February Revolution. "It is necessary to restore the party!". Chronicle of revolutionary events in Primorye
On the evening of March 2, 1917, Rodzianko sent a note to Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich, brother of Nicholas II: not to miss Mikhail being regent! And Rodzianka himself could be hanged at any moment.
Here burdened!
At six o'clock in the morning on March 3, Kerensky called Mikhail Alexandrovich from the Provisional Government: does the Grand Duke know what happened yesterday in Pskov? No? Then the ministers will come to meet him today, at the apartment of Princess Putyatina.
Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich, brother of Nicholas II
They wait until almost ten. Michael suspects his brother's denial. This means that they will impose a regency. Oh, they will deprive everyone human life! Here is fate! Then he was, by the will of his brother, the king, expelled from service, deprived of the rank of colonel, property guardianship was established over him. Then he commanded a brigade, a division, and finally an inspector of the entire cavalry. But - they offer him the whole of Russia? He was not accustomed to such space, he was accustomed to living in a more crowded place.
He regrets that his wife Natasha is not with him now (and she has always been very much in favor of the Duma).
When almost all the guests are already gathering, Mikhail goes out to them; are seated.
Rodzianko announces to the Grand Duke that the matter has gone much deeper than expected: he was not appointed regent, he was given the throne as emperor!
Michael is stunned. Didn't Nicky know his distaste for public affairs? And they didn't get ready!
Ask guests to speak.
The first is Rodzianko (he has already considered that in the event of a change of dynasty, he himself will be one of the main candidates for the throne). He begins with the fact that Mikhail Alexandrovich can decide quite freely, but the answer must be given now(it is not clear why such a rush). He explains that the transfer of the throne into the hands of the Grand Duke is illegitimate: the emperor can only abdicate for himself, but not for anyone else's benefit, and the transfer can only take place by succession to the throne, in this case only to Tsarevich Alexei. The act of renunciation does not say that the son of Nicholas II renounces the throne. Thus, the entire transfer of the throne to Mikhail Alexandrovich could cause violent legal disputes. This will play into the hands of the enemies of Russia, and with the growing revolutionary mood of the masses, it would be madness on the part of the Grand Duke to accept the throne. Mikhail Alexandrovich will reign only, perhaps, for a few hours, and a civil war will break out. And there are no loyal troops. The revolutionaries will not let him out of Petrograd, and the Grand Duke will be killed.
Mikhail Rodzianko, 1914
Rodzianko repeats the same thoughts for a long time different words. For Mikhail, this is even a relief: there is no need for a throne, and no need for responsibility!
They show Mikhail Alexandrovich a handwritten copy of the sovereign's Manifesto on renunciation.
Then the head of the Provisional Government, the bright, handsome Prince Georgy Lvov, takes the floor. Well-intentioned, wonderfully expressed, but it is very difficult to understand in his rounded phrases: what is his own opinion? Should Mikhail Alexandrovich take the throne or not? As much as one could catch from the smooth speech, Lvov was of the same opinion as Rodzianko.
But then Milyukov enters imperiously: Your Imperial Highness! It's out of the question for you not to take the throne! Your responsibility to the three-hundred-year-old dynasty, to Russia!... If you abdicate, too, it will be a renunciation for the whole dynasty. Russia cannot exist without a monarchy. The monarch is the center of it! this is the axis of it! Preserving the monarchy is the only way to preserve order in the country. Without reliance on this symbol, the Provisional Government will not live to see the Constituent Assembly.
Pavel Nikolaevich Milyukov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the first composition of the Provisional Government. Photo 1910
Mikhail Alexandrovich listens with surprise to this speech of the recent chief critic of the throne. And the truth is: Russia cannot exist without a monarchy!
Milyukov: Not then will a civil war begin if you accept the throne, but it will begin if you do not! - and it will be deadly in a foreign war ... You - hold the salvation of Russia in your hands: take the throne! Only in this way will our new government be established. The people know and recognize only one monarchy!
Milyukov does not stop: Your Imperial Highness! If you do not accept the throne now, a new Time of Troubles will arise in Russia and perhaps even more ruinous and long. I strongly disagree with Rodzianko's conclusion. Yes, now in the capital it is difficult to find the right part for support. But they are, I think, in Moscow. They are all over the country. You must immediately go to the active army - and you will be invincible. We are the first to not live without you turbulent time. We are asking you for help...
Mikhail Alexandrovich hesitates. Is it really not as difficult to slip away from Petrograd as Rodzianko portrayed? ..
Declaration of the Provisional Government on its composition and tasks
Citizens!
The Provisional Committee of the members of the State Duma, with the assistance and sympathy of the metropolitan troops and the population, has now achieved such a degree of success over the dark forces of the old regime that it allows it to proceed to a more stable organization of executive power.
For this purpose, the Provisional Committee of the State Duma appoints the following persons as ministers of the first public cabinet, the confidence in which the countries have been ensured by their past social and political activities.
Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior Prince G. E. Lvov.
Foreign Minister P. N. Milyukov.
Minister of War and Naval A. I. Guchkov.
Minister of Railways N. V. Nekrasov.
Minister of Trade and Industry AI Konovalov.
Minister of Public Education A. A. Manuilov.
Minister of Finance M. I. Tereshchenko.
Chief Prosecutor of the Holy Synod V. N. Lvov.
Minister of Agriculture A. I. Shingarev.
Minister of Justice A. F. Kerensky.
State Comptroller I. V. Godnev.
Minister for Finnish Affairs F. I. Rodichev.
In his present activity The Cabinet will be guided by the following principles:
1. Full and immediate amnesty for all political and religious cases, including terrorist attacks, military uprisings and agrarian crimes, etc.
2. Freedom of speech, press, unions, meetings and strikes with the extension of political freedoms to military personnel within the limits allowed by military technical conditions.
3. Cancellation of all class, religious and national restrictions.
4. Immediate preparations for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly on the basis of a universal, equal, secret and direct vote, which will establish the form of government and the constitution of the country.
5. Replacing the police with people's militia with elected leaders subordinate to local governments.
6. Elections to local self-government bodies on the basis of universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage.
7. Non-disarmament and non-withdrawal from Petrograd military units who took part in the revolutionary movement.
8. While maintaining strict military discipline in the ranks and when carrying military service- removal for the soldiers of all restrictions in the use of public rights granted to all other citizens. The Provisional Government considers it its duty to add that it does not at all intend to take advantage of military circumstances for any delay in the implementation of the above reforms and measures.
Chairman of the State Duma M. V. Rodzianko.
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Prince G. E. Lvov.
Ministers: P. N. Milyukov, N. V. Nekrasov, A. N. Konovalov, A. A. Manuilov, M. I. Tereshchenko, Vl. N. Lvov, A. I. Shingarev, A. F. Kerensky.
Causes of the February Revolution
- The unfortunate participation of Russia in the First World War, accompanied by defeats on the fronts, the disorganization of life in the rear
- The inability of Emperor Nicholas II to rule Russia, which degenerated into unsuccessful appointments of ministers and military leaders
- Corruption at all levels of government
- Economic difficulties
- Ideological decomposition of the masses, who ceased to believe in the king, and the church, and local leaders
- Dissatisfaction with the policy of the tsar by representatives of the big bourgeoisie and even his closest relatives
“... For several days we have been living on a volcano ... There was no bread in Petrograd, - transport was very disordered due to unusual snows, frosts and, most importantly, of course, because of the tension of the war ... There were street riots ... But it was, of course, not in bread... That was the last straw... The fact was that in this whole huge city it was impossible to find several hundred people who would sympathize with the authorities... And not even that... The point is that the authorities did not sympathize with themselves... There was no , in fact, not a single minister who would believe in himself and in what he is doing ... The class of former rulers came to naught .. "
(Vas. Shulgin "Days")
The course of the February Revolution
- February 21 - Bread riots in Petrograd. Crowds smashed bakery shops
- February 23 - the beginning of the general strike of the workers of Petrograd. Mass demonstrations with the slogans "Down with the war!", "Down with the autocracy!", "Bread!"
- February 24 - More than 200 thousand workers of 214 enterprises went on strike, students
- February 25 - Already 305 thousand people were on strike, 421 factories were standing. Employees and artisans joined the workers. The troops refused to disperse the protesters
- February 26 - Continued riots. Decomposition in the troops. The inability of the police to restore calm. Nicholas II
postponed the start of meetings of the State Duma from February 26 to April 1, which was perceived as its dissolution - February 27 - armed uprising. The reserve battalions of Volynsky, Lithuanian, Preobrazhensky refused to obey the commanders and joined the people. In the afternoon, the Semyonovsky regiment, the Izmailovsky regiment, and the reserve armored division revolted. The Kronverk Arsenal, the Arsenal, the Main Post Office, the telegraph office, railway stations, and bridges were occupied. The State Duma
appointed a Provisional Committee "to restore order in St. Petersburg and to communicate with institutions and persons." - On February 28, at night, the Provisional Committee announced that it was taking power into its own hands.
- On February 28, the 180th Infantry Regiment, the Finnish Regiment, sailors of the 2nd Baltic Naval Crew and the cruiser Aurora revolted. The insurgent people occupied all the stations of Petrograd
- March 1 - Kronstadt and Moscow revolted, the tsar's close associates offered him either the introduction of loyal army units into Petrograd, or the creation of the so-called "responsible ministries" - a government subordinate to the Duma, which meant turning the Emperor into an "English queen".
- March 2, night - Nicholas II signed a manifesto on the granting of a responsible ministry, but it was too late. The public demanded renunciation.
"The Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief," General Alekseev, requested by telegram all the commanders-in-chief of the fronts. These telegrams asked the commanders-in-chief for their opinion on the desirability under the circumstances of the abdication of the emperor from the throne in favor of his son. By one in the afternoon on March 2, all the answers of the commanders-in-chief were received and concentrated in the hands of General Ruzsky. These answers were:
1) From Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich - Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Front.
2) From General Sakharov - the actual commander-in-chief of the Romanian front (the king of Romania was actually commander-in-chief, and Sakharov was his chief of staff).
3) From General Brusilov - Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front.
4) From General Evert - Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front.
5) From Ruzsky himself - the commander-in-chief of the Northern Front. All five commanders-in-chief of the fronts and General Alekseev (gen. Alekseev was the chief of staff under the Sovereign) spoke in favor of the abdication of the Sovereign Emperor from the throne. (Vas. Shulgin "Days")
- On March 2, at about 3 p.m., Tsar Nicholas II decided to abdicate in favor of his heir, Tsarevich Alexei, under the regency of the younger brother of Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich. During the day, the king decided to abdicate also for the heir.
- March 4 - The Manifesto on the abdication of Nicholas II and the Manifesto on the abdication of Mikhail Alexandrovich were published in the newspapers.
“The man rushed to us - Darlings! - He shouted and grabbed my hand - Did you hear? There is no king! Only Russia remained.
He kissed everyone warmly and rushed to run on, sobbing and muttering something ... It was already one in the morning when Efremov usually slept soundly.
Suddenly, at this inopportune hour, there was a booming and short strike of the cathedral bell. Then the second blow, the third.
The blows became more frequent, a tight ringing was already floating over the town, and soon the bells of all the surrounding churches joined it.
Lights were lit in all the houses. The streets were filled with people. Doors in many houses stood wide open. strangers crying, hugging each other. From the side of the station, a solemn and jubilant cry of steam locomotives flew (K. Paustovsky "Restless Youth")
The real revolution took place on March 2-3 (15-16), when the monarchical power and the renewed order of government associated with it collapsed: we must not forget that on the night of March 1 (14) to March 2 (15), Nicholas II granted the State Duma the right to form the Council ministers, and Russia became a constitutional monarchy. With the collapse of the throne, the national symbol, the usual political rite for the masses, disappeared, and, most perniciously, the multimillion-strong army was instantly released from the oath to the legitimate heir to the throne, Tsarevich Alexei Nikolayevich. Now the fate of the Russian state and society depended on the will and activities of the newborn holders of power - the Provisional Government, the Soviets, and in the future - on the decisions of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, which was not provided for by the code of laws.
Drama Discussion: Sad Conclusions
The riots and the soldiers' revolt of the "reserves" that broke out in Petrograd on February 23-27 (March 8-12, NS) in 1917 were not the result of any conspiracy, the activities of the political underground or German agents. None of these reasons could bring hundreds of thousands of people to the streets, much less provoke a spontaneous revolt of the huge Petrograd garrison deep in the rear of the armies of the Northern Front. The scope of the metropolitan unrest turned out to be complete surprise even for professional revolutionaries - according to one of his contemporaries, February found them "sleeping like foolish gospel virgins."
On February 28-March 2 (March 13-15), the unrest grew rapidly and spilled out beyond the borders of Petrograd: a bloody sailor riot in Kronstadt and on the ships of the Baltic Fleet, unrest in Moscow and the transfer of the Moscow garrison to the side of opponents of the autocracy, unrest in Nizhny Novgorod and Tver. .. A social explosion in one city took on the character of a landslide state crisis in war conditions.
However, until 2-3 (15-16) March, only the rebellion of the rear garrisons won, primarily in Petrograd and Moscow. The real revolution took place on March 2-3 (15-16), when the monarchical power and the renewed order of government associated with it collapsed: we must not forget that on the night of March 1 (14) to March 2 (15), Nicholas II granted the State Duma the right to form the Council ministers, and Russia became a constitutional monarchy. With the collapse of the throne disappeared national symbol, habitual political practice for the masses of the people, and what is most pernicious - the multimillion-strong army was instantly released from the oath to the legitimate heir to the throne, Tsarevich Alexei Nikolaevich. Now the fate of the Russian state and society depended on the will and activities of the newborn holders of power - the Provisional Government, the Soviets, and in the future - on the decisions of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, which was not provided for by the code of laws.
So, why did the monarchical power collapse so rapidly?.. But a single and monosyllabic answer is inappropriate here.
1. The Great War demanded huge sacrifices: the regular army and officer corps of the imperial infantry died on the battlefields. For the lack of ammunition, technical means of combat and managerial mistakes at the front, one had to pay with their lives the best soldiers and officers. According to General Staff Lieutenant General Nikolai Golovin, "like a very rich man, our command staff is accustomed to shed officer and soldier blood too inconsiderately." As a result, for 27 months of the war there was qualitative thinning the civil stratum of Russian society, and the composition of the multi-million army has irreversibly changed and deteriorated. Therefore, her senior commanders were tormented by the inevitable question - is it possible to rely on such an army to protect the vacillating throne and unpopular supreme power without the risk of disintegration of the troops? .. The revolution came to Russia in the form of a ferocious revolt of soldiers in the capital's garrison, which consisted in the absolute majority of yesterday's peasants in gray overcoats.
2. From deprivation and loss great war all the warring peoples were tired, but our uncultured people were tired of the hardships of war and became impatiently irritated earlier than others due to deep social backwardness - the pernicious legacy of the Petrine state. Hidden Bolshevism, as natural as obscenity, hooliganism and swearing, was born and spilled over into the “God-bearing people” long before February. Healthy Christian preaching in Russia failed, as the Church, captivated by the state, experienced a deep crisis. The most important institutions of civil freedom - peasant property, self-government, public education and world courts - only strengthened in Russia.
The February riot of 1917 was largely born out of a spontaneous rear protest against the war: incomprehensible, meaningless and painful for that time for the dense majority of the people. February made the "God-bearing people": hundreds of thousands of striking workers and the murderers of their officers - the ranks of the reserve battalions of the Petrograd garrison and the sailors of the Baltic Fleet. It was they who became the main participants, extras and the driving force of the revolution.
3. The revolutionaries were not ready for the Petrograd turmoil. But half a century of underground socialist preaching - against the backdrop of half-hearted and sluggish reforms - was not in vain. Therefore, February quickly received its socialist leaders, confident in the grandiosity and magic of the coming rule of the people. The activism of the Russian revolutionaries, who fought against the tsarist regime for almost a century, created the Petrograd Soviet, based on a rebellious force that was not in State Duma. The Duma gave birth to power without force, and the socialist Petrograd Soviet headed elemental force without formal authority.
4. Neither the old Russian power, in the person of the monarch and the government, nor society, in the person of its representatives, knew how to talk to each other: they simply did not have such historical experience. For two hundred imperial years, the authorities did not take care to create representative bodies and accustom society to a calm dialogue within the framework of the law. When the Duma was established in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century, it turned out that neither the Duma members nor the authorities were accustomed to hear And listen each other, unable to limit their claims and ambitions, unable to find a compromise and use a legal platform for discussion.
Probably, in the conditions of peaceful development of the country - with sin in half - they would have learned. But in the conditions of the protracted war, the Duma turned not only into the headquarters liberal opposition, but also to the center for the interception of power, which since the autumn of 1915 has become increasingly weak and unattractive. Neither the Duma members, who dreamed of gaining the right to appoint the Council of Ministers (a “responsible ministry”), nor Emperor Nicholas II, who did not want to sacrifice autocracy “saving as of old,” categorically did not want even a modest compromise (option: appoints several ministers Duma, and the key members of the cabinet - the sovereign). From the sharp confrontation between the tsarist government and the Duma, the political February was born.
5. The irresponsibility of the Duma opposition is striking and depressing. Milyukov's unscrupulous speech on November 1, 1916, which served as a signal to "storm the government," became its vivid symbol. The uncompromising struggle for a "responsible ministry", which the Duma members stubbornly waged in the midst of a difficult war, pushed Russia towards February.
6. In turn, the government itself diligently weakened the vertical government controlled. Issues of supplying Petrograd were not resolved, the discontent of the population accumulated. During the February riots in the capital, all the responsible persons appointed by Nicholas II to key posts turned out to be completely unsuitable for their positions: Chairman of the Council of Ministers Prince Golitsyn, Minister of the Interior Protopopov, Commander of the Petrograd Military District of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Khabalov, Minister of War General of Infantry Belyaev. Their confusion and unprofessionalism allowed the Petrograd riots to gain momentum on February 23-25.
On the evening of February 27, the tsarist ministers turned to the sovereign with a request to grant Russia a "responsible ministry" and, without any Highest command, actually resigned their powers. The self-liquidation of the Council of Ministers was the culmination of the impotence and irresponsibility of the supreme executive power.
7. The "Rasputin story" discredited the Empress Alexandra Feodorovna, and with her the Emperor Nicholas II. "The cunning, rogue peasant," as Major General Batyushin called Rasputin, disgraced and compromised royal family in a monstrous form of false holiness. The conflict over Rasputin broke the unity in the House of Romanov as well, and Grand Duchess Elizaveta Feodorovna sent a telegram of congratulations to Princess Yusupova, the mother of one of the murderers of the ill-fated "old man": "All my deep and fervent prayers surround you all for the patriotic act of your dear son ". The murder of Rasputin became a crude and cynical crime. But an even worse event was the apparent impotence of the tsarist government, which refused to punish the murderers.
8. "Guchkov's conspiracy" existed on the eve of February. A small group of monarchist conspirators planned to carry out a behind-the-scenes palace coup and enthrone Tsarevich Alexei Nikolaevich under a regent from the House of Romanov in order to prevent, as they thought, an inevitable revolutionary explosion, the collapse of the throne and dynasty. Nicholas II and Alexandra Fedorovna, as Guchkov sincerely believed, provoked the revolution with their "mediocre management", so the transition to a constitutional monarchy was necessary. But the preparations for the coup were not practically completed: riots and a soldier's riot broke out in Petrograd before the conspirators had finished planning their actions - very chaotic, judging by fragmentary testimonies and testimonies.
The question of the extent to which Guchkov's intentions could become a reality will forever remain open, since none of the representatives of the highest generals and army command sympathized with the idea of a palace coup. Any conspiracy theories on this matter remain only unprovable assumptions. However, rumors and gossip about the future " palace coup"created on the eve of February a nervous atmosphere, contributed to the fall in the prestige of the royal name, the decomposition of power and the elite.
9. There was no “conspiracy of generals” who allegedly wanted to achieve the abdication of Nicholas II in favor of Tsarevich Alexei - this is a legend composed by unscrupulous emigre publicists who suffered from incontinence of monarchical feelings.
The terrible fate of the last Russian emperor and members of his family made such a heavy impression on contemporaries that any attempts to take an unbiased look at political activity Nicholas II and his managerial decisions seemed an insult to the memory of the royal martyrs. At the end of 1915, the Russian political elite needed a "scapegoat" who would take on the thankless task of restoring the bloodless army after the "Great Retreat" - having completed his mission, this person had to hand over the army to the victorious tsar and go into the shadows. Such a general was found in the person of Alekseev. And in emigration they decided to posthumously make him a "scapegoat" - the main culprit of February and the collapse of the monarchical power, so as not to place any responsibility on the executed emperor.
Joint participation in any conspiracy implies a necessary degree of personal trust: however, Generals Alekseev and Ruzsky had been so hostile to each other since 1914 that any conspiracy between them looked incredible. Since 1915, Ruzsky had been intriguing against Alekseev and wanted him removed from the post of Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. No less cool relations existed between Generals Alekseev and Lukomsky since the pre-war period. The decision to send tsarist trains from Malaya Vishera to Pskov, where the headquarters of the armies of the Northern Front was located, was made on the night of March 1 not by Alekseev, not Ruzsky, but by the sovereign himself and the ranks of his retinue.
Correspondence and telegrams Rates per day February Revolution show how stunned Alekseev and other generals were by the speed of events and the transformation of the anarchist revolt in Petrograd into all-Russian turmoil. The position of Alekseev himself changed as the situation in Russia worsened and threats to the rear of the Army in the field increased: on February 27-28, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief agreed only with the need to replace the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and moderate concessions to the Duma on the principles of government formation. Only late in the evening of March 1 did Alekseev consider it necessary, as a concession, to give the Duma the right to form a cabinet of ministers - and the emperor eventually agreed to his request. Only on the morning of March 2, having become acquainted with the content of the night negotiations between Rodzianko and Ruzsky, Alekseev considered lesser evil — compared to real risks civil war in metropolitan centers- the transfer of the throne from Nicholas II to Tsarevich Alexei Nikolaevich, but at the same time he expressed his personal opinion about the abdication to the king vaguely.
In the context of spontaneous social upheavals that swept the country, the main task of the generals and moderate public and political figures was to keep the front from rebellion and collapse, to preserve the dynasty, the throne and the renewed political system. army of millions was bound by an oath not only to NicholasII, but also to Tsarevich Alexei Nikolaevich, whose accession to the throne would become a positive and pacifying factor in stabilizing the upset situation. Therefore, the transfer of the throne to the fully capable Tsarevich Alexei Nikolayevich, regardless of his age, health and position of his parents, seemed the only reasonable way out of the acute dynastic crisis that had been brewing since the autumn of 1915 and culminated in a revolutionary explosion in Petrograd.
10. To a much greater extent than the mythical "generals' conspiracy", the spread of rebellion and unrest, as well as the negotiations between the generals and the Duma members, was facilitated by the political incapacity of Nicholas II. The autocrat in Russia existed, but the events of February 27 - March 1 showed a complete lack of autocracy- that is, a system for making clear, responsible and individual decisions by the emperor, who was at the top of the management vertical.
Before leaving Headquarters on the morning of February 28, the sovereign gave only two orders: to suppress the unrest in Petrograd and send front-line units to the Petrograd region at the disposal of General Ivanov. Unfortunately, being the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Nicholas II was guided in that situation to a greater extent by anxiety for the fate of the family, and not by the interests of the Army. Against the advice of Alekseev, Nicholas II decided to leave Headquarters and left Mogilev for Tsarskoye Selo.
Empress Alexandra Feodorovna and Chief Marshal Benkendorf offered to take the August family out of Tsarskoye Selo. It was a reasonable and sensible proposal - the emperor and the heir to the throne would be at Headquarters. However, Nicholas II did not want to disturb sick children. Instead of creating an alternative center of power and control under security conditions, subordinating all structures and departments outside the capital to it, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief left the Army and went to the revolutionary region with a small retinue, having lost contact with the Headquarters and the ability to respond to events.
At the same time, the sovereign did not hide his peace-loving moods. If Alekseev considered it necessary to concentrate a strong detachment in the area of Tsarskoye Selo before the evening of February 28 and advance on Petrograd, then Nicholas II and General Ivanov still days earlier refused to send troops to the capital, not wanting to arrange a bloody assault on the city and provoke civil strife. They hoped to limit themselves to a demonstration of soft power and negotiations with the Duma. Thus, neither Nicholas II nor General Ivanov, appointed commander-in-chief of the Petrograd military district, wanted to take responsibility for the inevitable and massive bloodshed in the suppression of the Petrograd riots.
11. After the disappearance of the legitimate government of Prince Golitsyn, a huge warring empire - with chaos and a riot of soldiers in the capital - was left without control. Yes, it can be said that the Provisional Committee of the State Duma (VKGD), headed by Rodzianko, picked up - or ambitiously claimed - the power that had fallen from the hands of the Golitsyn government. But what did the Emperor of All Russia and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief do in response when he found out about this on the way to Tsarskoye Selo in the afternoon of February 28?.. Nothing.
Nicholas II had to immediately recognize the unauthorized VKGD rebellious body, appoint a new cabinet in any Russian city and declare all the orders of the VKGD invalid, demanding that the local authorities stop relations with Petrograd. Corresponding orders had to be sent to Headquarters, commanders of military districts and governors. Thus, the monarch would disavow any statements by Rodzianko. As Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Nicholas II should have immediately subordinated the entire transport network of the empire to the Headquarters, and then, ex officio, returned to the command center of the Active Army in order to lead the fight against the rebellious capital. But nothing of this was done, and the attitude of the monarch to the VKGD is not defined.
On main question — was contact allowed with the interim government body created by the Duma to replace the disappeared Council of Ministers Golitsyn- Nicholas II did not answer. Throughout the journey to Pskov, the sovereign "sleep, ate and even occupied the closest persons of the Retinue with conversations." On the evening of February 28, he only sent a reassuring telegram from Likhoslavl to the Empress, forgetting that he was in command of a multimillion-strong army, and the Headquarters had not received any orders from him for 16 hours during the crisis, which was growing from the capital to the state. As a result, apathy and inaction reigned at the top of the Russian power vertical. Thus, Nicholas II actually tacitly acknowledged the claims of the VKGD, headed by Rodzianko, for the temporary performance of government functions. As a result of the absolute absence of any orders from the autocrat, contacts between the VKGD and the highest generals became inevitable, since in the end it was about whether the army would be able to continue the armed struggle at the front.
12. Abdication of the throne of Nicholas II on March 2 (15), 1917 was evil But lesser evil, compared with possible consequences civil war. At the same time, the emperor himself did not want a bloody suppression of a new turmoil and civil strife, so the loyal telegrams of Khan of Nakhichevan and Count Keller were not only hopelessly late, but also did not make much sense. Out of a sense of duty and subordination, Nicholas II would never have approved the rebellion of individual chiefs of the Army in action against Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (the Younger), whom he himself had appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief before his abdication.
The sovereign made a sacrifice for the sake of Russia and the successful continuation of the war with an external enemy. But the sacrifice can only be voluntary: consequently, Nicholas II had a choice - to abdicate or not to abdicate. All popular versions that Nicholas II signed a “different” act of renunciation or did not sign it at all are nothing more than legends. There are more than enough documents and evidence of the renunciation from contemporaries and participants in the events, including Nicholas II himself and his mother, Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna.
However, during his abdication, Nicholas II made the most serious political mistake of his reign, illegally depriving the throne of the heir Alexei Nikolayevich. "Father's feelings" again turned out to be above the interests of the motherland and the army, which was instantly released from the oath to the Tsarevich - and the Russian Tsar as a national symbol. The decision of the sovereign to leave the boy to the family, and not to Russia, had devastating consequences.
The revocation of the oath to Alexei Nikolayevich was a huge blow to the consciousness of the uncultured soldier masses of the Army in the Field, who at that moment more or less retained discipline. The pacifying image of a child, reminiscent of the young Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich, disappeared. No longer a regent, but a new sovereign, the Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich became, who did not yet know about it, and was not flawless in the eyes of many monarchists because of his problematic marriage. If Alexei Nikolaevich, due to his age, could not abdicate, then Mikhail Alexandrovich could well do it. Therefore, the abdication for the crown prince created a direct threat to the monarchical power.
The saddest thing in this story is that both the father of the heir and the adult politicians completely ignored the opinion of Alexei Nikolayevich himself - a lively, developed, proud and fully capable boy, despite his illness.
13. Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich, despite the insistence of Guchkov and Milyukov, who belatedly assessed the danger of the situation, refused to accept power not only because of the dangerous situation in Petrograd and hidden distrust of the members of the new government of Prince Lvov. Any member of the House of Romanov who ascended the throne under such circumstances would have felt the precariousness of his position on the throne, since the violation of the legal rights of Alexei Nikolayevich by his father was beyond doubt among sane monarchists and honest lawyers. Unfortunately, Guchkov's compromise proposal to keep the throne open under the protection of the regent-protector - until the passions were appeased - was not heard and supported.
Thus, the real collapse of the monarchical power in Russia and the state order on March 2-3, 1917 did not occur as a result of the abdication of Nicholas II, but after the illegal deprivation of the rights of Tsarevich Alexei Nikolaevich, and the refusal of Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich from the perception of supreme power before the decision of the All-Russian Constituent The assembly, which was dispersed by the Bolsheviks.
The February Revolution was the result of a deep crisis of the Russian autocracy, as well as centuries-old socio-political and spiritual-religious contradictions that aggravated under the influence of the Great War. Therefore, the conclusion of General Golovin should be recognized as fair: "The old regime was so psychologically undermined that the birth of a counter-revolutionary movement could not occur in the name of any restoration ideas."