately increased and acquired a “legitimate” appearance.
But on the other hand, the close interaction of the headquarters of the DShCh with the previously superior, but now unknown how related, headquarters of combined arms formations was disrupted. The airborne units intended to act in the interests of combined arms formations ceased to obey their command, which, in my opinion, sharply reduced the effectiveness of their combat use. Apparently the best solution would be such a scheme of subordination: administratively - to the commander of the Airborne Forces (recruitment, development of methods and forms of action, weapons and military equipment, uniforms and equipment), operationally (combat use) - to the commanders of operational and operational-strategic formations in the interests of which this formation intended to be used.
However, when it began in 1989. With the collapse of the Soviet Armed Forces, all this already played little role. But that is another story…
^

Differences between Airborne Forces and DShV


If the Airborne Forces, according to the established opinion, are characterized by their use in the form of large-scale (1-2 airborne divisions) airborne operations (VDO) with goals and objectives of an operational and operational-strategic nature at great depths (up to 100-150 km or more) , then the idea of ​​​​using DShV lies in the area of ​​​​rather purely tactical or, at most, operational-tactical. If, for the Airborne Forces, the issue of organizing interaction with the Ground Forces (GF) is not strictly considered - they are thrown out in the interests of no less than the front (group of fronts), and even the Supreme High Command (SHC), then for the Airborne Forces this is very urgent. As a matter of fact, DShCh do not even have their own goals, but only a task. (They act within the framework of the goal set by their senior commander - the combined arms commander. This “macro goal” determines the “micro goal” of the landing forces, also determines the task, the composition of the forces, and the method of use.) Thus, we can highlight the main all-determining feature of the airborne assault forces - their use is carried out in accordance with the goals and objectives of the ground combined arms command authority, as a rule, at the army-corps level, or, in some cases, even at the division level. The lower the command level is hierarchically, the smaller, as a rule, is the scale of the forces involved. If the Airborne Forces operate in divisions, then the Airborne Forces operate in companies and battalions, less often in a brigade/regiment.

Unlike the Airborne Forces, which had their own large “Gaizhyunay training” - the 44th Airborne Forces; The DShV were staffed by junior commanders and specialists, mostly those who had graduated from the training divisions of the Ground Forces and, to a lesser extent, Gaizhunai students.
^

Uniforms and equipment


Due to the fact that the DShV were organizationally part of the Ground Forces, initially their uniforms, equipment and allowance standards almost completely corresponded to those of the motorized rifle troops. The command did not want to pay attention to the discrepancy between a number of elements of the combined arms uniform and equipment and the landing specifics, and it did not take into account the moral factor. In general, until mid. 1983, the entire DShV l/s wore the usual motorized rifle uniform - however, due to a very obvious discrepancy, the standard duffel bags were replaced with RD-54 airborne backpacks. However, at the same time, there were also “non-statutory” deviations from this rule. Thus, one could see Airborne “birds” on red buttonholes, and those leaving active service tried to get a “normal” landing uniform - with a vest and beret - and in this form go “for demobilization”. To perform parachute jumps, they were issued so-called. "jumping" jumpsuits of the Airborne Forces.

In the summer of 1983, literally before the death of the CPSU Secretary General L.I. Brezhnev, it was decided to normalize the situation and transfer the Airborne Forces to the supply standards and form of the Airborne Forces, which was done almost everywhere by the spring of next year. Both soldiers and officers willingly put on blue berets and vests, quickly getting rid of the disgusted and despised “red color”.

For a combat situation, you can describe the standard appearance of a Soviet paratrooper like this. Underwear incl. and a vest (a T-shirt, with long sleeves and a double-knit vest, i.e. insulated); so-called "jumping" jumpsuit in greenish-olive color; a cloth helmet that fits the head (in winter - insulated with lining), boots with side lacing (or, less commonly, with belts); finally - a camouflage KZS (protective mesh suit) or a special camouflage suit. In winter, a warm suit consisting of a short jacket and trousers was worn; everything is khaki. Equipment (ammunition) - depending on the specialty. A must for everyone is the RD-54 paratrooper backpack. In addition to this, there could be: additional general-purpose pouches for AK magazines, a pouch for SVD sniper rifle magazines, backpacks for carrying RPG shots, etc. For parachute jumps, special cases for small arms and a GK-30 cargo container were used.

Also, in mid. In the 80s, to supply airborne assault vehicles, a BVD transport and unloading vest was developed, structurally reminiscent of the GeDeeR landing vest. However, he never entered the army en masse.
^

ORGANIZATION AND ARMAMENT


Speaking about the organizational structure (OSS) and the supply of weapons and equipment (WME) of units and units of the DShV, the following reservations should immediately be made. Firstly, the DShV is subject to the same rules and features that were characteristic of the entire SA, namely, some differences in the general equipment and equipment of weapons and military equipment from unit to unit. Secondly, changes over time - the OShS and the equipment of weapons and military equipment gradually changed. This applied to both lower divisions and the general structure of units. Thirdly, the author has not yet been able to establish the ORS with 100% accuracy in accordance with time periods and local characteristics; which is connected with the notorious secrecy regime in force in the USSR Armed Forces.
All this makes the problem of restoring the historical OSH DShV quite problematic and requires separate serious research. Below, I present only the fundamental structure of the ODSB and ODSB.

Unfortunately, I do not know in detail the initial organization of the air assault brigades. Therefore, you will have to limit yourself to only the general structure. Structurally, the brigade consisted of: an air group consisting of two helicopter regiments - combat (bvp) and transport-combat (tbvp), a total of 80 Mi-8T, 20 Mi-6A and 20 Mi-24A; three parachute landing battalions (standard for the Airborne Forces OShS) and one air assault battalion (the VShB had the original OSHS reinforced compared to the PDB) battalion. The brigades also had artillery, anti-tank, anti-aircraft and special units. It is believed that the brigades had a fairly powerful composition, which was generally not typical for Soviet airborne units of that period. The brigade had the status of a tactical unit - i.e. was equal to the division.

Some brigades had a structure different from that presented above. Thus, the organizational structure of the 83rd brigade was distinguished by the presence of only two parachute (1st and 2nd) and one airborne assault (3rd) battalions. And the organizational structure of the 56th Guards. brigade that fought in 1980-89. in Afghanistan, was distinguished by the presence of three air assault (1st, 2nd, 3rd) and one parachute (4th) battalions. The brigade had a non-standard organization and organizational structure odshp differed from the brigades by the presence of only two battalions: the 1st parachute assault (on foot) and the 2nd air assault (on BMD), as well as a slightly reduced composition of the units of the regimental set. The total strength of the regiment deployed in wartime states reached 1.5-1.6 thousand people.

Organizational structure odshb in the European theater of operations and the Far Eastern theater of operations was generally similar to the OShS of the pdb brigades, but also included a fourth company - an air assault (on a BMD) and a military platoon (either with a BMD or on a UAZ-469), and in the mortar battery the number of barrels increased to 8 units. The total strength of the battalion deployed throughout the wartime states reached 650-670 people.

In the winter-spring of 1988, organizational changes began and were completed by the summer of 1990, i.e. by the time the brigades were renamed airborne and reassigned to the command of the USSR Airborne Forces. The brigade was significantly lightened by removing all armored vehicles from there and removing the airborne assault battalion on the BMD/BTRD from its composition.

RESULTS

As mentioned earlier, in 1989-90, in connection with the transfer of airborne units to the Airborne Forces, major changes were made. Most air assault brigades are being reorganized into airborne brigades that are greatly lightened in armament (the actual process of lightening was started earlier); At the same time, several brigades are disbanded (57th and 58th), and the 39th is transformed into the 224th Airborne Training Center. It was decided to disband all of the individual air assault battalions. In the summer of 1990, all major transformations had already been completed. The brigades were reorganized, and most of the battalions were disbanded. As of November of this year, only 5 battalions remained from the former ones.
The general picture of the transformations can be seen in the tables below.

Number



Transformations

11 odshbr

Mogocha and Amazar (Chita region)*

In 1988, the helicopter regiment was withdrawn from service. And by Aug. 1. 1990 transferred to air-des. states. brigades.

13 odshbr

Magdagachi (Amur region)*

In 1988, the helicopter regiment was withdrawn from service.

21 odshbr

Kutaisi and Tsulukidze (Georgia)



23 odshbr

Kremenchug (Ukraine)

In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to air-desert states. brigades.

35th Guards odshbr

Cottbus (GDR)**

In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to air-desert states. brigades.

36 odshbr

urban-type settlement Garbolovo (Leningrad region)

In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to air-desert states. brigades.

37 odshbr

Chernyakhovsk (Kaliningrad region)

In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to air-desert states. brigades.

38th Guards Vienna Oshbr

Brest (Belarus)

In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to air-desert states. brigades.

39 odshbr

Khyrov (Ukraine)

In the spring of 1990, it was reorganized into the 224 Airborne Troops Training Center.

40 odshbr

With. Great Korenikha - Nikolaev (Ukraine)

In the summer of 1990, she was transferred to the airborne staff. brigades. And completely redeployed to Nikolaev.

56th Guards odshbr

village Azadbash (district of Chirchik, Uzbekistan) ***

In the winter of 1989, it was withdrawn from Afghanistan to the city of Yolotan (Turkmenistan). In the summer of 1990 it was transferred to air-desert states. brigades.

57 odshbr

village Aktogay (Taldy-Kurgan region, Kazakhstan)

Transferred to the village. Georgievka, Semipalatinsk region. (Kazakhstan) and disbanded there in 1989.

58 odshbr

Kremenchug (Ukraine)

Disbanded in December 1989.

83 odshbr

Bialogyard (Poland)

Transferred to the city of Ussuriysk (Primorsky Territory) in 1989. In the summer of 1990 transferred to the air-desert states. brigades.

128 odshbr

Stavropol (Stavropol AK)

Disbanded at the beginning. 1990.

130 odshbr

Abakan (Khakassian Autonomous Okrug)

Disbanded at the beginning. 1990.

1318 odshp

Borovukha-1 – Borogla (Polotsk district, Belarus)

Disbanded in August 1989.

1319 odshp

Kyakhta (Chita region)

Disbanded in March 1988.


The individual battalions were dealt with as follows: in 1989 (maximum, early 1990) all battalions with PPD on the territory of the USSR were disbanded, simultaneously redeploying those in groups of troops in Europe to the USSR. Then, before the beginning. 1991 they were disbanded too. Only the 901st battalion survived.


Number

Point of permanent deployment at the beginning of transformations

Transformations

139 odshb

Kaliningrad (Kaliningrad region)



145 odshb

village Sergeevka (Primorsky Territory)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

899 odshb

Burg (GDR)

In 1989 he was transferred to the village. Bear Lakes (Moscow region). Disbanded no later than early 1991.

900 odshb

Leipzig – Schinau (GDR)

Brought to the territory of the USSR in 1989 and disbanded.

901 odshb

in the region of the village Riečki (Czechoslovakia)

In 1989 he was transferred to Aluskene (Latvia). In the beginning. 1991 disbandment began, but soon the battalion was redeployed* and in May 1991 transferred to Abkhazia (Gudauta).

902 odshb

Kecskemét (Hungary)

In 1989 he was transferred to Grodno (Belarus).

903 odshb

Grodno (Belarus)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

904 odshb

Vladimir-Volynsky (Ukraine)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

905 odshb

Bendery (Moldova)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

906 odshb

village Khada-Bulak (Chita region, district of Borzya)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

907 odshb

Birobidzhan (Jewish Autonomous Region)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

908 odshb

village Goncharovo (Ukraine, Chernigov region)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

1011 odshb

Art. Maryina Gorka - Pukhovichi (Belarus)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

1044 odshb

Neuss-Lager (GDR, in the region of Königsbrück)

Transferred in 1989 to Tuarage (Lithuania). Disbanded no later than Jan. 1991.

1156 odshb

Novograd-Volynsky (Ukraine, Zhytomyr region)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

1179 odshb

Petrozavodsk (Karelia)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

1151 odshb

Polotsk (Belarus)

Disbanded no later than 1989.

1185 odshb

Ravensbrück (GDR)

Transferred in 1989 to Võru (Estonia). Disbanded no later than Jan. 1991.

1604 odshb

Ulan-Ude (Buryat Autonomous Okrug)

Disbanded no later than 1989


Notes:

* By this time it was already called a separate parachute battalion.

Thus, at the beginning of 1991, the former airborne assault units within the Airborne Forces were represented by eleven separate airborne brigades.

In 1989, it was decided to transfer the main part of the helicopters from the Air Force to the Army and, thus, significantly improve the capabilities of the air assault troops. However, following this, at the beginning of December 1989, an order was issued to reassign the DShV to the command of the Airborne Forces, thereby neutralizing the formation of army aviation, which was positive for the DShV. Coordination between the air assault formations and the command of combined arms formations in the interests of which they were supposed to act was disrupted. The reasons for the transfer of the Airborne Forces to the administrative and operational subordination of the Airborne Forces are not clear. Without a doubt, the existing similarities in recruitment and training do not explain everything. It is possible that the reason lies (as often happens) in non-military issues. The inattention of the Airborne Forces command to the development of the doctrine of using helicopter landings in the early and middle stages (60s-early 80s) resulted in a kind of “envy” of the “competitor”; Moreover, the successes of the “helicopter landing” doctrine were evident both for us and for the NATO members. In principle, the logical (and theoretically correct) decision to concentrate all airborne forces under one administrative command was unjustifiably supplemented by their operational unification. The command incorrectly assessed the dependence of airborne forces on helicopter support, considering it similar to the support of airborne forces by military air transport aircraft and not paying attention to the mandatory symbiosis of landing forces with helicopters, without which the effectiveness of the landing force drops sharply.