name the reasons for the rapid restoration of the war-ravaged economy in the USSR in the second half of the 1940s and received the best answer

Reply from Alter ego[guru]
The reason is, first of all, the selfless heroic work of the Soviet people.
And:
-high mobilization ability of the directive economy, on the not yet exhausted possibilities of extensive development
- reparations from Germany ( material values in the amount of 4.3 billion dollars) they provided up to half the volume of equipment installed in industry.
-traditional transfer of funds from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector.
-free labor of a multi-million army of Soviet Gulag prisoners and prisoners of war (1.5 million Germans and 0.5 million Japanese).
The restoration of destroyed villages and towns, industrial enterprises and transport communications began immediately after the liberation of territories temporarily captured by the enemy.
An extensive program for restoring the destroyed economy was determined by the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated August 21, 1943 “On urgent measures to restore the national economy in areas liberated from the German occupiers”
Large works began after the liberation of the industrial Donbass, where the occupiers ruled for about two years. Overcoming incredible difficulties and hardships, the Soviet people stubbornly and persistently revived the country's main coal mining camp, and by the end of the war, Donbass again took first place in the country in coal production.
In October 1944, the Volkhov hydroelectric power station, the firstborn of Soviet energy, which supplied electricity to the industry of Leningrad, was restored to full capacity, and by the end of the war, the Shterovskaya, Zuevskaya and Novomoskovskaya power plants were restored. The restored power plant capacity in 1945 amounted to 2.3 million kilowatts. More than 30 large power plants operated in the liberated areas, which generated 6.5 billion kWh of electricity in 1945
By the end of the war, 7.5 thousand large industrial enterprises had been restored in the liberated areas.
The most important construction projects of the post-war five-year plan were automobile and tractor plants in Minsk, a metallurgical plant in the Georgian city of Rustavi, the Ust-Kamenogorsk lead-zinc plant in Kazakhstan, and a pipe-rolling plant in Sumgait (Azerbaijan).
New power plants were built: Farhadskaya hydroelectric power station on the Syr Darya and Rybinskaya on the Volga, Shchekinskaya hydroelectric power station in the Moscow region and Nizhneturinskaya in the Urals. Oil production began from the bottom of the Caspian Sea, the first lines of the gas pipelines Saratov - Moscow, Kokhtla - Yarve - Leningrad, Dashava - Kyiv were laid. Hundreds of industrial enterprises began to be built in the Baltic states, Moldova, and the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus.
In 1948, a plutonium production reactor was launched in the Chelyabinsk region, and the following year the USSR successfully tested an atomic bomb.
In general, during the years of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, 6,200 large enterprises were restored and rebuilt. And the volume of industrial production exceeded pre-war figures by 73%

Answer from Divergent[guru]
The terrible inhumane exploitation of the victorious people by the top of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) led by Stalin. For example, DneproGES.

Answer from Veteran of the Brownian movement[guru]
1. The restoration was quantitative, not structural (unlike the economy of defeated Germany, Austria, Italy, Japan). The economy was restored not throughout the entire territory, but in areas of military operations, while the resources of the entire country were involved in restoration.
2. Equipment was actively exported from the defeated countries, by the way, obsolete, due to reparations.
3. Financing was carried out through unparalleled exploitation Soviet people: subscriptions to government loans, a minimum of a monthly salary every year, delays in salaries for several months, grain exports from a starving country, frantic panning of the gold-bearing sands of Kolyma (mainly ZK, which means practically free), widespread use of free labor ZK (1947 - new the peak of imprisonments for political and “everyday” articles like “for ears of corn”) and labor army soldiers (people not subject to conscription into the army, drafted as if into the army, detention as in camps, but without declaring guilt or criminal record) in industry.
4. less significant: reparation payments, labor of prisoners of war, are mentioned for the sake of completeness.
5. Despite everything - the enthusiasm of the masses.

Nobody canceled the Fourth Five-Year Plan of 1946-1951. The most ambitious goals were set - not only to reach the pre-war level, but also to surpass it - both in industry (46%) and in agriculture.

The United States, under the Marshall Plan, helped restore Europe (at the same time creating the European Union), and significant resources and effort were spent on this. Few believed that the USSR would not only fulfill, but even exceed its plan. However, this is what happened.

And we are talking not only about the growth of industry, measured in statistical figures, but also about life itself: infant mortality has decreased by more than 2 times, the number of medical personnel has increased by one and a half times, the number of scientific institutions has increased by 40%, the number of students - by 50% . Being a scientist has become prestigious.

At the same time, the foundations of the Soviet space program were laid. Yes, the laurels eventually went to Khrushchev, but already in February 1953 Joseph Stalin approved a plan to create an intercontinental ballistic missile. The government decree signed by Georgy Malenkov on the creation of the R-7 rocket was issued after the death of the Secretary General - on May 20, 1953.

Presentation material

Economy of the USSR after World War II

Economic recovery after World War II

After the Victory in the Great Patriotic War and the surrender of Japan on September 3, 1945, a new period began in the life of the Soviet state. The first years after the war, in fact, were a continuation of the “mobilization socialism” of the 30s, but on a joyful note, with the mood of the victors.

The return to peaceful life presupposed, first of all, the restoration of the economy and its reorientation towards peaceful purposes. The Soviet people could only rely on their own strength. The energy of war was so great and had such inertia that it could only be “switched” to peaceful construction. In 1948, the country reached and surpassed pre-war levels of industrial production. And in 1952, the volume of industrial production was 2.5 times higher than the level of 1940.

But it was more difficult to make up for the losses of the village, since it suffered great losses in people, 70 thousand villages were burned, 17 million heads of cattle were stolen. Moreover, in 1946, a terrible drought in a large area of ​​the European part of the USSR led to famine, which led to the death of people, as if “continuing the war.” There has not been such a drought in the country for more than 50 years. In reality, in the public consciousness, the transition “to peaceful lines” occurred at the end of 1947, with the abolition of cards and monetary reform. Very quickly after the war, the USSR restored a favorable demographic situation, which is an important indicator of the state of society.

The restoration of industry and cities was carried out at the expense of the countryside, from which resources were withdrawn until the mid-50s. Purchasing prices for agricultural products remained at pre-war levels, and prices for rural goods increased many times over. Collective farms handed over half of their products to government supplies. The war reduced the number of able-bodied peasants, especially those with education, by a third. To strengthen leadership in 1949-1950. Collective farms were consolidated.

Among a number of activities carried out by the Soviet government after the war, one of the largest was the demobilization of a significant contingent of military personnel. In industry, the 8-hour working day was restored, vacations for workers and employees were resumed, and overtime was abolished. Metal production was at the 1934 level, tractor production was at the 1930 level. Quite often in the post-war autumn, winter crops were sown by hand. The equipment of all enterprises needed updating, the production of consumer goods was 3/5 of the pre-war level. Total losses from direct destruction of socialist property by the enemy reached 679 billion rubles.

Already in August 1945, the State Planning Committee began to develop a draft of the fourth five-year plan - a plan for the restoration and further development of the country's economy. The main goal of the plan is to achieve pre-war production levels and then significantly exceed them. From a financial point of view, this required huge investments to improve living and working conditions. And investment is possible only with large savings, which are also created at a high rate. At the same time, it was necessary to strengthen money circulation, strengthen credit relations and increase the purchasing power of the ruble. The second group of events was resolved by the monetary reform of 1947, which I will talk about a little later. And the first group of events included integral part into the five-year financial support program.

Of course, it was necessary to use savings methods that had already proven themselves: self-financing, reducing production costs, mobilizing reserves, increasing profitability, increasing profits, strict regime savings, elimination of production losses, reduction of unproductive costs. However, if we limited ourselves to only this, the funds would not be enough. Since, due to the alarming international situation and the beginning of the Cold War, defense spending was not reduced to the extent expected by the USSR Government. Moreover, rapid progress military equipment required significant funds. Enormous costs were required to restore what was destroyed. The transition of the economy to peaceful footing was not cheap. Costs for further development households, for social and cultural events and consumer services. In general, expenses not only did not decrease, but, on the contrary, increased noticeably from year to year.

Meanwhile, some sources of income declined with the end of the war. The war tax was abolished. The practice of transferring money to savings banks for unused vacations has been stopped. Cash and clothing lotteries have ceased to be held. Payments by the population when signing up for a loan have decreased. The amount of agricultural tax has decreased. The interests of Soviet citizens required a reduction in prices for all goods in cooperative and state trade.

To sell more, you need to have something to trade. The population was in dire need of clothing, shoes, and household items.

Consumer goods were not enough. Because, for example, the textile industry was provided with raw materials, but lacked fuel and labor. The ranks of textile workers decreased by approximately 500 thousand. and the coal mines are partly flooded, partly abandoned for want of miners. The Ministry of Finance sent its first post-war proposal to the Council of Ministers: urgently develop personnel training for the textile industry; demobilize everyone related to it; redistribute labor by removing surpluses from other industries and transferring them to wool, cotton, knitting and silk weaving mills.

The second proposal concerned the mobilization of fuel resources for textile factories and factories. Due to the lack of production capacity, light industry was transferred large reserves from heavy industry. Council of Ministers and Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party (central committee of the All-Russian communist party Bolsheviks) promptly managed the matter, promptly suggested the right decisions, involving all parties, administrative and economic levels from top to bottom in their implementation. The country was entering peaceful life on a broad front.

We achieved an increase in market funds: the rationed supply of the population improved, and a prerequisite arose for a reduction in prices in “commercial” trade.

The issues of improving industrial management methods, increasing the attention of business executives to every penny, and strengthening the finances of enterprises were again on the agenda. Until 1951, it was not allowed to write off at least 5 thousand rubles from the balance sheet of even Union-Republican enterprises and organizations.

These examples indicate the well-known cruelty of financial discipline of those years. There was an undoubted disadvantage here, which was reflected in some constraint of actions on the ground. But there was also an undoubted plus, which led to tangible financial gains. The savings were transferred to the light and food industries.

In order to expand sources of income, the ministry proposed increasing the volume of production of consumer goods, without which it would not have been possible to carry out a monetary reform and abolish the rationing system for supplying the population. There were enough textile raw materials, but wool had to be purchased abroad. There were enough foreign exchange resources, since gold only accumulated during the war.

At this stage, it was also proposed to further accelerate the restructuring of industry in a peaceful manner. Redistribute labor reserves, especially through the non-productive sphere, and direct more people in the light and food industries. Provide for an increasing supply of fuel and restore broad specialization. Then it was proposed to set more precise, increased targets for increasing labor productivity and profitability, reducing production costs, and making a profit in these industries.

The implementation of all these proposals has brought tangible benefits. The country received more income than planned. The financial basis for the 1947 reform was formed faster. By mid-1949, the amount of money in circulation was 1.35 times higher than before the war, and retail trade turnover was 1.65 times higher than before the war. This ratio of products and their commodity equivalent was justified. The structure of trade turnover has improved. It was possible to achieve a reduction in prices for goods. Such a reduction was carried out seven times in 1947-1954, and by the end of the fourth Five-Year Plan, state prices had decreased by 41 percent, and by 1954 they were on average 2.3 times lower than before the reform. The strength of the financial base was also evident in the fact that the state, relying on additional reserves, was able to increase planned targets for the second (1947) and fourth (1949) years of the five-year plan. And this, in turn, made it possible already during the fourth five-year plan for some industries to work towards the next one, increasing national income compared to 1940 by 64 percent, and planned capital investments by 22 percent.

The Second World War became the bloodiest and most destructive in all of world history. The Soviet people had to make especially great sacrifices on the altar of victory. It is still impossible to accurately determine the number of Soviet people who died during the war. Initially, the death toll was estimated at 7 million people. But this figure, named by I.V. Stalin in 1946, was preliminary. It did not take into account not only all the losses in the rear, but even all the front-line losses.

In the 1960s–1970s. total number The death toll was already estimated at 20 million people, today – more than 27 million people. The scale of losses is indirectly evidenced by the fact that the population of the USSR in 1946 was 172 million people, i.e. approximately the same as in 1939, but in this time Soviet Union Huge, densely populated territories in the west and east of the country were annexed.

In addition to the heaviest direct losses, the war led to significant distortions in the gender and age structure of the population. Among people of reproductive age who died during the war, up to 80% were men. In addition, as a result of the fact that mainly young people were drafted to the front, the war “aged” Soviet society. One of the results of this is a drop in the birth rate. The decline in the birth rate is also due to the unfavorable psychological and economic conditions created by the war and the difficulties of the transition to peace.

During the war, the number of sick and disabled people in society increased sharply. One cannot help but mention the social problems caused by the war: an increase in crime, alcoholism, and poor household conditions. Faced Soviet

A union with such an inevitable companion of every hard time as homelessness. Finally, many difficult issues related to the demobilization of the 11 million army had to be resolved. Many soldiers went to the front straight from their school desks or student days and had not yet seen anything but war in their lives. The entire society had to relearn how to live a peaceful life.

Great also material damage from the war. Direct losses from the occupation alone amounted to 679 billion rubles. The Soviet Union lost 32 thousand enterprises, 50% of horses and 20% of cattle. 6 million buildings, 1,710 cities and towns, and 70 thousand villages were destroyed in the country. 25 million people lost their homes. The Nazis destroyed 40 thousand hospitals, 84 thousand schools, technical schools and universities, 43 thousand libraries.

We should also not forget that the transition from war to peace in itself always causes great difficulties in all countries. It seemed that the Soviet country was defeated, if not forever, then for a very long time.

Revival of the national economy

The country that emerged from the war had practically no necessary reserves: in previous years, much had to be given to the front. There was no need to count on outside help either: deliveries under Lend-Lease showed their weak effectiveness, in addition, after the war, the allies agreed to help the USSR only if the Soviet leadership refused to pursue an independent policy within the country and in the international arena. Only in this case was America ready to extend to the USSR the stabilization plan of Secretary of State George Marshall, in the recent past a general, chief of the US General Staff, and a participant in all conferences of the Big Three leaders.

The people, who had just won the greatest Victory in the history of mankind, could not accept such humiliating conditions, although some party leaders did not see any other way out of the crisis. The choice in favor of independent development fully justified itself. Pessimistic calculations and fears did not come true. The Soviet Union, having won the war, was capable of another miracle: with a colossal effort, it was possible to heal the wounds inflicted by the war in the shortest possible time and reach a new level of development. After the war Soviet Union, along with the USA, becomes one of the two superpowers, whose power was based not only on the prestige of past victories, but also on developed economic potential.

After the war, to boost the economy, society had to solve several important problems. It was necessary to demilitarize the economy, restore the economy destroyed by the war, and determine priorities for further development. As before the war, the problem of sources of financing economic growth was acute.

Initially, the reconstruction of the national economy was slowed down by the fact that the vast majority of enterprises worked for defense. According to data from the USSR Central Statistical Office, in 1945 production output was 92% of the 1940 level. However, heavy industry enterprises received the greatest development, while light industry produced slightly more than half of the goods compared to pre-war times. Therefore, the transfer of the economy to peaceful footing immediately led to a drop in industrial production, the volume of which in 1946 amounted to only 77% of the 1940 level.

The situation in agriculture was even more dire. In 1945, the amount of plowed land did not exceed 75% compared to pre-war indicators, and the amount of grain collected was half as much. The restoration of the village and the entire national economy was sharply complicated by crop failure, which in 1946 struck many parts of the country. Starting in Moldova, the drought of 1946 quickly spread to other southern, most fertile regions of the country.

Faced with the threat of growing hunger, the government took emergency measures aimed at saving bread. For some categories of the population, in the fall of 1946, the daily ration norms issued by cards were reduced. Food rations for 85% of rural residents were completely eliminated. To the least extent, savings measures affected employees of the administrative apparatus and the army. In accordance with the spirit of the times, steps were taken to tighten legislation on the theft of state and collective farm property.

The famine had dire consequences not only for Agriculture. It was accompanied by an increase in mortality, mental disorders, crime, demographic decline, and an increase in the incidence of serious illnesses (in particular, several outbreaks of typhoid epidemics were recorded in 1946). Modern historians estimate the number of famine victims at 3 million people.

To normalize the situation in the country's national economy, extraordinary, emergency measures were required. Their implementation was provided for by the plan fourth five year plan(1946–1950), adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in March 1946. Primary attention in the Fourth Five-Year Plan was given to the restoration of heavy industry. At the same time, growth tasks were also set for the light industry sectors responsible for ensuring the material well-being of the population. According to the plan of the Soviet leadership, by 1948 the country was supposed to reach the pre-war level of production, and by the end of the five-year plan it should have exceeded it by 48%. Reparations with Germany and Japan should have provided significant assistance to the restoration of the national economy. But nevertheless, the main ones were still internal sources, primarily the village.

In the field of development of high-tech technologies, the five-year development plan set the task of surpassing the achievements of science outside the USSR. The re-equipment of the national economy was supposed to help strengthen defense capability. In particular, the most important task of the Soviet Union in the post-war years was the elimination of America's nuclear monopoly and the threat of nuclear blackmail on its part. I.V. Kurchatov and other Soviet nuclear physicists, even before receiving intelligence data about the American nuclear program, were able to create their own nuclear bomb, which was superior in performance to the American bomb. Its successful tests were carried out on August 29, 1949 at the nuclear test site near Semipalatinsk. The news of this shocked the American ruling circles and seriously changed the military-political situation in the world.

Intelligence officers and many prominent foreign scientists, such as Klaus Fuchs, also made a great contribution to the development of the USSR nuclear shield. They collaborated with Soviet intelligence because they sympathized with the Soviet Union, which defeated fascism, and shared communist beliefs. It should be emphasized that, unlike the first nuclear developments in the United States, the Soviet nuclear program was aimed at using primarily peaceful atoms. Even before the creation of the Soviet nuclear bomb, the world's first nuclear power plant began operating in the USSR in 1948.

Restoring the USSR economy after the war was impossible without stabilizing finances. In order to normalize the country's disordered monetary economy, a monetary reform was carried out in 1947. The monetary reform of 1947 has been studied in sufficient detail in the historical and economic literature. However, as a rule, in educational, popular and even scientific publications, the reasons for the reform are pronounced quickly or are not mentioned at all, which, of course, does not contribute to a correct understanding of the reform.

One of its most important reasons was the presence of a huge number of counterfeit rubles in circulation. It should be borne in mind that these were not handicraft fakes, but high-quality products made by printing, since the government was in charge of issuing counterfeit rubles fascist Germany to undermine the monetary system of the USSR. All territories occupied by the Nazis during the war, and these are the most densely populated areas of the country, were flooded with this counterfeit money. The second reason was the general increase in the money supply, which made turnover more difficult. The third reason was the creation of shadow capital during the war years, which arose due to the difference in state and commercial prices, theft and speculation.

During the reform, old money was exchanged in a ratio of 10:1; small change coins were not subject to exchange. Deposits of the population up to 3 thousand rubles were not subject to revaluation (80% of these were). Deposits up to 10 thousand rubles were recalculated according to the principle: the first three thousand rubles - one to one, the rest of the deposit - 3 old rubles to 2 new ones. If the deposit exceeded 10 thousand rubles, then the first ten thousand were recalculated at the specified rate, and everything that exceeded this amount in the proportion of 2 old rubles was converted into one new one.

Some authors believe that the reform hit mainly workers, peasants and employees who did not have deposits, while speculators managed to learn about the preparation of the reform and disaggregate their deposits. This opinion has no compelling basis, since the reform was prepared in conditions of strict secrecy, and there were few who could abuse their knowledge, and all cases of abuse were prosecuted according to the laws of that time. The population that did not have deposits suffered moderately, since salaries began to be paid immediately in the new, “heavier” ruble. At the same time, even critics of the monetary reform of 1947 agree that, despite the costs, it made it possible to solve the problem of stabilizing finances.

The exchange of money was an important condition cancellation of cards. The card system was abolished in one package with the reform of the ruble in December 1947 - earlier than in other countries at war. The abolition of cards was accompanied by the abolition of the dual price system. Instead of the ration and commercial prices that existed during the war, uniform retail prices were introduced. On average, retail prices were several percent higher than ration prices, but approximately 3 times lower than commercial prices. Nevertheless, for the majority of the population, this measure brought material losses: during the war years, not everyone could afford shopping in commercial stores, and some increase in prices for publicly available goods affected everyone.

The logical outcome and worthy finale of financial transformations were the events of 1950. This means that from that time on, the determination of the ruble exchange rate based on the dollar was stopped. The ruble was completely converted to a gold base. The Soviet currency became more stable, its purchasing power increased, and the volume of foreign trade increased.

In order to compensate the population for losses incurred, to return prices to pre-war levels, and also to stabilize the market, the Soviet leadership began to carry out annual price reductions in 1948. This, in turn, stimulated production growth. The price reduction was carried out on equalizing principles; it was aimed not at differentiating incomes, but at equalizing them, which was dictated by the ideological guidelines that existed in those years.

In the literature, the policy of reducing prices is interpreted ambiguously. Some believe that the reform was carried out at the expense of the countryside, others argue that the benefits of lower prices for working people were minimal. These judgments need clarification. Firstly, the reduction in prices affected goods in both agricultural and industrial production equally. So, if we take prices in 1947 as 100%, then in 1954 the price index for foodstuffs was 38%, and for non-food items 53%, and on average prices fell by 57% - more than half.

The measures taken by the government significantly increased the solvency of the population, as well as the demand for goods. According to statistics, in 1949, after prices fell, the average daily sale of meat increased by 13%, butter - by 30%, the demand for watches doubled, for bicycles and gramophones - 4.5 times. Trade volumes increased accordingly. At the same time, in 1954, when the price decline stopped, the pre-war price level for many goods had not yet been achieved. We completely managed to fill the shelves with cheap goods. Thus, carried out in 1948–1954. the reforms were unfinished.

One of the main features of the development of the USSR's economy in the post-war five years was the continued use of heaps of prisoners. The volume of work performed in the Gulag system increased significantly compared to the pre-war period. Prisoner labor was used at nuclear facilities, during the construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline, and at metallurgical enterprises. In 1951 alone, capital work worth 14.3 billion rubles was carried out at construction sites of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, using mainly prisoners.

Enterprises of the camps and colonies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs produced gross output totaling 16.3 billion rubles. All this was achieved through hard, virtually hard labor. At the same time, the labor of prisoners was economically ineffective. In particular, a survey carried out after the war by order of L.P. Beria showed that the average cost of maintaining prisoners used in construction was higher than the average earnings of civilian builders. Seeing the imminent economic collapse of the Gulag, Beria sought to transfer the camp system from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice.

In general, despite the contradictions and problems noted above, post-war reconstruction was completed on schedule and in full. The factories of Leningrad, Kyiv, and Stalingrad were raised from the ruins. Despite the terrible destruction, the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station and power plants in Donbass, Voronezh, Kharkov, and Transnistria were revived. Over the years of the post-war five-year plan, Donbass miners were able to return 129 mines to operation, while continuing to develop new ones. Thanks to the labor enthusiasm of the people in 1946–1950. 6,200 industrial enterprises were returned to operation. During these same years, more than 100 million m2 of housing were restored to their previous condition and built.

In addition, the USSR managed to create significant fuel and raw material reserves, which guaranteed high rates of development of the country and its security. The village was less successful in healing the wounds caused by the war. But here, too, there have been serious positive changes. By the beginning of 1950, the livestock population had been largely restored. Cultivated areas expanded, production of main types of agricultural products increased. By the end of the Five-Year Plan, the gross output of rural areas had generally reached the pre-war level.

The war unleashed by Nazi Germany caused great damage to the Soviet Union. More than 25 million Soviet citizens died at the fronts, behind enemy lines, and in concentration camps. Many hundreds of thousands of people were mutilated and could not return to full blood human life. The country lost its best production personnel, technical support for production was suspended, and commodity-money turnover sharply decreased.

On September 13, 1945, the Pravda newspaper published a message from the Extraordinary State Commission to establish and investigate the atrocities of the Nazi invaders. The occupiers plundered, destroyed and burned 1,700 cities, more than 70 thousand villages and hamlets on the territory of the USSR, and deprived 25 million people of their homes. About 32 thousand industrial enterprises, 65 thousand km of railway tracks, 13 thousand railway bridges, 16 thousand steam locomotives, and over 400 thousand carriages were disabled. The Nazis plundered and ruined 98 thousand collective farms, about 2 thousand state farms, 3 thousand machine and tractor stations, stole 17 million cattle, 47 million sheep, goats, and pigs. During the war years, USSR agriculture lost 7 million horses, 137 thousand tractors and much more. The list of Hitler's atrocities took up several newspaper pages.

The direct damage caused by the invaders amounted to 679 billion rubles, which is approximately equal to the total capital investments of the USSR during the first four five-year plans. If we take into account the expenses of our country on restructuring industry on a war footing, waging war and the loss of income from areas captured by the Nazis, then the damage amounted to 2 trillion. 596 billion rubles. For comparison, all state budget revenues in 1940 amounted to 180 billion rubles.

As a result of the losses incurred, the national economy was thrown back: in the production of cement and the processing of industrial wood to the level of 1928-1929, in the production of coal, steel, and ferrous metals to the level of 1934-1938, i.e. for no less than 10 years.

During the war years, much of the equipment was badly worn out, and much was no longer usable. The curtailment of military production affected primarily heavy industry enterprises, where the volume of output in 1946 was 27% less than in 1945. In the light and food industries, the transition to peaceful production occurred much earlier. Already in 1946, the production of consumer goods increased by 13% compared to the previous year. However, as before, priority remained with heavy industry, which was fueled by income from the sale of consumer goods.

The problem of personnel was also extremely acute. Thus, compared with the pre-war period, the total number of workers and employees in the national economy decreased by more than 5 million people (from 33.9 million in 1940 to 28.6 million in 1945), including . in industry - by 14%, in transport - by 9, in agriculture - by 15%. The bulk of the labor force was made up of women, old people and teenagers. The composition of those employed in production has also deteriorated sharply. Thus, the number of engineers in industry in 1945 was 126 thousand less than in 1940.

It is also necessary to take into account that the Soviet people were in dire need of literally everything. In cities, a rationing system for the distribution of food and many consumer goods was maintained. A regular card issued monthly about 2 kg of meat and fish, 400 g of fat, 1.5 kg of cereals and pasta.

At the same time, a significant part of the funds went to the defense of the USSR and international assistance to people's democracies.

Country Recovery Program

The restoration of the national economy and its partial restructuring on a peaceful basis began in the summer of 1943 - the moment of the mass expulsion of the Nazis from the occupied territories of the country.

The main provisions of the program for the restoration and further development of the national economy were set out in Stalin’s speech to voters in the first post-war elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on February 9, 1946.

Five-year plan for the restoration and development of the USSR economy for 1946-1950. provided for the accelerated development of the Soviet economy, raising the living standards of the people, and strengthening the country's defense power. Industry was supposed to reach the pre-war level already in 1948, and by the end of the five-year plan it should have exceeded it by 48%. Twice as much money was allocated for capital construction as for all pre-war five-year plans combined. The total volume of capital investments amounted to 250.3 billion rubles. 157.7 billion were allocated for industry, and 19.9 billion rubles for agriculture. The plan also provided for an increase in the production of consumer goods and the replacement of the card system with expanded state trade. It was envisaged to reduce prices for all goods, increase wages, large-scale housing and cultural construction, expand the healthcare system, public education, etc. Although the already meager funds were devoured by the military-nuclear moloch. In accordance with the five-year plan for the restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR, similar plans were adopted in all 16 union and 20 autonomous republics.

The Soviet people steadfastly endured the hardships of post-war devastation. The idealized pre-war life, and most importantly, the victory over fascism, fueled the people's confidence in a wonderful future, their readiness to endure all the difficulties and hardships, and the desire to work hard.

Already in 1945, about 5 million people who were forcibly taken to work in Germany, 2.5 million Soviet prisoners of war, most of whom ended up in Gulag camps, returned to the USSR. Before 1948 Soviet army was reduced by almost 8.5 million people.

The victory over fascism caused a great political and labor upsurge of the entire Soviet people. The forms of labor activity were different. The enthusiasm of the workers was actively supported by party and trade union bodies, the Komsomol and the administration. However, most organizational activities were reduced not to the analysis of economic phenomena, but to the requirements of the political situation. Without discussing the fundamental issues of reality, a simple, traditional and so far reliable method was used - “to push or attribute.”

At the end of the 40s, the struggle between two lines of development of the economic mechanism continued: one aimed at strict centralization, comprehensive control, order methods, and the other at expanding the economic independence of production, introducing cost accounting, and the material interest of workers.

In the leadership of the country and locally, people began to appear who, in the practice of state and economic management, were convinced that emergency management measures suppressed economic independence and the initiative of workers, which led to public apathy, economic stagnation, increased command-bureaucratic actions and political repression. Already at the end of the 40s, society did not accept command methods of management and organization during the war, as well as production dictates and neglect of the social and spiritual needs of man. The war ended, but the difficulties and unsettled life remained.

Although the public consciousness was ready to accept new “enemies of the people,” it increasingly felt the need for reforms. However, the reform trend was significantly at odds with the interests of the administrative system. The logic of reform would ultimately lead to the realization of the need not for private, but for fundamental changes in public life, which in practice would show the harmfulness of the administrative-command apparatus and the socio-political system. Realizing the danger of the collapse of the created management system, the party-bureaucratic apparatus strengthened the proven methods of work - promises, lies, dictatorship.

Transition of industry to a peaceful direction

In the field of industrial production in the post-war years, a number of complex tasks were solved simultaneously: the transition from military production to the production of civilian products; restoration of destroyed enterprises; expansion of production and product range; construction of new enterprises; technical re-equipment and development of advanced technologies. During the Fourth Five-Year Plan, it was necessary not only to restore the pre-war level of industrial production, but also to exceed it by almost half.

The successful implementation of the assigned tasks was due to: a unified state plan covering all sectors of the national economy, which made it possible to centralize the distribution of the country's budget; the industry of the eastern regions of the USSR, which, after reconversion, became a powerful basis for the speedy restoration of the western and central regions affected by the war; additional funds received from government loans, high prices for food and consumer goods, and low wages.

During the restoration and further development of the national economy with the technical re-equipment of production, the growth of the cultural and technical level of the working class, and the improvement of production processes, close and constant cooperation between engineers and scientists was a vital necessity. Without such a union, it became impossible to solve complex economic problems and further technical progress.

In March-April 1947, a competition began between engineering and technical workers in industry to increase labor productivity and reduce the labor intensity of products based on improving technology and introducing advanced work methods. The initiator of the competition, the Ural technologist of the third mechanical shop of the Kirov Tractor Plant, A. Ivanov, by updating production technology, improving the skills of workers and using the experience of innovators, achieved an outstanding result at his site: the labor productivity of machine operators increased by 2 times, 30% of workers were released, 11 metal-cutting machines , the cost of manufacturing parts has sharply decreased. On May 17, 1947, Pravda wrote: “If every technologist in his area acts as creatively as A. Ivanov, then industry will achieve a significant increase in labor productivity, better use of machines and available equipment, and an increase in production output... It is necessary support in every possible way this new manifestation of creative activity and Soviet patriotism of engineering and technical workers.” On May 30, 1947, the Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions adopted a resolution on organizing the All-Union Competition of Technologists. Thus, it was no longer single specialists, but entire groups of engineers who accepted obligations aimed at improving technology, introducing mechanization and reducing the labor intensity of production operations, further increasing labor productivity, and ensuring savings in raw materials.

During 1946, industrial production was restructured to produce civilian products, and in 1948 the pre-war production level was already exceeded by 18%, including in heavy industry by 30%.

During the recovery period, special attention was paid to ferrous metallurgy enterprises and coal mines of Donbass. In honor of their restoration, special award medals were established. However, the pre-war level of coal production in the Donbass was achieved only in 1950, and the metallurgical industry of the Ukrainian SSR, which produced 75% of the country’s total metal before the war, was restored only in 1951.

Along with the restoration of old ones, the construction of new industrial facilities was underway. Power plants were built: Farhadskaya (Uzbek SSR), Sevanskaya (Armenian SSR), Kramskaya and Sukhumskaya (Georgian SSR), Rybinskaya (on the Volga), Shchekinskaya (Moscow region), etc. metallurgical complexes in Rustavi (Transcaucasia), Bogovat (Uzbekistan), Ust-Kamenogorsk lead-zinc plant, pipe-rolling plants in Sumgait (Azerbaijan) and Nikopol (Ukrainian SSR), etc.

Between the Volga and the Urals, new oil fields were intensively developed. The so-called Second Baku already in 1950 provided 44% of the country’s total oil production, although another 80% of the country’s fuel was allocated to coal.

In total, 6,200 large enterprises were built and restored during the five-year plan. However, the five-year target for commissioning new production facilities in the iron and steel industry, the coal industry and the construction of power plants was not fulfilled.

In general, targets were exceeded for the production of metals, coal and oil production, electricity generation, etc. However, a number of industries and especially the production of consumer goods have not reached pre-war levels.

The situation of agriculture after the Great Patriotic War

One of the most important tasks of the Fourth Five-Year Plan was to restore agriculture and ensure the further development of agricultural production in general. Without a general rise in agriculture, it was impossible to improve the financial situation of the working people, abolish the rationing system for the distribution of food and consumer goods, and provide industry with raw materials.

Meanwhile, the damage caused by the Nazi occupiers to collective farms alone amounted to 181 billion rubles. In terms of the size of sown areas, the country was at the level of 1913. Gross agricultural output in 1945 was 60% of the 1940 level. During the war years, the machine and tractor fleet was reduced by an average of a third, the number of horses was halved. There were farms where they plowed on their own and sowed by hand from a basket. The human losses were especially noticeable. The difficulties of the recovery period were aggravated by the severe drought of 1946. In addition, spending on agriculture during the Fourth Five-Year Plan was almost 4 times less than on industry.

In the most difficult conditions, collective and state farms and MTS were mainly restored in a short period of time. Industrial enterprises and townspeople provided great assistance to collective farms. In 1946, 3/4 of the sown areas of the occupied regions were brought into working condition.

By the end of the five-year plan, gross agricultural output was expected to exceed the 1940 level by 27%. The Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (February 1947) adopted a resolution “On measures to boost agriculture in the post-war period,” which emphasized the technical equipment of agriculture with tractors, cars, and various agricultural machines. And yet, there was not enough equipment on the collective farms; moreover, it was ineffective, there was a lot of downtime, and there was a lack of spare parts. The situation with mechanization in livestock farming was unsatisfactory.

During the Fourth Five-Year Plan, the capacity of rural power plants tripled. In 1950, 76% of state farms and 15% of collective farms were electrified, compared to 4% in 1940.

Serious attention was paid to the promotion and implementation of scientific achievements and best practices in agriculture. Great importance had three-year agro-zootechnical training courses for collective farmers on the job.

At the same time, in the process of restoring agriculture locally, and often in the center, serious mistakes were made. The grass-fed system of field cultivation was routinely planted, which led to a reduction in the crops of grain and legumes and hampered the production of the grain needed by the country. Excessively centralized planning, multi-stage and incompetent bureaucratic leadership fettered the economic initiative of peasants, led to irrational distribution of agricultural crops, violated the timing of sowing, harvesting, etc.

The development of agricultural production was significantly hampered by low procurement prices for grain, potatoes, meat and other products, as well as raw materials that the state received from collective farms as mandatory deliveries. Procurement prices not only did not cover the cost of their production, but did not even justify transportation costs for the delivery of procured products. The payment for a collective farmer's workday was extremely low and did not stimulate his interest in work.

At the same time, high taxes were levied on collective farmers (tax on personal plots, personal livestock, beehives, fruit trees, etc.).

Standard of living of the population after the Great Patriotic War

The main indicator of the living standard of the Soviet people was the growth of national income, the physical volume of which in 1950 exceeded the pre-war level by 1.62 times. This enabled the Soviet government to abolish the card system for the distribution of food and consumer goods in December 1947. At the same time, a monetary reform was carried out in a ratio of ten to one, i.e. one old-style chervonets was exchanged for one ruble of new money. Cash deposits in savings banks and the State Bank were revalued on preferential terms. The monetary reform did not affect the wages of workers and employees, or the labor income of peasants, which remained at the same level. In this way, excess (issued) and counterfeit money, and a significant part of the population’s cash savings, were confiscated.

The standard of living of the population was characterized by wages and retail prices for food and household industrial goods. After the war, before the abolition of the card distribution system, retail prices increased on average 3 times compared to 1940: for food by 3.6 times, for industrial goods - by 2.2 times. Over the years, wages for workers and employees have increased only 1.5 times. The average wage in the national economy in 1940 was 33 rubles; in 1945 - 43.4 rubles; in 1948 - 48 rubles; in 1950 - 64 rubles. per month, from which it was necessary to deduct the amount for subscription to government loans. Research workers had the highest salaries activity - on average per month 46.7 rub. in 1940 and 38-48 rubles. in 1950. Thus, the abundance in stores of food, consumer goods and even luxury goods (gold, furs, etc.) was a consequence of the low purchasing power of the bulk of the population.

In 1950, per capita consumption was: meat - 26 kg, milk and dairy products - 172 kg, outerwear - 0.3 pieces. etc. Many cultural and household items - televisions, washing machines, radios, etc. were considered luxury goods.

The improvement in the financial situation of broad sections of the population was ensured by a reduction in retail prices for consumer goods and household services. In state trade, prices decreased every year in April. If their level before the abolition of the card distribution system is taken as 100%, then on March 1, 1949 their index was 71%, on April 1, 1954 - 43%, and yet prices were more than 1/3 higher than the pre-war level. People with high earnings benefited most from price reductions: trade workers, Catering, various procurements, material supplies, as well as employees of administrative bodies.

It was very difficult for the peasants, who were actually forcibly attached to the land. In the early 50s, a collective farmer received 16.4 rubles for his hard work. per month, i.e. 4 times less than a worker. Wheat was bought from collective farms for 1 kopeck. per kilogram at a retail price for flour of 31 kopecks. and so on.

In a letter to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks G. Malenkov, a student of the Smolensk Military-Political School N. Menshikov wrote: “As a communist, it pains me to hear such a question from collective farmers: “Do you know whether the collective farms will be dissolved soon? ... there is no strength to live like this.” further"".

The difficult situation after the war was with the housing stock, the restoration and construction of which was carried out simultaneously and in conjunction with industrial construction. If in 1940 the average per capita urban population was 6.7 square meters. m, then in 1950 - 7 sq. m, and yet many lived in basements, and the bulk of the population lived in communal apartments.

Thus, the standard of living of the population was still far from normal and largely depended on investments in heavy industry, defense, and international assistance.

Changes in territories included in the USSR

A feature of the restoration and development of the national economy were transformations in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, Right Bank Moldova, which joined the USSR in 1939-1940, as well as in the Tuva Autonomous Region, Transcarpathian, Kaliningrad and Sakhalin regions, which were included in composition of the USSR in 1944-1945.

Socialist transformations begin from the moment the Nazi troops are expelled from these territories. By decision of the Soviet and party bodies, specific measures are being taken to liquidate all bodies and institutions of nationalist power and create party, Soviet state and local institutions. The main core of party and state events were operational groups of party and Soviet activists, representatives of partisans and underground fighters, as well as local residents demobilized from the Soviet Army.

A fierce struggle with the bodies of Soviet power was waged by nationalists - capitalist elements in the city, kulaks in the countryside, and the clergy, who had well-armed secret detachments.

To establish the new government, it was necessary to carry out socialist transformations throughout the entire economic complex. Along with the nationalization process, there was a restoration of industrial enterprises and the expansion of the material and technical base of the republics. As a result, industrial output in 1950 in Estonia exceeded the pre-war level by 3.4 times, in Latvia by 3 times, etc. Industrial production was significantly expanded, new branches were mastered, enterprises were equipped with first-class machines and the latest technological equipment.

In an atmosphere of intense struggle, changes also took place in agriculture, where the sad experience of collectivization of the countryside and the struggle against landowners and kulaks was also used. Violent methods of agricultural transformation led to the expropriation and liquidation of the kulaks, who made up the bulk of the rural population of the Baltic states, as well as to the expulsion from their homes of all those who resisted.

Particularly striking changes occurred in the Tuvan village. Semi-patriarchal and feudal relations prevailed here, and a significant part of the Arat population led a nomadic lifestyle. Thanks to the help of the Soviet peoples and the strong-willed party-Soviet leadership, the peasantry of the Tuva Autonomous Region, bypassing the capitalist stage of development, moved to “socialism.”

The political process, or more precisely, the population’s dogmatic memorization of Marxist-Leninist theory, “mastery of the method of socialist realism” and “scientific communism,” was complex and difficult, and in many ways incomprehensible. In the field of culture and education there was a massive ideological filling and Russification.

Thus, using traditional methods, from class positions and with the help of party and administrative pressure, the restoration and development of the USSR took place.

Sources and literature

The secrecy has been removed. Losses of the Soviet Armed Forces in wars, hostilities and military conflicts: Stat. study. M., 1991.

Zubkova E.Yu. Society and reform, 1945-1964. M., 1993.

Knyshevsky Extraction: The Mystery of German Reparations. M., 1994.

Manenkov A.I. Cultural construction in the post-war village (1946-1950). M., 1991.

Polyak G.B. Post-war restoration of the national economy. M., 1986.

Khanin T.E. Dynamics economic development THE USSR. Novosibirsk, 1991.