Causes: On September 6, 1991, an armed coup was carried out in Chechnya - the Supreme Council of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was dispersed by armed supporters of the Executive Committee of the National Congress of the Chechen People. The pretext was that on August 19, 1991, the party leadership in Grozny, unlike the Russian leadership, supported the actions of the State Emergency Committee.

With the consent of the leadership of the Russian parliament, a Provisional Supreme Council was created from a small group of deputies of the Supreme Council of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and representatives of the OKCHN, which was recognized by the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation as the highest authority on the territory of the republic. However, less than 3 weeks later, OKCHN dissolved it and announced that it was taking full power upon itself.

On October 1, 1991, by decision of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, the Chechen-Ingush Republic was divided into the Chechen and Ingush Republics (without defining borders).

At the same time, parliamentary elections of the Chechen Republic were held. According to many experts, all this was just a staging (10 - 12% of voters took part, voting took place only in 6 of the 14 districts of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic). In some areas, the number of voters exceeded the number of registered voters. At the same time, the OKCHN executive committee announced a general mobilization of men aged 15 to 65 years and brought its National Guard to full combat readiness.

The Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR officially declared the non-recognition of these elections, since they were held in violation of the current legislation.

With his first decree on November 1, 1991, Dudayev declared the independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI) from the RSFSR, which was not recognized by either the Russian authorities or any foreign states.

Consequences

On December 1, 1994, a decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On some measures to strengthen law and order in the North Caucasus” was issued, which ordered all persons illegally possessing weapons to voluntarily surrender them to Russian law enforcement agencies by December 15.

On December 11, 1994, on the basis of the decree of Russian President Boris Yeltsin “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic,” units of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs entered the territory of Chechnya.

On August 16, 1996, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev and Alexander Lebed in the village of Novye Atagi announced the creation of a supervisory commission to monitor compliance with the ceasefire conditions, as well as a supervisory council, which was to include the secretaries of the Security Councils of Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria.

On August 31, 1996, the Khasavyurt Agreements were concluded between the Russian Federation and the ChRI, according to which the decision on the status of the ChRI was postponed until 2001. It was also planned to exchange prisoners on the principle of “all for all,” about which human rights activists discretely said that “this condition was not observed by the Chechens.”

In 1997, Aslan Maskhadov was elected president of the ChRI.

2nd company:

It started in 1999 and actually lasted until 2009. The most active combat phase occurred in 1999-2000

RESULTS

Despite the official cancellation of the counter-terrorism operation, the situation in the region has not become calmer, quite the opposite. Militants waging guerrilla warfare have become more active, and incidents of terrorist acts have become more frequent. Beginning in the fall of 2009, a number of major special operations were carried out to eliminate gangs and militant leaders. In response, a series of terrorist attacks were carried out, including, for the first time in a long time, in Moscow. Military clashes, terrorist attacks and police operations occur not only on the territory of Chechnya, but also on the territory of Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria. In certain territories, the CTO regime was repeatedly temporarily introduced.

Some analysts believed that the escalation could develop into a “third Chechen war.”

In September 2009, the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Rashid Nurgaliev, stated that more than 700 militants were neutralized in the North Caucasus in 2009. . The head of the FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, said that almost 800 militants and their accomplices were detained in the North Caucasus in 2009.

Starting from May 15, 2009, Russian security forces intensified operations against militant groups in the mountainous regions of Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan, which caused a retaliatory intensification of terrorist activities by militants.

Artillery and aviation are periodically involved in participation in operations.

Culture of the USSR at the turn of the 1980s-1990s.

Culture and perestroika. At the turn of the 80-90s, changes occurred in government policy in the spiritual life of society. This was expressed, in particular, in the refusal of cultural management bodies to administer administrative methods of managing literature, art, and science. The arena for heated public debate was the periodical press - the newspapers "Moscow News", "Arguments and Facts", the magazine "Ogonyok". The authors of the published articles attempted to understand the causes of the “deformations” of socialism and determine their attitude to the perestroika processes. The publication of previously unknown facts of Russian history in the post-October period caused polarization of public opinion. A significant part of the liberal-minded intelligentsia actively supported the reform course of M. S. Gorbachev. But many groups of the population, including specialists and scientists, saw the ongoing reforms as “betrayal” to the cause of socialism and actively opposed them. Different attitudes towards the transformations taking place in the country led to conflicts in the governing bodies of creative associations of the intelligentsia. At the end of the 80s, several Moscow writers formed an alternative committee to the Union of Writers of the USSR, “Writers in Support of Perestroika” (“April”). An identical association was formed by Leningrad writers (“Commonwealth”). The creation and activities of these groups led to a split in the USSR Writers' Union. The Union of Spiritual Revival of Russia, created on the initiative of scientists and writers, declared support for the democratic transformations taking place in the country. At the same time, some representatives of the intelligentsia negatively greeted the course of perestroika. The views of this part of the intelligentsia were reflected in the article by N. Andreeva, a teacher at one of the universities, “I Can’t Give Up Principles,” published in March 1988 in the newspaper “Soviet Russia.” The beginning of “perestroika” gave rise to a powerful movement for the liberation of culture from ideological pressure.

The desire for a philosophical understanding of the past affected the art of cinema (T. Abuladze’s film “Repentance”). Numerous studio theaters emerged. New theater groups tried to find their way in art. Exhibitions of artists little known to a wide circle of viewers of the 80s were organized - P. N. Filonov, V. V. Kandinsky, D. P. Shterenberg. With the collapse of the USSR, all-Union organizations of the creative intelligentsia ceased their activities. The results of perestroika for Russian culture turned out to be complex and ambiguous. Cultural life has become richer and more diverse. At the same time, the perestroika processes resulted in significant losses for science and the education system. Market relations began to penetrate into the sphere of literature and art.

Ticket No. 6

Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union at the end of the 20th – beginning of the 21st century.

On June 25, 1988, an agreement on trade and cooperation between the EEC and the USSR was signed, and on June 24, 1994, a bilateral agreement on partnership and cooperation between the European Union and Russia (came into force on December 1, 1997). The first meeting of the EU-Russia Cooperation Council took place in London on January 27, 1998.

In 1999-2001 The European Parliament adopted a series of critical resolutions on the situation in Chechnya.

25 years ago, on December 11, 1994, the First Chechen War began. With the issuance of the decree of the Russian President “On measures to ensure law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic,” Russian regular army forces entered the territory of Chechnya. The document from the "Caucasian Knot" presents a chronicle of events that preceded the start of the war and describes the course of hostilities up to the "New Year's" assault on Grozny on December 31, 1994.

The first Chechen war lasted from December 1994 to August 1996. According to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 1994-1995, a total of about 26 thousand people died in Chechnya, including 2 thousand Russian military personnel, 10-15 thousand militants, and the rest of the losses were civilians. According to General A. Lebed's estimates, the number of deaths among civilians alone amounted to 70-80 thousand people and among federal troops - 6-7 thousand people.

Chechnya's exit from Moscow's control

The turn of the 1980-1990s. on post-Soviet space was marked by a “parade of sovereignties” - Soviet republics of different levels (both the USSR and the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) one after another adopted declarations of state sovereignty. On June 12, 1990, the first Republican Congress of People's Deputies adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR. On August 6, Boris Yeltsin uttered his famous phrase in Ufa: “Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow.”

On November 23-25, 1990, the Chechen National Congress was held in Grozny, which elected the Executive Committee (later transformed into the Executive Committee of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People (OCCHN). Major General Dzhokhar Dudayev became its chairman. The Congress adopted a declaration on the formation of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-Cho A few days later, on November 27, 1990, the Supreme Council of the Republic adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty.Later, in July 1991, the second congress of the OKCHN announced the withdrawal of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-Cho from the USSR and the RSFSR.

During the August 1991 putsch, the Chechen-Ingush Republican Committee of the CPSU, the Supreme Council and the government of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the State Emergency Committee. In turn, OKCHN, which was in opposition, opposed the State Emergency Committee and demanded the resignation of the government and secession from the USSR and the RSFSR. Ultimately, a political split occurred in the republic between supporters of the OKCHN (Dzhokhar Dudayev) and the Supreme Council (Zavgaev).

On November 1, 1991, the elected President of Chechnya, D. Dudayev, issued a decree “On declaring the sovereignty of the Chechen Republic.” In response to this, on November 8, 1991, B.N. Yeltsin signed a decree introducing a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia, but practical measures for its implementation failed - two planes with special forces landing at the airfield in Khankala were blocked by supporters of independence. On November 10, 1991, the OKCHN executive committee called for breaking off relations with Russia.

Already in November 1991, supporters of D. Dudayev began seizing military camps, weapons and property of the Armed Forces and internal troops on the territory of the Chechen Republic. On November 27, 1991, D. Dudayev issued a decree on the nationalization of weapons and equipment military units located on the territory of the republic. By June 8, 1992, all federal troops left the territory of Chechnya, leaving behind a large amount of equipment, weapons and ammunition.

In the fall of 1992, the situation in the region sharply deteriorated again, this time in connection with the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in the Prigorodny region. Dzhokhar Dudayev declared the neutrality of Chechnya, but during the escalation of the conflict, Russian troops entered the administrative border of Chechnya. On November 10, 1992, Dudayev declared a state of emergency, and the creation of a mobilization system and self-defense forces of the Chechen Republic began.

In February 1993, disagreements between the Chechen parliament and D. Dudayev intensified. The emerging disagreements ultimately led to the dissolution of parliament and the consolidation of opposition political figures in Chechnya around Umar Avturkhanov, who became the head of the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic. The contradictions between the structures of Dudayev and Avturkhanov grew into an assault on Grozny by the Chechen opposition.

After an unsuccessful assault, the Russian Security Council decided on a military operation against Chechnya. B.N. Yeltsin put forward an ultimatum: either the bloodshed in Chechnya stops, or Russia will be forced to “take extreme measures.”

Preparing for war

Active military operations on the territory of Chechnya have been carried out since the end of September 1994. In particular, opposition forces carried out targeted bombing of military targets on the territory of the republic. The armed formations that opposed Dudayev were armed with Mi-24 attack helicopters and Su-24 attack aircraft, which had no identification marks. According to some reports, Mozdok became the base for the deployment of aviation. However, the press service of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District, the Air Force command and the Army Aviation command ground forces categorically denied that the helicopters and attack aircraft bombing Chechnya belonged to Russian army.

On November 30, 1994, Russian President B.N. Yeltsin signed secret decree No. 2137c “On measures to restore constitutional legality and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic,” which provided for “disarmament and liquidation of armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic.”

According to the text of the decree, from December 1 it was prescribed, in particular, “to implement measures to restore constitutional legality and order in the Chechen Republic,” to begin disarmament and liquidation of armed groups, and to organize negotiations to resolve the armed conflict on the territory of the Chechen Republic by peaceful means.

On November 30, 1994, P. Grachev stated that “an operation has begun to forcefully transfer Russian army officers fighting against Dudayev on the side of the opposition to the central regions of Russia.” On the same day, in a telephone conversation between the Russian Minister of Defense and Dudayev, an agreement was reached on the “immunity of Russian citizens captured in Chechnya.”

On December 8, 1994, a closed meeting was held State Duma Russian Federation regarding the Chechen events. At the meeting, a resolution was adopted “On the situation in the Chechen Republic and measures for its political settlement,” according to which the activities of the executive branch in resolving the conflict were recognized as unsatisfactory. A group of deputies sent a telegram to B.N. Yeltsin, in which they warned him of responsibility for the bloodshed in Chechnya and demanded a public explanation of their position.

On December 9, 1994, the President of the Russian Federation issued decree No. 2166 “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.” By this decree, the president instructed the Russian government to “use all means available to the state to ensure state security, legality, the rights and freedoms of citizens, protect public order, fight crime, and disarm all illegal armed groups.” On the same day, the government of the Russian Federation adopted resolution No. 1360 “On ensuring state security and territorial integrity Russian Federation, legality, rights and freedoms of citizens, disarmament of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and adjacent regions North Caucasus", which entrusted a number of ministries and departments with the responsibility for introducing and maintaining a special regime similar to an emergency on the territory of Chechnya, without formally declaring a state of emergency or martial law.

The documents adopted on December 9 provided for the use of troops of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the concentration of which continued on the administrative borders of Chechnya. Meanwhile, negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides were supposed to begin on December 12 in Vladikavkaz.

Beginning of a full-scale military campaign

On December 11, 1994, Boris Yeltsin signed decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public activities on the territory of the Chechen Republic,” repealing decree No. 2137c. On the same day, the president addressed the citizens of Russia, in which, in particular, he stated: “Our goal is to find a political solution to the problems of one of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation - the Chechen Republic - to protect its citizens from armed extremism.”

On the day the decree was signed, units of the troops of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops advanced in three columns from three directions: Mozdok (from the north through areas of Chechnya controlled by the anti-Dudaev opposition), Vladikavkaz (from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia) and Kizlyar (from the east, from the territory of Dagestan).

On the same day, December 11, an anti-war rally was held in Moscow, organized by the Russia's Choice party. Yegor Gaidar and Grigory Yavlinsky demanded to stop the movement of troops and announced a break with the policies of Boris Yeltsin. A few days later the communists also spoke out against the war.

Troops moving from the north passed unhindered through Chechnya to settlements located approximately 10 km north of Grozny, where they first encountered armed resistance. Here, near the village of Dolinsky, on December 12, Russian troops were fired from a Grad launcher by a detachment of field commander Vakha Arsanov. As a result of the shelling, 6 Russian soldiers were killed and 12 wounded, and more than 10 armored vehicles were burned. The Grad installation was destroyed by return fire.

On the line Dolinsky - the village of Pervomaiskaya, Russian troops stopped and installed fortifications. Mutual shelling began. During December 1994, as a result of shelling of populated areas by Russian troops, numerous casualties occurred among civilians.

Another column of Russian troops moving from Dagestan was stopped on December 11 even before crossing the border with Chechnya, in the Khasavyurt region, where mainly Akkin Chechens live. Crowds of local residents blocked the columns of troops, while individual groups of military personnel were captured and then transported to Grozny.

A column of Russian troops moving from the west through Ingushetia was blocked by local residents and fired upon near the village of Varsuki (Ingushetia). Three armored personnel carriers and four vehicles were damaged. As a result of the return fire, the first civilian casualties occurred. The Ingush village of Gazi-Yurt was shelled from helicopters. Using force, Russian troops passed through the territory of Ingushetia. On December 12, this column of federal troops was fired upon from the village of Assinovskaya in Chechnya. There were killed and wounded among the Russian military personnel; in response, fire was also opened on the village, which led to the death of local residents. Near the village of Novy Sharoy, a crowd of residents of nearby villages blocked the road. Further advance of Russian troops would lead to the need to shoot at unarmed people, and then to clashes with a militia detachment organized in each of the villages. These units were armed with machine guns, machine guns and grenade launchers. In the area located south of the village of Bamut, regular armed formations of the ChRI, which had heavy weapons, were based.

As a result, in the west of Chechnya, federal forces consolidated along the line of the conditional border of the Chechen Republic in front of the villages of Samashki - Davydenko - New Sharoy - Achkhoy-Martan - Bamut.

On December 15, 1994, against the backdrop of the first setbacks in Chechnya, Russian Defense Minister P. Grachev removed from command and control a group of senior officers who refused to send troops into Chechnya and expressed a desire “before the start of a major military operation that could entail large casualties among civilians.” population", receive a written order from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The leadership of the operation was entrusted to the commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Colonel General A. Mityukhin.

On December 16, 1994, the Federation Council adopted a resolution in which it invited the President of the Russian Federation to immediately stop hostilities and the deployment of troops and enter into negotiations. On the same day, Chairman of the Russian Government V.S. Chernomyrdin announced his readiness to personally meet with Dzhokhar Dudayev, subject to the disarmament of his forces.

On December 17, 1994, Yeltsin sent a telegram to D. Dudayev, in which the latter was ordered to appear in Mozdok to the plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in Chechnya, Minister of Nationalities and Regional Policy N.D. Egorov and FSB Director S.V. Stepashin and sign a document about the surrender of weapons and a ceasefire. The text of the telegram, in particular, read verbatim: “I suggest you immediately meet with my authorized representatives Egorov and Stepashin in Mozdok.” At the same time, the President of the Russian Federation issued decree No. 2200 “On the restoration of federal territorial executive authorities on the territory of the Chechen Republic.”

Siege and assault of Grozny

Starting from December 18, Grozny was bombed and bombed multiple times. Bombs and rockets fell mainly on areas where residential buildings were located and there were obviously no military installations. As a result, there were large casualties among the civilian population. Despite the Russian President's announcement on December 27 that the bombing of the city had ceased, air strikes continued to strike Grozny.

In the second half of December, Russian federal troops attacked Grozny from the north and west, leaving the southwestern, southern and southeastern directions practically unblocked. The remaining open corridors connecting Grozny and numerous villages of Chechnya with the outside world allowed the civilian population to leave the zone of shelling, bombing and fighting.

On the night of December 23, federal troops attempted to cut off Grozny from Argun and gained a foothold in the area of ​​the airport in Khankala, southeast of Grozny.

On December 26, bombing of populated areas in rural areas began: in the next three days alone, about 40 villages were hit.

On December 26, it was announced for the second time about the creation of a government of national revival of the Chechen Republic headed by S. Khadzhiev and the readiness of the new government to discuss the issue of creating a confederation with Russia and enter into negotiations with it, without putting forward demands for the withdrawal of troops.

On the same day, at a meeting of the Russian Security Council, a decision was made to send troops to Grozny. Before this, no specific plans were developed to capture the capital of Chechnya.

On December 27, B.N. Yeltsin made a televised address to the citizens of Russia, in which he explained the need for a forceful solution to the Chechen problem. B.N. Yeltsin stated that N.D. Egorov, A.V. Kvashnin and S.V. Stepashin were entrusted with conducting negotiations with the Chechen side. On December 28, Sergei Stepashin clarified that this is not about negotiations, but about presenting an ultimatum.

On December 31, 1994, the assault on Grozny by Russian army units began. It was planned that four groups would launch “powerful concentric attacks” and unite in the city center. For a variety of reasons, the troops immediately suffered heavy losses. The 131st (Maikop) separate motorized rifle brigade and the 81st (Samara) motorized rifle regiment, advancing from the northwestern direction under the command of General K.B. Pulikovsky, were almost completely destroyed. More than 100 military personnel were captured.

As stated by deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation L.A. Ponomarev, G.P. Yakunin and V.L. Sheinis stated that “a large-scale military action was unleashed in Grozny and its environs. On December 31, after fierce bombing and artillery shelling, about 250 units of armored vehicles. Dozens of them broke through to the city center. The armored columns were cut into pieces by the defenders of Grozny and began to be systematically destroyed. Their crews were killed, captured or scattered throughout the city. The troops that entered the city suffered a crushing defeat."

The head of the press service of the Russian government admitted that the Russian army suffered losses in manpower and equipment during the New Year's offensive on Grozny.

January 2, 1995 press service Russian government reported that the center of the Chechen capital is “completely controlled by federal troops” and the “presidential palace” is blocked.

The war in Chechnya lasted until August 31, 1996. It was accompanied by terrorist attacks outside Chechnya (Budennovsk, Kizlyar). The actual result of the campaign was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements on August 31, 1996. The agreement was signed by Secretary of the Russian Security Council Alexander Lebed and Chief of Staff of Chechen militants Aslan Maskhadov. As a result of the Khasavyurt agreements, decisions were made on “deferred status” (the issue of the status of Chechnya was supposed to be resolved before December 31, 2001). Chechnya has become de facto independent state.

Notes

1. Chechnya: ancient turmoil // Izvestia, 11/27/1995.
2. How many died in Chechnya // Arguments and Facts, 1996.
3. The assault that never happened // Radio Liberty, 10/17/2014.
4. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On measures to restore constitutional legality and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic."
5. Chronicle of an armed conflict // Human Rights Center "Memorial".
6. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict."
7. Chronicle of an armed conflict // Human Rights Center "Memorial".
8. Chronicle of an armed conflict // Human Rights Center "Memorial".
9. 1994: War in Chechnya // Obshchaya Gazeta, 12/18.04.2001.
10. 20 years of the Chechen war // Gazeta.ru, 12/11/2014.
11. Chronicle of an armed conflict // Human Rights Center "Memorial".
12. Grozny: bloody snow of New Year's Eve // ​​Independent Military Review, 12/10/2004.
13. Chronicle of an armed conflict // Human Rights Center "Memorial".
14. Signing of the Khasavyurt agreements in 1996 // RIA Novosti, 08/31/2011.

The First Chechen War is a military conflict between government forces of the Russian Federation and Chechen armed forces in 1994-1996. The goal of the Russian authorities was to establish their sovereignty over the territory, which declared the independence of Chechnya. The Russian army managed to establish its control over most of the Chechen settlements, but the task of suppressing the resistance of the Chechen separatists was not solved. The fighting was characterized by a large number of casualties among military and civilians. In 1996, the Russian leadership agreed to sign a peace agreement, according to which government troops were withdrawn from Chechnya, and the separatist leaders agreed to postpone the issue of recognition of independence for the future.

The weakening of state power in the USSR during the years of perestroika led to the intensification of nationalist movements, including in Checheno-Ingushetia. In 1990, the National Congress of the Chechen People was created, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed by General Dzhokhar Dudayev. In 1991, a dual power actually developed in the republic: the National Congress of the Chechen People opposed the official party-state apparatus.

During the August events of 1991, the official leadership of Checheno-Ingushetia supported the State Emergency Committee. After the failure of the attempt to remove M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin from power on September 6, 1991, D. Dudayev announced the dissolution of the Chechen republican state structures, his Dudayev supporters stormed the building of the Supreme Council of Checheno-Ingushetia. The Russian authorities initially supported the actions of the Dudayevites, but it soon became clear that the new Chechen authorities did not recognize the supremacy of Russian laws on their territory. A massive anti-Russian campaign began in Chechnya, genocide of the entire non-Chechen population.
On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the President of Chechnya, and nationalist sentiments prevailed among the deputies of parliament. These elections were declared illegal by the Russian Federation. On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree introducing a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia. The situation in the republic worsened - armed separatist groups blocked the buildings of internal affairs and state security bodies, military camps, and transport arteries. In fact, a state of emergency was not introduced; the withdrawal of Russian military units, internal troops and police units from the republic began, which was completed by the summer of 1992. At the same time, the separatists captured and plundered a significant part of the military warehouses, obtaining large stocks of weapons, including heavy ones.

The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the collapse of Checheno-Ingushetia. Malgobek, Nazranovsky and part of Sunzhensky district, inhabited by Ingush, formed the Republic of Ingushetia, whose authorities advocated further development of its people within the Russian Federation. The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ceased to exist on December 10, 1992. After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation.

In 1991-1994, Chechnya was a de facto independent state, but not legally recognized by anyone. Officially, it was called the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, had state symbols (flag, coat of arms, anthem), authorities - the president, parliament, government, courts. On March 12, 1992, its Constitution was adopted, declaring Chechnya an independent secular state. The state system of Chechnya turned out to be ineffective and took on a criminal character. Armed attacks on railway trains took on a massive scale, which forced the Russian government to decide to stop railway traffic through the territory of Chechnya from October 1994. Chechen criminal groups received more than 4 trillion rubles using false advice notes. Hostage-taking and slave trading became commonplace. Despite the fact that the Chechen authorities did not transfer taxes to the all-Russian budget, funds from federal sources came to Chechnya, in particular, for the payment of pensions and social benefits. However, Dudayev's leadership spent this money at their own discretion.

The reign of Dzhokhar Dudayev was marked by ethnic cleansing against the entire non-Chechen population, primarily Russians. Most non-Chechens were forced to leave Chechnya, expelled from their homes, and deprived of their property. Anti-Russian propaganda was fueled in the media, Russian cemeteries were desecrated. Both state and Muslim religious figures of independent Chechnya addressed the Chechens with calls to kill Russians. In the separatist camp, contradictions related to the division of power quickly emerged. Parliament tried to resist the authoritarian leadership style of Dzhakhar Dudayev. On April 17, 1993, the President of Chechnya announced the dissolution of the parliament and the constitutional court. On June 4 of the same year, an armed detachment of Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev finally dispersed a meeting of deputies of the Chechen parliament and the constitutional court. Thus, a coup d'etat took place in Chechnya, establishing the regime of personal power of Dzhokhar Dudayev. It was not until August 1994 that parliament's legislative powers were returned.

After the coup d'etat on June 4, 1993, the formation of an anti-Dudaev opposition began in the northern regions of Chechnya. The first opposition organization was the Committee of National Salvation (KNS), which intended to overthrow Dudayev's power by force. However, his troops were defeated. The CNS was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VCCR), which declared itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VSChR was recognized by the Russian authorities, who provided it with support, including weapons and volunteers.

Since the summer of 1994, the fighting between Dudayev’s supporters and the forces of the opposition VSChR has become widespread. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by the oppositionists. Tanks and artillery were used in battles. Military operations proceeded with varying degrees of success, relying on Russian assistance; the oppositionists twice (September 12 and October 15, 1994) tried to capture Grozny, but to no avail. The Russian authorities sought to prevent the defeat of the opposition and became increasingly drawn into the intra-Chechen conflict. After another failure in the assault on Grozny (November 26, 1994), Russian President B.N. Yeltsin decided to eliminate the Chechen problem by force.

On December 11, 1994, the decree “On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic” was signed. On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Russian army and internal troops, entered the territory of Chechnya from three sides - from the west (from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), from the northwest (from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia), from the east (from Kizlyar, from the territory of Dagestan).

The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt region of Dagestan by local residents - Akkin Chechens. The western group was also blocked by residents of Ingushetia, came under fire near the village of Barsuki, but, using force, broke through to Chechnya. On December 12, the Mozdok group approached the village of Dolinsky, 10 km from Grozny. Here Russian troops came under fire from a Chechen missile artillery installation"Grad" and entered the battle for the village.

On December 15, the Kizlyar group reached the village of Tolstoy-Yurt. On December 19, the Western group blocked Grozny from the west, bypassing the Sunzhensky ridge. The next day Dolinsky was occupied, the Mozdok group blocked Grozny from the north-west. The Kizlyar group approached the city from the east. Units of the 104th Airborne Division closed the routes to Grozny from the Argun Gorge. However, the approaches to the city from the south were not cut off.

On December 31, 1994, the assault on Grozny began, about 250 armored vehicles entered the city. In street battles, its extreme vulnerability was revealed, Russian troops turned out to be poorly prepared for combat operations, there was no reliable communication between units, there was no interaction and coordination of the actions of individual units. The expectation that the separatists would retreat in front of the armored rampart did not materialize. The western and eastern groups of Russian troops, having lost a significant part of their armored vehicles, were unable to break into the city. In the northern direction, the 131st Maikop Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 81st Petrakuvsky Motorized Rifle Regiment, under the command of General K.B. Pulikovsky, managed to break through to railway station and the Presidential Palace. But there they were surrounded and defeated.

Russian troops had to change tactics - instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, maneuverable air assault groups, supported by artillery and aviation, went into battle. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny. By January 9, 1995, the building of the Grozny Oil Institute and the airport were occupied. By January 19, the city center was cleared of separatists and the Presidential Palace was occupied. Chechen detachments retreated across the Sunzha River and took up defensive positions on Minutka Square. Open routes to the south allowed them to transfer reinforcements and ammunition to Grozny and quickly escape from attack.

By early February, the number of Russian troops in Chechnya had increased to 70 thousand people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the commander of the OGV. On February 3, 1995, the “South” group was formed and the blockade of Grozny from the south began. On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between Anatoly Kulikov and the chief General Staff The Armed Forces of Chechnya by Aslan Maskhadov on concluding a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, both sides were given the opportunity to remove the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. Active fighting in Grozny resumed on the 20th of February, but Chechen troops, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city. On March 6, 1995, Shamil Basayev’s detachment retreated from Chernorechye, the last area of ​​Grozny controlled by the separatists. As a result of the assault, the city was turned into ruins. After the fall of Grozny, new government bodies were organized in Chechnya, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov, who advocated the preservation of the Chechen Republic as part of the Russian Federation.

Meanwhile, Russian troops were establishing control over the lowland regions of Chechnya. The Russian command conducted active negotiations with the local population, urging them to expel the militants from populated areas. Federal troops occupied commanding heights above villages and cities. Thanks to such tactics, on March 15-23, detachments of Chechen militants left Argun (March 23), Shali (March 30), Gudermes (March 31). In the western part of Chechnya, since March 10, there have been battles for the village of Bamut. There, on April 7-8, detachments of internal troops and police carried out an operation to clear the village of Samashki from militants, during which civilians also died. The operation in Samashki caused a stir in the media around the world, had a negative impact on the image of the Russian army, and strengthened anti-Russian sentiment in Chechnya.

On April 15-16, the assault on Bamut began. Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. However, the militants retained the commanding heights above the village in their hands. The fighting for Bamut continued until 1996. But, in general, by April 1995, Russian troops occupied almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya; the separatists had to limit themselves to purely sabotage and guerrilla operations.
On April 28, 1995, the Russian side announced a suspension of hostilities on its part. On May 12, actions began to establish control over Mountainous Chechnya. The Russian troops struck the villages of Chiri-Yurt (at the entrance to the Argun Gorge) and Serzhen-Yurt (at the entrance to the Vedenskoye Gorge). Significant superiority in manpower and equipment allowed Russian troops, despite difficult mountain conditions and enemy resistance, to capture the regional centers of Vedeno (June 3), Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt (June 12). Thus, by the summer of 1995, most of the settlements in Chechnya came under the control of the federal authorities. Detachments of Chechen separatists switched to guerrilla warfare. They largely retained their fighting strength, enjoyed the support of the population of Chechnya, and the fight against them was to be long and intense. Chechen militants maneuvered widely throughout the republic, and already in May 1995 they reappeared near Grozny.

On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen militants numbering 195 people, led by Shamil Basayev, managed to drive into the territory of the Stavropol Territory in trucks. In the city of Budennovsk, after an attack on the building of the city department of internal affairs, the Basayevites occupied the city hospital and herded captured civilians into it. In total, about two thousand hostages ended up in the hands of terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. The leadership of Russian security forces decided to storm the hospital building. The battle lasted about four hours, but the terrorists held the main building of the hospital with most of the hostages. The second assault also ended in failure. After the failure of military action to free the hostages, negotiations began between the Chairman of the Russian Government V.S. Chernomyrdin and Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.

After the Budyonnovsk events, on June 19-22, negotiations were held in Grozny between the Russian and Chechen sides, at which it was decided to introduce a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period. At a new round of negotiations (June 27-30), an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners on the “all for all” principle, the disarmament of separatist groups, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, and the holding of free elections. In general, these agreements turned out to be beneficial for the separatists. The moratorium on military operations tied the hands of the Russian army; it could not conduct military operations. There was no real disarmament of the Chechen armed forces. The militants returned to their villages, where “self-defense units” were created.

At the same time, the partisan war against federal forces did not stop, local battles took place throughout Chechnya. From time to time, militant groups occupied large settlements, which had to be liberated using armored vehicles and aircraft. On October 6, 1995, against the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General A.A. An assassination attempt was made on Romanov and he was seriously wounded. This event contributed to the escalation of tensions and largely dashed hopes for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

On the eve of the elections of new authorities of the Chechen Republic, scheduled for December, the Russian leadership decided to replace Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov with the former leader of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Doku Zavgaev, who seemed more authoritative. On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes was captured by the detachments of Salman Raduev, Hunkar-Pasha Israpilov, and Sultan Gelikhanov. On December 14, battles for the city broke out, but only by December 20 did Russian troops clear Gudermes of militants. Against this background, on December 14-17, 1995, elections to local authorities were held in Chechnya. Separatist supporters announced in advance their boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Doku Zavgaev won the elections, receiving over 90% of the votes.

Hopes for stabilization of the situation in Chechnya as a result of the elections did not materialize. On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants numbering 256 people under the command of Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov carried out a raid on the city of Kizlyar in Dagestan. The militants' target was a helicopter base and an ammunition depot for federal forces. The terrorists managed to destroy two Mi-8 transport helicopters. When units of the Russian army began to approach the city and law enforcement, militants captured a hospital and a maternity hospital, driving about three thousand civilians into them. The federal authorities negotiated with the terrorists and agreed to provide them with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved from Kizlyar. In the village of Pervomaisky, the column was stopped, the militants captured the village. From January 11 to January 14, fruitless negotiations took place, and on January 15, federal troops began the assault on Pervomaisky. On January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of Chechen terrorists seized the passenger ship "Avrazia" and threatened to shoot the Russian hostages if the storming of Pervomaisky was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities. The battle for Pervomaiskoye lasted several days; on January 18, under the cover of darkness, the militants broke through the encirclement and fled to Chechnya.

On March 6, 1996, several groups of militants attacked Grozny, controlled by Russian troops. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city and fired at Russian checkpoints. Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, but when they retreated, the separatists took with them supplies of food, medicine and ammunition. By the spring of 1996, it became obvious that the war in Chechnya had become protracted and required large budget investments. In the context of the beginning of the 1996 presidential election campaign, the continuation of hostilities had a negative impact on B.N.’s chances. Yeltsin to retain his post.

On April 21, 1996, Russian aviation managed to destroy the President of Chechnya, Dzhokhar Dudayev, and on May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Chechen delegations was held in Moscow, at which a decision was made on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. On June 10 in Nazran, during the next round of negotiations, a new agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist detachments, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was again temporarily postponed.

After the re-election of B.N. Yeltsin as President of Russia (July 3, 1996), the new Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Alexander Lebed, announced the resumption of hostilities in Chechnya. However, by that time, the units of the Russian army in Chechnya had largely lost their combat effectiveness and were disoriented in terms of the goals of the war and the identification of the enemy. The majority of the Chechen population did not trust the local and federal authorities and viewed Russian soldiers as occupiers. The increased power of the military formations of the Chechen separatists was demonstrated by the August 1996 battles, when Russian troops, despite superiority in manpower and equipment, were forced to leave the cities of Grozny, Gudermes, and Argun. These failures prompted the federal authorities to end the war. On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) signed a truce agreement in the city of Khasavyurt (Dagestan). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.

The Khasavyurt agreements actually granted independence to Chechnya, but legally its sovereignty was not recognized by any country in the world. During the fighting, Russian troops lost 4,103 people killed and 1,231 missing. The losses of the Chechen side are estimated at 17 thousand people; the civilian population lost 30-40 thousand people killed. Almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya. The economy, infrastructure, cities and villages of the republic were largely destroyed. After the end of hostilities, Chechnya entered a period of deep crisis, against the backdrop of which followers of radical and aggressive forms of Islam gained increasing influence.

Exactly 20 years ago the First Chechen War began. On December 11, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure law, order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic.” Later, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation recognized most of the decrees and resolutions of the government that justified the actions of the federal government in Chechnya as consistent with the Constitution.

On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different directions - from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia, from the northwest from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering Chechnya, and from the east from the territory of Dagestan.

The famous St. Petersburg political scientist, Doctor of Philosophy, discusses the causes and consequences of the First Chechen War in an interview with the Russian People's Line Sergey Lebedev :

Why did the First Chechen War begin? I discussed this topic in my book “Russian Ideas and Russian Cause.” Everything cannot be blamed on personal hostile relations between Yeltsin and Khasbulatov, and then Dudayev. Some have suggested that they fought over “black gold,” but this is not true, because large reserves of oil are extracted in Siberia and processed in the Urals. Moreover, at that time there was a shortage of oil in the Chechen Republic, so it was delivered to Grozny even during the war.

What are the true reasons for the war?! In my opinion, everything is simple and tragic. It was 1994, Parliament was shot last fall, an American dictatorship reigned in the country - dozens of all-knowing and all-knowing Washington advisers sat in every ministry. What problem did they face?! It was necessary to finally dispose of the Russian state. But how can this be achieved if Russia still has powerful armed forces capable of challenging the United States?! Let me remind you that in those days China was weak, although now it is not so strong. And Saddam Hussein was given a demonstrative flogging back in 1991. What should American advisers do? After all, it will not be possible to simply disband the powerful armed forces. Therefore, it was decided to carry out a reform that would destroy the Russian army, but present it as a necessary and urgent decision. What is needed for this?! Little dirty shamefully lost war! As a result of this action, demand reforms, since allegedly everything in the army is poorly and incorrectly organized. In addition, defeat in Chechnya would foreshadow a “parade of sovereignties” and then the collapse of Russia. Chechnya would be followed by the rest of the country's republics. It was precisely these deep-reaching plans that the American advisers nurtured.

Until then, Dudayev’s Ichkeria had been fed for three years, starting in the fall of 1991, when the Maidan took place in Grozny and the former leader of the republic was overthrown, and Dudayev seized power. For all three years, Chechnya did not recognize itself as part of Russia, although money regularly flowed into the republic for the social needs of the population - salaries, pensions, benefits. In turn, Russia did not receive a penny from Chechnya; the oil was sent to an oil refinery in Grozny. The republic in those days became a zone where the mafia had its own territorial and political entity. The puppeteers understood that the Chechens were courageous and wonderful warriors. It was in Latvia in August 1991 that 140 Riga riot police calmly established Soviet power on the territory of the republic. However, such a scenario will not work in Chechnya. The Americans counted on the military impulse of the Chechens, filling them with weapons and choosing the right time - the sunset of 1994. Military operations began in the winter, when the numerical and technical superiority of the federal forces, otherwise called “federals,” came to naught in the mountainous areas. Starting a war in December in the mountains is very difficult. But, nevertheless, it was for this reason that the war was started. The puppeteers were counting on a shameful defeat of the Russian army, after which they would sign a peace treaty and the purge of the armed forces would begin. The Chechen war was intended to be a huge defeat for Russia, so it began in December, at the worst possible time. For unknown reasons, not only Yeltsin, who was undergoing surgery, but also the generals were not at the post of Commander-in-Chief. The guys who were drafted into the army in the spring and autumn of 1994 were thrown into the war! The calculation was based on the defeat of the armed forces, but as always, when the headquarters calculate how to defeat Russia, what comes out is not at all what was intended.

From a military point of view, there were no defeats in the First Chechen War. Of course, there were failures at the start of the assault on Grozny, but, although with heavy losses, the city was taken and cleared of terrorists. At that time, there were also suspicious nuances when they demanded that the military take off their body armor, etc. If there were private military failures, they were all explained by betrayal at headquarters, because the Chechens knew almost everything. A special forces officer who participated in the First Chechen War told me a story about how the Chechens hung up a poster congratulating the unit commander on his birthday, his last name, first name, patronymic, and the name of the military unit that had just arrived in Grozny. They knew not only secret information, but also the personal data of the commanders.

The most important headquarters was the first traitor in the war, which was started with the goal of a shameful loss of the federal forces. But it didn't work out. As General Lebed said, it was custom-made military campaign. The Kremlin sometimes declared a truce in order to not defeat the Chechens so quickly. At one time he announced the introduction of a moratorium on aviation flights, although from the point of view of common sense it was possible in the spring, when there was no dense greenery, to destroy gangs using aerial bombing. Human rights activists were unleashed on the military like dogs. The entire Russian “fourth estate” fought for Dudayev, and the soldiers were called “federals.” This word has an ironic connotation; at that time the population was not yet accustomed to this term. Also, puppeteers created legends about bandits, they were glorified as freedom fighters, constantly spitting in the back of Russian soldiers!

This is an indicator of how our society has changed because of that war. Many people began to recover from the intoxication that had been going on since the times of glasnost and perestroika. The attempt to create an anti-war movement failed. Government figures - Gaidar, Yavlinsky - suddenly began speaking at rallies against the war in Chechnya! One of two things: if you are against the war, then resign, if you are for it, then don’t interfere. The calculation was for the emergence of an anti-war movement along with the dispersal of the army, which would throw a hysteria that would lead to the collapse of the army. But eighteen-year-old conscripts took and broke the backs of the Chechen wolves. What about military generals?! Let's remember Rokhlin, Babichev, Kvashnin! All these generals of the First Chechen War showed extraordinary abilities while fighting against the Chechens.

After the start of finishing off the bandits, the famous strange provocation followed - the Chechens captured Grozny while our troops were out on maneuvers, and only the police remained in the city. Newspapers write at lightning speed about the imminent capture of Grozny by the Chechens. But when General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov blocked the city, intending to destroy the militants with artillery fire, General Lebed arrived and signed the surrender in Khasavyurt. In the First Chechen War there was only one defeat - political. In military terms, despite a number of frequent setbacks, the war was won. The surrender in Khasavyurt was signed after the almost complete destruction of the gang. The media and traitors at the top played a shameful role in this matter.

From 1996 to 1999, Chechnya was again stewing in its own juice. By this time, “Russification” had occurred in Russia, after a decade of rabid glorification of liberalism. The press covered the beginning of the Second Chechen War (1999-2000) in a completely different way. Is this war over, given the recent terrorist attack in Chechnya? Unfortunately, wars have been going on in the Caucasus for tens and hundreds of years.

To some extent, the opinion that the Kremlin feeds the Caucasus is partly true. Masses of people with weapons were busy with something in these small conditions. No matter how we finance Chechnya, where over 90% of the revenue comes from the federal budget, no matter how it sounds, it is still cheaper than war.

Nowadays an interesting situation has developed in the Caucasus. On the one hand, they were beaten well, but, on the other hand, they began to be appeased and respected. After a certain time, they will forget how they got hit in the neck. Placating sooner or later will lead to them saying - not enough, give us more money! To avoid war, the Kremlin pursued a policy that was initially effective and brought good results - it relied on local figures, including Akhmat and Ramzan Kadyrov. So far it's effective. He managed to quite calmly integrate many militants into normal life. In the Caucasus, as the tsarist and Soviet experience shows, the most effective was the general government headed by a Russian general. Why Russians?! Chechens are people of a clan society, and when one of the Chechens is in power, the rest of the clans can feel offended. So far, the current policy in Chechnya is producing good results, but it cannot be continued for long. Care must be taken to avoid war, which could break out with renewed vigor!

Security officials have drawn conclusions from two Chechen wars. Vladimir Putin came to power in the 1999-2000s with considerable support, primarily from the security forces. Among them there were many people associated with the Chechen war, so they were determined that entities like Ichkeria would not appear on Russian territory. It must be admitted that a number of military leaders who made a career in both Chechen wars entered the military-political elite. Of course, there are not many of them, but they exist. Let us remember that Shamanov was not very effective, but still a governor, and General Troshev was engaged in the revival of the Cossacks. These are the proponents of two Chechen wars.

The Kremlin made a conclusion about the media and public organizations, such as Soldiers' Mothers. The conclusions were drawn correctly - completely ban and close similar organizations, creating an aura of martyrdom for them is impossible, otherwise the Kremlin will be suspected of hiding something. The Kremlin has put them on a short leash. Now a certain citizen Vasilyeva is trying to repeat the experience of human rights activists of the 90s. She created the “Gruz-200” society, gives interviews and tries to prove something about the huge number of soldiers who died in the Donbass. Vasilyeva’s imagination has run out, so she lists all sorts of football teams where everyone died, or simply takes numbers from a lantern. Such individuals must be deftly neutralized by directing them to the marginal sphere.

If we compare the information field of 1994 and the current one, it’s heaven and earth. Of course, the victory is not final, but Putin’s rating is known, which is recognized with gnashing of teeth by Western figures speaking from the position of Chechen terrorists, “white ribbon activists,” liberals and other anti-Putin opposition. Who are these pussies, writers who have declared their desire to emigrate?! For example, Akunin wants to be expelled from the country in disgrace, like Solzhenitsyn was in his time. They told Akunin - go! Who needs him over the hill?! It is very awkward to merge the opposition, showing what it is, without banning it.

In Soviet times, everything was prohibited; many people spoke in glowing terms about Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. But then they read what Sakharov wrote. Some brave souls who are trying to overcome the burden of Solzhenitsyn’s novels are perplexed, what did these authors want to say, did they really have such an influence on minds?! Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov would not have had the same influence if they had not been silenced, but had been allowed to speak, as they say, to the side.

The Kremlin has learned the lessons of the First Chechen War. It was by relying on the security forces that a change of regime took place with the arrival of Putin. The Kremlin has realized the role of the media, and the fight against them should not be so primitive, in the spirit of “take it and shut it down.” In pathetic language, the guys who died in Chechnya did not die in vain! In Russia, it was possible to overcome the real collapse of the country and preserve the armed forces, which received a certain training and experience. As often happens, they wanted to destroy Russia, but everything turned out the other way around, the country grew stronger in spite of its enemies.

The worst war in the history of the Russian Federation began in 1994. On December 1, 1994, Russian troops were introduced into the territory of the Chechen Republic. It was after these actions that the war in Chechnya began. The first Chechen war lasted 3 years, from 1994 to 1996.

Despite the fact that the war in Chechnya has been on newspaper pages and television screens for 3 years, many Russians still do not understand what led to this bloody conflict. Although many books have been written about the war in Chechnya, the reasons for the outbreak of the conflict in Chechnya remain quite vague. After the hostilities in Chechnya ended, Russians gradually ceased to be interested in this problem.

The beginning of the war in Chechnya, the causes of the conflict

After the collapse of the USSR, a presidential decree was issued, according to which Chechnya received state sovereignty, which could allow it to secede from the Russian Federation. Despite the desire of the people, Chechnya failed to secede from the Russian Federation, since already in 1992 power was seized by Dudayev, who was extremely popular among the Chechen people.

Dudayev's popularity was due to his politics. The goals of the Chechen leader were quite simple and appealed to the common people:

1. Unite the entire Caucasus under the flag of the Mountain Republic;
2. Achieve complete independence of Chechnya.

Since after the collapse of the USSR, various ethnic groups living in Chechnya began to openly conflict with each other, the people joyfully welcomed their new leader, whose political program promised to end all these troubles.

During the 3 years of Dudayev’s rule, the republic slipped decades backward in development. If 3 years ago there was relative order in Chechnya, then since 1994, such bodies as the police, courts and prosecutor's office have completely disappeared in the republic. All this provoked the growth of organized crime. After 3 years of Dudayev’s rule, almost every second criminal in Russia was a resident of the Chechen Republic.

Since after the collapse of the USSR many republics decided to break with Russia and follow their own path of development, the Chechen Republic also declared a desire to secede from Russia. Under pressure from the Kremlin elite, Russian President Boris Yeltsin decided to overthrow the Dudayev regime, which was recognized as criminal and outright gangster. On December 11, 1994, Russian soldiers entered the territory of the Chechen Republic, marking the beginning of the Chechen war.

According to the forecasts of the Russian Minister for National Affairs, the entry of Russian troops into Chechen territory should have taken place with the support of 70 percent of the local population. The fierce resistance of the Chechen people came as a complete surprise to the Russian government. Dudayev and his supporters managed to convince the Chechen people that the invasion of Russian troops would only bring enslavement to the republic.

Most likely, the negative attitude of the Chechen people towards the Russian military was formed back in 1944, when the Chechen people were subjected to mass repression and deportation. Almost every Chechen family had deaths. People died from cold and hunger, and most of them never returned to their homeland. The old people still remembered the executions for which the Stalinist regime was famous, and encouraged the youth to resist to the last drop of blood.

Based on all of the above, you can understand what the essence of the war in Chechnya was:

1. The criminal regime of Dudayev was not satisfied with establishing order in the republic, since the bandits would inevitably have to curtail their activities;
2. Chechnya's decision to secede from the Russian Federation did not suit the Kremlin elite;
3. The desire of the Chechen “elite” to create an Islamic state;
4. Chechen protest against the entry of Russian troops.

Naturally, oil interests were not in last place.

First Chechen War, chronicles

The first Chechen war began with the fact that Dudayev’s militants received reinforcements from those from whom Russia expected help for itself. All Chechen groups that were in opposition to the Dudayev regime suddenly united in the fight against Russian military personnel. Thus, the operation, which was planned to be short-term, turned into the first Chechen war, which ended only in 1996.

Chechen militants were able to provide very worthy resistance to the Russian army. Since after withdrawal Soviet troops There were a lot of weapons left on the territory of the republic; almost all residents of Chechnya were armed. In addition, the militants had established channels for the delivery of weapons from abroad. History remembers many cases when the Russian military sold weapons to the Chechens, which they used against them.

The Russian military command had information that Dudayev's Chechen army consisted of only a few hundred militants, but they did not take into account that there would be more than just one participant on the Chechen side. Dudayev's army was constantly replenished with members of the opposition and volunteers from the local population. Modern history has come to the conclusion that about 13 thousand militants fought on Dudayev’s side, not counting the mercenaries who constantly replenished the ranks of their troops.

The first Chechen war began extremely unsuccessfully for Russia. In particular, an operation was undertaken to storm Grozny, as a result of which the war in Chechnya was supposed to end. This attack was launched in an extremely unprofessional manner; the Russian command simply threw all its forces into the assault. As a result of this operation, Russian troops lost almost all available armored vehicles ( total number which was 250 units). Although Russian troops captured Grozny after three months of fierce fighting, this operation showed that Chechen militants are a serious force to be reckoned with.

The first Chechen war after the capture of Grozny

After Grozny was captured by Russian troops, the war in Chechnya in 1995-1996 moved to the mountains, gorges and villages. Information that Russian special forces massacres entire villages, is not very true. Civilians fled to the mountains, and abandoned towns and villages turned into fortifications for militants, who often disguised themselves as civilians. Often, women and children were used to deceive the special forces and were released to meet Russian troops.

The summer of 1995 was marked by relative calm as Russian forces took control of the mountainous and lowland regions of Chechnya. In the winter of 1996, militants attempted to recapture the city of Grozny. The war resumed with renewed vigor.

In April, Russian forces were able to locate the leader of the militants, Dudayev, along with his motorcade. Aviation immediately responded to this information, and the motorcade was destroyed. For a long time, residents of Chechnya did not believe that Dudayev had been destroyed, but the remnants of the separatists agreed to sit down at the negotiating table, as a result of which the Khasavyurt agreements were reached.

On August 1, 1996, a document was signed that meant the end of the first Chechen war. The ended military conflict left behind devastation and poverty. After the war, Chechnya was a republic in which it was almost impossible to make money through peaceful means. Legally, the Chechen Republic gained independence, although the new state was not officially recognized by any world power, including Russia.

After Russian troops were withdrawn, Chechnya was hit by a post-war crisis:

1. No one restored the destroyed cities and villages;
2. Purges were carried out regularly, as a result of which all representatives of non-Chechen nationality were killed or expelled;
3. The economy in the republic was completely destroyed;
4. Bandit formations received actual power in Chechnya.

This state of affairs lasted until 1999, when Chechen militants decided to invade Dagestan to help the Wahhabis establish an Islamic republic there. This invasion provoked the start of the second Chechen campaign, since the creation of an independent Islamic state posed a great danger to Russia.

Second Chechen War

The counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus, which lasted for 10 years, is unofficially called the second Chechen war. The impetus for the start of this war was the entry of Russian armed forces into the territory of the Chechen Republic. Although large-scale hostilities lasted only about a year, fighting continued until 2009.

Although the Khasavyurt agreements satisfied both sides at the time of signing, there was no peace in the Chechen Republic. Chechnya was still ruled by bandits who made a business out of kidnapping people. Moreover, these abductions were of a massive nature. The media of those years regularly reported that Chechen gangs had taken hostages for ransom. The bandits did not know who to capture. Both Russians and foreigners who worked or covered events in Chechnya became hostages. The bandits grabbed everyone:

1. Journalists lured with promises of sensational reporting;
2. Red Cross employees who came to help the Chechen people;
3. Religious figures and even those who came to Chechnya for the funeral of their relatives.

In 1998, a French citizen was kidnapped and spent 11 months in captivity. In the same year, bandits kidnapped four employees of the company from Great Britain, who were brutally killed three months later.

The bandits made money in all areas:

1. Sale of oil stolen from wells and overpasses;
2. Sale, manufacture and transportation of drugs;
3. Production of counterfeit banknotes;
4. Act of terrorism;
5. Predatory attacks on neighboring regions.

The main reason why the second Chechen war began was the huge number of training camps in which militants and terrorists were trained. The core of these schools were Arab volunteers who learned military science from professional instructors in Pakistan.

These schools tried to “infect” not only the Chechen people, but also the regions neighboring Chechnya with the ideas of separatism.

The last straw for the Russian government was the kidnapping of the plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in Chechnya, Gennady Shpigun. This fact became a signal that the Chechen government is unable to fight terrorism and banditry, which have spread throughout the republic.

The situation in Chechnya on the eve of the second Chechen war

Before starting hostilities and not wanting a second Chechen war to break out, the Russian government took a number of measures that were supposed to cut off the flow of money to Chechen bandits and militants:

1. Self-defense units were created throughout the Chechen Republic and received weapons;
2. All police units were reinforced;
3. Operational employees of the department for combating ethnic crimes were sent to the Caucasus;
4. Several firing points were set up, equipped with rocket launchers designed to carry out targeted strikes on concentrations of militants;
5. Strict economic sanctions were adopted against Chechnya, which led to problems with conducting criminal business;
6. Border controls were strengthened, which resulted in drug trafficking;
7. Gasoline made from stolen oil has become impossible to sell outside Chechnya.

In addition, a serious fight unfolded against criminal groups that financed the militants.

Invasion of Chechen militants into the territory of Dagestan

Deprived of their main sources of funding, Chechen militants, under the leadership of Khattab and Basayev, were preparing to seize Dagestan. Since August 1999, they have carried out several dozen military operations of a reconnaissance nature, although during these operations dozens of military and civilians were killed. Reconnaissance in force showed that the militants did not have enough strength to overcome the resistance of the federal troops. Realizing this, the militants decided to strike the mountainous part of Dagestan, where there were no troops.

On August 7, 1999, Chechen militants, reinforced by Khattab's Arab mercenaries, invaded the territory of Dagestan. Shamil Basayev, who led this operation along with field commander Khattab, was confident that the Chechen fighters, assisted by professional mercenaries associated with al-Qaeda, would easily be able to carry out this invasion. However, the local population did not support the militants, but, on the contrary, resisted them.

While the federal troops of Ichkeria were holding back the Chechen militants, the Russian leadership proposed conducting a joint military operation against the Islamists. In addition, the Russian side offered to take on the problem of destroying all bases and warehouses of militants that were located on the territory of Chechnya. The President of the Chechen Republic, Aslan Maskhadov, assured the Russian authorities that he knew nothing about such underground bases on the territory of his country.

Although the confrontation between the federal troops of Dagestan and the Chechen militants lasted a whole month, in the end, the bandits had to retreat to the territory of Chechnya. Suspecting the Russian authorities of providing military assistance to Dagestan, the militants decided to take revenge.

Between September 4 and September 16, residential building explosions occurred in several Russian cities, including Moscow. Taking these actions as a challenge, and realizing that Aslan Maskhadov is not able to control the situation in the Chechen Republic, Russia decides to conduct a military operation, the goal of which was the complete destruction of illegal gangs.

On September 18, Russian troops completely blocked the Chechen borders, and on September 23, the Russian President signed a decree on the creation of a joint group of troops to conduct a large-scale anti-terrorist operation. On the same day, Russian troops began bombing Grozny, and on September 30 they invaded the territory of the republic.

Features of the second Chechen war

During the second Chechen war, the Russian command took into account the mistakes made in 1994-1996 and no longer relied on brute force. The military relied on military stratagems, luring militants into various traps (including minefields), infiltrating agents among the militants, and so on.

After the main centers of resistance were broken, the Kremlin began to win over the elite of Chechen society and former authoritative field commanders. The militants relied on gangs of non-Chechen origin. These actions turned the Chechen people against them, and when the leaders of the militants were destroyed (closer to 2005), the organized resistance of the militants ceased. There were no significant terrorist attacks between 2005 and 2008, although several major terrorist attacks were carried out by militants after the end of the second Chechen war in 2010.

Heroes and veterans of the Chechen war

The first and second Chechen campaigns were the bloodiest military conflicts in history new Russia. Most of all, in this war, reminiscent of the war in Afghanistan, the Russian special forces distinguished themselves. Many, while paying off their soldier's duty, did not return home. Those servicemen who participated in the hostilities of 1994-1996 were given veteran status.