Zhukov Georgy Konstantinovich (1896-1974)

In April-May 1945 - Marshal of the Soviet Union, commander of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front.

He was in a difficult relationship with Marshal Konev, whom he perceived during the Berlin operation as a competitor in the "race for Berlin".

"A harsh, tough business man," characterizes Zhukov's sergeant. "Eighty kilograms of trained muscles and nerves. A bundle of energy. An ideal, brilliantly debugged mechanism of military thought! Thousands of unmistakable strategic decisions circulated with lightning speed in his brain. Coverage - capture! Encirclement - defeat! Pincers "march-throw! 1,500 tanks to the right! 2,000 planes to the left! To take the city, 200,000 soldiers must be "activated"! He could immediately give the numbers of our losses and the losses of the enemy in any proposed operation. He could, without a doubt, and He was a new type of commander: he killed innumerable people, but almost always achieved victorious results. Our great commanders of the old type were even better able to ruin millions, but they didn’t really think about what would come of it, so how simply they were not very good at thinking. Zhukov is full of energy, he is charged with it, like a Leyden jar, as if electric sparks are pouring out of him. "

After the end of the war, Zhukov headed the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (into which the troops of the 1st BF were transformed), as well as the Soviet military administration in Germany. In March 1946, Stalin appointed him to the positions of Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense (Stalin himself was the minister). However, already in the summer of 1946, Zhukov was accused of misappropriating a large number of trophies, as well as exaggerating his own merits. He was removed from his posts and sent to command the troops of the Odessa Military District. After Stalin's death, he was returned to Moscow. From February 1955 to October 1957 - Minister of Defense of the USSR. He exercised military leadership in the suppression of the anti-communist uprising in Hungary in 1956. At the end of 1957, at the initiative of Khrushchev, he was expelled from the Central Committee of the party, removed from his posts and dismissed.

Konev Ivan Stepanovich (1897-1973)

In April-May 1945 - Marshal of the Soviet Union, commander of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

He dreamed of taking Berlin, ahead of Marshal Zhukov, which he openly admitted: “asserting the composition of the groupings and the direction of strikes, Stalin began to mark with a pencil on the map the dividing line between the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. In the draft directives, this line went through Lubben and further south of Berlin.While drawing this line with a pencil, Stahl suddenly cut it off at the city of Lübben, located about 60 kilometers southeast of Berlin.<…>Was there an unspoken call for a competition of fronts in this cliff of the dividing line on Lübben? I accept this possibility. In any case, I do not exclude it. This is all the more possible if we mentally go back to that time and imagine what Berlin was for us then and what a passionate desire everyone, from a soldier to a general, experienced, to see this city with their own eyes, to master it with the power of their weapons. Of course, this was also my passionate desire. I'm not afraid to admit it even now. It would be strange to portray oneself in the last months of the war as a person devoid of passions. On the contrary, we were all filled with them then."

After the completion of the Berlin operation, Konev deployed the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front to attack Prague, where he ended the war.

After the end of the war in 1945-1946. - Commander-in-Chief of the Central Group of Soviet Forces in Austria and Hungary. In 1946, he replaced Zhukov, who had fallen into disgrace, as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. In 1957, he supported the exclusion of Zhukov from the Central Committee of the party. During the Berlin Crisis of 1961 - Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Berzarin Nikolai Erastovich (1904-1945)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, commander of the 5th shock army of the 1st Belorussian Front. The first Soviet commandant of Berlin.

On April 21, Berzarin's army crossed the Berliner Ring and approached the eastern outskirts of the Reich's capital. With battles, it moved towards the city center through the districts of Lichtenberg and Friedrichshain. On May 1, the forward detachments of the 5th UA were the first of the Soviet units to reach the building of the Reich Chancellery, located on Fossstrasse, and stormed it.

Marshal Zhukov appointed Berzarin commandant of Berlin on April 24. And already on April 28, when the fighting was still in full swing in the city, the general set about creating a new administration, issuing order No. 1 "On the transfer of all power in Berlin into the hands of the Soviet military commandant's office." Berzarin did not stay as commandant for long. On June 16, 1945, he died in a car accident. Nevertheless, in less than 2 months of his administration of the city, he managed to leave a good memory of himself with the Germans. Mainly because he managed to restore public order on the streets and provide the population with food. A square (Bersarinplatz) and a bridge (Nikolai-Bersarin-Brucke) are named in his honor in Berlin.

Bogdanov Semyon Ilyich (1894-1960)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

On April 21, the 2nd GvTA crossed the Berliner Ring and broke into the northern outskirts of the city. On April 22, the advanced units of the army, bypassing Berlin from the north, reached the Havel River and crossed it. On April 25, units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army and the 47th Army (Franz Perkhorovich) joined west of Berlin with the advanced units of the 4th Guards Tank Army (Dmitry Lelyushenko) of the 1st Ukrainian Front, closing the encirclement around the city. Other formations of the 2nd GvTA approached the Berlin-Spandauer-Schiffarts canal on April 23 and crossed it the next day. On April 27, the main forces of the army crossed the Spree, entered the Charlottenburg region and moved southeast in the direction of the Tiergarten. On the morning of May 2, in the Tiergarten area, units of the 2nd GvTA united with units of the 8th Guards Army (Vasily Chuikov) and the 3rd Shock Army (Nikolai Kuznetsov).

After the end of the war, Bogdanov commanded the armored and mechanized troops of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and from December 1948 - the armored and mechanized troops of the entire USSR. In 1956 he was dismissed.

Katukov Mikhail Efimovich (1900-1976)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

Katukov's army attacked Berlin from the southeast, supporting the 8th Guards Army (Vasily Chuikov). She fought in the area of ​​Neukölln and Tempelchow. It advanced in a fairly narrow band, limited by several streets.

Therefore, it suffered significant losses from artillery and faustpatrons of the enemy. On April 28, units of the 1st GvTA went to the Potsdam station area. From April 29, they fought in the Tiergarten park. On May 2, it connected there with units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov) and the 3rd Shock Army (Vasily Kuznetsov).

After the war, Katukov continued to command his army, which became part of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Kuznetsov Vasily Ivanovich (1894-1964)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, commander of the 3rd shock army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

On April 21, the 3rd UA crossed the Berliner Ring and entered the northern and northeastern outskirts of Berlin. Passed through the districts of Pankow, Siemensstadt, Charlottenburg, Moabit. Starting on April 29, units of the 3rd UA stormed the area of ​​​​government buildings on Koenigsplatz,. On the morning of May 2, they joined in the Tiergarten with units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov) and the 8th Guards Army (Vasily Chuikov).

At the end of the war, Kuznetsov continued to command the 3rd shock army, which became part of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Lelyushenko Dmitry Danilovich (1901-1987)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, commander of the 4th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

The 4th GvTA advanced in the direction of Potsdam, covering Berlin from the southwest. On April 23, the army reached the Havel River and captured the southeastern region of Potsdam - Babelsberg. On April 25, units of the 4th GvTA crossed the Havel and west of Berlin joined with units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov) and the 47th Army (Franz Perkhorovich) of the 1st Belorussian Front, advancing from the north.

Thus, the encirclement ring around the capital of Germany closed. On April 27, the 4th GvTA took Potsdam, and on April 29, Peacock Island on the Havel River. In addition, Lelyushenko's army had to repel the counterattack of the 12th army of Walter Wenck on the outskirts of Potsdam. In areas of Berlin with dense buildings, Lelyushenko's army did not have a chance to fight, so her losses were lower than those of other armies. On May 4, after the end of the battle for Berlin, she was sent to Prague.

After the war, Lelyushenko commanded various military districts. Then he was retired. In 1960-1964 headed DOSAAF.

Luchinsky Alexander Alexandrovich (1900-1990)

In April-May 1945 - lieutenant general, commander of the 28th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

Luchinsky's army was advancing on Berlin from the south. On April 23, she approached the Teltow Canal, and then, together with the 3rd GvTA (Pavel Rybalko), fought in the western part of Berlin.

After the end of World War II in Europe, Luchinsky was sent to the Far East. There he commanded the 36th Army during the war with Japan in August 1945.

Perkhorovich Franz Iosifovich (1894-1961)

In April-May 1945 - lieutenant general, commander of the 47th army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

During the Berlin operation, the 47th Army captured Berlin from the northwest, occupied the urban area of ​​Spandau. On April 25, west of Berlin, together with units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov), it connected with the 4th Guards Tank Army (Dmitry Lelyushenko) of the 1st Ukrainian Front, closing the encirclement around the German capital. On April 30, in front of the forces of the 47th Army, the citadel of Spandau.

After the war, Perkhorovich continued to command his army. Since 1947, he headed the department at the General Staff of the Ground Forces. In 1951 he was dismissed.

Rybalko Pavel Semyonovich (1894-1948)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

Rybalko's army was advancing on Berlin from the south. By April 22, she reached the Teltow Canal. On April 24, she crossed it and entered the areas of Zehlendorf and Dahlem. Then she fought in Schöneberg and Wilmensdorf.

After the war, Rybalko continued to command his army. In 1947 he was appointed commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the USSR.

Chuikov Vasily Ivanovich (1900-1982)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, commander of the 8th Guards Army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

Received wide popularity during the Battle of Stalingrad. His 62nd Army (renamed the 8th Guards after the Stalingrad battles) fought fierce street battles in the city for several months. The experience of such battles was very useful to her during the storming of Berlin.

The 8th Guards Army attacked the capital of the Reich from the east and southeast with the support of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Mikhail Katukov). With battles, she occupied the Neukölln and Tempelhof districts of Berlin. On April 28, the 8th Guards Armed Forces reached the southern bank of the Landwehr Canal and reached the Anhalt Station. On April 30, the advanced units of Chuikov were at a distance of 800 meters from the Reich Chancellery. On May 1, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General Hans Krebs, came to Chuikov's headquarters, who announced Hitler's suicide and conveyed Goebbels and Bormann's proposal for a temporary ceasefire. On the morning of May 2, in the Tiergarten area, the 8th Guards Army united with units of the 3rd Shock Army (Nikolai Kuznetsov) and the 2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov). On the same morning, at Chuikov's headquarters, General Helmut Weidling wrote an order for the surrender of the Berlin garrison.

After the war, Chuikov continued to command his army. In 1949-1953. was the commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany. Under Khrushchev, he became a marshal (1955), and in 1960-1964. served as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR (1960-1964).

	Berlin, Germany
	Decisive Soviet victory
Opponents
	Germany
Commanders
G. K. Zhukov	G. Weidling
I. S. Konev
Side forces
Approximately 1,500,000 troops	About 45,000 Wehrmacht soldiers, as well as police forces, the Hitler Youth and 40,000 Volkssturm militia
75,000 military dead and 300,000 wounded.	100,000 military dead and 175,000 civilian dead.

The final part of the Berlin offensive operation of 1945, during which the Red Army captured the capital of Nazi Germany and victoriously ended the Great Patriotic War and World War II in Europe. The operation lasted from April 25 to May 2.

At 12 noon on April 25, the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps of the 4th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front forced the Havel River and connected with units of the 328th Division of the 47th Army of the 1st Belorussian Front, thus closing the encirclement around Berlin.

By the end of April 25, the Berlin garrison was defending on an area of ​​approx. 325 km². The total length of the front of Soviet troops in Berlin was approx. 100 km.

The Berlin group, according to the Soviet command, consisted of about 300 thousand soldiers and officers, 3 thousand guns and 250 tanks, including the Volkssturm - the people's militia. The defense of the city was carefully thought out and well prepared. It was based on a system of strong fire, strongholds and centers of resistance. Nine defense sectors were created in Berlin - eight around the circumference and one in the center. The closer to the city center, the tighter the defense became. Massive stone buildings with thick walls gave it special strength. The windows and doors of many buildings were closed up and turned into loopholes for firing. In total, the city had up to 400 reinforced concrete long-term structures - multi-storey bunkers (up to 6 floors) and pillboxes equipped with guns (including anti-aircraft guns) and machine guns. The streets were blocked by powerful barricades up to four meters thick. The defenders had a large number of faustpatrons, which in the conditions of street fighting turned out to be a formidable anti-tank weapon. Of no small importance in the German defense system were underground structures, including the metro, which were widely used by the enemy for covert maneuver of troops, as well as for sheltering them from artillery and bomb attacks.

A network of radar observation posts was deployed around the city. Berlin had a strong anti-aircraft defense provided by the 1st Anti-Aircraft Division. Its main forces were located on three huge concrete structures - Zoobunker in the Tiergarten, Humboldthain and Friedrichshain. The division was armed with 128-, 88- and 20-mm anti-aircraft guns.

The center of Berlin, cut by canals, with the Spree River, was especially strongly fortified, which in fact became one huge fortress. Having superiority in people and technology, the Red Army could not fully use its advantages in urban areas. First of all, it concerned aviation. The ram force of any offensive - tanks, once on the narrow city streets, became an excellent target. Therefore, in street battles, the 8th Guards Army of General V.I. Chuikov used the experience of assault groups, proven back in the Battle of Stalingrad: 2-3 tanks, a self-propelled gun, a sapper unit, signalmen and artillery were attached to a rifle platoon or company. The actions of the assault detachments, as a rule, were preceded by a short but powerful artillery preparation.

By April 26, six armies of the 1st Belorussian Front (47 A; 3.5 Ud. A; 8 Guards A; 1.2 Guards TA) and three armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front (28.3 , 4 Guards TA).

By April 27, as a result of the actions of the armies of the two fronts that had deeply advanced towards the center of Berlin, the enemy grouping stretched out in a narrow strip from east to west - sixteen kilometers long and two or three, in some places five kilometers wide.

The fighting went on day and night. Breaking through to the center of Berlin, Soviet soldiers broke through the houses on tanks, knocking out the Nazis from the ruins. By April 28, only the central part remained in the hands of the defenders of the city, which was shot through by Soviet artillery from all sides.

Allied refusal to storm Berlin

Roosevelt and Churchill, Eisenhower and Montgomery believed that they, as the Western allies of the USSR, had the opportunity to take Berlin.

At the end of 1943, US President Franklin Roosevelt, aboard the battleship Iowa, set the task for the military:

Winston Churchill also considered Berlin a primary target:

And back in late March - early April 1945, he insisted:

According to Field Marshal Montgomery, Berlin could have been captured in the early autumn of 1944. Trying to convince the commander in chief of the need to storm Berlin, Montgomery wrote to him on September 18, 1944:

However, after the unsuccessful landing operation of September 1944, called the "Market Garden", in which, in addition to the British, American and Polish airborne formations and units also participated, Montgomery admitted:

Subsequently, the allies of the USSR abandoned their plans to storm and capture Berlin. Historian John Fuller calls Eisenhower's decision to abandon the capture of Berlin one of the strangest in military history. Despite a large number of guesses, the exact reasons for the refusal of the assault have not yet been clarified.

Capture of the Reichstag

By the evening of April 28, units of the 3rd Shock Army of the 1st Belorussian Front reached the Reichstag area. On the same night, to support the Reichstag garrison, an assault force consisting of cadets from the Rostock Naval School was dropped by parachute. This was the last visible operation of the Luftwaffe in the skies over Berlin.

On the night of April 29, the actions of the advanced battalions of the 150th and 171st rifle divisions under the command of Captain S. A. Neustroev and senior lieutenant K. Ya. Samsonov captured the Moltke bridge across the Spree River. At dawn on April 30, the building of the Ministry of the Interior was stormed at the cost of considerable losses. The way to the Reichstag was open.

An attempt to take the Reichstag on the move was unsuccessful. The building was defended by a 5,000-strong garrison. An anti-tank ditch filled with water was dug in front of the building, making it difficult to attack frontally. On Royal Square there was no large-caliber artillery capable of making breaches in its powerful walls. Despite heavy losses, all capable of attacking were assembled into consolidated battalions on the first line for the last decisive push.

Basically, the Reichstag and the Reich Chancellery were defended by SS troops: units of the SS division "Nordland", SS French battalion Fene from the division "Charlemagne" and the Latvian battalion of the 15th SS Grenadier Division (Latvian SS division), as well as SS security units of the Fuhrer Adolf Hitler (their was, according to some sources, about 600-900 people).

On the evening of April 30, through a breach in the northwestern wall of the Reichstag, made by sappers of the 171st division, a group of Soviet soldiers broke into the building. Almost simultaneously, soldiers of the 150th Infantry Division stormed it from the main entrance. This passage to the infantry was pierced by the cannons of Alexander Bessarab.

The tanks of the 23rd Tank Brigade, the 85th Tank Regiment and the 88th Heavy Tank Regiment provided great assistance during the assault. So, for example, in the morning, several tanks of the 88th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment, having crossed the Spree along the surviving Moltke bridge, took up firing positions on the Kronprinzenufer embankment. At 13:00, the tanks opened direct fire on the Reichstag, participating in the general artillery preparation that preceded the assault. At 18:30, the tanks also supported the second assault on the Reichstag with their fire, and only with the start of fighting inside the building did they stop shelling it.

On April 30, 1945, at 9:45 pm, units of the 150th Infantry Division under the command of Major General V. M. Shatilov and the 171st Infantry Division under the command of Colonel A. I. Negoda captured the first floor of the Reichstag building.

Having lost the upper floors, the Nazis took refuge in the basement and continued to resist. They hoped to break out of the encirclement, cutting off the Soviet soldiers who were in the Reichstag from the main forces.

In the early morning of May 1, the assault flag of the 150th Infantry Division was raised over the Reichstag, but the battle for the Reichstag continued all day and only on the night of May 2 did the Reichstag garrison capitulate.

Chuikov's negotiations with Krebs

Late in the evening of April 30, the German side requested a ceasefire for negotiations. The Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General Krebs, arrived at the headquarters of the 8th Guards Army of General Chuikov, who announced Hitler's suicide and read out his will. Krebs conveyed to Chuikov the proposal of the new German government to conclude a truce. The message was immediately passed on to Zhukov, who called Moscow himself. Stalin confirmed the categorical demand for unconditional surrender. At 18:00 on May 1, the new German government rejected the demand for unconditional surrender, and Soviet troops resumed the assault on the city with renewed vigor.

End of battles and surrender

By May 1, only the Tiergarten and the government quarter remained in German hands. The imperial office was located here, in the courtyard of which there was a bunker at Hitler's headquarters.

On May 1, units of the 1st Shock Army, advancing from the north, south of the Reichstag, connected with units of the 8th Guards Army, advancing from the south. On the same day, two important Berlin defense centers surrendered: the Spandau citadel and the anti-aircraft tower of the Zoo (“Zoobunker” is a huge reinforced concrete fortress with anti-aircraft batteries on the towers and an extensive underground bomb shelter).

Early in the morning of May 2, the Berlin metro was flooded - a group of sappers from the SS division "Nordland" blew up a tunnel passing under the Landwehr Canal in the Trebbiner Strasse area. The explosion led to the destruction of the tunnel and filling it with water at a 25-km section. Water rushed into the tunnels, where a large number of civilians and the wounded were hiding. The number of victims is still unknown.

Information about the number of victims ... is different - from fifty to fifteen thousand people ... The data that about a hundred people died under water look more reliable. Of course, there were many thousands of people in the tunnels, among whom were the wounded, children, women and the elderly, but the water did not spread through the underground communications too quickly. Moreover, it spread underground in various directions. Of course, the picture of the advancing water caused genuine horror in people. And some of the wounded, as well as drunken soldiers, as well as civilians, became its inevitable victims. But talking about thousands of dead would be a strong exaggeration. In most places, the water barely reached a depth of one and a half meters, and the inhabitants of the tunnels had enough time to evacuate themselves and save the many wounded who were in the "hospital cars" near the Stadtmitte station. It is likely that many of the dead, whose bodies were subsequently brought to the surface, actually died not from water, but from wounds and diseases even before the destruction of the tunnel. Anthony Beevor, The Fall of Berlin. 1945". Ch. 25

In the first hour of the night on May 2, the radio stations of the 1st Belorussian Front received a message in Russian: “Please cease fire. We are sending parliamentarians to the Potsdam Bridge.” A German officer who arrived at the appointed place on behalf of the commander of the defense of Berlin, General Weidling, announced the readiness of the Berlin garrison to stop resistance. At 6 am on May 2, Artillery General Weidling, accompanied by three German generals, crossed the front line and surrendered. An hour later, while at the headquarters of the 8th Guards Army, he wrote an order to surrender, which was reproduced and, using loud-speaking installations and radio, brought to the enemy units defending in the center of Berlin. As this order was brought to the attention of the defenders, resistance in the city ceased. By the end of the day, the troops of the 8th Guards Army cleared the central part of the city from the enemy.

Separate units that did not want to surrender tried to break through to the west, but for the most part were destroyed or dispersed. The main direction of the breakthrough was the western suburb of Berlin, Spandau, where two bridges over the Havel River remained intact. They were defended by members of the Hitler Youth, who were able to sit on the bridges until the surrender on May 2. The breakthrough began on the night of May 2. Parts of the Berlin garrison and civilian refugees who did not want to surrender, frightened by Goebbels' propaganda about the atrocities of the Red Army, went into the breakthrough. One of the groups under the command of the commander of the 1st (Berlin) anti-aircraft division, Major General Otto Sydow, was able to seep to Spandau through the metro tunnels from the Zoo area. In the area of ​​​​the exhibition hall on the Masurenallee, she connected with the German units retreating from the Kurfürstendamm. The units of the Red Army and the Polish Army stationed in this area did not engage in battle with the retreating units of the Nazis, apparently due to the exhaustion of the troops in previous battles. The systematic destruction of the retreating units began in the area of ​​​​the bridges over the Havel and continued throughout the flight towards the Elbe.

The last remnants of the German units were destroyed or captured by May 7th. The units managed to break into the area of ​​the Elbe crossings, which until May 7 held the units of the 12th army of General Wenck and join the German units and refugees who managed to cross into the zone of occupation of the American army.

Part of the surviving SS units defending the Reich Chancellery, led by SS Brigadeführer Wilhelm Mohnke, attempted to break through to the north on the night of May 2, but were destroyed or captured in the afternoon of May 2. Mohnke himself was captured by the Soviets, from which he was released as an unamnestied war criminal in 1955.

Operation results

Soviet troops defeated the Berlin grouping of enemy troops and stormed the capital of Germany - Berlin. Developing a further offensive, they reached the Elbe River, where they joined up with American and British troops. With the fall of Berlin and the loss of vital areas, Germany lost the opportunity for organized resistance and soon capitulated. With the completion of the Berlin operation, favorable conditions were created for the encirclement and destruction of the last large enemy groupings on the territory of Austria and Czechoslovakia.

The losses of the German armed forces in killed and wounded are unknown. Of the approximately 2 million Berliners, about 125,000 perished. The city was badly damaged by bombing even before the arrival of Soviet troops. The bombing continued during the battles near Berlin - the last bombing of the Americans on April 20 (Adolf Hitler's birthday) led to food problems. The destruction intensified as a result of the actions of Soviet artillery.

Three guards heavy tank brigades IS-2, the 88th separate guards heavy tank regiment and at least nine guards heavy self-propelled artillery regiments of self-propelled guns took part in the battles in Berlin, including:

tank losses

According to the TsAMO of the Russian Federation, the 2nd Guards Tank Army under the command of Colonel General S. I. Bogdanov during the street fighting in Berlin from April 22 to May 2, 1945 irretrievably lost 52 T-34s, 31 M4A2 Sherman, 4 IS- 2, 4 ISU-122, 5 SU-100, 2 SU-85, 6 SU-76, which accounted for 16% of the total number of combat vehicles before the start of the Berlin operation. It should be taken into account that the tankers of the 2nd Army acted without sufficient rifle cover and, according to combat reports, in some cases, tank crews were engaged in combing houses. The 3rd Guards Tank Army under the command of General P.S. Rybalko during the fighting in Berlin from April 23 to May 2, 1945 irretrievably lost 99 tanks and 15 self-propelled guns, which amounted to 23% of the combat vehicles available at the beginning of the Berlin operation. The 4th Guards Tank Army under the command of General D. D. Lelyushenko was only partially involved in street fighting on the outskirts of Berlin from April 23 to May 2, 1945 and irretrievably lost 46 combat vehicles. At the same time, a significant part of the armored vehicles was lost after the defeat from faustpatrons.

On the eve of the Berlin operation, the 2nd Guards Tank Army tested various anti-cumulative screens, both solid and made of steel rod. In all cases, they ended with the destruction of the screen and burning through the armor. As A. V. Isaev notes:

Criticism of the operation

In the years of perestroika and after, critics (for example, B.V. Sokolov) repeatedly expressed the opinion that the siege of the city, doomed to inevitable defeat, instead of storming it, would save many lives and military equipment. The assault on a well-fortified city was more of a political decision than a strategic one. However, this opinion does not take into account that the siege of Berlin would delay the end of the war, as a result of which the cumulative loss of life (including the civilian population) on all fronts would possibly exceed the losses actually incurred during the assault.

The situation of the civilian population

Fear and despair

A significant part of Berlin, even before the assault, was destroyed as a result of Anglo-American air raids, from which the population hid in basements and bomb shelters. There were not enough bomb shelters and therefore they were constantly overcrowded. By that time, in Berlin, in addition to the three million local population (which consisted mainly of women, the elderly and children), there were up to three hundred thousand foreign workers, including Ostarbeiters, most of whom were forcibly deported to Germany. They were forbidden from entering bomb shelters and cellars.

Although the war for Germany had long been lost, Hitler ordered to resist to the last. Thousands of teenagers and old people were drafted into the Volkssturm. From the beginning of March, on the orders of Reichskommissar Goebbels, responsible for the defense of Berlin, tens of thousands of civilians, mostly women, were sent to dig anti-tank ditches around the German capital. Civilians who violated the orders of the authorities, even in the last days of the war, were threatened with execution.

There is no exact information on the number of civilian casualties. Different sources indicate a different number of people who died directly during the Battle of Berlin. Even decades after the war, during construction work, previously unknown mass graves are found.

After the capture of Berlin, the civilian population faced the threat of starvation, but the Soviet command organized the distribution of rations to civilians, which saved many Berliners from starvation.

Violence against civilians

After the occupation of Berlin, cases of violence against civilians were noted, the extent of this phenomenon is the subject of debate. According to a number of sources, as the Red Army advanced through the city, a wave of looting and rape of the civilian population, including group rapes, began. According to data provided by German researchers sander And Johr In total, from 95 to 130 thousand women were raped by Soviet soldiers in Berlin, of which approximately one in ten committed suicide. Irish journalist Cornelius Ryan writes in his book The Last Battle that doctors he spoke to estimate that between 20,000 and 100,000 women have been raped.

The English historian Anthony Beevor, referring to Professor Norman Nyman, notes that with the advent of Soviet troops, a wave of violence against women rose, which then subsided rather quickly; however, everything was repeated after the approach of new parts.

According to the witness and participant in the battles, philosopher and culturologist Grigory Pomerants, “At the end of the war, the masses were seized by the idea that German women from 15 to 60 years old were the legitimate prey of the winner”. Pomeranz recounts a series of Berlin episodes illustrating the impunity of rapists in April 1945: for example, a drunken sergeant handed over to counterintelligence for attempted rape did not receive “even three days of arrest for outrageous behavior.” The chief of Pomerants, a major, could only "try to persuade" the lieutenant, who found a beautiful film actress in a bomb shelter and took all his friends to rape her.

According to Anthony Beevor:

German women soon realized that in the evenings, during the so-called "hunting hours", it was better not to appear on the streets of the city. Mothers hid young daughters in attics and cellars. They themselves dared to go for water only in the early morning, when the Soviet soldiers were still sleeping off after a night of drinking. When caught, they often gave away the places where their neighbors were hiding, thereby trying to save their own offspring (...) Berliners remember the piercing screams at night that were heard in houses with broken windows. (...) A friend of Ursula von Kardorf and the Soviet spy Schulze-Boysen was raped "in turn by twenty-three soldiers" (...) Later, while already in the hospital, she threw a noose over herself.

Beevor also notes that in order to avoid constant, and even more so group rape, German women often tried to find a “patron” among Soviet soldiers, who, while disposing of a woman, at the same time protected her from other rapists.

In view of cases of violence against the civilian population, the Directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of April 20 and the Military Council of the Front of April 22, 1945 followed. According to Pomeranets, at first they “spit on” the directives, but “after two weeks, the soldiers and officers cooled off.” On May 2, the military prosecutor of the 1st Belorussian Front wrote in a report that after the issuance of the Stavka directive “In relation to the German population on the part of our military personnel, of course, a significant turning point has been achieved. The facts of aimless and [unfounded] executions of Germans, looting and rape of German women have significantly decreased”, although still fixed

On April 29, the report of the head of the political department of the 8th Guards Army (of the same front) also states a decrease in the number of excesses, but not in Berlin, where “In the location of formations and units engaged in hostilities, there are still cases of exceptionally bad behavior by military personnel. (...) Some military personnel have gone so far as to turn into bandits ". (Following is a list of more than fifty looted items confiscated during the arrest from Private Popov).

According to E. Beevor, “the change in the political line came too late: on the eve of the big offensive it was no longer possible to direct in the right direction that hatred for the enemy that had been propagated in the Red Army for many years”

In the Russian media and historiography, the topic of mass crimes and violence by the Red Army was banned for a long time, and now a number of historians of the older generation tend to hush up or downplay this issue. Russian historian, President of the Academy of Military Sciences, General of the Army Makhmut Gareev, disagrees with the statements about the mass nature of the atrocities:

Reflection in art

The storming of Berlin is the central theme or background of the action of the characters in the following films:

• The Storming of Berlin, 1945, dir. Y. Raizman, documentary (USSR)
• The Fall of Berlin, 1949, dir. M. Chiaureli (USSR)
• 5 series (“The Last Storm”, 1971) of the epic film “Liberation” by Y. Ozerov (USSR)
• Der Untergang (in Russian box office - "Bunker" or "Fall"), 2004 (Germany-Russia)

The Berlin offensive entered the Guinness Book of Records as the largest battle in history. Today, many details are known, thanks to which it is possible to refute some of the myths that have accumulated over the years around this main event of the end of the war.

Three fronts (1st and 2nd Belarusian and 1st Ukrainian) participated in the Berlin offensive operation with the support of the 18th Air Army, the Baltic Fleet and the Dnieper Flotilla. The concerted actions of more than 2 million people led to the fact that in the first days of May 1945 the capital of Germany was taken. From April 16 to April 25, Soviet troops closed the ring around Berlin and went to strike positions, cutting off enemy military groupings. And on the 25th, the assault on the city itself began, ending on May 2, when white flags were thrown out of the windows of the last buildings held (the Reichstag, the Reich Chancellery and the Royal Opera).

Berlin could have been captured in February

In 1966, the former commander of the 8th Guards Army, Marshal Vasily Chuikov, in one of his conversations, spoke about an event that allegedly happened in the winter of 1945: “On February 6, Zhukov gives instructions to prepare for an attack on Berlin. On this day, during a meeting at Zhukov's, Stalin called. He asks: "Tell me, what are you doing?" Toth: "We are planning an attack on Berlin." Stalin: "Turn to Pomerania." Zhukov now refuses this conversation, but he was.

Of course, Marshal Chuikov is a man with an almost impeccable reputation, and it is difficult to suspect him of intentional lies. However, it is not clear whether he himself witnessed this conversation or just recounted the rumors that circulated among the command of the 1st Belorussian Front? But it is in our power to assess whether there were opportunities for an attack on Berlin in February 1945 and how justified such a step would be.

By the end of January, Soviet troops reached the Oder and captured bridgeheads at a distance of only 60-70 kilometers from Berlin. It would seem that a breakthrough to Berlin in such a situation simply suggested itself. But instead, the 1st Belorussian Front moved to Eastern Pomerania, where it took part in the defeat of part of the Vistula Army Group, which was led by Heinrich Himmler. For what?

The fact is that the East Pomeranian operation, in fact, was just a preparation for an attack on Berlin. If the 1st Belorussian Front had moved on the German capital in February, it would most likely have received a powerful blow from Himmler on the right flank. The forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky would not have been enough to hold back several armies, including SS grenadier and tank divisions.

But before entering Berlin, the soldiers of the 1st Belorussian had to defeat the re-equipped 9th Wehrmacht Army, which was ready to fight to the death and even launched a short-term counteroffensive in February. Under such conditions, moving to the capital, exposing the flank to the enemy's Pomeranian grouping, would be uniform irresponsibility. The turn to Eastern Pomerania in February 1945 followed the normal logic of war: destroy the enemy piecemeal.

Competition between fronts

In the early morning of April 16, the first volleys of artillery preparation heralded the beginning of the Soviet offensive. It was carried out by the forces of the 1st Belorussian Front, commanded by Marshal Georgy Zhukov. The 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal Ivan Konev supported the offensive from the south. However, after it became clear that Zhukov's units were moving too slowly, both the 1st Ukrainian and 2nd Belorussian fronts turned to the German capital.

These maneuvers are sometimes said to be that Stalin allegedly arranged a competition between Zhukov and Konev - who would take Berlin first. This led to turmoil at the front, many hasty decisions, and ultimately cost the lives of thousands of soldiers. At the same time, it is completely unclear where and when Stalin could announce the beginning of this "race to Berlin." Indeed, in the texts of the directives sent to the commanders of the fronts, everything is said quite unambiguously. "Take control of the capital of Germany, the city of Berlin" - for Zhukov. "To defeat the enemy grouping (...) south of Berlin" - for Konev. So was there a competition?

Actually - yes. Only it was not Stalin who arranged it, but Marshal Konev himself, who later wrote directly in his memoirs: “The break in the dividing line at Lubben, as it were, hinted at the proactive nature of actions near Berlin. And how could it be otherwise. Advancing, in essence, along the southern outskirts of Berlin, knowingly leaving him untouched on the right flank, and even in a situation where it was not known in advance how everything would turn out in the future, seemed strange and incomprehensible. The decision to be ready for such a blow seemed clear, understandable and self-evident.

Of course, Konev could not go against the order of the Headquarters. However, he did everything so that his forces were ready for an instant turn to Berlin. The act is somewhat risky and arrogant, as it partially jeopardized the fulfillment of the combat missions determined by the Headquarters. But as soon as it became clear that the 1st Belorussian was moving too slowly, the forces of the 1st Ukrainian and 2nd Belorussian fronts were deployed to help him. This helped save soldiers' lives rather than waste them thoughtlessly.

It was necessary to take Berlin under siege

Another question that often comes up is: was it necessary to send troops to the streets of Berlin at all? Wouldn't it be better to enclose the city in a siege ring and slowly "squeeze" the enemy, at the same time waiting for the allied troops to approach from the west? The fact of the matter is that if the Soviet troops competed with anyone during the storming of Berlin, it was precisely with the allies.

Back in 1943, US President Franklin Roosevelt set an unambiguous task for his military: “We must reach Berlin. The US should get Berlin. The Soviets can take territory to the east." It is believed that the Allies said goodbye to the dreams of taking the capital of Germany in the fall of 1944, after the failure of Operation Magke * Sagyep. However, the words of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, said at the end of March 1945, are known: “I attach even greater importance to entering Berlin ... I consider it extremely important that we meet with the Russians as far east as possible.” In Moscow, most likely, they knew and took into account these sentiments. So it was necessary to take Berlin guaranteed before the approach of the allied forces.

The delay in the start of the attack on Berlin was beneficial, first of all, to the command of the Wehrmacht and personally to Hitler. The Fuhrer, who had lost his sense of reality, would have used this time to further strengthen the defense of the city. It is clear that in the end this would not have saved Berlin. But the assault would have paid a higher price. In turn, those generals from Hitler's entourage who had already resigned themselves to the fact that the Reich's cause was lost actively tried to build bridges with England and the United States in order to conclude a separate peace. And such a peace could cause a split in the anti-Hitler coalition.

To the credit of the Allies, it is worth noting that later, when the Germans suggested that the commander of the American forces, General Dwight Eisenhower, sign a partial surrender (concerning only the fighting on the Western Front), he sharply replied that they "stop looking for excuses." But that was already in May, after the capture of Berlin. In the event of a delay in the Berlin operation, the situation could have turned out quite differently.

Unreasonably high losses

Few non-specialists can describe in detail the course of the Berlin operation, but almost everyone is confident in the "colossal" and, most importantly, "unjustified" losses that the Soviet troops suffered in it. However, simple statistics refute this opinion. Less than 80,000 Soviet soldiers died during the storming of Berlin. There were much more wounded - more than 274 thousand.

German losses remain a hotly debated issue. According to Soviet data, the enemy lost about 400 thousand people. Germany did not recognize such high losses. But even if we take the German data, then according to them the losses still amount to about 100 thousand! That is, the defenders lost significantly more attackers, even according to the most rigorous estimates! But Berlin was perfectly fortified, and literally every meter our soldiers overcame with a fight. With all the desire, such an assault cannot be called unsuccessful.

Were the actions of the Soviet troops hasty or thoughtless? Also no. Instead of thoughtlessly trying to break through the German defenses with brute force, even at the very beginning of the operation, the very 9th Wehrmacht Army, which numbered 200 thousand people, was encircled on the Oder. As soon as Georgy Zhukov got too carried away with a dash for Berlin and allowed these units to reinforce the garrison of the city, the assault would become several times more difficult.

Here it is worth mentioning the famous German "faustniks", who allegedly burned dozens of our tanks on the streets of Berlin. According to some estimates, losses from faustpatrons amounted to no more than 10% of the total number of wrecked Soviet tanks (although other researchers count up to 30, and even up to 50%). This weapon was very imperfect. The Faustniks could shoot effectively from a distance of no more than 30 meters. One way or another, but the introduction of tank armies into the streets of the city was completely justified. Moreover, the tanks did not act independently, but with the support of the infantry.

Who raised the banner over the Reichstag?

The canonical answer to this question is known: Lieutenant Berest, junior sergeant Kantaria and Red Army soldier Yegorov. However, in reality, the story with the banner of Victory is much more complicated. The first message that the banner had been hoisted over the Reichstag was broadcast on the radio on the afternoon of April 30th. It did not correspond to reality - the assault on the building was still in full swing. “The soldiers of the units that lay down in front of the Reichstag went on the attack several times, made their way forward alone and in groups, everything roared and rumbled around. It might seem to some of the commanders that his fighters, if not achieved, are about to achieve their cherished goal, ”the commander of the 756th Infantry Regiment, Fyodor Zinchenko, explained this mistake.

The confusion is reinforced by the fact that during the assault on the Reichstag, soldiers threw red banners in the windows to indicate that this floor was free from the enemy. Some might consider these signal flags to be banners. As for real banners, at least four of them were installed.

Around 22:30 on April 30, a group of fighters under the command of Captain Vladimir Makov set up a banner on the sculpture "Goddess of Victory", which is located on the pediment of the western part of the Reichstag. Shortly after that, the soldiers of the assault group of Major Mikhail Bondar hung out the red flag here. At 22:40 on the western facade of the roof of the Reichstag, the third flag was set up by scouts under the command of Lieutenant Semyon Sorokin. And only about 3 o’clock in the morning on the eastern side of the roof of the Reichstag, Berest, Yegorov and Kantaria hung out their red flag, attaching it to the equestrian sculpture of Wilhelm I. It so happened that it was this banner that survived after the artillery shelling that hit the Reichstag that night. And already in the afternoon of May 2, by order of Colonel Fyodor Zinchenko, Berest, Kantaria and Yegorov transferred the banner to the top of the glass dome that crowned the building. By that time, only one frame remained from the dome, and it was not an easy task to climb onto it.

Hero of the Russian Federation Abdulkhakim Ismailov claimed that, together with his comrades Alexei Kovalev and Leonid Gorychev, he planted a flag on one of the towers of the Reichstag on April 28. These words are not supported by facts - some of them fought to the south. But it was Ismailov and his friends who became the heroes of the famous series of staged photographs “The Banner of Victory over the Reichstag”, filmed on May 2 by war correspondent Yevgeny Khaldei.

Berlin offensive operation April 16 - May 2, 1945

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COMMANDERS

USSR: Joseph Stalin (commander-in-chief), Marshal Georgy Zhukov (1st Belorussian Front), Ivan Konev (1st Ukrainian Front), Konstantin Rokossovsky (2nd Belorussian Front). Germany People: Adolf Hitler, Helmut Weidling (the last commandant of Berlin). -

FORCES OF THE PARTIES

USSR: 1.9 million men (infantry), 6,250 tanks, 41,600 guns and mortars, over 7,500 aircraft. Polish Army (as part of the 1st Belorussian Front): 155,900 people. Germany: about 1 million people, 1,500 tanks and assault guns, 10,400 guns and mortars, 3,300 aircraft. -

LOSSES

USSR: killed - 78,291, wounded - 274,184, lost 215.9 thousand units of small arms, 1997 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2108 guns and mortars, 917 aircraft. Poland: killed - 2825, wounded - 6067. Germany: killed - about 400,000 (according to Soviet data), captured - about 380,000.

Map

Berlin strategic offensive operation (Battle of Berlin):

Berlin strategic offensive operation

Dates (beginning and end of the operation)

The operation continued 23 day - from April 16 By May 8, 1945, during which Soviet troops advanced westward at a distance of 100 to 220 km. The width of the combat front is 300 km.

The goals of the parties to the Berlin operation

Germany

The Nazi leadership tried to drag out the war in order to achieve a separate peace with England and the United States and split the anti-Hitler coalition. At the same time, holding the front against the Soviet Union acquired decisive importance.

USSR

The military-political situation that had developed by April 1945 required the Soviet command to prepare and carry out an operation to defeat the group of German troops in the Berlin direction, capture Berlin and reach the Elbe River to join the Allied forces as soon as possible. The successful fulfillment of this strategic task made it possible to thwart the plans of the Nazi leadership to prolong the war.

The forces of three fronts were involved in the operation: the 1st Belorussian, 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian, as well as the 18th air army of long-range aviation, the Dnieper military flotilla and part of the forces of the Baltic Fleet.

• Capture the capital of Germany, the city of Berlin
• After 12-15 days of operation, reach the Elbe River

• Deliver a cutting blow south of Berlin, isolate the main forces of Army Group Center from the Berlin grouping and thereby ensure the main attack of the 1st Belorussian Front from the south
• Defeat the enemy grouping south of Berlin and operational reserves in the Cottbus area
• In 10-12 days, no later, reach the Belitz-Wittenberg line and further along the Elbe River to Dresden

• Deliver a cutting blow north of Berlin, securing the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front from possible enemy counterattacks from the north
• Press to the sea and destroy the German troops north of Berlin

• Assist the troops of the 5th Shock and 8th Guards Armies with two brigades of river ships in crossing the Oder and breaking through the enemy defenses at the Kustra bridgehead
• The third brigade to assist the troops of the 33rd Army in the Furstenberg area
• Provide anti-mine defense of water transport routes.

• Support the coastal flank of the 2nd Belorussian Front, continuing the blockade of the Kurland Army Group pressed to the sea in Latvia (Kurland Cauldron)

The balance of power before the operation

Soviet troops:

• 1.9 million people
• 6250 tanks
• over 7500 aircraft
• Allies - Polish troops: 155,900 people

German troops:

• 1 million people
• 1500 tanks
• over 3300 aircraft

Photo gallery

Preparations for the Berlin operation



Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied Forces of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition



Soviet attack aircraft in the sky over Berlin



Soviet artillery on the outskirts of Berlin, April 1945



A volley of Soviet Katyusha rocket launchers in Berlin



Soviet soldier in Berlin



Fighting on the streets of Berlin



Hoisting the Banner of Victory on the Reichstag building



Soviet gunners write on the shells "Hitler", "To Berlin", "According to the Reichstag"



Gun crew of the guard senior sergeant Zhirnov M.A. fights on one of the streets of Berlin



Infantrymen are fighting for Berlin



Heavy artillery in one of the street fights



Street fight in Berlin



The crew of the tank unit of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel Konstantinov N.P. knocks the Nazis out of the house on Leipzigerstrasse



Infantrymen fighting for Berlin 1945



The battery of the 136th Army Cannon Artillery Brigade is preparing to fire on Berlin, 1945.

Commanders of fronts, armies and other units

1st Belorussian Front: Commander Marshal - G.K. Zhukov M.S. Malinin

Front Composition:

• 1st Army of the Polish Army - Commander Lieutenant General Poplavsky S. G.

Zhukov G.K.

• 1st Guards Tank Army - Commander Colonel General of the Tank Forces Katukov M.E.
• 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps - Commander Lieutenant General Kryukov V.V.
• 2nd Guards Tank Army - Commander Colonel General of the Tank Forces Bogdanov S.I.
• 3rd Army - Commander Colonel General Gorbatov A.V.
• 3rd Shock Army - Commander Colonel General Kuznetsov V.I.
• 5th Shock Army - Commander Colonel General Berzarin N.E.
• 7th Guards Cavalry Corps - Commander Lieutenant General Konstantinov M.P.
• 8th Guards Army - Commander Colonel General Chuikov V.I.
• 9th Tank Corps - Commander Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Kirichenko I.F.
• 11th Tank Corps - Commander Major General of the Tank Forces Yushchuk I.I.
• 16th Air Army - Commander Colonel General of Aviation S.I.
• 33rd Army - Commander Colonel General Tsvetaev V.D.
• 47th Army - Commander Lieutenant General Perkhorovich F.I.
• 61st Army - Commander Colonel-General Belov P.A.
• 69th Army - Commander Colonel General Kolpakchi V. Ya.

1st Ukrainian Front: Commander Marshal - I. S. Konev, Chief of Staff General of the Army I. E. Petrov

Konev I.S.

Front Composition:

• 1st Guards Cavalry Corps - Commander Lieutenant General Baranov V.K.
• 2nd Army of the Polish Army - Commander Lieutenant General Sverchevsky K.K.
• 2nd Air Army - Commander Colonel General of Aviation Krasovsky S.A.
• 3rd Guards Army - Commander Colonel General V. N. Gordov
• 3rd Guards Tank Army - Commander Colonel General Rybalko P.S.
• 4th Guards Tank Corps - Commander Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Poluboyarov P.P.
• 4th Guards Tank Army - Commander Colonel General Lelyushenko D.D.
• 5th Guards Army - Commander Colonel General Zhadov A.S.
• 7th Guards Motorized Rifle Corps - Commander Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Korchagin I.P.
• 13th Army - Commander Colonel General Pukhov N.P.
• 25th Tank Corps - Commander Major General of the Tank Forces Fominykh E.I.
• 28th Army - Commander Lieutenant General Luchinsky A.A.
• 52nd Army - Commander Colonel General Koroteev K.A.

2nd Belorussian Front: Commander Marshal - K. K. Rokossovsky, Chief of Staff Colonel General A. N. Bogolyubov

Rokossovsky K.K.

Front Composition:

• 1st Guards Tank Corps - Commander Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Panov M.F.
• 2nd Shock Army - Commander Colonel General Fedyuninsky I.I.
• 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps - Commander Lieutenant General Oslikovsky N. S.
• 3rd Guards Tank Corps - Commander Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Panfilov A.P.
• 4th Air Army - Commander Colonel General of Aviation Vershinin K.A.
• 8th Guards Tank Corps - Commander Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Popov A.F.
• 8th Mechanized Corps - Commander Major General of Tank Troops Firsovich A.N.
• 49th Army - Commander Colonel General Grishin I.T.
• 65th Army - Commander Colonel-General Batov P.I.
• 70th Army - Commander Colonel General Popov V.S.

18th Air Army- Commander Chief Marshal of Aviation Golovanov A.E.

Dnieper military flotilla- Commander Rear Admiral Grigoriev V.V.

Red Banner Baltic Fleet- Commander Admiral Tributs V.F.

The course of hostilities

At 5 o'clock in the morning Moscow time (2 hours before dawn) on April 16, artillery preparation began in the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front. 9000 guns and mortars, as well as more than 1500 installations of the BM-13 and BM-31 RS, for 25 minutes, grinded the first line of German defense on the 27-kilometer breakthrough section. With the start of the attack, artillery fire was moved deep into the defense, and 143 anti-aircraft searchlights were turned on in the breakthrough areas. Their dazzling light stunned the enemy and at the same time illuminated

Soviet artillery on the outskirts of Berlin

way for advancing units. For the first one and a half to two hours, the offensive of the Soviet troops developed successfully, individual formations reached the second line of defense. However, soon the Nazis, relying on a strong and well-prepared second line of defense, began to offer fierce resistance. Intense fighting broke out along the entire front. Although in some sectors of the front the troops managed to capture individual strongholds, they did not succeed in achieving decisive success. The powerful knot of resistance, equipped on the Zelov heights, turned out to be insurmountable for rifle formations. This jeopardized the success of the entire operation. In such a situation, the front commander, Marshal Zhukov, decided to bring the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies into battle. This was not foreseen by the offensive plan, however, the stubborn resistance of the German troops required to increase the penetration ability of the attackers by bringing tank armies into battle. The course of the battle on the first day showed that the German command attaches decisive importance to the retention of the Zelov Heights. To strengthen the defense in this sector, by the end of April 16, the operational reserves of the Vistula Army Group were thrown. All day and all night on April 17, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front fought fierce battles with the enemy. By the morning of April 18, tank and rifle formations, with the support of aviation of the 16th and 18th air armies, took the Zelov Heights. Overcoming the stubborn defenses of the German troops and repulsing fierce counterattacks, by the end of April 19, the troops of the front had broken through the third defensive zone and were able to develop the offensive against Berlin.

The real threat of encirclement forced the commander of the 9th German Army T. Busse to come up with a proposal to withdraw the army to the suburbs of Berlin and take up a strong defense there. Such a plan was supported by the commander of the Vistula Army Group, Colonel General Heinrici, but Hitler rejected this proposal and ordered to hold the occupied lines at any cost.

April 20 was marked by an artillery raid on Berlin, inflicted by long-range artillery of the 79th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army. It was a kind of gift to Hitler for his birthday. On April 21, units of the 3rd shock, 2nd guards tank, 47th and 5th shock armies broke through the third line of defense, broke into the outskirts of Berlin and started fighting there. The first to break into Berlin from the east were troops that were part of the 26th Guards Corps of General P. A. Firsov and the 32nd Corps of General D. S. Zherebin of the 5th Shock Army. On the evening of April 21, advanced units of the 3rd Guards Tank Army of P.S. Rybalko approached the city from the south. On April 23 and 24, hostilities in all directions took on a particularly fierce character. On April 23, the 9th Rifle Corps under the command of Major General I.P. Rosly achieved the greatest success in the assault on Berlin. The soldiers of this corps captured Karlshorst, part of Kopenick, by a decisive assault and, having reached the Spree, crossed it on the move. Great assistance in forcing the Spree was provided by the ships of the Dnieper military flotilla, transferring rifle units to the opposite bank under enemy fire. Although by April 24 the pace of advance of the Soviet troops had decreased, the Nazis failed to stop them. On April 24, the 5th shock army, fighting fierce battles, continued to successfully advance towards the center of Berlin.

Operating in an auxiliary direction, the 61st Army and the 1st Army of the Polish Army, having launched an offensive on April 17, overcoming the German defenses with stubborn battles, bypassed Berlin from the north and moved towards the Elbe.

The offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front developed more successfully. On April 16, early in the morning, a smoke screen was placed along the entire 390-kilometer front, blinding the advanced observation posts of the enemy. At 0655, after a 40-minute artillery strike on the front line of the German defense, the reinforced battalions of the divisions of the first echelon began to cross the Neisse. Having quickly captured bridgeheads on the left bank of the river, they provided conditions for building bridges and crossing the main forces. During the first hours of the operation, 133 crossings were equipped by the engineering troops of the front in the main direction of attack. With every hour, the number of forces and means transferred to the bridgehead increased. In the middle of the day, the attackers reached the second lane of the German defense. Feeling the threat of a major breakthrough, the German command already on the first day of the operation threw into battle not only its tactical, but also operational reserves, setting them the task of throwing the advancing Soviet troops into the river. Nevertheless, by the end of the day, the troops of the front broke through the main line of defense on the 26 km front and advanced to a depth of 13 km.

Storming Berlin

By the morning of April 17, the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies crossed the Neisse in full force. All day long, the troops of the front, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy, continued to widen and deepen the gap in the German defenses. Air support for the advancing troops was provided by pilots of the 2nd Air Army. Assault aviation, acting at the request of ground commanders, destroyed the firepower and manpower of the enemy at the forefront. Bomber aircraft smashed suitable reserves. By mid-April 17, the following situation had developed in the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front: the tank armies of Rybalko and Lelyushenko were moving west along a narrow corridor pierced by the troops of the 13th, 3rd and 5th Guards armies. By the end of the day, they approached the Spree and began crossing it.

Meanwhile, on the secondary, Dresden, direction, the troops of the 52nd Army of General K. A. Koroteev and the 2nd Army of the Polish General K. K. Sverchevsky broke through the enemy’s tactical defenses and advanced to a depth of 20 km in two days of hostilities.

Considering the slow advance of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, as well as the success achieved in the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, on the night of April 18, the Stavka decided to turn the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front to Berlin. In his order to the army commanders Rybalko and Lelyushenko on the offensive, the front commander wrote: “In the main direction with a tank fist, it is bolder and more decisive to break forward. Bypass cities and large settlements and not get involved in protracted frontal battles. I demand to firmly understand that the success of tank armies depends on a bold maneuver and speed in action"

Fulfilling the order of the commander, on April 18 and 19, the tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front marched irresistibly towards Berlin. The pace of their offensive reached 35-50 km per day. At the same time, the combined-arms armies were preparing to liquidate large enemy groupings in the area of ​​Cottbus and Spremberg.

By the end of the day on April 20, the main strike force of the 1st Ukrainian Front had penetrated deeply into the enemy’s location, and completely cut off the German Army Group Vistula from the Army Group Center. Feeling the threat caused by the rapid actions of the tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the German command took a number of measures to strengthen the approaches to Berlin. To strengthen the defense in the area of ​​​​the cities of Zossen, Luckenwalde, Jutterbog, infantry and tank units were urgently sent. Overcoming their stubborn resistance, on the night of April 21, Rybalko's tankers reached the outer Berlin defensive bypass. By the morning of April 22, Sukhov's 9th Mechanized Corps and Mitrofanov's 6th Guards Tank Corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army crossed the Notte Canal, broke through the outer defensive bypass of Berlin, and reached the southern bank of the Teltowkanal at the end of the day. There, having met strong and well-organized enemy resistance, they were stopped.

On the afternoon of April 22, a meeting of the top military leadership was held at Hitler's headquarters, at which it was decided to withdraw W. Wenck's 12th Army from the western front and send it to join T. Busse's semi-encircled 9th Army. To organize the offensive of the 12th Army, Field Marshal Keitel was sent to its headquarters. This was the last serious attempt to influence the course of the battle, since by the end of the day on April 22, the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts formed and almost closed two encirclement rings. One - around the 9th Army of the enemy east and southeast of Berlin; the other - west of Berlin, around the units that were directly defending in the city.

The Teltow Canal was a rather serious obstacle: a moat filled with water with high concrete banks forty to fifty meters wide. In addition, its northern coast was very well prepared for defense: trenches, reinforced concrete pillboxes, tanks and self-propelled guns dug into the ground. Above the canal is an almost solid wall of houses, bristling with fire, with walls a meter or more thick. Having assessed the situation, the Soviet command decided to conduct thorough preparations for forcing the Teltow Canal. All day on April 23, the 3rd Guards Tank Army was preparing for the assault. By the morning of April 24, a powerful artillery grouping, with a density of up to 650 barrels per kilometer of front, was concentrated on the southern bank of the Teltow Canal, designed to destroy German fortifications on the opposite bank. Having suppressed the enemy defenses with a powerful artillery strike, the troops of the 6th Guards Tank Corps, Major General Mitrofanov, successfully crossed the Teltow Canal and captured a bridgehead on its northern bank. On the afternoon of April 24, the 12th Army of Wenck launched the first tank attacks on the positions of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps of General Ermakov (4th Guards Tank Army) and units of the 13th Army. All attacks were successfully repulsed with the support of Lieutenant General Ryazanov's 1st Assault Aviation Corps.

At 12 noon on April 25, west of Berlin, the advanced units of the 4th Guards Tank Army met with units of the 47th Army of the 1st Belorussian Front. On the same day, another significant event took place. An hour and a half later, on the Elbe, the 34th Guards Corps of General Baklanov of the 5th Guards Army met with American troops.

From April 25 to May 2, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front fought fierce battles in three directions: units of the 28th Army, 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies participated in the storming of Berlin; part of the forces of the 4th Guards Tank Army, together with the 13th Army, repulsed the counterattack of the 12th German Army; The 3rd Guards Army and part of the forces of the 28th Army blocked and destroyed the encircled 9th Army.

All the time from the beginning of the operation, the command of the Army Group "Center" sought to disrupt the offensive of the Soviet troops. On April 20, German troops delivered the first counterattack on the left flank of the 1st Ukrainian Front and pushed back the troops of the 52nd Army and the 2nd Army of the Polish Army. On April 23, a new powerful counterattack followed, as a result of which the defense at the junction of the 52nd Army and the 2nd Army of the Polish Army was broken through and the German troops advanced 20 km in the general direction of Spremberg, threatening to reach the rear of the front.

From April 17 to April 19, the troops of the 65th Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front, under the command of Colonel-General Batov P.I., conducted reconnaissance in force and advanced detachments captured the Oder interfluve, thereby facilitating the subsequent forcing of the river. On the morning of April 20, the main forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front went on the offensive: the 65th, 70th and 49th armies. The crossing of the Oder took place under the cover of artillery fire and smoke screens. The offensive developed most successfully in the sector of the 65th Army, in which the engineering troops of the army had a considerable merit. Having built two 16-ton pontoon crossings by 13 o'clock, by the evening of April 20, the troops of this army captured a bridgehead 6 kilometers wide and 1.5 kilometers deep.

More modest success was achieved in the central sector of the front in the zone of the 70th Army. The left-flank 49th Army met stubborn resistance and was not successful. All day and all night on April 21, the troops of the front, repulsing numerous attacks by German troops, stubbornly expanded their bridgeheads on the western bank of the Oder. In the current situation, the front commander K.K. Rokossovsky decided to send the 49th Army along the crossings of the right neighbor of the 70th Army, and then return it to its offensive zone. By April 25, as a result of fierce battles, the troops of the front expanded the captured bridgehead to 35 km along the front and up to 15 km in depth. To build up striking power, the 2nd shock army, as well as the 1st and 3rd guards tank corps, were transferred to the western bank of the Oder. At the first stage of the operation, the 2nd Belorussian Front, by its actions, fettered the main forces of the 3rd German tank army, depriving it of the opportunity to help those fighting near Berlin. On April 26, formations of the 65th Army stormed Stettin. In the future, the armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front, breaking the resistance of the enemy and destroying the suitable reserves, stubbornly moved to the west. On May 3, Panfilov's 3rd Guards Tank Corps, southwest of Wismar, established contact with the advanced units of the 2nd British Army.

Liquidation of the Frankfurt-Guben group

By the end of April 24, formations of the 28th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front came into contact with units of the 8th Guards Army of the 1st Belorussian Front, thereby encircling the 9th Army of General Busse southeast of Berlin and cutting it off from the city. The encircled grouping of German troops became known as the Frankfurt-Gubenskaya. Now the Soviet command was faced with the task of eliminating the 200,000th enemy grouping and preventing its breakthrough to Berlin or to the west. To accomplish the latter task, the 3rd Guards Army and part of the forces of the 28th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front took up active defense in the path of a possible breakthrough by German troops. On April 26, the 3rd, 69th, and 33rd armies of the 1st Belorussian Front began the final liquidation of the encircled units. However, the enemy not only offered stubborn resistance, but also made repeated attempts to break out of the encirclement. Skillfully maneuvering and skillfully creating superiority in forces in narrow sections of the front, the German troops twice managed to break through the encirclement. However, each time the Soviet command took decisive measures to eliminate the breakthrough. Until May 2, the encircled units of the 9th German Army made desperate attempts to break through the battle formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the west, to join General Wenck's 12th Army. Only separate small groups managed to seep through the forests and go west.

Capture of the Reichstag

At 12 noon on April 25, the ring around Berlin was closed, when the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps of the 4th Guards Tank Army crossed the Havel River and connected with units of the 328th Division of the 47th Army of General Perkhorovich. By that time, according to the Soviet command, the Berlin garrison numbered at least 200 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and 250 tanks. The defense of the city was carefully thought out and well prepared. It was based on a system of strong fire, strongholds and centers of resistance. The closer to the city center, the tighter the defense became. Massive stone buildings with thick walls gave it special strength. The windows and doors of many buildings were closed up and turned into loopholes for firing. The streets were blocked by powerful barricades up to four meters thick. The defenders had a large number of faustpatrons, which in the conditions of street fighting turned out to be a formidable anti-tank weapon. Of no small importance in the enemy's defense system were underground structures, which were widely used by the enemy for maneuvering troops, as well as for sheltering them from artillery and bomb attacks.

By April 26, six armies of the 1st Belorussian Front (47th, 3rd and 5th shock, 8th guards, 1st and 2nd guards tank armies) and three armies of the 1st Belorussian Front took part in the assault on Berlin. th Ukrainian Front (28th, 3rd and 4th Guards Tank). Taking into account the experience of capturing large cities, assault detachments were created for battles in the city as part of rifle battalions or companies, reinforced with tanks, artillery and sappers. The actions of the assault detachments, as a rule, were preceded by a short but powerful artillery preparation.

By April 27, as a result of the actions of the armies of the two fronts that had deeply advanced towards the center of Berlin, the enemy grouping in Berlin stretched out in a narrow strip from east to west - sixteen kilometers long and two or three, in some places five kilometers wide. The fighting in the city did not stop day or night. Block by block, Soviet troops "gnawed through" the enemy's defenses. So, by the evening of April 28, units of the 3rd shock army went to the Reichstag area. On the night of April 29, the actions of the forward battalions under the command of Captain S. A. Neustroev and Senior Lieutenant K. Ya. Samsonov captured the Moltke bridge. At dawn on April 30, the building of the Ministry of the Interior, adjacent to the parliament building, was stormed at the cost of considerable losses. The way to the Reichstag was open.

Banner of Victory over the Reichstag

April 30, 1945 at 21.30, units of the 150th Infantry Division under the command of Major General V. M. Shatilov and the 171st Infantry Division under the command of Colonel A. I. Negoda stormed the main part of the Reichstag building. The remaining Nazi units offered stubborn resistance. We had to fight for every room. In the early morning of May 1, the assault flag of the 150th Infantry Division was raised over the Reichstag, but the battle for the Reichstag continued all day and only on the night of May 2 did the Reichstag garrison capitulate.

On May 1, only the Tiergarten and the government quarter remained in German hands. The imperial office was located here, in the courtyard of which there was a bunker at Hitler's headquarters. On the night of May 1, by prior arrangement, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General Krebs, arrived at the headquarters of the 8th Guards Army. He informed the commander of the army, General V. I. Chuikov, about Hitler's suicide and about the proposal of the new German government to conclude a truce. The message was immediately conveyed to G.K. Zhukov, who himself telephoned Moscow. Stalin confirmed the categorical demand for unconditional surrender. At 6 pm on May 1, the new German government rejected the demand for unconditional surrender, and the Soviet troops were forced to resume the assault with renewed vigor.

In the first hour of the night on May 2, the radio stations of the 1st Belorussian Front received a message in Russian: “Please cease fire. We are sending parliamentarians to the Potsdam Bridge.” A German officer who arrived at the appointed place on behalf of the commander of the defense of Berlin, General Weidling, announced the readiness of the Berlin garrison to stop resistance. At 6 am on May 2, General of Artillery Weidling, accompanied by three German generals, crossed the front line and surrendered. An hour later, while at the headquarters of the 8th Guards Army, he wrote a surrender order, which was duplicated and, using loud-speaking installations and radio, brought to enemy units defending in the center of Berlin. As this order was brought to the attention of the defenders, resistance in the city ceased. By the end of the day, the troops of the 8th Guards Army cleared the central part of the city from the enemy. Individual units that did not want to surrender tried to break through to the west, but were destroyed or scattered.

Side losses

USSR

From April 16 to May 8, Soviet troops lost 352,475 people, of which 78,291 people were irretrievably lost. The losses of the Polish troops during the same period amounted to 8892 people, of which 2825 people were irretrievably lost. The loss of military equipment amounted to 1997 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2108 guns and mortars, 917 combat aircraft.

Germany

According to the combat reports of the Soviet fronts:

• The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front in the period from April 16 to May 13 killed 232,726 people, captured 250,675 people
• Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the period from April 15 to April 29 killed 114,349 people, captured 55,080 people
• Troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front in the period from April 5 to May 8: killed 49,770 people, captured 84,234 people

Thus, according to the reports of the Soviet command, the loss of German troops was about 400 thousand people killed, about 380 thousand people captured. Part of the German troops was pushed back to the Elbe and capitulated to the allied forces.

Also, according to the assessment of the Soviet command, the total number of troops that emerged from the encirclement in the Berlin area does not exceed 17,000 people with 80-90 armored vehicles.

Did Hitler have a chance?

Under the onslaught of the advancing armies, Hitler's feverish intentions to take refuge either in Berchtesgaden, or in Schleswig-Holstein, or in the South Tyrolean fortress advertised by Goebbels collapsed. At the suggestion of Gauleiter Tyrol to move to this fortress in the mountains, Hitler, according to Rattenhuber, "with a hopeless wave of his hand, said:" I see no more sense in this running around from place to place. "The situation in Berlin at the end of April left no doubt that that our last days had come. Events were unfolding faster than we expected."

Hitler's last plane was still at the ready at the airfield. When the plane was destroyed, hastily began to build a take-off site near the Reich Chancellery. The squadron intended for Hitler was burned by Soviet artillery. But his personal pilot was still with him. The new Commander-in-Chief of Aviation Greim was still sending planes, but not one of them could get through to Berlin. And, according to Greim's exact information, not a single plane from Berlin crossed the offensive rings either. There was literally nowhere to go. Armies were advancing from all sides. Escape from fallen Berlin to get caught by the Anglo-American troops, he considered a lost cause.

He chose a different plan. Enter from here, from Berlin, into negotiations with the British and Americans, who, in his opinion, should be interested in the Russians not taking possession of the capital of Germany, and stipulate some tolerable conditions for themselves. But negotiations, he believed, could only take place on the basis of an improved martial law in Berlin. The plan was unrealistic, unworkable. But he owned Hitler, and, figuring out the historical picture of the last days of the imperial office, he should not be bypassed. Hitler could not fail to understand that even a temporary improvement in the position of Berlin in the general catastrophic military situation in Germany would change little in general. But this was, according to his calculations, a necessary political prerequisite for the negotiations, on which he pinned his last hopes.

With manic frenzy, he therefore repeats about the army of Wenck. There is no doubt that Hitler was decidedly incapable of directing the defense of Berlin. But now we are talking only about his plans. There is a letter confirming Hitler's plan. It was sent to Wenck with a messenger on the night of April 29th. This letter reached our military commandant's office in Spandau on May 7, 1945, in the following way.

A certain Josef Brichzi, a seventeen-year-old boy who studied as an electrician and was drafted into the Volkssturm in February 1945, served in an anti-tank detachment defending the government quarter. On the night of April 29, he and another sixteen-year-old boy were called from the barracks in Wilhelmstrasse, and a soldier took them to the Reich Chancellery. Here they were led to Bormann. Bormann announced to them that they had been chosen to carry out the most important task. They have to break out of the encirclement and deliver a letter to General Wenck, commander of the 12th Army. With these words, he handed them a package.

The fate of the second guy is unknown. Brihzi managed to get out of encircled Berlin on a motorcycle at dawn on April 29. General Wenck, he was told, he would find in the village of Ferch, northwest of Potsdam. Upon reaching Potsdam, Brichzi discovered that none of the military knew or heard where Wenck's headquarters were actually located. Then Brichzi decided to go to Spandau, where his uncle lived. My uncle advised me not to go anywhere else, but to hand over the package to the military commandant's office. After a while, Brihtzi took him to the Soviet military commandant's office on May 7th.

Here is the text of the letter: "Dear General Wenck! As can be seen from the attached messages, Reichsführer SS Himmler made an offer to the Anglo-Americans, which unconditionally transfers our people to the plutocrats. The turn can only be made personally by the Führer, only by him! The precondition for this is the immediate establishment of communication armies of Wenck with us, in order to give the Fuhrer domestic and foreign political freedom of negotiations. Your Krebs, Heil Hitler! Chief of Staff Your M. Bormann"

All of the above suggests that, being in such a hopeless situation in April 1945, Hitler still hoped for something, and this last hope was placed on Wenck's army. Wenck's army, meanwhile, was moving from the west to Berlin. She was met on the outskirts of Berlin by our troops advancing on the Elbe and dispersed. Thus melted Hitler's last hope.

Operation results

The famous monument to the Soldier-Liberator in Treptow Park in Berlin

• The destruction of the largest grouping of German troops, the capture of the capital of Germany, the capture of the highest military and political leadership of Germany.

• The fall of Berlin and the loss of the German leadership's ability to govern led to the almost complete cessation of organized resistance on the part of the German armed forces.

• The Berlin operation demonstrated to the Allies the high combat capability of the Red Army and was one of the reasons for the cancellation of Operation Unthinkable, Britain's plan for a full-scale war against the Soviet Union. However, this decision did not further influence the development of the arms race and the beginning of the Cold War.

• Hundreds of thousands of people have been liberated from German captivity, including at least 200,000 citizens of foreign countries. Only in the zone of the 2nd Belorussian Front in the period from April 5 to May 8, 197,523 people were released from captivity, of which 68,467 were citizens of the allied states.

"Damned questions" of the Great Patriotic War. Lost victories, missed opportunities Alexander Gennadievich Patients

STORM OF BERLIN

STORM OF BERLIN

The last operation of the Great Patriotic War, upon closer examination, turns into a real tangle of mysteries and contradictions, and the threads from this tangle stretch both into the distant future and into the past. In terms of historical alternatives, we need to consider several basic questions. Was it necessary to storm Berlin at all? If it is necessary, then when and how should it be done? To find answers to these questions, we will have to consider the prehistory of the assault, and this consideration will begin not at Stalin's Headquarters, but at the headquarters of General Eisenhower.

The fact is that out of all the Big Three, Winston Churchill thought more about politics and about the post-war structure of Europe than Roosevelt and Stalin put together. It was he who constantly rushed about with various ideas that contradicted preliminary agreements. Either he wanted to land in the Balkans to cut off the Red Army's path to Central Europe, or he wanted to capture Berlin ... That's what it's worth talking about. At the suggestion of Churchill, Field Marshal Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, began to consider

options for a rapid throw of British troops to Berlin, although plans for such operations were not seriously developed. And there was no one to command a swift throw. The British commander, Field Marshal Montgomery, was known for his pathological methodicalness and utter incapacity for swift decisions and actions. Now, if Churchill had decided to talk to the American General Patton, then, you see, history could have taken a different course. By the way, here's another possible alternative for you - an attempt by the allies to capture Berlin.

However, the commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in Europe, General Eisenhower, refused to even consider such adventures. However, rumors about the intentions of the British could well reach Stalin, and then it was not difficult to predict his reaction. Let's take Berlin! Alas, the former seminarian was organically capable of nothing more reasonable. After that, the next question inevitably arose: how to take it? And here we are simply forced to consider in more detail the events that immediately preceded the Berlin operation, more precisely, the Vistula-Oder operation of the Red Army.

This operation is remarkable in many respects. First of all, few people thought about it, but it is not at all impossible that it was the course of the fighting between the Vistula and Oder rivers and their results that once and for all repelled the Allies' desire to get involved with the Soviet Union. It is not for nothing that the Anglo-American warriors built all their subsequent calculations solely on the use of some kind of miracle weapon that would help them defeat the damned Bolsheviks, but at the same time they did not even stutter about unleashing a conventional war. The Vistula-Oder operation showed in all its brilliance the real power of the Red Army and its main striking force - the tank troops. Moreover, the fact that in the course of the operation the commanders, let's say delicately, did not shine with fresh ideas, gave its results a special persuasiveness. It was a monstrous force that crushed the vaunted Wehrmacht like a rag doll on a road roller.

Since the events of 1945 had several opportunities to turn onto an alternative track, we will simply be forced to abandon the usual scheme for constructing a chapter: an introduction and then an alternative. Now we will highlight alternative scenarios in italics, as we will have to return to reality again and again.

The strategic situation before the start of the Vistula-Oder operation was crystal clear. The Red Army had three bridgeheads across the Vistula, and strikes were to be expected from them. In any case, the well-known German historian and former General Tippelskirch writes that the German command foresaw this, but simply did not have enough strength to parry these blows. I don’t know, I don’t know ... If we recall the Battle of Stalingrad, there the places where decisive blows were delivered and the prospect of encircling Paulus’s army were also quite obvious, but for some reason none of the German generals had an insight. As for “not enough,” Tippelskirch is absolutely right. Although here, too, he cannot refrain from telling a fable about the "tenfold" superiority of the Red Army in manpower. Apparently, the general had certain problems with arithmetic - a common illness of beaten commanders. If our generals in 1941 counted “three times as many tanks” among the Germans, now it is the turn of the Germans to deal with multiplication and division. The number of German troops Tippel-skirch was well aware, and if you believe his calculations, it turns out that everything that the Red Army had on the Eastern Front was assembled against the unfortunate Army Group A. Between Tippelskirch and General von Butlar even a heated scientific dispute flared up: was our army 10 or 11 times superior to theirs?

In tanks, we had a sevenfold superiority, what happened, it happened. But who is to blame for this? Who prevented the Germans from spinning their industry to full speed? I have already written more than once that such excuses are simply pathetic evasions. This is the art of the commander, in order to concentrate superior forces at a decisive moment in a decisive place. And if the state and industry can give it these superior forces, this fact only speaks of the advantages of this state and that one should not try to fight with it.

However, not everything is clean with our history. What is the mere statement of the "Military Encyclopedia" about the 500-kilometer depth of the German defensive structures between the Vistula and the Oder. It immediately becomes clear why they did not have enough tanks: all of Germany was digging trenches and trenches day and night. True, if you believe the map placed in the same second volume of the SVE, with all the diligence between the Vistula and the Oder, it is impossible to measure more than 350 kilometers of distance. Maybe our General Staff measured the distance from the lower reaches of the Oder to the upper reaches of the Vistula? Then it might get even bigger.

But distance played a part in this operation. During the Second World War, the maximum depth of operations was determined by the presence or absence of a supply system for the advancing troops. But even the Americans, who had just a fantastic amount of vehicles, could not afford to go beyond certain limits. For example, the Germans wrote more than once that it was supply problems that eventually killed the Paulus army near Stalingrad and the German troops in the North Caucasus. The most curious thing is that in this case they are not so wrong. It was the Americans who could afford to drop supplies for the XIV Air Force into China along the perilous route across the Himalayas, spending four tons of gasoline to get a fifth to General Chennault's planes. But not more! Even they could not supply the advancing armies of Patton and Bradley in this way. Therefore, almost all armies, after a breakthrough of about 500 kilometers, were forced to stop to regroup and pull up the rear, even if there was no enemy resistance in principle.

However, let us return to January 1945 on the banks of the Vistula. For one reason or another, the Soviet offensive began on 12 January. The 1st Belorussian Front of Marshal Zhukov struck from the Magnushevsky and Pulavsky bridgeheads, and the 1st Ukrainian Marshal Konev - one, but much more powerful, from the Sandomierz bridgehead. The strength of this strike can be easily imagined if we remember that 8 combined arms and 2 tank armies, as well as 3 separate tank corps, took part in it. Nice and easy to describe such operations. There are no sophisticated maneuvers in them, no subtle designs. The main idea can be characterized in two words: pace and power!

The troops of Marshal Konev were the first to go on the offensive, the Sandomierz-Silesian operation began. The breakthrough was carried out within a strip 40 kilometers long by the forces of three armies. The troops of the front had a deep operational formation, but at the same time, in the breakthrough sector, even in the first lane, Konev created an overwhelming superiority over the enemy. In total, almost 12,000 guns and more than 1,400 tanks were concentrated on the Sandomierz bridgehead, and all this force fell upon the German XLVIII tank corps. After a powerful artillery preparation, the infantry went on the attack, and after a couple of hours the enemy's main line of defense was broken through. In the afternoon, the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies were thrown into battle, and the German defense simply fell apart.

And where were the German reserves at that time? Here we have to thank Hitler. Almost all the generals write that, at his request, the reserves were located close to the front line, so they came under artillery fire and bombing attacks and were pretty battered by the time they should have joined the battle. But only Guderian reveals another little secret. Army Group A had only 12 tank and mechanized divisions at its disposal. However, they were all evenly distributed along the front line. The Germans did not create a single shock fist. Who ordered it? Not known. However, Guderian, apparently retaining some scraps of honesty, in this case does not try to put the blame on Hitler, from which we can conclude that either the German General Staff or someone in the High Command tried.

Two days later, the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. And here we are faced with the first of the mysteries of the Vistula-Oder operation. The configuration of the front simply suggested the idea of ​​encircling the LVI tank and XL1I army corps of the Germans, who were already in the bag, with simultaneous strikes from the Magnushevsky and Sandomierz bridgeheads. Another small alternative. However, this did not happen. Why? Maybe, after all, the stories about, to put it mildly, not the best relationship between Zhukov and Konev are not without foundation? After all, both fronts did not even try to create another cauldron, but rushed together to the west, as if not noticing each other. Moreover, Zhukov's 69th army, with a blow from the Pulawy bridgehead, threw the Germans out of the cauldron, which could have arisen by itself, even against the will of the commanders. What was the meaning of the offensive from the tiny patch of the Puławy bridgehead is not clear, because this offensive had no tactical or operational significance. Although, on the other hand, both commanders were not seen in brilliant decisions, and no matter how hard A. Isaev tries to promote Zhukov, if you carefully read everything he wrote, Isaev’s books prove precisely the complete mediocrity of the marshals.

Organized German resistance ceased on the second day of the fighting, and the offensive moved into the stage of pursuit. This may partly explain the abandonment of attempts to create an encirclement ring. Why waste time on cunning maneuvers if you can use the second advantage of tank troops - striking power? But even she had to use it skillfully. The heavy skating rink of a tank army can quite turn into a thin pancake all the divisions that are in its path, you just need to aim it correctly and ensure the possibility of straight and non-stop movement. But with this, our generals constantly had problems. By the way, straightforwardness still had the right to exist. If we compare the composition of the German 9th Army, which took the main blow, at the beginning of January and the end of the same month, it turns out that none of the original divisions remained in it. Everything that fell under the frontal impact of Zhukov and Konev died.

Hitler naturally blamed his generals for everything and began feverishly shuffling the commanders of the armies and corps. The first to fly from his post was the commander of Army Group A, Oberst General Harpe, followed by other generals. It seems that in January 1945 all the commanders of the army groups and armies operating in Poland were replaced, but the situation could not be corrected by this.

The offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front began on January 14 and at first developed not so successfully. The advance on the first day of the offensive was no more than 3 kilometers, but then the Germans simply could not stand it. As we have already mentioned, they did not have enough forces on the front line or reserves. After the destruction of the main forces of the 9th Army, Zhukov's tanks also rushed further. Finally, our tankers stopped being equal to the infantry divisions and began to act independently. They were ahead of the infantry divisions by 30-50 kilometers, at times this gap could reach 100 kilometers, and then the actions of Guderian and Rommel immediately come to mind.

Our historians somehow do not notice this, but the same Guderian admits that around September 19, the German front in Poland ceased to exist, as it was last year in Belarus. The task set by the operation plan to reach the Zhychlin - Lodz - Radomsko - Czestochowa - Mechow line was completed on the sixth day instead of the twelfth according to the plan. At the same time, the offensive line of both fronts gradually deviated northward into Pomerania. If you look at the map, you can see some parallels with the operation "Gelb". In the same way, a large grouping of enemy troops, which was located in East Prussia, was cut off. The only difference was that the Germans did not line up on the parade ground to lay down their arms in an organized manner, but tried to fight back.

But here begins a new portion of incomprehensible moments. The 1st Belorussian Front finally turns north and, instead of moving towards Berlin, breaks into Pomerania. There is a formal explanation for this. The Germans created a shock (supposedly) grouping here that threatened the flank of the front, and it was necessary to defeat it first. But even General Routh himself, who commanded this parodic offensive, honestly writes that he did not have any forces. Do you get the subtlety? Not "not enough", but in general "none". In his own words: "10 divisions with 70 tanks." Against such a background, even the freshly formed Clausewitz Panzer Division looks menacing, which had, scary to think, as many as 12 tanks and 20 self-propelled guns. There is one good example of the effectiveness of such counterattacks. Tippelskirch and von Butlar write about the attempt of the German 4th Army to jump out of East Prussia. But look carefully at all our publications, starting with the same old SVE and ending with completely modern issues of Frontline Illustration. Nowhere is there a word about this "breakthrough". It is not shown on any map. History, as we have said more than once, loves evil things. In 1941, the Germans did not even suspect that they had taken part in the great tank battle near Rovno and Brody, and in 1945 Zhukov and Rokossovsky, without noticing it themselves, repulsed the attack of the divisions of General Hossbach. So such an explanation should be regarded precisely as a formal one.

As a final measure, the German command renamed Army Group Center into Army Group North, and Army Group A was given the name Army Group Center. But even this did not help stop the Soviet tanks.

Meanwhile, the all-destroying shaft of Soviet tanks continued to roll towards the Oder. The 1st Belorussian Front crossed the Warta River, bypassed the city of Poznan, declared another "festung", and continued the offensive, although now only the 1st Guards Tank Army remained its vanguard. By the way, here is an excerpt from the memoirs of the commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army, which best characterizes the change in the views of Soviet commanders and the doctrine of the Red Army: “On the fifth day of the offensive, the 11th Guards Corps of A. Kh. approached the Warta River - the sixth line of German defense. In the place where the forward brigade of Gusakovsky went, the Warta flowed strictly to the north. Then, near the city of Kolo, it turned sharply to the west and, having reached the Poznań meridian, again headed north. I ordered Babadzhanyan and Dremov to bypass the enemy reserves concentrated in the eastern bend of the river and pincer the Poznan-Warsaw motorway. Having crossed the Warta and left the German grouping on the flank across the river, both corps rushed to Poznan. The enemy grouping under these conditions was doomed to inaction. She could no longer prevent the further advance of our troops.

Pay attention to the end of the quote. If only our tank generals acted like this in 1944, without getting involved in the destruction of each isolated stronghold!

Already on January 22-23, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front reached the Oder and crossed it in a number of sectors. But this front also lost one of its tank armies, which had to turn south to decide the outcome of the fighting in Silesia and around Krakow. By February 3, troops of the 1st Belorussian Front also reached the Oder in the Kustrin area. They also crossed the river and created a small foothold. The Oder also did not become a serious obstacle for Katukov's tankers.

Here is what the army commander wrote: “The brigade commanders decided to cross the river together. They brought self-propelled guns, rocket launchers and all the rest of the artillery to the shore. After a massive fire strike on enemy positions on the opposite bank, chains of motorized riflemen descended onto the ice. Having quickly crossed the river, they, with the support of artillery from the eastern bank, shot down the small barriers of the Nazis and captured a bridgehead 5 kilometers along the front and 4 kilometers in depth. Motorized rifle battalions reached the Reitwein-Woden line.

Having received the message that Gusakovsky and Fedorovich had crossed the Oder, I ordered A. Kh. But only seven tanks from Gusakovsky's brigade managed to cross the ferry crossing to the bridgehead. The fact is that I received a new order: the army was transferred to Eastern Pomerania, to the area north of the city of Landsberg (Gurovo-Ilavetske). She was given a new task.

This ended the Vistula-Oder operation, which became one of the largest in scope in the entire war. As we have already said, it fully manifested the qualities of tank troops that Fuller, Liddell Hart, Tukhachevsky and others dreamed about before the war. Mobility allowed tanks to overcome distances unthinkable for foot armies, and firepower and armor made senseless attempts to resist the rear units and modest reserves gathered from the pine forest. The steel skating rink crushed under itself everything that met on its way. The infantry could only reap the fruits of the victories of the tankers and deal with the elimination of scattered pockets of resistance such as Poznan, Schneidemuhl and the like. The main issue remained to provide the advancing tank corps with all the necessary supplies and, above all, fuel.

Here we come to the most interesting issue of the Vistula-Oder operation, its alternative version. But was it possible, without stopping, to continue the offensive further directly to Berlin? After all, this would make it possible to avoid bloody battles for the Seelow Heights and protracted battles in the city itself. Alas, a rather categorical answer should be given here: “No!” First of all, during the operation, Soviet troops advanced deep into the enemy’s territory to a distance of about 400 kilometers, which was the limit for army supply systems of that time. Even the Wehrmacht, in the ideal conditions of the 1940-1941 blitzkriegs, made stops in such cases to put the troops in order and tighten up the rear. And the rear services of the Red Army, unfortunately, even at the very end of the war did not at all resemble a well-oiled machine. In addition, as we have seen, the offensive has lost its penetrating power. Two tank armies were diverted to other directions, and the two that reached the Oder suffered some losses and, accordingly, did not have the same power. Therefore, to make a breakthrough of another 100 kilometers and start fighting in Berlin itself - this clearly exceeded their capabilities.

And yet there is one "but". Reading the memoirs of Katukov, it is impossible to get rid of the impression that his army and the army of General Badanov, after forcing the Oder, could move a little further. After all, the width of the Seelow Heights is small, no more than 10 kilometers. At that time, there was simply no one to defend this line. Let me remind you that the Germans had to re-form the 9th Army, which occupied this sector of the front, all its divisions to the last fell on the Vistula, and it could not offer any serious resistance. In fact, it is impossible to find anything like this in the history of the war: in three weeks, the composition of the whole army has completely changed!

Therefore, if generals Katukov and Badanov advanced only 15-20 kilometers further, even if they later transferred their areas to the approaching infantry armies, we would have a full-fledged bridgehead at our disposal, and not the Kustrinsky Piglet, and the Germans would have lost their main line of defense. By the way, Zhukov understood all this, because in an order dated February 4, he demanded that the 5th shock army expand the bridgehead to 20 kilometers along the front and up to 10 kilometers in depth. The task was facilitated by the fact that the command of the German troops on the line of the Oder was entrusted to the great commander Heinrich Himmler. In addition, it was during these days that Hitler started the Balaton operation, after which the Panzerwaffe finally ceased to exist. But the main thing was done - the last remnants of German tank units and formations were tied up in another sector of the front, and the Germans could not oppose anything to the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies.

If the Seelow Heights were occupied by a strike on the move, the Germans simply had nothing to beat them off. The state of the German troops at that moment is best described by the same Guderian: “On January 26, Hitler ordered the formation of a tank destroyer division. The name of this new compound sounded beautiful and promising. But there was nothing else. In reality, this formation should have consisted of companies of cyclists under the command of brave lieutenants; the crews of these companies armed with faustpatrons were supposed to destroy the G-34 and heavy Russian tanks. The division entered the battle as a squadron. It was a pity for the brave soldiers! Apparently, the Führer was greatly impressed by the actions of the Soviet tank armies if he gave such an order. But such impromptu formations were for the Soviet armies, as they say, "on one tooth." We will not even consider the attempts of the Germans to recapture the Seelow Heights, we will simply give a short excerpt from the payroll of the 9th Army on January 26, that is, after the end of the Vistula-Oder operation: the 608th special headquarters of the division; remnants of the 19th Panzer Division; remnants of the 25th Panzer Division; Well, there is something else on the little things.

That is, the Soviet command had a real opportunity to occupy the Seelow Heights and for nothing get an excellent starting position for the subsequent assault on Berlin and avoid the colossal problems and losses that took place in reality. In addition, it became possible, after regrouping, to strike directly at Berlin instead of a large-scale operation to encircle the capital of the Reich. Probably, in this case, the war would have ended a month and a half earlier. It seems to be a little, but still - these are thousands of soldiers' lives.

After that, we come to the second fork in the spring of 1945 - the Berlin offensive operation of the Red Army. What was she? A golden exclamation mark that crowned the most difficult war in the history of our country? Or a bloody blot that casts a gloomy shadow over the entire victory as a whole? Like any grandiose historical event, the assault and capture of Berlin cannot be assessed unambiguously.

The importance of the Kyustrinsky bridgehead was understood by everyone, even the Fuhrer. Therefore, he ordered the revived 9th Army of General Busse to liquidate it. In February and March, Busse carried out a whole series of attacks, but their only result was the loss of 35,000 people, whom he no longer received. During these attacks, one of the Vlasov divisions especially distinguished itself, and Heinrich Himmler handed the Iron Crosses to these warriors. Of course, it was not worth counting on Hitler himself to reward the traitors. So, even before the start of the decisive battles, the German forces in the main direction were weakened. After that, Busse decided at all costs to keep the city of Kustrin itself, which blocked the direct road to Berlin. It separated two Soviet bridgeheads, at Reitwein and Kinitz, and was a real bone in the throat of the 1st Belorussian Front. However, the Germans did not succeed either, on March 30 the city fell. The Soviet armies consolidated the bridgehead and could calmly prepare a decisive offensive.

But it did not work out calmly. Here we absolutely involuntarily have to enter into a small controversy with A. Isaev, more precisely, with his book “Georgy Zhukov. The last argument of the king. By the way, a very interesting name. Without a doubt, the enlightened public knows the historical roots of this curious phrase, although for some reason the author did not consider it possible to decipher them even in the preface. But I do not at all exclude the possibility that he also knows the beautiful-sounding Latin original "Ultima ratio regis", and he may well be aware that this inscription was emblazoned on the barrels of the cannons of the most Christian kings of France, Louis with rather large numbers. So whose cannon should we consider Marshal Zhukov?

However, certain doubts still arise. When you criticize and expose others, you should be more precise yourself. The simplest example. Isaev writes that Zhukov's troops were the first to reach the Oder, although in fact Konev was ahead of him by a couple of days. And so on. By the way, Zhukov himself was never an artilleryman, so where is the connection here? On the other hand, this motto perfectly describes Zhukov's manner of communicating with the outside world, so the name is quite appropriate.

However, we digress a little, let's return to the events on the Seelow Heights. The roots of Zhukov's more than controversial decisions should still be sought in his hostile relations with Konev and his desire to please Stalin. Talking about some kind of socialist competition to take the Reichstag, of course, is stupid, here I am 150 percent in agreement with Isaev. But there was rivalry, and in addition to completely natural reasons (jealousy for the success of a neighbor has always been and will remain forever), there was another, artificially introduced. I do not know for what purpose Stalin tried to pit the two marshals before the start of the decisive offensive, but he did it. Let us turn to the memoirs of Zhukov himself, in which he describes the meetings at Headquarters preceding the Berlin operation:

"Here he is<Сталин>said to Marshal I.S. Konev:

“In the event of stubborn enemy resistance on the eastern approaches to Berlin, which will certainly happen, and a possible delay in the offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front, the 1st Ukrainian Front should be ready to strike with tank armies from the south to Berlin.”

There are misconceptions that

The 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies were brought into the battle for Berlin allegedly not by the decision of I.V. Stalin, but at the initiative of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front. In order to restore the truth, I will quote the words of Marshal I. S. Konev on this issue, which he said at the meeting of the highest command staff of the central group of troops on February 18, 1946, when everything was still so fresh in my memory:

“When at about 24:00 on April 16 I reported that the offensive was proceeding successfully, Comrade Stalin gave the following instruction: “It’s going hard at Zhukov, turn Rybalko and Lelyushenko to Zehlendorf, remember how we agreed at Headquarters.”

Therefore, the maneuver that Rybalko and Lelyushenko made is a direct indication of Comrade Stalin. Therefore, all fabrications on this subject should be excluded from our literature.

That is, the notorious race was organized by order from above. What, Konev, after Stalin's direct order to turn the tank armies to Berlin, will voluntarily give up the opportunity to be the first to capture the same Reichstag? In addition, there was another race with an imaginary opponent. But the assumption that the Soviet command was in a hurry to capture Berlin before the Allies should be discarded. After all, the operation plan provided for the encirclement of Berlin. Will the British or Americans really begin to fight their way to Berlin, breaking through the positions of the Soviet troops?! Well, this is complete nonsense, you see. But we will return to the question of the storming of Berlin.

Let us recall that Stalin had every reason to expect that the storming of Berlin would not drag on. The Red Army had an overwhelming superiority in manpower and equipment. As usual, one should not believe either the SVE, which writes about a two- or four-fold superiority, or the memoirs of German generals, where fables are told about a twenty-fold superiority. The truth, as always, lies in the middle.

But at the same time there are many nuances that are quite capable of changing these ratios. As already noted, the entire first part of the German 9th Army, defending in the Berlin direction, died during the Vistula-Oder operation, and in front of the 1st Belorussian Front in March there were hastily assembled motley formations everywhere. By the beginning of the Berlin operation, the composition of the army changed again, and again entirely! 9th Army December 31, 1944, January 26, March 1 and April 12, 1945 - these are four completely different armies! You yourself understand that in such an environment, there can be no talk of any normal interaction of compounds. And so it happened.

The plan of operation developed by the Stavka was very optimistic. On the very first day, it was supposed to break through the German defenses on the Seelow Heights and bring the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies into the gap. Berlin was scheduled to be taken on the sixth day of the operation, and by the eleventh day the 3rd shock army went to the Elbe to meet with the Americans.

Marshal Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front struck in the direction of Brandenburg, Rathenow and Dessau. In the same way, immediately after the breakthrough of the German defenses, the 3rd and 4th tank armies entered the operational space. Moreover, it was initially assumed that one of the corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army of General Rybalko was to attack Berlin from the south. But there was an option according to which both tank armies of Konev could be sent to Berlin.

Moreover, this is written by the SVE, and if Isaev intended to refute a certain myth, then it was necessary to do this in more detail.

An auxiliary, but very important task was solved by

2nd Belorussian Front Marshal Rokossovsky. He was supposed to advance in the Stettin-Schwedt area and defeat the German 3rd Panzer Army, which, naturally, would not allow it to move its forces to help Berlin.

The offensive began early in the morning on 16 April. After a 30-minute artillery preparation, 140 powerful anti-aircraft searchlights were turned on, which were supposed to blind the Germans. It looked very nice in the movie Liberation, but in reality it did more harm than good. A word to Marshal Chuikov: “I must say that at the time when we admired the power and effectiveness of the searchlights at the training ground, none of us could accurately predict how it would look in a combat situation. It is difficult for me to judge the situation in other sectors of the front. But in the zone of our 8th Guards Army, I saw how powerful beams of searchlights hit a swirling curtain of burning, smoke and dust raised over enemy positions. Even searchlights could not penetrate this veil, and it was difficult for us to observe the battlefield. As a sin, even the wind was blowing towards. As a result, Hill 81.5, where the command post was located, was soon shrouded in impenetrable darkness. Then we stopped seeing anything at all, relying in command and control only on radiotelephone communications and on messengers.

The infantry and part of the tanks advanced about 2 kilometers, after which the offensive stalled. The artillery strike was delivered on the first line of defense that the Germans left, and now the Soviet troops had to storm the heights themselves, which were almost not affected by artillery preparation.

“German prisoners could also see huge columns of Soviet equipment waiting for the troops of Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army and Berzarin’s 5th Shock Army to open their way to the west. However, there was very little progress that day. At his observation post, Zhukov began to lose patience. He pushed the commanders, threatened that he would remove them from their posts and send them to a penal company. General Chuikov also got it. Its parts got stuck in the swamp in front of the German positions on the hill.

And here Zhukov makes the most controversial of his decisions. Isaev is trying to present the matter as if both Zhukov and Konev made all changes in the strategic plans on their own initiative. Well, don't! All these changes were made only after consultations with the Stavka and their approval by Stalin. The front commander could decide where and how to use the corps subordinate to him, but never turn several armies to another direction! Actually, Zhukov himself writes about this, and, if you believe this passage, he misleads Stalin just in case.

Zhukov: “At 15 o’clock I called the Headquarters and reported that we had broken through the first and second positions of the enemy’s defense, the troops of the front advanced up to six kilometers, but met serious resistance at the line of the Zeelovsky Heights, where, apparently, the enemy’s defense had mostly survived. To strengthen the blow of the combined arms armies, I brought both tank armies into battle. I believe that tomorrow by the end of the day we will break through the enemy defenses.

His troops did not advance for 6 kilometers and did not break through the second line of defense. This is where the January delay in front of the Seelow Heights backfired! Moreover, in the same conversation, Stalin ponders aloud whether it is worth turning Konev's armies to Berlin. Note that Zhukov writes about all this, not Konev. And the marshal decides to break through the defense at any cost, throwing the tank armies of Katukov and Bogdanov into battle. Apparently, Zhukov did not learn the lessons of the Battle of Kursk. Tank formations can break through the prepared defenses, but only at the cost of absolutely monstrous losses, especially since the German anti-tank weapon-45 was better than the Soviet weapon-43.

General Katukov writes: “The rest of the day did not bring joyful messages. With great difficulty, suffering heavy losses, the tankers bit into the enemy defenses and did not advance further than the positions occupied by the infantry. It was not easy for the rifle divisions of V.I. Chuikov, with whom the commanders of the tank corps closely cooperated.

On the same day, a second conversation with Stalin took place, in which Zhukov promised to break through the defenses at the Seelow Heights at any cost, and the Stavka immediately encouraged him, informing Konev of the order to attack Berlin from the south, and Rokossovsky from the north. I repeat once again, so as not to be biased, I state all this exclusively from the memoirs of Zhukov himself. In fact, strictly speaking, it turns out that the Stavka approved Zhukov's decision and thus removed part of the blame from him.

One way or another, but in the afternoon of April 16, a tank battle began, which continued the next day. All this very much resembled the actions of Montgomery near El Alamein, when he pushed through the German front in the same way. Didn't break through, but pushed through. Only on April 19, the Germans could not withstand the onslaught and began to retreat to Berlin. During these days, according to German data, more than 700 Soviet tanks were burned. Like it or not - the question remains open. But even the book “Secrecy Removed” reports that during the Berlin operation, the Red Army lost about 2000 tanks. That is, during the assault on the Seelow Heights, Zhukov gave a textbook example of the misuse of tanks.

Reluctantly, he is forced to admit: “The offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front from the very first day developed at a faster pace. As expected, the enemy’s defenses were weak in the direction of his attack, which made it possible on the morning of April 17 to bring both tank armies into action there. On the very first day, they advanced 20-25 kilometers, crossed the Spree River, and on the morning of April 19 began to advance on Zossen and Luckenwalde.

And now it is simply absolutely necessary to say a few words about what Konev supposedly had to do, linking his main forces to the solution of this problem, so that, God forbid, they would not even think of advancing on Berlin. We are talking about the liquidation of the so-called Frankfurt-Guben grouping of the enemy. What was she like? These were the remnants of the once again defeated 9th Army, which was joined by individual units

4th Panzer Army. To allocate the forces of an entire front for their destruction was, to put it mildly, unreasonable. In addition, over General Busse saw a categorical order: to hold the front on the Oder. Of course, at that time Konev could not have known about this order, but he saw perfectly well that the Germans were not even trying to move towards Berlin. Busse later received a new order: to retreat west to link up with General Wenck's 12th Army in order to liberate Berlin. I strongly advise you to pay attention to such an interesting wording. That is, General Busse did not have the strength at his disposal to somehow really threaten the Konev front, and one could not even dream of a breakthrough to Berlin in such conditions. He did not have an order to retreat to Berlin, and everyone knew very well what they did with the violators of orders in the last days of the existence of the Reich. For example, General Weidling, the commander of the LVI tank corps, on which Zhukov's main attack fell, was sentenced to death for not holding his position, but, however, they managed to pardon. Did Theodor Busse need such adventures? The way to Berlin was blocked only by the 40th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Army, but that was enough. So Konev correctly decided not to fight the ghosts, allocated a couple of corps to block the German group stuck in the forests and lakes, and went to Berlin.

At 12 noon on April 25, west of Berlin, the advanced units of the 4th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front met with units of the 47th Army of the 1st Belorussian Front. On the same day, another significant event took place. An hour and a half later, on the Elbe, the 34th Guards Corps of General Baklanov of the 5th Guards Army met with American troops.

This is where we get another historical fork. There was no longer any danger of the Western allies coming out to Berlin. The breakthrough of the German troops to the capital also looked like a perfect chimera. So was it necessary to storm the city? It could well have been limited to what Hitler intended to do with Leningrad: a tight blockade, constant artillery shelling and air bombing. Well, the situation with the latter was not very good, the Soviet aviation did not have the ability to deliver powerful strikes due to the lack of strategic bombers. But on the other hand, the artillery of the Red Army has always served as the object of envy and hatred of both enemies and allies. Moreover, April 20 was marked by an artillery strike on Berlin, inflicted by long-range artillery of the 79th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army. The Red Army gave the Fuhrer a birthday present.

But in this case, we will be forced to give a negative answer. It was necessary to storm Berlin, although not at all for the reasons that were voiced

Soviet historiography. It would just take too long to slowly suffocate such a huge city. Civilian casualties? Sorry, this is a war, and it was not the Soviet army that invaded Germany in 1941, but quite the opposite. In the end, the Germans themselves came up with the concept of "Kriegsraison" - "Military necessity", which always and unconditionally prevails over the "Kriegsmanier" - "Method of Warfare".

The strangulation of Berlin led to an unjustified prolongation of the war, because one should not even dream of any surrender of Hitler, unless his own guards crushed him in the bunker like a rat ... And it is likely that the Western allies would have protested about "unjustified victims ". Of course, one could remind them of the bombings of Hamburg and Dresden, but it was not worth starting political discussions. Not the time and not the place. That is - assault!

But with the assault, too, not everything is clear. It began on April 20, 1945 (by the way, on Hitler's birthday), the artillery of the 1st Belorussian Front opened fire on the city center. After the war, our historians claimed that our guns dropped more explosives on the city than the Allied heavy bombers. Zhukov writes: “11 thousand guns of various calibers opened simultaneous fire at certain intervals. From April 21 to May 2, one million eight hundred thousand artillery shots were fired at Berlin. And in total, more than 36 thousand tons of metal were brought down on the enemy defenses in the city.

The Germans did not have a single chance to defend the capital of the Reich. The garrison of the city at this point consisted of about 45,000 soldiers from scattered, battered units and about 40,000 of all kinds of rabble from the Volkssturm, police, and so on. The main force of the garrison was considered to be the LVI Corps of General Weidling: Panzer Division Münchenberg (formed on March 8, 1945!), 9th Parachute Division, 18th and 20th Panzer Grenadier, 11th Panzer SS " Norland" and the 503rd heavy tank battalion. Everything would be great if at least one of these divisions had more than 400 soldiers in its composition. By the way, it was the first two divisions that defended the Seelow Heights, so it’s not difficult to imagine their condition.

Well, purely for educational purposes, we will list others who were supposed to save the capital of the Third Reich. French volunteer assault battalion "Charlemagne"; a naval battalion sent by Grand Admiral Doenitz; 15th Lithuanian Fusilier Battalion; 57th fortress regiment; 1st Anti-Aircraft Division "Berlin", Hitler's bodyguard; the Hitler Youth regiment, hastily formed from Berlin boys and had nothing to do with the SS division of the same name. Oddly enough, Himmler's bodyguards were also immediately stuck. That's all...

They were opposed by about one and a half million hardened soldiers of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. For the first time, the Germans had every right to talk about a tenfold superiority of the enemy. It probably makes no sense to describe in detail the course of the battles for the city itself, since it was done in several works

A. Isaev, although everyone preaches one simple truth: Zhukov took Berlin, once again Zhukov and again Zhukov. And the rest were just there.

In reality, of course, things were more complicated. Let's start with the fact that the race to Berlin still took place. As evidence, I will cite two orders given at an interval of two hours. Let the participants in the events speak, and the reader will be able to draw his own conclusions.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE 1st UKRAINIAN FRONT TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 3rd AND 4TH GUARDS TANK ARMIES ON THE NEED TO ENTER BERLIN EARLIER THE TROOPS

1st BELARUSIAN FRONT

The troops of Marshal Zhukov, 10 km from the eastern outskirts of Berlin. I order you to be the first to break into Berlin tonight. Deliver execution.

Krainyukov

RF. F. 236. Op. 2712. D. 359. L. 36. Original.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE 1st BELARUSIAN FRONT TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 2nd GUARDS TANK ARMY WITH THE DEMAND TO BREAK INTO BERLIN FIRST

The 2nd Guards Tank Army is entrusted with a historic task: to be the first to break into Berlin and hoist the Banner of Victory. I personally instruct you to organize the execution.

Send one of the best brigades from each corps to Berlin and set them the task of breaking through to the outskirts of Berlin no later than 4 a.m. on April 21, 1945 and immediately reporting to Comrade Stalin and the announcements in the press.

RF. F. 233. Op. 2307. D. 193. L. 88. Original.

Moreover, mind you, Zhukov perfectly understands the significance of the report "on the authorities" and newspaper PR. It is interesting that General Lelyushenko in his memoirs slightly corrected Konev’s order, cutting out the word “first” from it, or the editors did it for him.

Meanwhile, in the German command, the fever of the change of commanders could not stop. On April 22, Hitler removes General Reimann, replacing him with Colonel Ernst Keter, in one day promoting him first to major general, and then to lieutenant general. On the same day, he orders the execution of the commander of the LVI tank corps, General Weidling, who did not hold the line of defense on the Oder, and immediately cancels his order. After that, the Fuhrer decides to personally take command of the Berlin garrison, and then appoints Weidling to this position. Such a series of events clearly shows that the Fuhrer's headquarters has turned into a madhouse. Despite the complexity of the situation in the midst of the battle for Moscow, during the panic that arose in the Soviet capital (it was, it was!), Our command did not reach such insanity.

Wadeding divided the city into eight defensive sectors to make it easier to manage the defenses. However, nothing could stop the Soviet troops. On April 23, Chuikov's 8th Guards Army crossed the Spree and, with the support of General Katukov's 1st Guards Tank Army, began to advance in the direction of Neukölln. On April 24, the 5th shock army of General Berzarin also crossed the Spree in the Treptow Park area. The remnants of the LVI Panzer Corps, still under Weidling's part-time command, tried to counterattack, but were simply annihilated. On the same day, after the most powerful artillery preparation - 650 guns per kilometer! Never before in history has such a density of artillery been encountered! - Soviet troops launched a decisive offensive. By evening, Treptow Park was busy.

This text is an introductory piece.

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