In January 1943, at a meeting in Casablanca (Morocco), US President F.D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister W. Churchill declared that they would wage war until the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany. However, towards the end of the war, some politicians in the West began to cautiously speak out in the spirit that the demand for unconditional surrender spurred German resistance and dragged out the war. Besides, it would not be bad, they continued, not to bring matters to a complete defeat of Germany, but to partially preserve the military power of this country as a barrier against the growing Soviet Union. Moreover, if we assume that Soviet troops enter Germany, then the USSR will firmly settle in Central Europe.

For similar reasons, Stalin also doubted the practicality of demanding unconditional surrender and believed that a weakened but not completely defeated Germany, no longer able to threaten an aggressive war, was less dangerous for the USSR than the victorious Anglo-Saxon countries established in the center of Europe. After all, in 1922-1933 and 1939-1941. The USSR and Germany were on friendly terms.

At the Tehran Conference of the Heads of Government of the Three Allied Powers (November 28 - December 1, 1943), Stalin, in a private conversation at a dinner at Roosevelt's, proposed to put forward specific demands for surrender to Germany, as was the case at the end of the First World War. It was necessary to announce how much weapons Germany should give out, and what territories it should give up. The slogan of unconditional surrender, according to Stalin, makes the Germans rally and fight to the bitterness and helps Hitler to stay in power. Roosevelt remained silent and did not give an answer. On the part of Stalin, obviously, it was a “shooting point” in order to find out the reaction of the allies. In the future, he did not return to this topic. At the Tehran Conference, the USSR officially joined the declaration demanding the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany.

In the same place, at the Tehran conference, the question of the post-war territorial structure of Germany was discussed. Roosevelt proposed dividing Germany into five states. The US President, in addition, believed that the Kiel Canal, the Ruhr Basin and the Saarland should be internationalized, and Hamburg made a "free city". Churchill considered it necessary to separate the southern lands (Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden) from Germany and include them, together with Austria, and probably also Hungary, in the "Danube Confederation". The rest of Germany (minus the territories belonging to neighboring states), the British Prime Minister proposed to divide into two states. Stalin did not express his attitude to the plans for the division of Germany, but he obtained promises that East Prussia would be torn away from Germany and divided between the USSR and Poland. Poland, in addition, will receive significant increments at the expense of Germany in the west.

Plans for the post-war division of Germany into several independent states captured Soviet diplomacy for some time. In January 1944, the former Soviet ambassador to London, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs I.M. Maisky drew up a note in which he substantiated the need for the dismemberment of Germany. At the end of 1944, the former People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov also formulated a project in which he argued that Germany should be divided into at least three, maximum seven states. These plans were studied by Stalin and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov before the Yalta Conference of the Great Powers in February 1945.

Stalin, however, was in no hurry to take advantage of these recommendations, but intended to find out first the position of Britain and the United States. Back in September 1944, at a meeting in Quebec, Roosevelt and Churchill discussed the plan of the American Treasury Secretary Morgenthau. According to it, it was supposed to deprive Germany of heavy industry in general and divide what was left of it (minus the lands ceded to Poland and France) into three states: northern, western and southern. Such a division of Germany into three was first envisaged as early as 1942 in the plan of US Deputy Secretary of State (Foreign Secretary) S. Wells.

However, by that time the mood of influential circles in the West had changed significantly. As already mentioned, the Soviet Union was perceived in the post-war perspective as a greater threat than a united Germany, which was defeated. Therefore, Roosevelt and Churchill were in no hurry to discuss at the Yalta Conference the post-war state structure of Germany, except for the zones of its occupation by the great powers. Stalin, therefore, also did not make such proposals. The projects of Maisky and Litvinov were shelved. Obviously, Stalin did not sympathize with them in advance. For the same reason as his Western partners, he did not want Germany to be excessively weakened and fragmented.

On May 9, 1945, speaking on the radio on the occasion of Victory Day, Stalin, rather unexpectedly for the Western allies, announced that the USSR did not aim to dismember Germany or deprive it of statehood. This was a definite position on the eve of the last meeting of the leaders of the three victorious powers, which took place from July 17 to August 2, 1945 in Potsdam. When the Allies raised the question of the internationalization of the Ruhr area at the Potsdam Conference, Stalin remarked that his views on this question "have now changed somewhat." “Germany remains a single state,” the Soviet leader firmly emphasized. This topic was not brought up again.

Although summits like the Big Three conferences were no longer held, several post-war meetings of the foreign ministers of the victorious powers agreed that the future Germany should become a single democratic federal state. The constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, proclaimed in the western zones of occupation on May 23, 1949, corresponded to these plans. The problem was that both the West and the USSR wanted to equip Germany in their own way. In the end, each side in the Cold War got the Germany it was striving for - united and under its control, but not all, but only part of it.

From the first days of the war, President Roosevelt linked America's aid in arms and supplies to the Soviet Union with an end to persecution of the Church. The day after Hitler invaded the USSR in June 1941, he notified Stalin that American aid and religious freedom went hand in hand. Throughout 1942, he reminded Stalin that there would be no big help from the United States until the Russian Orthodox Church was restored in the USSR. Stalin surrendered to Roosevelt two months before the Tehran conference.

How Roosevelt's demand to end the persecution of religion and the Church in the USSR is described in the book by the American historian Susan Butler "Stalin and Roosevelt: a great partnership" (Eksmo, 2017). For informational purposes, we present an excerpt from this book:

"The most significant steps that received the approval of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Stalin took in the religious sphere. Two months before the Tehran Conference, Stalin officially abandoned his anti-religious policy. He knew that the negative attitude of the Soviet Union towards religion was a constant problem for Roosevelt The President knew that this provided ample opportunity for the enemies of the Soviet Union in the United States (especially catholic church) to criticize the Soviet system, but this offended him personally. Only those closest to Roosevelt were aware of his deep religiosity.

Rexford Tugwell, a close friend of Roosevelt and a member of the Columbia University Brain Trust, which developed the first guidelines for political course Roosevelt as president, recalled that when Roosevelt thought about organizing, creating, or establishing something, he asked all his colleagues to join him in prayer as he asked for divine blessings on what they were about to do. Presidential speechwriter Robert Sherwood believed that " his religious faith was the most powerful and most mysterious force that lived in him".

Roosevelt took every opportunity to stress the need for religious freedom in the Soviet Union. The day after Hitler's invasion of the USSR in June 1941, he notified Stalin that American aid and religious freedom went hand in hand: " Freedom to worship God as conscience dictates is the great and fundamental right of all peoples. For the US, any principles and doctrines of the communist dictatorship are as intolerant and alien as the principles and doctrines of the Nazi dictatorship. No imposed domination can and will not receive any support, any influence in the way of life or in the system of government from the American people.".

In the autumn of 1941, when german army approached Moscow and Averell Harriman, along with Lord Beaverbrook, the newspaper magnate and Minister of Supply of Great Britain, was about to fly to Moscow to agree on a program of possible American-British supplies to the Soviet Union, Roosevelt took advantage of this opportunity to again defend freedom of religion in the USSR. Stalin was in a hopeless situation, and Roosevelt knew that a more favorable moment might not present itself to him. " I believe that this is a real opportunity for Russia to recognize freedom of religion as a result of the conflict.", Roosevelt wrote in early September 1941.

He took three steps. First, the president invited The White house Konstantin Umansky, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, to inform him that it would be extremely difficult to approve in Congress the assistance to Russia, which, as he knew, was badly needed, due to the strong hostility of the Congress towards the USSR. He then suggested: If in the next few days, without waiting for the arrival of Harriman in Moscow, the Soviet leadership authorizes media coverage of issues related to freedom of religion in the country, this could have a very positive enlightening effect before the Lend-Lease bill enters Congress.". Umansky agreed to assist in this matter.

On September 30, 1941, Roosevelt held a press conference, during which he instructed journalists to familiarize themselves with Article 124 of the Soviet Constitution, which spoke of guarantees for freedom of conscience and freedom of religion, and to publish this information. (After this information was duly publicized in the press, Roosevelt's nemesis, Hamilton Fish, the Republican congressman for Roosevelt's Hyde Park district, sarcastically suggested to the President that Stalin be invited to the White House "so that he could perform the rite of baptism in the pool White House")

Roosevelt then instructed Harriman, who was already ready to leave for Moscow, to raise the issue of religious freedom in the course of communication with Stalin. As Harriman recalled, " the president wanted me to convince Stalin of the importance of loosening restrictions on religion. Roosevelt was concerned about possible opposition from various religious groups. In addition, he sincerely wanted to use our cooperation during the war to influence the hostile attitude of the Soviet regime towards religion.". Harriman raised this issue in a conversation with Stalin in such a way that it became clear to him: the political situation and the negative public opinion of the United States regarding Russia will change for the better if " The Soviets will be ready to ensure freedom of religion not only in words but in deeds". As Harriman recounted, when he explained it, Stalin " nodded his head, which meant, as I understood it, his willingness to do something".

Harriman raised the subject also in a conversation with Molotov, who made it clear that he did not believe in Roosevelt's sincerity. " Molotov frankly told me the great respect he and others had for the President. At some point, he asked me if the president, such a smart, intelligent person, is really as religious as he seems, or is it done for political purposes" Harriman recalled.

The reaction of the Soviet side was quite understandable. Umansky may have reported to Moscow that Roosevelt never went to Sunday services at the National Cathedral, the Episcopal Church that presidents and the cream of the society from among the parishioners of the Episcopal Church in Washington traditionally attended during the service (although he sometimes visited St. Lafayette Square). Obviously, Umansky did not know that Roosevelt avoided the National Cathedral because he could not stand Bishop James Freeman presiding in Washington.

Harriman managed to achieve the minimum. Solomon Lozovsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, waited a day after Harriman's departure from Moscow, called a press conference and read out the following statement: " The public of the Soviet Union learned with great interest about President Roosevelt's statement at a press conference on religious freedom in the USSR. All citizens are recognized freedom of religion and freedom of anti-religious propaganda Along with this, he noted that the Soviet state "does not interfere in matters of religion", religion is a "private matter". Lozovsky concluded the statement with a warning to the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church, many of whom were still in prison: " Freedom of any religion implies that religion, church or any community will not be used to overthrow the existing and recognized authority in the country".

The only newspaper in Russia to cover the event was Moskovskiye Novosti, an English-language publication read only by Americans. The newspapers Pravda and Izvestiya ignored Lozovsky's comments. Roosevelt was not pleased as he expected more. As Harriman recalled, " he let me know it wasn't enough and chastised me. He criticized my inability to achieve more".

A few weeks later, after reviewing the latest draft of the "Declaration of the United Nations" prepared by the State Department, which was supposed to be signed on January 1, 1942, by all countries at war, Roosevelt asked Hull to include a provision on freedom of religion in the document: " I believe that Litvinov will be forced to agree with this.". When the Soviet ambassador Litvinov, who had just replaced Umansky, objected to the inclusion of a phrase regarding religion in the text, Roosevelt played on this expression by changing "religious freedom" to "religious freedom." This change, essentially insignificant and unprincipled, allowed Litvinov , without distorting the truth, to inform Moscow that he was able to force Roosevelt to change the document and thereby satisfy Stalin.

In November 1942, the first changes appeared in the anti-religious position of the Soviet government: Metropolitan Nikolai of Kiev [and Galicia], one of the three metropolitans who led the Russian Orthodox Church, became a member of the Extraordinary State Commission for establishing and investigating the atrocities of the Nazi invaders. Now, two months before the Tehran conference, Roosevelt has achieved important results and strengthened his position. Stalin, who took part in the closing and/or destruction of many churches and monasteries in Russia, began to view religion not through the narrow lens of communist doctrine, but from the perspective of Roosevelt.

On September 4, 1943, in the afternoon, Stalin summoned G. Karpov, the chairman of the Council for the Russian Orthodox Church under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Georgy Malenkov and Lavrenty Beria, to his "near dacha" in Kuntsevo. Stalin announced that he had decided to immediately restore the patriarchate, the patriarch-led system of church government that had been abolished in 1925, and open churches and seminaries throughout the Soviet Union. Later that evening, Metropolitans Sergius, Nikolai and Alexiy were summoned to the Kremlin, and Stalin informed them of the fateful decisions that had been made.

P.S. Thus, the restoration of the Patriarchate and at least partial legalization Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union, the merit was solely of Franklin D. Roosevelt's perseverance. How "comrade Stalin" really treated the Russian church is perfectly shown by this picture:

At 18:37 a question was received in the section of the Unified State Examination (school), which caused difficulties for the student.

Question causing difficulty

Why did Roosevelt support Stalin and not Churchill on the issue of opening a second front?

Answer prepared by experts Learn.Ru

In order to give a full answer, a specialist was involved who is well versed in the required subject "USE (school)". Your question was as follows: "Why did Roosevelt support Stalin, and not Churchill, on the issue of opening a second front?"

After a meeting with other specialists of our service, we are inclined to believe that the correct answer to your question will be as follows:

Roosevelt supported Stalin on the issue of opening the Second Front in Normandy, and not in the Balkans, as Churchill suggested, because he wanted to defeat Germany as soon as possible. And there was no military logic in Churchill's proposal, because if the Germans landed in the Balkans, it would be easier for them to defend themselves. In addition, Roosevelt was interested in the allied countries helping America in the fight against Japan. Stalin declared his readiness to start a war against Japan immediately after the victory over Germany, if the allies recognize the new western borders of the USSR

The works that I prepare for students are always highly appreciated by teachers. I have been writing student papers already over 4 years. During this time, I still never returned the work done for revision! If you want to order help from me, leave a request on

From Sergey999: A look at the question from across the ocean

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At first glance, there could be nothing in common between them: an American patrician, scion of the oldest noble family, an aristocrat to the marrow of his bones, bathed in luxury all his life, a graduate of the most prestigious educational institutions, who achieved supreme power through democratic means, a political romantic who dreamed of world democracy with himself at the head - and a Caucasian bandit, disguised as a revolutionary, walking knee-deep in blood, cunningly and intriguingly making his way to the top, a rude and vulgar dork, a ruthless despot and tyrant, eager for world domination. And yet, the fact is that until his death, US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt ardently courted the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin in the hope of subordinating him to his charm.

Roosevelt's romance with Stalin is one of the least known pages in the history of World War II. To this day, in “respectable society” it is inconvenient to even mention it: the slightest hint of this kind is met with hostility as a “McCarthy sortie”. However, secular convention is secular convention, but no one denies what was perfectly known to everyone who happened to be in the corridors of power in Washington in those years: the American president passionately sought the location of the Soviet tyrant and did not want to hear warnings from those who understood the character better than him. and the true intentions of America's "valiant ally".

Almost from the first moment after Franklin Roosevelt came to power, Washington's attitude towards Moscow changed dramatically: hostile alertness was replaced by lively sympathy and sincere affection. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who had no illusions about communism, wrote indignantly in his memoirs about the ease with which the Soviet Union gained diplomatic recognition early in the Roosevelt administration.

The employees of the Soviet embassy and consulates, who overwhelmingly carried out intelligence missions, were given complete freedom of action, no one paid attention to their blatant violations of standard rules and prohibitions. Such connivance was especially striking against the backdrop of the strict surveillance of potential Nazi agents, installed by the FBI on orders from above.

When Whittaker Chambers appeared in 1939 with a senior administration official, Adolf Berle, with evidence of the existence of Soviet agents in the State Department, he simply filed the documents presented to him in the case, but did not give it a go. Any hints of the existence of a communist underground or Soviet agents in the United States met with a unanimous rebuff from the left-liberal circles, whose views were completely shared in the White House.

On July 25, 1941, Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's closest adviser and confidant, arrived in Moscow for a personal meeting with Stalin. During several cordial conversations with the American emissary, the Soviet leader assured him of the invincible power of the Red Army, but at the same time demanded all-round help - from tanks, planes, artillery pieces and vehicles to industrial raw materials and food. And all this on a colossal scale.

Hopkins took careful notes. Upon returning home, he published an article with impressions of his Kremlin meetings, where the Soviet leader was described in prayerful tones. But even before arriving in Washington, in order not to lose time, Hopkins sent a telegram to his patron asking him to immediately start deliveries, which the Soviet Union so badly needs. Roosevelt immediately rushed to fulfill the requests of a new ally.

On August 1, even before the return of his faithful assistant from Moscow, the president announced at a government meeting that from now on, Soviet needs should be given top priority. The Soviet Union became the most favored country in every sense of the term. Hopkins took personal control of the assistance provided to Moscow. Everyone who had anything to do with Lend-Lease supplies knew that the Soviet demands had to be given the green light, otherwise you wouldn't end up in trouble.

At the same time, the administration led an intensified agitation in favor of a new ally. At the time, anti-Soviet sentiment was strong in America, and Congress was unenthusiastic about the prospect of unlimited aid to Moscow. In addition, the United States had not yet entered the war, the economy was functioning in peacetime, and the American army was experiencing a catastrophic shortage of literally everything - from weapons and ammunition to military equipment and equipment. And then suddenly it was proposed to forget about their own needs and throw all their strength into supporting the regime, which a few weeks ago was a staunch ally of Nazi Germany. Without the support of public opinion, it would be difficult for the White House to overcome the resistance of lawmakers.

Particularly negative was the attitude towards the "godless Soviets" among believers. In the hope that the Vatican would set American Catholics on the right path, the president sent a message to the Pope, assuring him that he, Roosevelt, “hopes to persuade the Russian government to restore religious freedom,” and reminding the Roman pontiff: “At present, Russia can never be considered an aggressor. It is Germany." At the same time, the White House called in hundreds of pro-Soviet leaders of Protestant denominations to help them. In early November, at a press conference, Roosevelt assured journalists that religious freedom was guaranteed in the USSR, citing Article 124 of the Soviet Constitution as evidence.

The President of the United States several times tried to persuade the Soviet government to make some kind of even a purely symbolic gesture in the direction of religious tolerance, but he did not succeed. Nevertheless, he managed to convince himself that Stalin had nothing against religion. Upon his return from the Yalta conference in February 1945, Roosevelt told his associates that he had caught in the character of Stalin “something that breaks out of the image of a Bolshevik revolutionary” and, apparently, is rooted in the seminarian past of the Soviet leader. “The features of a true Christian gentleman are visible in him,” the president summed up. One can imagine how the “Kremlin highlander” laughed when he was told about this characteristic.

Roosevelt tried just as zealously to please Stalin on the question of a second front. As soon as Hitler, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, thoughtlessly declared war on America, Moscow began to insist on the immediate invasion of France by Anglo-American forces in order to relieve pressure on the Red Army.

The British generals, who knew the situation much better than their overseas allies, were convinced that it would be possible to really talk about the invasion no earlier than 1944. They had no doubt that an attempt to land in France with meager available forces would inevitably turn into a disaster, not to mention the fact that the American army was completely unprepared for military operations at that time. For specialists, it was an axiom that a landing operation of this magnitude would require lengthy preparation.

But Roosevelt didn't want to hear anything. He sent message after message to Churchill, demanding the immediate opening of a second front. “Even if we cannot count on complete success,” the US President wrote, “the main goal will be achieved.” And what is this purpose? To make Stalin happy! And this despite the fact that at the time being described, the United States could deploy on the European front only five relatively combat-ready divisions and no more than 500 of the required 5,700 air support aircraft.

The following curious episode eloquently testifies to the psychological mood that prevailed in the White House. At a meeting to discuss the opening of a second front, Churchill's military adviser, General Alan Brooke, asked US Secretary of War George Marshall how the American command plans to organize the immediate transfer of reinforcements to the shore if the assault troops succeed in seizing the bridgehead. To which Marshall casually replied that he had not thought about it, and indeed, this question was not worth paying attention to. That is, the Master ordered - so go ahead! What other additions are there!

What the Allies could expect if they tried to invade France, as Roosevelt wanted, was clearly demonstrated by the deplorable results of the landing by the British in the French port of Dieppe in August 1942. The operation, as if conceived as a substantive lesson for the Americans, involved 6,000 well-trained and well-equipped paratroopers, mostly commandos, who also had the factor of surprise on their side. The Germans easily repulsed the attack, the British lost 70% of their personnel killed, wounded and captured.

The Dieppe operation showed that for the time being there was nothing to dream of a second front in the European theater of operations. Considering the enormous concentration of forces and resources required by the invasion of Normandy in June 1944, it is terrible even to imagine how the attempt to storm the heavily fortified coast with the insignificant forces that the Allies could scrape together two years earlier would have ended. But what were the considerations of military expediency for Roosevelt in comparison with the need to please Stalin?

After the triumphant return of Harry Hopkins from Moscow in July 1941, Roosevelt was obsessed with holding a secret tête-à-tête with Stalin. He bombarded the Soviet leader with flattering letters, begging for a date, but Stalin invariably evaded, citing busyness. And why did he need such a meeting? Roosevelt tried to please him in everything. Finally, Stalin nevertheless relented and agreed to the summit, but, alas, not face-to-face with his admirer, but with the participation of the head of the British government. In November 1943, the heads of the three allied powers arrived in the capital of Iran.

The American embassy in Tehran was one and a half kilometers from the British and Soviet embassies, located almost next to each other. Churchill sent a telegram to Stalin asking him to convey to Roosevelt an invitation to stay at the British Embassy. Stalin "forgot" to forward the British Prime Minister's telegram to the destination, but for his part invited Roosevelt to stay at the Soviet embassy, ​​referring to a conspiracy of German intelligence invented by him to kidnap the US president.

Roosevelt gladly accepted the invitation. It is not difficult to guess that Soviet intelligence stuffed the room assigned to the distinguished guest with listening devices in advance, and was fully aware of all the intentions of the Americans. But for Roosevelt, the main thing was that Stalin's invitation gave him hope for a secret meeting with the Soviet leader. His dream came true with a vengeance - the leaders of the United States and the USSR met three times in secret from the third participant of the summit, in the presence of only interpreters. During these meetings, almost all items on the agenda of the official meeting were settled, which, because of this, turned into an empty formality.

One of the main issues of the summit was related to the future of Poland. Stalin did not hide his intention to retain the territorial acquisitions of the USSR - the fruits of the Soviet-German pact of 1939. The geopolitical reality left the United States no choice: they would have had to give in to the Soviet demand anyway. But it was reasonable to assume that in exchange Roosevelt would negotiate some concessions from Moscow. However, judging by the minutes of the meetings, which were kept by the president's interpreter Charles Bowlen, this did not happen.

Roosevelt himself raised the issue of Poland and stated that he personally fully shared the point of view of Mr. Stalin, but for political reasons he could not make his position public. The President explained that 6-7 million American Poles form a powerful electoral bloc, and on the eve of the 1944 elections, the prospect of losing their votes worries him greatly.

But lest Stalin be offended, the US president sweetened the pill by announcing that he had no objection to the Soviet Union's annexation of the three Baltic states. The realist Churchill was well aware that in any case Stalin would not let Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia out of his clutches, but from the point of view of the highly experienced British prime minister, this should at least try to get reciprocal concessions. Roosevelt's hasty obsequiousness robbed the West of such hope.

Roosevelt stabbed Churchill on another important issue by agreeing with Stalin that the post-war reconstruction of Germany and France should not be rushed. The Soviet position was dictated by a sober calculation - strong Western European powers would become an obstacle to the spread of Moscow's hegemony over the entire continent. By supporting Stalin, the US President gave the green light to the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence not only in Eastern Europe, but even further - all the way to the English Channel. And it is not Roosevelt's fault that his successor Truman stopped Soviet expansion on the Elbe.

But the FDR made an even more serious concession on the question of a "third" front. From the very beginning of the war, Churchill toyed with the idea of ​​striking at the "soft underbelly of Europe" - in parallel with the landing in Normandy, to launch an offensive in Italy with access to the Po Valley, from where the Anglo-American troops could threaten southern France, the Balkans, Austria and Germany proper. With long persuasion, the British Prime Minister managed to persuade the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, General Eisenhower, to his point of view. Even Roosevelt eventually supported the "Italian strategy" in the hope that Stalin would like the idea of ​​an operation in the upper Adriatic that would play into the hands of Tito's Communist partisans.

But Stalin easily figured out Churchill's true intention - to block the Soviet Army's access to Central Europe - and set himself the goal of preventing its implementation in any case. There is no doubt that the outcome of the war would have been quite different if Roosevelt had insisted on accepting the plan of his British ally. (By the way, the Wehrmacht command, as it turned out, fully shared Churchill's point of view on the strategic importance of Northern Italy: despite the desperate situation on the eastern and western fronts, until the very last days of the war, huge German forces were concentrated in the Po Valley - over a million soldiers and officers. )

At the very first official meeting of the Tehran conference, Stalin announced that the Allies' first priority was to agree on the exact date for the start of Operation Overlord (the opening of a second front by crossing the Channel), immediately begin planning and preparing the operation, and, as for the Italian campaign, curtail offensive fighting after the capture of Rome and transfer the liberated troops to southern France with the task of moving north to join the invading army, which will land in Normandy.

Upon hearing Stalin's demand, Roosevelt immediately forgot all the arguments of the British ally and came out in support of the Soviet position, in fact transferring control over the strategy of military operations to the Soviet leader not only on the Eastern Front, but also in Western Europe. After all, Stalin promised to enter the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany, and Roosevelt decided that it was a gentleman's duty to encourage his ally by agreeing to his demands. The fate of Eastern and Central Europe was sealed.

Thus, Stalin got everything he wanted in Tehran, without losing anything at all. Moreover, Roosevelt in every possible way made it clear to him that he considered only him, Stalin, to be his equal, and Churchill assigned the role junior partner. Before the Tehran conference, the British prime minister suggested that the US president hold a preparatory meeting to agree on the positions of the Western powers, but Roosevelt refused, and at the summit he emphatically took the side of Stalin, who made fun of the British prime minister in every possible way.

As Keith Eubanks wrote, “Roosevelt insulted Churchill and fawned over Stalin, seeking his friendship and approval. However, Stalin mocked not so much Churchill as the President of the United States, who mocked his ally to please the tyrant.” Many of those present watched with amazement and bitterness as the leader of the world's leading democracy humiliates the leader of the allied country, which for two years heroically waged a one-on-one fight against Nazi Germany, and at the same time fawns over the despot, who had mercy on Hitler while England was bleeding.

Roosevelt's unrequited flirtation with Stalin was continued in February 1945 at the Yalta Conference. As a matter of fact, in Yalta, the concessions made by Roosevelt to Stalin at the Tehran conference were only confirmed and consolidated, which liberal historians interpret as a manifestation of elementary common sense: they say, Soviet troops have already occupied the countries of Eastern Europe, and it was clear that Moscow was not going to release tasty prey from its claws.

But it is one thing to bow before necessity and recognize the geopolitical reality, and quite another to obsequiously sanction it. Meanwhile, this was precisely the outcome of the Yalta meeting. Roosevelt gave Stalin a generous gift, recognizing the moral legitimacy of Soviet territorial gains. As Chester Wilmot wrote, “ main question was not that it was Stalin who would capture, but that he received sanction for this. Therefore, the Soviet historians were absolutely right, erecting the post-war division of Europe to the Yalta summit. It was in Yalta that the iron curtain was forged, which soon after the end of the war blocked the continent.

During the meeting, Roosevelt was forced to support Churchill, who rejected the Soviet demand for the immediate recognition of the Soviet puppet created in Lublin as the legitimate government of Poland. However, that evening he changed his mind and wrote to Stalin that "the United States will never, under any circumstances, support any provisional government of Poland that is hostile to your interests."

Now Churchill could resist as much as he wanted: having Roosevelt's note, Stalin knew that his hands were untied. The immediate cause of World War II was the enslavement of Poland by the Nazi predator. One of the main outcomes of the war was the enslavement of Poland by another - communist - predator with the blessing of the US President.

Roosevelt's generosity came to a head when discussing how the Soviet Union would be rewarded for entering the war against Japan after the fighting in the European theater was over. Stalin easily got everything he wanted: the southern part of Sakhalin, the Kuriles and the ice-free port of Dairen on the Kwantung Peninsula. Although the port belonged to the sovereign Republic of China, both interlocutors decided that they could not inform the head of the Chinese government, Chiang Kai-shek, for the time being. Sometime later, on occasion.

A tragicomic impression is produced by that part of the conversation where Stalin explained to the interlocutor what his indefatigable demands were based on. With a deep sigh, the Soviet leader told Roosevelt that he had a difficult task to "report" to his people about the obligations that he had taken on their behalf. The people will be dissatisfied with their leader when they find out that they will have to fight again, and not with anyone, but with Japan, “with whom we have nothing to share,” Stalin emphasized. To reconcile the Soviet people with such an unpleasant prospect, he concluded, is possible only with the promise of a fairly solid compensation. Roosevelt was touched to the core.

And another priceless gift Roosevelt gave to Stalin shortly before his death. On March 28, 1945, General Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief of the Western Allies, sent a telegram to Stalin describing his strategic plan for the remaining weeks of the war. Eisenhower informed the Soviet ally that he was going to move the bulk of his troops in a southerly direction - to Dresden and further to Bavaria. There was not a word about Berlin in the telegram, although in early February, at a meeting in Malta that preceded the Yalta summit, the Joint Anglo-American Headquarters unanimously decided that Berlin should be chosen as the direction of the main attack.

Stalin could not believe his luck. He was well aware of the enormous strategic and psychological advantages that the side that would be the first to capture the capital of the Reich and the bunker where the Nazi leadership, led by Hitler himself, was hiding, would receive. The capture of Berlin was the main point of the Soviet strategy to establish its hegemony over Central Europe. Stalin was aware that Eisenhower would never have made such an offering to him without specific instructions from his president, as Roosevelt transparently hinted to him at Yalta.

Churchill fell into a deep shock when he learned about Eisenhower's telegram. Throughout the war, he tirelessly thought about how to block the communist hordes from entering the heart of Europe, but at the very last moment, when it seemed that there was nothing to worry about, Roosevelt suddenly planted such a pig on him. The British Prime Minister was clearly aware of the colossal military and political importance of Berlin. It was clear to him: the outcome of the war and the post-war balance of power in Europe largely depend on whose hands the capital of the Third Reich ends up.

In hindsight, Roosevelt's apologists argued that nothing terrible had happened: they say that the Soviet Army would have reached Berlin first in any case, since at the time of sending the Eisenhower telegram it was much closer to the German capital than the Anglo-American troops. However, on the eastern front, the Germans fought desperately, and on the western front they offered only token resistance.

On April 11, the 9th US Army, under the command of Lieutenant General William Simpson, reached the Elbe. Berlin was less than 100 kilometers away. German resistance was broken, American troops were waiting for an easy ride. Their commander was sure that in two days at the latest he would be at Berlin. But suddenly he received an order from General Omar Bradley: to stop the offensive and in no case force the Elbe.

An enraged Simpson rushed to Bradley to find out who could give such an idiotic order. He briefly replied: "Ike" (Eisenhower's nickname). Everything became clear. Both generals knew that the highly experienced courtier and dexterous politician Eisenhower (it was for these qualities that he was first of all chosen for the post of commander-in-chief of the allied forces) would never have acted over the head of the Joint Anglo-American Headquarters without the unequivocal instructions of Secretary of War George Marshall - a faithful executor the will of the president. Soviet troops broke through to Berlin only by the end of April.
* * *

How to explain such a passionate desire of Franklin Roosevelt to win the favor of the Soviet tyrant? Why did he always indulge Stalin in everything, why did he meekly endure any insults from him and in response write tender letters expressing unbreakable friendship? Why did he get into unbridled delight from the rare and rather mean compliments given to him by the Soviet despot? To the extent that even Stalin's gracious permission to call him "Uncle Joe" was perceived by Roosevelt in Tehran as a great favor.

And it cannot be said that Roosevelt lived in a vacuum and could not get good advice from smart people. There was no shortage of specialists in the president's inner circle who knew the value of the Soviet regime and its leader, from US ambassadors to the USSR William Bullitt, Averell Harriman and Admiral Standley to experienced diplomats Cordell Hull, Charles Bowlen, Loy Henderson and George Kennan. All of them repeatedly tried to open the president's eyes to the true nature of his idol. But Roosevelt was deaf to all warnings, preferring to listen to those who sang in unison with his own feelings.

When discussing the reasons for the pro-Soviet sentiments of the US president, it is impossible to overestimate the influence of his closest friend, confidante, adviser and ambassador-at-large, Harry Hopkins, whom the president even moved to the White House in 1940 to always have at hand. They wrote about Hopkins: “He “always knew when to open his mouth, and when to remain silent, when to push, and when to retreat, when to go ahead, and when to go around”, “Hopkins feels Roosevelt’s moods in a purely feminine way”, “He knows how advise under the guise of flattery and flatter under the guise of advice. Approximately in the same spirit, contemporaries described the secret of the charms of the Marquise Pompadour, who bewitched the French king Louis XV.

Harry Hopkins carried out the most delicate assignments of his patron. The degree of his closeness to Roosevelt is evidenced, for example, by a telegram signed by the president, with which Hopkins arrived in Moscow on July 25, 1941 for a personal meeting with Stalin. The telegram said: "I ask you to give Mr. Hopkins the same confidence as if you spoke directly to me." In a word, it was not for nothing that he was called the “second self” of Roosevelt.

Meanwhile, Harry Hopkins was known as an ardent supporter of the Soviet Union and an ardent admirer of Stalin. But it is possible that it was not even a matter of Hopkins' personal sympathies, which in those years were shared by the entire "progressive" intelligentsia. The Soviet intelligence reports intercepted and decoded as part of Operation Venona provide strong evidence that Hopkins was not just an enthusiastic admirer of Moscow, but its direct agent.

However, we must not forget that Hopkins and other Soviet fellow travelers surrounded by Roosevelt were still nothing more than servants, obedient to the will of their master. If the president did not feel sympathy for Stalin, no persuasion of advisers could have forced him to change his position. He listened to them only to the extent that their whispering strengthened his own convictions. But if not someone else's influence, then what explains the attraction of the head of the most powerful democracy in the world to the bloody despot, who seemed to be at the opposite end of the ideological spectrum?

The intellectual premises of Roosevelt's pro-Soviet sympathies are to be found in his Wilsonism. In the first quarter of the last century, the American elite prayed to Woodrow Wilson, bowing to the moral authority and puritanical idealism of this President of Princeton University and then President of the United States, who devoted his life to the struggle for democratic ideals. Contrary to his campaign promises, Wilson brought the country into the First world war in which he saw a crusade for world democracy.

In Wilson's eyes, the center of evil in the world was imperialism and its personification - the British Empire. Roosevelt fully shared the views of his idol. For him, the "imperialist" Churchill was far more dangerous and repulsive than the communist Stalin - despite the fact that Churchill always had an ardent sympathy for America, not to mention the fact that his mother was half American.

To be fair, Roosevelt was far from alone in his dislike of the British imperialist system. The vast majority of Americans, brought up on the ideas of democracy and experiencing an atavistic dislike for the country with which their ancestors had to fight for their independence, experienced similar feelings.

The main argument of the supporters of US neutrality, who argued that the treacherous Albion would fool the innocent America around their fingers and use it as an obedient tool to achieve their goals, sounded very convincing to many Americans. And if Hitler, fulfilling his allied obligations, had not declared war on America the day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, it remains to be seen whether Roosevelt would have succeeded in dragging his country into World War II in Europe.

Like Wilson, Roosevelt was interested not so much in the war itself as in the post-war world order, in which he assigned the Soviet Union a prominent role. The eminent diplomatic historian Sir John Wheeler-Bennet wrote: “President Roosevelt dreamed of creating the United Nations within the framework of the American-Soviet alliance and managing world affairs to the detriment of the interests of Great Britain and France. That is why he made such huge concessions to Marshal Stalin.”

There is also no doubt that Roosevelt's sympathy for Stalin was to a certain extent explained by ideological affinity - and here, probably, Soviet agents and fellow travelers from the American president's entourage played a significant role. After all, what was Roosevelt's New Deal if not an attempt to build socialism in America? Isn't it the same system, adjusted for Russian barbarism and Asianism, that Stalin erected?! Didn't the USSR Constitution proclaim the same freedoms that underlie the American state system?!

Franklin Roosevelt was extremely power-hungry, power for him was the alpha and omega of politics. The absolute despotic power enjoyed by Stalin fascinated him. Not like this miserable Churchill, who regularly reported to his cabinet and, at the first request, like a boy, was obliged to run to Parliament and answer to the deputies. Thank God, he, Roosevelt, does not have to report to anyone. In Stalin, he felt a kindred spirit.

This did not escape the shrewd Churchill. At some point at one of the summits, finding himself between Roosevelt and Stalin, he remarked: “Here I stand, an instrument of democracy, between two dictators.” The concept of a people's choice as the sole spokesman for the collective will of the people is one of the most enticing ideas in political history, and Roosevelt was certainly an adherent of it.

But in addition to worldview and ideological factors, in no case should one underestimate the significance of circumstances of a purely personal nature. George Kennan wrote that Roosevelt's egocentrism and selfishness, his "political infantilism, unworthy of a figure of such caliber as the FDR," lay at the heart of the ardent flirtation of the US President with the "Kremlin highlander."

Roosevelt was extremely successful in his political career, he succeeded in everything, no one could resist his charm. He had no doubt that he would charm the Soviet leader as well. "I'm sure I can handle Stalin much better than your Foreign Office or my State Department," he wrote arrogantly to Churchill.

Roosevelt was absolutely convinced that as soon as he appeared before Stalin, as the Soviet despot would melt, all ideological differences would fade into the background, and comrades-in-arms would move hand in hand to the shining heights of friendship and cooperation. That is why the President of the United States so insistently sought a personal meeting with the master of the USSR. And the more Stalin resisted his flirting, the more Roosevelt became inflamed - so the old rake, who had never known refusal before, the more persistently besieges the coquette, the more stubbornly she resists his claims.
* * *

During the 1991 war for the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation (Operation Desert Storm), the commander of the anti-Iraqi coalition, American General Norman Schwarzkopf, described Saddam Hussein as a military leader as follows: art, tactics for him is a dark forest, he is a useless general and, in general, a would-be soldier. Well, otherwise he is, of course, a great warrior.”

Franklin Delano Roosevelt led a disastrous internal politics. Understanding nothing in economics, he delayed and deepened the economic crisis for many years. He laid the foundation for the imperial presidency and elevated class struggle to the founding principle of the Democratic Party, which it still adheres to today.

His foreign policy was also a match for the domestic one. With the overwhelming military and economic power of the United States, Roosevelt could, if not completely, then to a large extent, dictate the terms of the post-war world order and put up a barrier to communist expansion. Instead, he indulged Stalin in everything and did not lift a finger to prevent the aggressive encroachments of his idol and not allow him to capture half of Europe.

Well, otherwise, Roosevelt, of course, was a great president.

The Prosveshchenie publishing house publishes two volumes of Stalin's Correspondence with Roosevelt and Churchill during the Great Patriotic War. Documentary Research. They contain unique materials that allow you to understand how relations developed between the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition. And most importantly, you can trace how three people - the heads of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain - divided the post-war world. Now, when relations between America, European countries and Russia are quite tense, with the help of this book one can look into the origins of the contradictions.

Churchill: "We admire the courage of the Russian army"

Vladimir Olegovich, who was the first to start this correspondence? - I ask one of the authors of the book - Head of the Department of Europe and America at MGIMO, Doctor of Historical Sciences Vladimir Pechatnov.

Correspondence began in July 1941. The initiator was Winston Churchill. For Stalin, this format of communication was new. And in the autumn of 1941, correspondence began with Roosevelt. It continued until the death of Roosevelt, and with Churchill - until the Potsdam Conference. That is almost five years.

DOCUMENT

First personal message from Mr. Churchill to Mr. Stalin.

“We are all very happy here that the Russian armies are putting up such strong, courageous and courageous resistance to the completely unprovoked and ruthless Nazi invasion. The courage and perseverance of the Soviet soldiers and people are universally admired.

We will do our best to help you as time, geographical conditions and our growing resources permit. The longer the war goes on, the more help we can provide...

About 400 planes made daytime raids on the other side of the sea yesterday. On Saturday evening, more than 200 heavy bombers raided German cities. And last night, about 250 heavy bombers took part in the operations. It will continue to be so.

We hope in this way to force Hitler to return part of his air force to the West and to gradually ease the burden on your country ...

We just have to keep working hard to beat the spirit out of the villains."

- Churchill is actually a convinced anti-communist, a man who hated the Soviet Union ...

But it was he who, on June 22, 1941, was the first to declare help to the USSR. After all, they had a common enemy. Churchill never concealed his feelings for communism, but he believed that we were allies in a new war.

Leaks were inevitable

In terms of uniqueness, historical significance and intensity, in terms of the caliber of figures, this correspondence is an unprecedented phenomenon. In total, about 900 messages passed in the Stalin-Roosevelt-Churchill triangle. Sometimes they wrote several times a day.

- And how?

They used cipher telegrams, which, as a rule, were sent through embassies. And there they were transferred either personally by our ambassador, or by courier.

- Was there a signal on the radio?

Yes. With encryption and decryption at the place of receipt.

Stalin wrote a letter...

It ended up in the secret department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. And from there it went to the embassy in Washington or London. If it was a very important message, and the ambassador was well received by the first persons, say, like Maisky to Churchill or Litvinov to Roosevelt, the message was delivered personally. But more often it was passed with a courier either to the White House or to the office in Downing Street.

- How quickly?

The connection itself took three or four hours. Plus decryption. In general, if the message was sent in the morning, the addressee received it on the same day.

- Was the connection secure?

One of Roosevelt's first messages to Stalin was intercepted by German intelligence. Roosevelt used the State Department cipher, which was not very well protected. Then Roosevelt began to use only communication with his naval attache in Moscow - more reliable. And there were no more serious systematic hacking of correspondence by the Germans and the Japanese. But there were leaks. For example, the Foreign Office in London, when it received another telegram from Stalin about Polish affairs, acquainted the Polish migration government in London with its contents. And the Poles, based on their interests, could leak to the press or on the radio.

Lies about the second front

- I understand that in the end the correspondence became personal.

On the Soviet side, only Molotov and Stalin led it. Stalin often wrote everything himself. But even if Molotov wrote, Stalin always corrected the text. You can see it in autographs. Moreover, Stalin sometimes changed both the meaning and the tone of the letter - either in the direction of warming, or in the direction of toughening. Already with Stalin's correction and his "I approve" visa, the letter was sent for encryption.

- And what about the translation? Diplomatic nuances are also important here.

Most often, we sent a text in Russian to our embassy, ​​and there they translated either ours, the embassy's, or transferred the version in Russian to the Foreign Office, and there were people who knew Russian well. The same was true in Washington. And in 1944, Gromyko became ambassador to the United States, he often translated Stalin's messages into English himself.

- I read that everyone had their own style. Magnificent, "democratic" - in Churchill. Hard - with Stalin ...

Relations developed in different ways. Stalin and Churchill's are more complex, contradictory and at the same time more intense. They met more often and knew each other better. Stalin, of course, understood Churchill's nature. More detached, but also more even relations were with Roosevelt.

- Roosevelt was just more sympathetic to the USSR.

- If he had not died, it is still unknown whether there would have been a cold war ...

Roosevelt, as a rule, often added a warm note to messages prepared by the State Department or the military. “My friend,” he wrote, referring to Stalin. Or conveyed greetings, congratulations ...

He gave great importance building personal relationships. Just like Churchill. They were both obsessed with the idea of ​​establishing personal contact with Stalin. And jealous of the competition. Churchill was at first Stalin's chief correspondent and wanted to act as an intermediary between the head of the USSR and Roosevelt. Roosevelt was tired of it. Stalin himself, given the nature of Churchill, was more wary of him, made harsh statements.

- For example?

His message is known in the summer of 1943, when, after the Anglo-American conference, the opening of the second front was once again postponed - already to 1944. Roosevelt and Churchill first sent Stalin an explanation of the reasons for this decision. And got a very strong response. He listed previous promises from Churchill and Roosevelt to open a second front. The picture turned out to be unambiguous: the allies deliberately lied ...

DOCUMENT

Personal and secret message from Prime Minister I. V. Stalin to President Roosevelt.

“Your message, in which you report on certain decisions taken by you and Mr. Churchill on questions of strategy, was received on June 4th. Thanks for the message.

As can be seen from your communication, these decisions are in conflict with the decisions that you and Mr. Churchill took at the beginning of this year on the timing of the opening of a second front in Western Europe.

You, of course, remember that in your joint message with Mr. Churchill of January 26 of this year, it was announced that the decision taken at that time was to withdraw significant German ground and air forces from the Russian front and force Germany to kneel in 1943.

After that, on February 12, Mr. Churchill, in his own name and yours, announced the updated dates for the Anglo-American operation in Tunisia and the Mediterranean Sea, as well as on the western coast of Europe. This report stated that preparations were vigorously being made by Great Britain and the United States for an operation to cross the Channel in August 1943, and that if weather or other reasons interfered with this, this operation would be prepared with a larger force for September 1943.

Now, in May 1943, together with Mr. Churchill, you are taking a decision postponing the Anglo-American invasion of Western Europe until the spring of 1944.

This decision of yours creates exceptional difficulties for the Soviet Union, which has been waging war with the main forces of Germany and its satellites for two years now with the utmost exertion of all its forces, and provides Soviet army, fighting not only for her country, but also for her allies, her own forces, almost in single combat with a still very strong and dangerous enemy.

Needless to say, what a heavy and negative impression in the Soviet Union - among the people and in the army - this new postponement of the second front and the abandonment of our army, which has brought so many victims, without the expected serious support from the Anglo-American armies, will make.

As for the Soviet Government, it does not find it possible to join such a decision, which, moreover, was adopted without its participation and without an attempt to jointly discuss this most important issue and which could have grave consequences for the further course of the war.

Between Boar and Captain

- Stalin's letter provoked a strong reaction from Churchill. He even considered ending the correspondence.

With Roosevelt, too, there were harsh explanations. The most famous case is March - early April 1945. The famous operation "Crossword" - separate negotiations between the Americans and the British in Switzerland with the emissaries of the German command. Remember, in "Seventeen Moments of Spring" there is a similar plot? When Stalin suspected that separate negotiations were underway behind his back on the surrender of the Germans on the Western Front, in Italy, he allowed himself a very sharp tone with Roosevelt.

DOCUMENT

Personally, strictly confidential.

From Marshal IV Stalin to President Roosevelt.

“I have received your message regarding the negotiations in Bern.

You claim that there have been no negotiations yet. It must be assumed that you were not fully informed. As for my military colleagues, based on the data they have, they have no doubt that the negotiations took place and they ended with an agreement with the Germans, by virtue of which the German commander on the western front, Marshal Kesselring, agreed to open the front and let the Anglo- American troops, and the Anglo-Americans promised in return to ease the terms of the truce for the Germans.

I think my colleagues are close to the truth. Otherwise, it would be incomprehensible that the Anglo-Americans refused to allow representatives of the Soviet command to Bern to participate in negotiations with the Germans.

I understand that there are certain advantages for the Anglo-American troops as a result of these separate negotiations in Bern or somewhere else, since the Anglo-American troops get the opportunity to move deep into Germany with almost no resistance from the Germans, but why it was necessary to hide this is from the Russians and why didn't they warn their allies - the Russians - about this?

And so it turns out that at this moment the Germans on the Western Front have actually stopped the war against England and America. At the same time, the Germans continue the war with Russia - with an ally of England and the United States.

It is clear that such a situation can in no way serve the cause of maintaining and strengthening trust between our countries.”

- Roosevelt had a hope after the war to make friends with the Soviet Union, "to tame the beast."

He believed that it was worth influencing Stalin as the master of the country, and then it would be possible to slowly turn the whole system around. It was important to change the program in Stalin's head. At one time it seemed to him that this was happening. Indeed, there was a reconciliation with the church, the dissolution of the Comintern, a return to Russian historical traditions. All this gave hope that Russia would become, from the point of view of the West, a normal nation-state that would forget about the world revolution.

You mention in the book that Roosevelt and Churchill had code names in intelligence reports. They show the attitude of Soviet intelligence and the Soviet leadership...

Boar - Churchill, Captain - Roosevelt ...

How the world was divided

In the second half of the war there was a turning point. It became clear that the USSR was winning. The leaders began to agree on the post-war reconstruction of the world. That's how? They could not sit in Tehran or Yalta at a table on which a map is laid out: so, Poland is mine, Hungary is mine, but France is yours.

There were cases of such a frank exchange - that is, to exchange influence in one country for influence in another.

- Roosevelt was in favor of leaving the Baltic countries in the sphere of influence of the USSR?

And the Baltics, and Western Ukraine, and Western Belarus. That is, the borders of 1941. The Allies understood that this would have to come to terms. Churchill and Roosevelt write to each other: well, we won't be at war with the Soviet Union when it re-enters these territories. Nevertheless, neither the British nor the Americans formally recognized the entry of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. And the diplomatic missions of these Baltic countries continued to function both in the USA and in Great Britain.

More difficult was the issue of Eastern Europe, Iran, Turkey, the Far East. Where there is competition for influence. I must say that negotiations on this began in 1941. First visit to Moscow by British Foreign Secretary Eden, right hand Churchill, took place in December 1941. Stalin offers him: we recognize your predominant influence in Western Europe, your bases that you can create in Holland, Belgium, and we would like you to recognize the borders of 1941, that is, the Baltic states, Western Ukraine, Western Belarus. Plus our right to establish military bases in Romania and Bulgaria.

HELP "KP"

Roosevelt Franklin Delano- 32nd President of the United States, led the United States during the global economic crisis and World War II. Died April 12, 1945.

Churchill Winston Leonard- Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1940-1945 and 1951-1955. His speech in 1946 in the American Fulton, in fact, became a declaration of the Cold War of the USSR.

Gusev Fedor Tarasovich- in 1943 - 1946 Ambassador to Great Britain.

Gromyko Andrey Andreevich- From 1943 to 1946, the USSR Ambassador to the United States.

Eden Anthony - Member of the military government of Churchill in 1940-1945. From 1955 to 1957 he was Prime Minister of Great Britain.