One of the myths of the Great Patriotic War about "wonder tanks", invulnerable, sweeping everything out of their way, there was a myth about new tanks Soviet Union- T-34, KV, in the initial period of the war. There were even suggestions that the German armed forces had to use aircraft to knock them out, as conventional anti-tank weapons could not cope. From this followed another myth - the reason for the defeat at the beginning of the war was the lack of "wonder tanks". The blame, of course, was laid on the Soviet leadership, which allegedly did not understand their significance before the war, and Stalin personally.

Examples were given when KV (Klim Voroshilov) returned from battle with dozens of dents from enemy shells, but without holes, such facts really took place. Even more interesting were the memories of the Germans; one of the most famous was the memoirs of the commander of the 2nd tank group G. Guderian based on his message about the "invulnerability" of the T-34 for German guns, about the heavy battle of the 4th tank division in October 1941 south of Mtsensk - it was attacked by T-34 tank brigade Katukov. As a result, they created a myth, including in Anglo-American literature, about the "invincible" T-34 tanks, which overcome slopes and swamps with lightning speed, they are not taken by shells, they sow death and destruction. Although it is clear that the tanks of that time moved over rough terrain at a speed of no more than 10-15 km per hour.

Although it is clear that if the German column was attacked in march formation and taken by surprise, then the fault of the German commanders, its commander, Major General W. von Langemann und Erlenkamp, ​​is here. He did not organize reconnaissance in order to deploy the column in battle order ahead of time. The 4th Panzer Division had enough funds to organize anti-tank defense: 50-mm guns Pak-38, 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, hull guns. But the Germans allowed themselves to be taken by surprise and, in order not to admit their mistakes, they blamed the "terrible" Russian "wonder tanks". Guderian supported Langemann's report so as not to undermine his reputation.

Interestingly, Guderian had previously stated that: “... the Soviet T-34 tank is a typical example of backward Bolshevik technology. This tank cannot be compared with the best examples of our tanks, made by the faithful sons of the Reich and repeatedly proving their superiority…”

T-34 model 1940.

The first battles of new Soviet tanks with the Wehrmacht

The Wehrmacht met in battle with the new Soviet tanks at the very beginning of the war. With normal reconnaissance, well-oiled interaction of tank units with artillery and infantry, our new tanks would not come as a surprise to the Germans. German intelligence reported on new tanks in April 1941, although they made a mistake in assessing armor protection: KV was estimated at 40 mm, but it was from 40 to 75 mm, and T-34 - at 30 mm, and the main armor was 40-45 mm.

One of the battles with new tanks is the clash of the 7th Panzer Division of the 3rd Panzer Group Gotha on June 22 at the bridges across the Neman near the city of Alytus (Olita) with the 5th Soviet Panzer Division, it had 50 of the latest T-34s, not counting other tanks. German division was mainly armed with Czech tanks "38 (t)", there were 167 of them, there were only 30 T-34s. The battle was difficult, the Germans failed to expand the bridgehead, but our T-34s could not knock them out, the Germans pulled up artillery, developed an offensive to the flank and rear, and under the threat of encirclement, our division withdrew. That is, already on the first day, the Wehrmacht "met" with the Soviet the latest tanks, and no disaster.

Another battle took place in the area of ​​​​the town of Radzechow on June 23, units of the 4th mechanized corps and units of the 11th German Panzer Division collided. German tanks broke into the town and there they collided with our T-34s. The battle was hard, but the forces were unequal - a German tank regiment, reinforced by artillery, and two of our tank battalions without artillery, ours withdrew. According to Soviet data, the Germans lost 20 tanks, 16 anti-tank guns, our losses - 20 BT tanks, six T-34s. Thirty-fours were hit by 88-mm anti-aircraft guns. In further battles German tankers with the support of 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, taking advantage of a good defensive position, they knocked out, according to them, 40-60 Soviet tanks, according to our data, a detachment of the 4th mechanized corps lost 11 tanks, knocking out another 18 enemy tanks. In the battle on June 25, 88-mm anti-aircraft guns destroyed 9 KV, Soviet data confirm this number.

On June 24, the 6th tank division of the Wehrmacht of the Reinhardt corps met with the 2nd Soviet tank division of the 3rd mechanized corps. The Soviet division had 30 KV, 220 BT and several dozen T-26s, the Landgraf division had 13 command tanks (without guns), 30 Panzer IVs, 47 Panzer IIs, 155 Czech Panzer 35 (t). But the Germans had a variety of artillery pieces, as a result, the Germans were able to fight off 30 KV, and then go on the offensive along with the 1st Panzer Division, surrounding and destroying the 2nd Soviet Panzer Division.

From the first days, the Wehrmacht was faced with new Soviet tanks, but this did not stop him, he had, capable of hitting the KV and T-34. Most of them were hit by 105-mm guns (10.5 cm) and 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, this is also confirmed by F. Halder.

The main means of combating "wonder tanks"

Anti-aircraft guns and field 10.5 cm guns played leading role in the fight against the KV and T-34 at the beginning of the war, but then the 50-mm Pak-38 began to play the main role, it was put into service in 1940. The armor-piercing projectile of this anti-tank gun pierced 78-mm homogeneous armor at a distance of 500 meters, and this made it possible to hit the KV and T-34 in favorable conditions. The main problem was - to hit the frontal armor of the T-34, the shells ricocheted, it was possible to hit it only at a certain angle.

On June 1, 1941, the Wehrmacht had 1047 of these guns, as their production increased, anti-tank units began to receive them, their role in the fight against the KV and T-34 was constantly growing. According to the NII-48 of 1942, the Pak-38 accounted for 51.6% of dangerous hits from total number hits.

50 mm gun PAK-38.

105 mm German light field howitzer.

A gun from the famous series of German anti-aircraft guns 8.8 cm FlaK 18, 36 and 37. Considered one of the best anti-aircraft guns Second World War. It was successfully used not only as an air defense system, but also as an anti-tank gun, since the standard anti-tank artillery Germans in 1941 proved to be weak for Soviet heavy tanks.

Problems of KV and T-34

When a projectile and large-caliber bullets hit the KV, the tower could jam, jamming of armored caps. The KV engine had a small power reserve, so the engine was often overloaded and overheated, the failure of the main and onboard clutches. In addition, "Klim Voroshilov" was slow, poorly maneuverable. By the beginning of the war, the V-2 diesel engine was "raw", its total resource did not exceed 100 hours on the bench, on the tank 40-70 hours. For example: German gasoline Maybachs worked 300-400 hours, our GAZ-203 (on T-70 tanks) and M-17T (stood on BT-5, BT-7, T-28, T-35) up to 300 hours .

At the T-34, armor-piercing shells of 37-mm anti-tank guns pierced armor from a distance of 300-400 meters, and 20-mm armor-piercing shells also pierced the sides. With a direct hit by a projectile, the driver's front hatch and the “apple” of the machine gun mount fell through, weak tracks, failure of the main and side clutches. The ball mount of the Dektyarev tank machine gun was calculated on bullets and fragments, it did not hold 37-mm shells. The front hatch of the tank was also a problem.

But it cannot be said that most of the new tanks "broke" before reaching the battlefield, or were abandoned due to breakdowns. In general, about half of the tanks died in battle, the Wehrmacht beat them quite successfully. The rest of the "non-combat losses" are quite understandable, for the retreating army, breakdowns, damage to tanks that could be corrected in a different situation (with a stable front or during an offensive), forced them to blow up and abandon. This is also true for tanks that ran out of fuel during the retreat. Tank units of the Wehrmacht, retreating in 1943-1945, lost about the same amount of equipment due to the inability to evacuate it.

The Nazis inspect the padded KV-1 with additional. armor screens.

Other methods of the Wehrmacht

The command of the Wehrmacht, faced with new Soviet tanks, tried to strengthen the anti-tank capabilities of the army. The 75-mm French field gun of the 1897 model was massively converted into an anti-tank gun - the body of the gun was placed on the PAK-38 carriage. But the effect was small, there were no guarantees to hit the Soviet tanks in the forehead, so they tried to hit the side. But in order to successfully hit the tanks, it was necessary to hit from a distance of 180-250 meters. In addition, there were almost no armor-piercing shells for it, only cumulative and high-explosive fragmentation ones. The disadvantage when firing cumulative projectiles was low starting speed projectile - about 450 m / s, this made the calculation of lead more complicated.

Soviet tanks were hit with 75-mm cannons German tanks T‑IV (Pz. IV) with cumulative ammunition. It was the only German tank projectile capable of hitting the T-34 and KV.

German 75-mm steel became a truly effective weapon against KV and T-34 anti-tank guns with kinetic armor-piercing and sub-caliber shells, PAK-40, Pak-41 guns (it was produced for a short time and in small batches). The Pak-40 became the basis of the German anti-tank defense: in 1942, 2114 units were fired, in 1943 - 8740, in 1944 - 11 728. These guns could knock out the T-34 at a distance of 1200 meters. True, there was a problem of circular firing, after several shots the coulters dug so deep into the ground that it was possible to deploy the gun only with the help of a tractor.

That is, the Wehrmacht was forced to use heavy, inactive guns against new Soviet tanks, which were vulnerable to detour maneuvers of armored vehicles, aircraft, and artillery of the enemy.

PAK-40 German 75 mm anti-tank gun.

Outcome

The myth about "Russian supertanks" has extremely negative information - it elevates technology, belittles people. Like, the Russians had "miracle tanks", but they could not really use them and eventually retreated to Moscow.

Although it is clear that even well-protected tanks had their weaknesses and were vulnerable to the enemy. This is true for the latest German tanks - "tigers", "panthers". There were anti-aircraft guns, heavy hull guns, it was possible to hit tanks on the side with anti-tank guns. In addition, tanks were knocked out by aircraft and heavy artillery, which struck before the offensive of the troops. Quite quickly, both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army increased the main caliber of anti-tank and tank guns to 75 mm.

There is no need to create another myth - "about the weakness of the Soviet new tanks." The new Soviet tanks had the disadvantages of "childhood", they were eliminated by modernization, and the T-34 is not without reason considered the best tank of the Second World War.

T-34 1941 issue in the Armored Museum in Kubinka.

Sources:
Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk, 1999.
Zheltov I. G. and others. Unknown T-34. M., 2001.
Isaev A.V. Antisuvorov. Ten myths of World War II. M., 2004.
Isaev A. V. Dubno 1941. The greatest tank battle of World War II. M., 2009.
Müller-Hillebrand B. Land Army of Germany 1933-1945 M., 2002.
http://militera.lib.ru/tw/ibragimov/index.html
http://armor.kiev.ua/Tanks/WWII/KV/KV_MK5_95.php

Combat use of tank and motorized (panzergrenadier) troops of the Wehrmacht

Experience combat operations of the Wehrmacht in the wars against Poland, the countries of Western and Northern Europe and in the Balkans, he showed that tank formations, acting in great depth, gave offensive operations a maneuverable character and a high pace.

During the Polish campaign, sudden such strikes involving a large number of tanks and motorized infantry carried out a breakthrough of the poorly prepared defense of the Polish troops. The density of tanks in the direction of the main attack reached 50-80 vehicles per 1 kilometer. Polish troops were unprepared for action against massive tank attacks. In the Polish army there was a lack of effective anti-tank weapons, outdated tanks had low fighting qualities. As a result, the Wehrmacht's tank divisions achieved significant success in a short time.

Successfully acted tank forces, like all formations of the Wehrmacht, during the fighting in Western Europe. The High Command of the Wehrmacht skillfully used the mistakes of the Anglo-French command in the deployment of troops, the backwardness of the military doctrines of the Western Allies, in particular on the use of tanks, as well as their lack of anti-tank weapons. From May 10 to June 24, the Wehrmacht troops defeated the Dutch, Belgian and French armies and inflicted a major defeat on the British expeditionary forces.

In all political and military leadership The Third Reich managed to successfully implement the blitzkrieg strategy. However, the experience gained was insufficiently analyzed and critically comprehended. In the military leadership of Germany, there was a tendency to overestimate their capabilities and their weapons and underestimate the forces of the enemy. The combat experience acquired in France began to be absolutized, and the forms and methods of conducting operations in the West were recognized as universal and suitable for use in any conditions and against any enemy.

Medium tank Pz Kpfw IV in France

During the Second World War, the main part of the tank and motorized units of the Wehrmacht operated on the Eastern (Soviet-German) front. In North Africa, Italy and on other fronts, several mobile formations fought battles that did not have a significant impact on the theory of the combat use of tanks. In 1941-1942, tank and motorized troops were used mainly in offensive operations. After the transition of Germany in the fall of 1943 to strategic defense and until the end of the war, they were used for counterattacks, counterattacks and deterrence actions.

When conducting offensive operations tank troops were used for combat operations against prepared defenses, developed success in the operational depth, pursued the enemy and crossed water barriers. The main principles of the combat use of tank troops were surprise, massing in the direction of the main attack. Favorable terrain was needed for the actions of the tank troops. The main forms of maneuver for the tank troops were the frontal offensive, the breakthrough, and the enveloping and flank offensive.

When meeting with the prepared defense in the operational depth, the tank troops sought to bypass it, and if it was impossible to bypass, they made a breakthrough.

Tank groups (armies) received the immediate, further tasks and the direction of the further offensive. The depth of the operation in 1941 was 400-500 km; in subsequent years, it was reduced to 125 km or less. This was due to large losses in people and equipment and the increased capabilities of the Soviet troops.

Motorized (tank) corps received tasks, as a rule, to capture three or four lines (regions), which corresponded in depth to the immediate tasks of tank groups (armies). During the course of the war, the depth of the tasks of the corps was reduced from 200-300 km to 50 km or less. The rate of advance was reduced from 20-30 km per day in separate operations in 1941 to 1.5-2 km in subsequent years.

To break through the defense significant densities of forces and means were created, which in 1941-1942. amounted to 40 - 50 tanks and self-propelled guns, 15 - 20 armored personnel carriers, 30 - 40 guns and mortars per 1 km in the breakthrough area. During the war, the density of artillery and mortars increased to 150-200 per 1 km. Artillery preparation began to be used in the battle for the second and subsequent lines of defense. The duration of the artillery preparation was reduced from 50-60 minutes to 30 minutes or less due to increased artillery densities and ammunition difficulties. The Wehrmacht High Command overestimated the ability of tanks to overcome defenses. Despite the fact that, starting from 1943, a significant part of the shock tank groups were heavy tanks Pz Kpfw V "Panther" And Pz Kpfw VI "Tiger", the German troops could not quickly break through the tactical defense zone of the Soviet troops. Tank divisions and corps were forced to fight long and fierce battles for the main line of defense and subsequent lines, during which they suffered heavy losses. Therefore, tank formations and units could not develop success, even if in some areas they broke through into the depths of the defense of the Soviet troops, as, for example, in the offensive in the summer of 1943 near Kursk and in the counteroffensive in March 1945 near Balaton.

The operational formation of formations of German tank forces was, as a rule, one-echelon. There were no strong second echelons and reserves. Tank corps and divisions built their battle formations in most cases in one echelon, which did not ensure the build-up and development of success during the battle.

Actions in operational depth took place only in 1941-1942, as well as in the course of December 1944. Tank troops sought to develop tactical success into an operational one, while they received deeper tasks than during a breakthrough. In front of the advancing troops, forward detachments operated, including tanks, motorized infantry, artillery and sappers. The removal of forward detachments was 20-50 km. Their task was to capture important lines, settlements, bridges, and conducting pursuit. The pursuit in 1941-1942 It was carried out non-stop, mainly along the roads, on a wide front. During the persecution, forcing water barriers. It was carried out on the move or with systematic preparation. First, motorized infantry crossed water barriers, and after building bridges, tanks crossed. During the period of preparation and forcing, aviation delivered strikes against enemy troops. In 1941 and in December 1944, airborne units and units were dropped. The forward detachments of units and formations of tank troops interacted with them.

Reflection of counterattacks was assigned to motorized infantry (panzergrenadier) units and formations, as well as anti-tank units. Tank units and formations were used to strike at the flank and rear.

Panzergrenadier squad in an armored personnel carrier Sd Kfz 251

In most cases, tanks could not operate effectively without support. motorized infantry(since the end of 1942 - panzergrenadiers). Tanks could be vulnerable to small enemy groups or even individual infantrymen, especially in rough terrain and in cities. If the enemy infantry had anti-tank guns or other anti-tank weapons, the vulnerability of the tanks increased. When breaking through the enemy defenses, tanks needed the support of motorized infantry. Periodically, motorized infantry moved forward, making a breakthrough through the enemy's defense line, the success of which was then developed by tanks. When advancing in the operational depth, motorized infantry quickly advanced behind the tanks on armored personnel carriers, trucks or motorcycles, and sometimes on the tanks themselves. She dismounted when necessary. The tanks bypassed the centers of stubborn resistance of the enemy, continuing to move on. The task of the motorized infantry (panzergrenadiers) included the destruction of such centers.

In theory, there was the concept of an attack by motorized infantry (panzergrenadiers) on enemy defense armored vehicles with the support of tanks. The main means of transportation for motorized infantry (panzergrenadiers) were Sd Kfz 251 armored personnel carriers of various modifications, but these vehicles were always not enough to fully provide them with motorized infantry (panzergrenadier) units and formations. Most of the motorized infantry shooters (panzergrenadiers) were transported on trucks and motorcycles. Deprived of armor protection, they were more vulnerable.

The production of Sd Kfz 251 armored personnel carriers was increased at the beginning of 1941. However, not all motorized infantry (panzergrenadier) divisions have them in sufficient quantity. IN tank divisions only one of the two motorized battalions was equipped with armored personnel carriers.

Armor Sd Kfz 251, which was 13 mm, provided sufficient protection against small arms the enemy, but was vulnerable even to small-caliber anti-tank. The heavy casualties suffered by armored personnel carriers and their personnel forced the motorized infantry to dismount 400 meters or more from enemy positions, even when they used Sd Kfz 251 armored personnel carriers. . Then they attacked like regular infantry, supporting the advance of the tanks. Sometimes motorized infantry fought directly from armored personnel carriers, which provided convenient firing positions. The main tactical advantage of motorized infantry over conventional infantry was that, thanks to their motorization, they could quickly be brought into battle in the right place.

The smallest motorized infantry (panzergrenadier) unit was the squad (gruppe). Typically, a motorized infantry (panzergrenadier) squad consisted of 12 soldiers transported by truck or, less commonly, by an armored personnel carrier. The squad leader was usually a corporal armed with a machine gun. He also commanded a vehicle and fired from a machine gun mounted on it. The assistant squad leader was usually a corporal and was armed with a rifle. If the squad was divided in two, one half was commanded by an assistant. The squad consisted of two crews of light machine guns, two soldiers each, four infantrymen and a driver with a partner. They were usually armed with rifles. When the car was moving, one of the squad soldiers constantly watched the sky in case enemy aircraft appeared, the rest watched what was happening on both sides of the car. When dismounting the department, the driver was forbidden to leave the car.

When armored personnel carriers collided with enemy tanks or artillery, they sought cover. Machine gunners and shooters of the squad could fire while the armored personnel carrier was moving. At the same time, the (Panzergrenadier) units used a combination of maneuver and fire. Moving forward, they made short stops and fired to cover the advance of other armored personnel carriers. When armored personnel carriers were in the enemy's fire zone, they were not recommended to stop for more than 15 - 25 seconds. Usually, the soldiers of the squad were disembarked from the rear of the vehicle, and, if necessary, on both sides. Disembarking from the vehicle, the Panzergrenadiers fought like ordinary infantry. When faced with anti-tank defences, panzergrenadiers often had to go ahead of the tanks or form mixed groups of tanks and soldiers in order to jointly break through the enemy defenses.

The motorized infantry (panzergrenadier) platoon consisted of three squads. His headquarters was located in a separate staff car, where they were: the platoon commander (junior officer or non-commissioned officer), driver, radio operator, orderly and two messengers. An anti-tank gun could be installed on the machine.

In a platoon column, the distance between vehicles was usually 5-10 meters. In battle, the vehicles moved either in a checkerboard pattern or in an uneven line at distances of up to 50 meters from each other. The battalion in battle was usually built in a wedge. Most of the vehicles used to transport troops moved at an average speed of no more than 30 kilometers per hour. Therefore, even with minimal enemy resistance, a tank division could not advance more than 200 kilometers in a day.

During the fighting on the Eastern Front, the German tank forces developed one of the most important combat formations, the so-called "pulk" (pulk: panzer und lastkraftwagen- tank and truck) - construction of tanks and vehicles. It was an advancing tank wedge, inside which motorized infantry (Panzergrenadiers) moved. At the edge of the wedge were best tanks, self-propelled guns and other tanks were located on the sides. As the "pulka" moved deeper, the gap in the enemy's defenses expanded. The motorized infantry at the same time attacked the pockets of enemy resistance, which bypassed the tanks. Sometimes, in order to find a weak point in the enemy's defense, the offensive pulk could have the shape of a blunt quadrangle. When a breach was made in any place of the enemy's defense, this part of the "bullet" became the point of attack.

The main task of the panzergrenadiers was to interact with tanks, but they could also act independently, like ordinary infantry in the offensive and defense, especially in counterattacks when repelling the advancing enemy. Panzergrenadiers stormed the enemy's fortified points, captured bridges, and cleared the way for tanks in wooded areas and city blocks.

In 1944 - 1945. in the fighting of the tank troops of the Wehrmacht, an innovation appeared - the transition to night operations, which were previously rejected by the German charters. Such a change in views was influenced by the successful night operations of Soviet tank formations.

German tank troops in battle, they closely interacted with aviation (1941-1943), widely used technical means of communication for command and control of troops, and on the scale of the battle group of a tank division organized interaction with the field self-propelled artillery. In 1941, interaction with tactical airborne assault forces was widely used.

In the overwhelming majority of cases, it was our fighters who were the first to rush into hostility.

For the Nazi troops that attacked the USSR, the ability of the Red Army to fight with bayonets, knives and sapper shovels turned out to be as unexpected as the T-34 tank, Katyusha and Russian snipers. By the way, the leader of the Belgian Nazis, Leon Degrel, commander of the 28th SS Volunteer Division "Wallonia", which fought on the Eastern Front, was imbued with deep respect for the Russian soldier for the rest of his life. In the mid-90s, in one of his interviews (the text of which we will publish separately), he literally stated the following: “Russians are a great people. When we came to this war, we were sure that we would meet there Marxist “untermenschs” (“subhumans” - the term of the official ideology of the Third Reich - ed.) of the Asian type, who forcibly seized power in Russia and barbarously destroy the Russian people. That's what our propaganda told us.

We really encountered the terrible realities of communist reality there, both on the battlefields and in the territories we occupied. But very soon they realized that politic system- this is one thing, but the people and their way of life, this is another.

Russians and Ukrainians are great nations, courageous, noble and generous. I admire them. Faced with the Russians, I realized that they should be part of the Reich on an equal footing. Like a great European nation."

In his office there was a poster depicting German and Russian soldiers - in this way Leon Degrel emphasized his respect for the Russian soldier as a worthy enemy!

Single complex

The Finnish war showed how important it is to train the Red Army in hand-to-hand combat. As a result of the reform of the Soviet ground forces, which took place before the Second World War, shooting, grenade throwing and bayonet fighting were combined into a single complex. Later, already in battles with the Nazis, especially in urban conditions and in the trenches, this experience was generalized and strengthened.
Lieutenant General Gerasimov described the tactics of storming enemy fortified areas in the following way:

From a distance of 40-50 meters, the attacking infantry ceases fire in order to reach the enemy trenches with one decisive throw. From a distance of 20-25 meters, she uses hand grenades thrown on the run. This is followed by a point-blank shot and the defeat of the enemy with melee weapons.

The NKVD fighter Yakov Fedorovich Kovshar spoke about the details of the pre-war preparation for hand-to-hand combat:

“It is important for each fighter not only to know, but also to be able to wield a bayonet and hands in hand-to-hand combat with enemies. I myself began my military service in 1935. He graduated from the courses of junior commanders and was sent to a special rifle regiment of deep front-line reconnaissance. We were taught well.

With hand-to-hand combat, we also prepared well. Twice a week we went to "boxing" - competed in gloves, got used to the blows. The strongest could withstand up to five blows at the same time. Three months later, we learned not to be afraid of blows, and then they began to teach us how to throw. They threw it to the right, and to the left, and over the back, and with a grip.

Special training - to the masses

The catastrophe of 1941 led to significant losses of the Red Army. At the same time, the strengths of our Armed Forces were also revealed. It turned out that in hand-to-hand combat, Wehrmacht soldiers were inferior to trained Red Army soldiers. The disputes that simmered before the war that the bayonet had lost its relevance showed the correctness of those military specialists who nevertheless insisted on mass training in the skills of its use.

A special visual aid was even issued by Major General A.A. Tarasov "Destroy the enemy in hand-to-hand combat", which was sent to all units where there was an accelerated training of mobilized fighters.
The deadly and insidious enemy of your Motherland - German fascism - is armed to the teeth with fire and technical means of war, - Tarasov wrote in the preface. “At the same time, the fascist German hordes avoid meeting us in hand-to-hand combat, because our fighters have shown that there was and is no equal to them in courage and dexterity in hand-to-hand combat. But we must seriously consider the technique and tactics of the enemy. Therefore, in battles with our fierce enemy: - move quickly and secretly - throw a grenade far and accurately - hit with a bayonet and butt firmly reception - in their own or in the trenches of the enemy, inflict an accurate blow with a bayonet in the throat. But the most formidable weapon of our fighter was a sapper shovel.

Collective farmers who joined the ranks of the Red Army and numerous builders, who often had to work with carpenter's axes, were especially good at it. Their blows were continuous, sharp and sometimes so strong that they cut limbs, not to mention broken heads. German funeral teams after hand-to-hand fighting often saw their soldiers with their skulls cut open.

Face to face

This is the name of the book of the commander of the 181st special reconnaissance and sabotage detachment of the Northern Fleet, Viktor Leonov. He and his fighters had to engage in numerous hand-to-hand fights with the most trained soldiers of the mountain rifle units of the Wehrmacht. Among themselves, the Red Army called them chasseurs. It was about the German elite, consisting, as a rule, of young physically strong soldiers with a height of at least 176 cm. These Germans were trained to fight in harsh climatic conditions and were excellent at martial arts. However, the fascist huntsmen could not resist our scouts-saboteurs.

An unusual battle broke out and flared up, rare in its intensity and suddenness, - Leonov recalled. - It was that deadly fight, when both the fist and cold weapons, and the cobblestone that turned up under the arm, are used. I saw Andrei very close, hiding behind a large stone.
On the other side of the stone, two huntsmen were waiting for him to appear. A short lunge forward, then a deceptive movement, and now one huntsman fell down, knocked down by a blow from the butt. But, falling, he hooked Andrei, and he stretched out on a slippery stone. Another huntsman immediately rushed towards him. I threw up my machine gun, but fired a burst, seeing behind the huntsman Tarashnin and Guguev.

The tall huntsman had already raised his rifle over the scout sprawled on the ground. I didn't see how Andrey dangled to the side like a bird, but I heard the clang of the butt on the stone. The rifle fell out of the hands of the huntsman, and he bent down to pick it up. At that moment, I jumped over a stone and stunned the huntsman with a blow from the butt of my machine gun.
According to the twice Hero of the Soviet Union Viktor Leonov, often the huntsmen and our fighters did not shoot at each other during the approach, preferring short and fierce fights. The reason lay in the terrain, which allows you to covertly approach the enemy. Both ours and the Germans came out to meet almost close - at a distance of twenty meters. Before the fight, the Red Army always smiled contemptuously and evilly, forcing the Nazis to get nervous and think if there was a catch here.
“... A smile and a vest have become our weapons. The enemies could not withstand this pressure on the psyche, ”said the commander of the scouts.

In the trenches of Stalingrad

Remembering European companies, the Wehrmacht soldiers more and more often expressed the idea in conversations with each other and in letters home: "whoever did not fight the Russians in hand-to-hand combat did not see a real war." Skirmishes, artillery fire and bombardments, grueling marches through the mud, hunger and cold were no match for short and furious battles in which it was almost impossible to survive.

“We fought for 15 days for one house, using mortars, grenades, machine guns and bayonets,” wrote a German lieutenant of the 24th Panzer Division, a member of the Battle of Stalingrad. - Already on the third day, the corpses of 54 of my killed comrades were lying in the basements, on the stairwells and stairs.

"Front Line" runs along the corridor separating the burnt rooms, along the ceiling between the two floors. Reinforcements are brought in from nearby houses via fire escapes and chimneys. From morning to night there is a continuous struggle. From floor to floor, faces blackened with soot, we throw grenades at each other in the roar of explosions, clouds of dust and smoke, among heaps of cement, pools of blood, fragments of furniture and parts of human bodies. Ask any soldier what half an hour of hand-to-hand combat means in such a fight. And imagine Stalingrad. 80 days and 80 nights of hand-to-hand fighting. The length of the street is now measured not by meters, but by corpses ... "

Hand-to-hand fighting statistics show that during the Great Patriotic War, eighty percent of the fights were initiated by our fighters.

It should be noted that in Nazi Germany a special award was established specifically for hand-to-hand combat. And she was highly valued. It was called "Sign of Close Combat" (German. Nahkampfspange des Heeres). This badge was established on November 25, 1942 by Hitler's personal order. The design for the award was designed by the firm of Wilhelm Pickhaus in Berlin. Hitler, Himmler and Guderian were among the first to be awarded the gold degree of the badge. On March 26, 1944, Hitler declared his unquestioning sole right to appropriate and present the golden badge.

The sign was introduced in order to celebrate the courage and valor of the infantrymen, who repeatedly won in hand-to-hand combat.

Awarded to military personnel who directly participated in hand-to-hand combat. The proximity of the battle was determined by the fact whether the soldier saw during the battle

As a matter of fact, the Wehrmacht already had an award that marked a fighter for participating in close combat. This award was established at the end of 1939, "Assault Infantry Badge". But the mass character of the troops participating in the battles and the duration new war led to the fact that, in fact, any infantryman who had shown himself to be on the front line for several weeks could count on receiving an assault badge. Here, in order to highlight the merits of the best, most experienced soldiers who have been fighting for several months, and sometimes even years, it was decided to introduce a new award, with much higher award criteria. The sign was of three degrees:

• "Bronze Sign" - 15 days of hand-to-hand fights.
• "Silver Badge" - 30 days of hand-to-hand combat.
• "Golden Sign" - 50 days of hand-to-hand fights.

As an exception, for military personnel who, as a result of injury, could no longer return to the front, it was allowed to reduce these terms to 10, 20 and 40 days, respectively. Also, the badge could be awarded posthumously, but not to those who were missing or taken prisoner. Together with the presentation of the highest degree of the award, a leave of 21 days could also be granted.

In addition, continuous stay at the front for a certain time was counted accordingly for a certain number of days of hand-to-hand combat.

The gradation of time served was as follows:

• Eight months of continuous service was equated to hand-to-hand fighting for 5 days;
• Twelve months of service was equivalent to hand-to-hand combat for 10 days;
• Fifteen months of service was equivalent to hand-to-hand combat for 15 days.

Among the soldiers, the sign enjoyed high prestige and respect. During the Second World War were awarded:

• Bronze badge - 36,400 people
• Silver - 9,400 people
• Gold - 631 people.

So - the Germans did not attack with their infantry? They attacked, but only by attack they didn’t mean running with rifles at the ready in order to run up and stab the enemy with a bayonet or hit with a shovel, but something else (more on that later), but such attacks, as planned by the generals of the Red Army, they remained in history of the First World War.

To begin with, I propose to simply recall all the documentaries and photographs of the Second World War. Soviet "documentary" films and photos, I think, in 95% of cases were filmed in the rear during exercises, but this does not matter in this case. What does the offensive of the Soviet troops look like? The tanks go on the attack, and behind them the Soviet infantry runs in chains or in a crowd at the enemy shooting at them. Or this infantry runs on the enemy to attack on its own. But now there are a lot of photos and film frames of the German newsreel, so, are there any similar shots of the offensive of the German troops in it? Completely absent!

Interestingly, even a glance at the infantryman showed a difference in tactics. In Russia and the USSR, an infantryman has always been called a "private" - one who goes on the attack along with his other comrades. That is, the fact that he is in the ranks, from the position of Russian and Soviet generals, is the most important and valuable thing in him. And for the Germans, it was a "shütze" - a shooter. That is, from the position of the German army, the most valuable thing in an infantryman was that he shoots. The Germans taught their foot soldiers a lot, but they just didn’t teach bayonet fighting - it was unnecessary for those who knew how to shoot.

A little about it. We have military theorists from the Suvorov slogan "A bullet is a fool, a bayonet is well done!" they made a fetish, turning Suvorov into a cretin. Firstly, in the time of Suvorov, the bayonet was still a real weapon, and secondly, Suvorov insistently demanded that the soldiers learn to shoot, he even persuaded them, assuring them that lead was cheap and that a soldier in peacetime would not incur large expenses for target practice. In addition, Suvorov taught the soldiers to shoot accurately and warned that although he was counting on a battle of 100 rounds per soldier, he would flog the one who shot all these rounds, since such a number of rounds in a real battle is shot only with non-aimed fire.

Yes, of course, it's not bad if a soldier knows how to operate with a bayonet, but with the rate of fire of weapons of the 20th century, who will let him in at a bayonet strike distance?

And I continue to be convinced that the point was, in fact, not in the bayonet, but in the fact that the bayonet was, as it were, the meaning and justification of the tactics of attacks with manpower on the enemy's defenses. Tactics that dramatically simplify the service of officers and generals, tactics that do not require extensive knowledge from them and reduce their work to primitive commands at the level of the 18th century.

But back to what the Germans considered an attack and an offensive.

The Intelligence Directorate of the 16th German Army in September 1941 translated the article "Peculiarities of offensive operations of the German infantry in a maneuver war" from Volume 1 "West" of the Soviet reference book on the Armed Forces of the border states. The book was captured in the band of the German 39th Army Corps. Let's read this article, omitting the ideological introduction.

“The experience of the war that Germany is waging in Europe and Africa allows us to draw some conclusions about the features of offensive tactics, which are generally close to the truth. Until now, fascist German troops have dealt with an enemy who could not resist them.

The fighting with the Polish, French, and especially with the Yugoslav and Greek troops led to a drop in military discipline in the Wehrmacht, inattention to the elementary requirements for camouflage and self-digging. Self-confidence, as a consequence of "victories", results in inattention to what is happening on the battlefield.

The facts show that the "victories" of the Wehrmacht were achieved by no means by the stubbornness of the infantry in overcoming the barrier zone or in breaking through the fortified positions of this or that enemy. These "victories" were achieved mainly due to the premature abandonment of the fortifications by the defenders as a result of the massive (in comparison with the Polish, French, Yugoslav or Greek armies taken separately) the use of artillery and aviation.

It should be noted that by mocking quoting the word “victory”, the Soviet military theorists who wrote this article, the massive action of German artillery and aviation on the enemy - the main principle of victory in battle - was brought to the weakness of the German infantry, massive fire on the enemy - to the lack of tactics!

“German infantry rarely goes into bayonet charges. In many cases, she seeks to avoid such actions. In the event of strong enemy resistance, the German infantry, as a rule, avoids attacking such positions. In each such case, the commander of any German unit or unit (platoon, company, battalion or regiment) is looking for a solution in a maneuver. Feeling the flanks and outflanking them is a common tactic of the German commanders.

A position that is steadfastly defended is subjected to artillery fire, bombardment and, according to the situation, dummy tank attacks. At the same time, the infantry (subunits and units), leaving minimal forces to pin down the enemy, the main forces and reinforcements perform a maneuver aimed at hitting the enemy flank.

We note the described complexity of the work of a German officer. Instead of shouting "For the Reich, for the Fuhrer!" to send soldiers into a bayonet attack, the officer must study the terrain and intelligence, be able to change both the direction of the attack and the combat formation of the troops entrusted to him if the enemy puts up stronger resistance than expected. The German officer needs to organize communication with all branches of the military, know how and when they need to be used, be able to issue target designation for artillery and aviation, and be able to maneuver his units on the battlefield.

“Experience shows that such German tactics will be used in the future.

With careful observation of the battlefield, such a maneuver would be discovered and used against the Germans.

If we read the introductory article PP-36, we will see what it says: an adversary bypassing or surrounding is himself in danger of being surrounded. Therefore, one must strive to oppose the enemy's maneuver with one's own counter-manoeuvre. Leaving at the front of a platoon, company or battalion such a quantity of fire weapons as is minimally necessary, the main forces attack on the flank of the bypassing enemy.

This is an effective method in the fight against such an enemy as the Nazi troops., - the Soviet theorist did not miss the opportunity to say a clever banality, which looks especially wild against the backdrop of the tragedy of the Red Army at the beginning of the war.

“Special mention should be made of the rapid maneuver in the offensive of motorized artillery, both individual guns and entire batteries. The battle that the Germans are waging is distinguished by the roar created by the fire of artillery, machine guns, and the howl of aircraft. Fiery jets of flamethrowers, puffs of black smoke create the impression of an attack sweeping away everything in its path.

Undoubtedly, all this is aimed at undermining the morale of the enemy. Morality, the will to resist must be suppressed. Cowards and alarmists are morally crushed.

This appearance of clear superiority is created, first of all, by artillery fire (anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft guns), as well as tanks.

Why "visibility"? When shells of all types of weapons that the Germans had are flying at you, when tanks are driving at you, which you cannot inflict any damage with your weapons, is this “visibility”?

“When the infantry takes up initial positions, motorized artillery fires from guns of all calibers at all objects on the front line. Infantry support is carried out jointly with tanks, often by direct fire, without the organization of reliable communications and adjustments, which are organized only in the event of an expansion of the battle.

Through the massive use of guns of all calibers, including 150-mm guns, the Germans seek to assure the enemy of the numerical superiority of the advancing forces and the approaching artillery.

Such a rapid concentration of artillery, characteristic of oncoming battles, the Germans try to use in the offensive in each case.

Another feature of offensive battles is the use of short artillery preparation, during which the infantry seeks to get close to the enemy. During the war with Poland, France, Yugoslavia and Greece, this method was widely used when attacking field fortified positions, and in exceptional cases when attacking long-term fortified lines.

Let's take a typical German company attack as an example.

The rifle company occupies initial positions from 800 to 900 meters, depending on the conditions of the terrain, after which it receives the direction of attack (sometimes the offensive zone). The usual order of battle is two platoons in the first line, one platoon in reserve. In this order of battle, the company, combining fire and maneuver, moves at a speed of 600-800 meters per hour to the area of ​​concentration.

So, the German infantry advanced to the line (from which the Soviet infantry usually rises in a bayonet attack), maneuvering from cover to cover, and already at this distance firing at the enemy from their own heavy weapons. But since the Germans' own fire had to be accurate, it also took time to detect the target, install weapons (machine guns, mortars, infantry or anti-tank guns), zero in and destroy targets. As a result, as you can see, the advance to the line of the actual attack proceeded at a speed of only 600–800 meters per hour (infantry in a marching column moves at a pace of 110 steps per minute, that is, about 5 kilometers per hour). The Germans, as you can see, were in no hurry to get a bullet from the defending enemy, they first did everything to destroy him from afar.

"When an attack (of a battalion, regiment) begins, the artillery shells the front line of the enemy for 15 minutes." Note, not an hour, as in the per hectare calculations of Soviet generals, but only 15 minutes.

“The company, as a rule, is reinforced by a machine-gun platoon, as well as a platoon of infantry guns (mortars). The latter are used from the beginning of the attack to the assault, changing positions if necessary. Here we are not talking about breaking through long-term fortifications, since the Germans in these cases create assault groups consisting of engineering, infantry and artillery units. Artillery preparation in this case is carried out according to a special plan. After a 15-minute artillery preparation, the fire is transferred to the flanks of the breakthrough and to the rear objects. At the same time, the front line is bombarded by aircraft and fired upon by infantry guns and mortars.

From the defending enemy, in theory, there should be nothing left. And only after that the infantry begins what the Germans call an assault.

"The attack continues in rolls of 15-20 meters." That is, even here the Germans did not run to the enemy trenches, putting forward their bayonets, but moved in the direction of the enemy from cover to cover, or rather, from one position for firing to the next. And from these positions rifles and light machine guns continuously aimed fire at the enemy, preventing him from leaning out of the trench to fire at the advancing. And they approached the enemy’s positions in this way until the distance was reduced to throwing a hand grenade, with which they finished off the enemy in his shelter if the enemy did not give up.

“If the starting positions are reached, then the company opens fire on the front line of the enemy from all available fire weapons. At this point, as a rule, flamethrowers and hand grenades are used. Anti-tank guns receive special tasks, namely: shelling of observation slots and embrasures of fortifications, as well as identified firing positions. The task of escort guns and assault guns is to suppress machine-gun nests and mortars.

That's what the German attack was like.

“Before the company goes on the attack, the decisive moment comes for the defenders. By this moment, you need to carefully prepare, you need to unleash the full power of the fire system on the enemy. Fire maneuver, the use of wandering guns and dagger machine guns (such machine guns that unexpectedly open fire at point-blank range) can turn the tide in favor of the defenders.

Experience shows that the German infantry, under fire from machine guns and mortars, lies down and waits for the support of escort artillery. This favorable moment must be used. After the massive use of flamethrowers, mortars and hand grenades, one should switch to a surprise bayonet attack on the flank of the attacking enemy with the forces of a squad, platoon or company, attacking individual groups of the enemy, especially at a time when artillery is not firing at the front line. This will reduce your own losses.

It often happens that a short bayonet attack, carried out decisively, develops into a general counteroffensive.

While the Germans are on open space, approaching the defending enemy units, they are very vulnerable to fire from all types of artillery. There is a general conversation about the power of the “fire system”, but when it comes to clarifying what kind of “fire system” it is, it is clarified that this is the fire of nomadic (individual and constantly changing positions) guns and it is not known how machine guns put forward at close range to the approaching Germans . There are no requirements to develop a system of barrage and concentrated artillery fire, there are not even requirements to simply cover hectares with artillery. Where is the advice to call on the Germans attacking and in open space the fire of regimental, divisional and corps artillery? After all, she was! But no, as you can see, such advice for the Soviet generals was prohibitive in terms of its military complexity, and their favorite bayonet attack, even if it was a squad, was their answer! Not fire, but a bayonet - that's the main thing that will repel a German attack!

The German General E. Middeldorf, in the book “Russian Campaign: Tactics and Weapons” written by him after the war, compares the Soviet and German infantry:

“There is no doubt that of the two largest land powers of the period of the last war - Russia and Germany - the German land army, both at the beginning and at the end of the war, had the most combat-ready infantry. However, for a number important issues combat training and weapons, the Russian infantry, especially at the initial stage of the war, was superior to the German. In particular, the Russians were superior to the Germans in the art of night combat, combat in wooded and swampy areas and combat in winter, in the training of snipers and in the engineering equipment of positions, as well as in equipping the infantry with machine guns and mortars. However, the Germans were superior to the Russians in the organization of the offensive and the interaction between the military branches, in the training of junior officers and in equipping the infantry with machine guns. During the war, the opponents learned from each other and managed to some extent eliminate the existing shortcomings..

Let us note that, in the opinion of this general of that war, our infantry was strong where it could take cover from German fire. Even when he praised the equipment of our infantry with machine guns and mortars, he did not praise the fact that our infantry enjoyed this advantage. And he did not say a single commendable word about our bayonet charge as our advantage.

And since Middeldorf mentioned snipers, I'll digress a little more on the advantages of well-aimed fire and German tactics.

Wehrmacht "invincible and legendary" [Military art of the Reich] Runov Valentin Alexandrovich

DEFENSE OF THE WEHRMACHT

DEFENSE OF THE WEHRMACHT

Preparing to conduct lightning wars, the Wehrmacht command primarily assumed that the German armed forces would have to at least temporarily go on the defensive in certain areas. Therefore, in the pre-war charters and manuals, this type of hostilities was spelled out quite fully. However, the offensive campaigns of 1939 and 1940 did not provide practical experience in defense, with the result that most German military leaders began to treat him superficially.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, cases of the transition of German troops to tactical defense became more frequent. So, already in border battles, the frequent counterattacks and counterattacks of the Soviet troops in a number of cases, the German command preferred to repel blows from the spot, for which their troops temporarily took up defensive positions. The peculiarities of this defense were that it was based on random lines and nodes of resistance, unprepared in advance in engineering terms. The troops advancing earlier hurriedly occupied these lines, building their battle formation in one echelon, and tried to inflict maximum defeat on the enemy on the outskirts of the defense. Most of the artillery, as a rule, was brought to direct fire. Often the defensive actions of ground forces were linked to air strikes or offensive actions in other directions. In the overwhelming majority, such defense was short in time and was integral part larger offensive.

In the summer of 1941, German troops also used defense to block the encircled Soviet troops (the inner front of the encirclement) and prevent their breakthrough or strike from the outside with the aim of deblocking (the outer front of the encirclement). In this case, too, the main forces of the German troops were concentrated in the first echelon, which included tanks and artillery for direct fire. As a rule, engineering equipment for defensive lines was not carried out, defensive actions of ground forces were closely linked with air strikes. Such a defense was considered temporary, and after solving a particular task, the troops undertaking it immediately went over to the offensive and, after regrouping and replenishing, were used as reserves of armies or army groups.

For the first time, the German command began to think seriously about the problem of defense with the start of the Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow in early December 1941. By that time, the German troops operating in this direction had practically lost their offensive capabilities and ran into the Soviet defense. For some time, the parties stood in front of each other: Soviet troops before the approach of the reserves, they did not dare to go on the counteroffensive, the German troops did not plan to defend themselves. But the fate of the latter had already been sealed by the decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army.

In early December 1941, the Soviet command managed to gather significant forces of its troops in the Moscow direction, which were distributed along three fronts: Kalinin, Western and Southwestern. It was planned to defeat the strike groups of German troops operating north and south of Moscow with simultaneous powerful strikes by the troops of the Western, left wing of the Kalinin and the right wing of the Southwestern Fronts, and then complete the encirclement and defeat of the main forces of Army Group Center with a swift offensive to the west.

The main forces went to the Western Front. By the beginning of the offensive, he outnumbered the enemy in personnel by about 1.5 times, in guns and mortars - 1.3 times, in tanks - 1.5 times. For one rifle or cavalry division accounted for more than 8 kilometers of front. On each kilometer of the front, from 10 to 12 guns and mortars, about 5 tanks could be used. It was difficult to attack with such superiority, but it is quite possible.

The German military command was well aware that their troops would not be able to hold out in such a position near Moscow for a long time, but Hitler's Headquarters did not allow this. So, General G. Guderian wrote in his book “Memoirs of a Soldier”: “The attack on Moscow failed ... The main command ground forces, being far from the front of East Prussia, had no idea about the actual situation of its troops ...

The timely withdrawal of troops and the occupation of the defense at a favorable and previously prepared line would be the best and most effective means of restoring the situation and gaining a foothold before the onset of spring. In the zone of operations of the 2nd Panzer Army, such a line could be the line of defense it occupied in October along the Zusha and Oka rivers. However, Hitler did not agree with this.

South of Moscow, on the 350-kilometer line along the line of Tula, Serebryannye Prudy, Mikhailov, Chernava, the troops of the 2nd Panzer Army of General G. Guderian were stopped. The front line of defense of the tank army was occupied by the 24th tank, 53rd army and 47th tank corps, having divisions in one line with very small reserves. All divisions were stretched along the front from 25 to 50 kilometers and had regiments, also lined up in one line, and regiments - one line of battalions. Thus, in view of the one-echelon construction of the battle order of formations, the depth of the main defensive line of the German troops did not exceed 3-4 kilometers. Only two divisions were left in the reserve of the tank army - the 25th motorized and 112th infantry, which were located, respectively, in the areas of Venev and Stalinogorsk.

There was no continuous front line on the main line of German defense. The troops were garrisoned in settlements, which were turned into strongholds and adapted to all-round defense. There were significant gaps between the strongholds, which were not occupied by the troops, were not equipped in engineering terms, but according to the plan of the command, they were to be shot through by artillery and rifle-machine-gun fire. Minefields were laid on the outskirts of the strongholds.

Schematic diagram of the defense of the Wehrmacht in December 1941

Usually, centers of resistance in large settlements were defended by forces up to an infantry battalion, reinforced with tanks. Smaller villages housed infantry or tank companies. Larger forces were in the cities. So, in Serebryanye Prudy there was a motorized infantry regiment, in Mikhailov - two motorized infantry and one artillery regiment. In the operational depth of defense, the defensive lines along the western banks of the Pronya and Don rivers were prepared in engineering terms by the forces of the local population, but they were not engaged in troops.

For the attack on Mikhailov, formations of the 10th Army (commander - Lieutenant General I.F. Golikov) were put forward, which, by decision of the Headquarters, was transferred to the Western Front only on December 2. It consisted of eight rifle, three cavalry and one mixed aviation divisions. The army was armed with 254 field guns, 81 anti-tank guns, 270 mortars of 82 and 120 mm caliber. In front of the offensive front of the army was one motorized division, reinforced with tanks.

A neighbor of the 10th Army on the right was a group of General P. A. Belov consisting of a cavalry corps, one rifle division, a tank brigade and a separate tank battalion. Still further, in the Tula region, was the 50th Army. To the south, the 61st Army was advancing for an offensive from the Ryazhi region and preparing for the offensive the 3rd Army of the Southwestern Front.

Thus, in the area east of Tula, the troops of the 2nd Panzer Army of General G. Guderian were practically in a deep “cauldron”, the neck of which the Soviet troops could slam with counter attacks from the direction of Tula to the south and from the direction of Efremov to the north.

Under these conditions, General G. Guderian decides to withdraw his subordinate troops, covering the withdrawal with defense. In his memoirs, he writes: “In the face of a threat to my flanks and rear, and given the onset of incredibly cold weather, as a result of which the troops lost mobility, on the night of December 6, for the first time since the start of this war, I decided to stop this isolated offensive and withdraw far advanced parts on the line of the upper reaches of the river. Don, r. Shat, r. Upa, where to take up defense.

Thus, the defense of the German troops east of Tula should be regarded not as a well-prepared defensive operation of the 2nd Panzer Army, but as a tactical defense conducted in order to ensure the exit from the battle and the withdrawal of the main group of troops.

The offensive of the Soviet troops of the 10th Army began on December 6, and during the day slowly, through a deep snow cover, its formations approached the city of Mikhailov. At 24 hours on December 6, after a 10-minute artillery preparation, the Soviet regiments again went on the attack. At 2 o'clock on December 7, they broke into the city and completely liberated it by 7 o'clock. The Germans systematically withdrew troops from Mikhailov to the west.

Information about how the battles for Mikhailov were fought is contained in the textbook of the Department of the History of Military Art of the M.V. Frunze Military Academy "Preparation and conduct of an offensive with the advancement of the 10th Army formations from the depths in the counteroffensive near Moscow." In particular, it says: “By 2 o’clock on December 7, the troops of the 330th Infantry Division broke into the city. Regimental artillery, being in infantry combat formations, destroyed enemy firing points with direct fire. The enemy troops began to panic. In order to cut off the escape routes for the Germans, the division commander ordered the commander of the 1111th Infantry Regiment to send one battalion to the road southwest of Mikhailov and block the enemy's withdrawal routes. But due to deep snow, the battalion did not complete the task. The remnants of the defeated enemy units managed to escape unhindered in the south-west direction under the cover of darkness.

In the battles for Mikhailov, the 330th Rifle Division captured about 50 people, captured 16 guns, 6 vehicles, one tank, 16 motorcycles, a large number of ammunition, as well as documents of the 32nd, 63rd motorized infantry and 422nd motorized artillery regiments of the 10th motorized division.

The tank battalion, attached to the 330th rifle division, did not participate in the battle due to the failure of the materiel. The 28th Aviation Division on the first day of the operation in the interests of reconnaissance and with the aim of defeating the enemy in the city of Mikhailov produced (total. - Auth.) 11 sorties. Other formations of the army on December 6 acted less successfully.

From this academic study guide one can draw reasonable conclusions that the offensive of the troops of the 10th Army in the counteroffensive near Moscow was organized very badly. Soviet troops advanced on a wide front after advancing from the depths for a long distance. Preliminary reconnaissance of the enemy was not carried out. There was no artillery and aviation preparation for the offensive. Tanks did not participate in the offensive. Nevertheless, the liberation of the city of Mikhailov by the morning of the next day of the offensive was presented as a great victory.

Thus, within the prescribed period, none of the divisions operating in the first echelon of the 10th Army, despite the virtual absence of resistance from the enemy, failed to fully fulfill the task of the first day of the operation, which consisted in advancing from the concentration area to the front line of the enemy’s defense on 25-30 kilometers and mastering its tactical defense zone at a depth of 4-6 kilometers.

Subsequently, the advance of the troops of the 10th Army continued at a slow pace. Not knowing the situation at the front and not having a specific task, the division commanders acted slowly, cautiously and without initiative. When intelligence reported to the commander of the 323rd Rifle Division that a convoy of German vehicles with troops was moving along the Mikhailovo highway to Stalinogorsk, he did not take any measures to cut the highway and destroy the enemy. In general, the advance of the army troops on the second day of the operation, despite the absence of resistance from the enemy in front of all divisions, with the exception of one 322nd, was insignificant.

The 322nd Infantry Division was advancing on the city of Serebryanye Prudy, which also represented a center of resistance. On December 7, by 15 o'clock, having overcome 8 kilometers off-road, the regiments of the division reached the city. But it was not possible to take it on the move. The attack of the Soviet infantry was repelled by machine gun and artillery fire. The troops lay down and were forced to spend several hours in this position.

With the onset of darkness, units of the 322nd Infantry Division again launched an attack on Silver Ponds. Its parts covered the city from the north and south. German troops not only repulsed attacks from a place, but also tried to go on a counterattack. By 20 o'clock the city was captured by the Soviet units, who took 50 prisoners in it, 6 artillery pieces and about 30 motorcycles.

In the other direction, the 326th Rifle Division at 7 o'clock in the morning, without much resistance from the enemy, captured the village of Gryaznoye, after which its commander, Colonel V. S. Andreev, decided to temporarily stop the offensive and make a day's rest. The commander of the 41st Cavalry Division, which was advancing on the left flank of the 10th Army, brigade commander P. M. Davydov, on the second day of the operation, did not make any attempts at all to continue the offensive. On the second day of the operation, the 28th Aviation Division made only 24 sorties.

The offensive on the left flank of the army developed even more slowly. The 10th Army did not have an elbow connection with its neighbor on the left, which was immediately used by the German troops defending there. On December 8, Guderian ordered the forces of the 40th Communications Regiment to counterattack the 41st Cavalry Division on the flank, which was forced to stop the offensive and begin a retreat in an easterly direction. Only after the commander of the 10th Army sent the 41st and 57th Cavalry Divisions to reinforce on December 9, the offensive resumed and the Soviet troops were able to occupy the village of Tabola by the end of December 10.

Thus, during the first four days of the operation, German troops were practically pushed out of the Stalinogorsk sack. By the end of December 10, the 330th Infantry Division reached the approaches to the Don near the settlement of Krutoye. The 328th Infantry Division captured Dubovo. And only the 324th Rifle Division completed the task of the first day of the operation and reached the Don. During the four days of the offensive, they covered 35–40 kilometers, advancing at an average rate of 8–10 kilometers per day. By that time, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, in cooperation with the 322nd Rifle Division of the 110th Army, had captured the city of Venev.

On December 10, General G. Guderian reported the situation to A. Hitler's chief adjutant General Schmundt and the chief of personnel of the main command of the ground forces, warning that if effective measures were not taken in this direction, then they should not have any illusions about successful ones there actions of the German troops.

On December 12, Soviet troops occupied Efremov, on December 13, after a long battle, they captured the city of Epifan. The 1st Guards Cavalry Corps advanced several kilometers south of Venev.

Thus, by the end of December 13, the 10th Army had only partially reached the milestone determined by it as part of the first offensive operation. The average rate of advance of its formations fell to 4-5 kilometers per day. The opposing formations of the 2nd Panzer Army were able, having avoided encirclement, by defending the rearguards to delay the offensive of the Soviet troops and systematically withdraw to a new rear line of defense.

In general, the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow in December 1941 achieved its goal. By throwing the enemy's shock grouping to the west and inflicting serious losses on it, the Red Army eliminated the danger looming over Moscow. The counteroffensive lasted 34 days. The total width of the front of hostilities was 1000 kilometers, and the depth of advance of the Soviet troops was 100–250 kilometers. The average daily rate of advance of rifle formations was 3–6 kilometers.

During this operation, the enemy's plan to capture Moscow was thwarted, the troops of Army Group Center were defeated, and the myth of the invincibility of the German troops was dispelled.

The German command does not publish the exact number of losses during the offensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow. But, referring to F. Halder's "War Diary", it can be calculated that from December 10, 1941 to February 10, 1942, the German ground forces lost 191 thousand people on the Eastern Front. A significant part of these forces was located near Moscow. It is known that during the operation, the Soviet troops irretrievably lost 139.6 thousand people, wounded and frostbite - 231.4 thousand people.

Schematic diagram of the defense of the Wehrmacht in the autumn of 1942

Almost a year has passed. Having exhausted their offensive capabilities and not having reached the goals of the summer offensive of 1942, the German troops were forced to go on the defensive along the entire Soviet-German front, the total length of which reached 2,300 kilometers. The order of the High Command of the German Ground Forces dated October 14, 1942 stated: “We have to conduct a winter campaign. The task of the Eastern Front is ... by all means to hold the achieved lines, repel all enemy attempts to break through them and thereby create the prerequisites for our offensive in 1943.

To carry out this order, the German command began to create a defense that ran along previously occupied lines. The main area of ​​​​this defense was Stalingrad, where the troops of the 6th field and 4th tank defended. German armies, as well as the 3rd Army of Romania. Moreover, the German troops acted directly in the area of ​​Stalingrad, and their flanks were covered by the Romanian troops.

On the northern face of the Stalingrad ledge, where the Romanian troops were defending, the defense consisted of one main strip 5–8 kilometers deep, on which the infantry divisions defended. In the operational depth of defense along the Krivaya and Chir rivers, separate centers of resistance were created in the main directions and road junctions, which were not engaged in advance by the troops. Even deeper in areas not equipped for defense, there were units of the 1st Panzer Division of the Romanians, the 22nd and 14th Panzer Divisions of the Wehrmacht, which by that time had already lost more than half of their tanks and were in a state of reformation.

Consequently, practically all the hope of defense was placed on the main strip, defended by the infantry divisions of Romania. It consisted of two positions, each of which was equipped with one or two trenches. In some directions, mainly in the area of ​​​​roads, minefields and barbed wire were set up in front of the first trench. The second position was located at a depth of 5-8 kilometers from the front line of defense, was equipped with one trench and was defended by regimental reserves up to a battalion. But in connection with winter conditions a significant part of the reserves was attracted to the settlements, which were officially called "centers of resistance", in fact, they were a collection of headquarters, rear services, non-combat units and served as the location of hospitals.

It was entrusted to the troops of the Southwestern and right wing of the Don fronts, consisting of the 65th, 21st field and 5th tank armies, to break through the defenses of the Romanian troops and carry out coverage from the north of the main grouping of German troops located near Stalingrad. From the southeast, the troops of the Stalingrad Front attacked them with the forces of the 57th and 51st field armies of the 4th mechanized and 4th cavalry corps. By that time, in the area of ​​Stalingrad, as part of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts, significant forces of the Red Army had been accumulated at the expense of reserves. In total, the fronts included ten combined arms, one tank and four air armies. These troops included 66 rifle divisions, 15 rifle brigades, three motorized rifle brigades, 4 tank corps, 14 separate tank brigades, 4 separate tank regiments, 3 cavalry corps. This grouping included more than one million personnel, 900 tanks, 13,500 guns and mortars, including about 2,500 calibers of 76 mm and above, and more than a thousand combat aircraft.

The law of military art states that in order to achieve a rapid breakthrough of the enemy's defense, the attacking side must go for a decisive massing of forces and means in the direction of the main attack, even at the cost of weakening other directions. By the end of the autumn of 1942, the Soviet command had already mastered this rule. So, in the zone of the 5th Panzer Army, where the Soviet troops outnumbered the Romanians in men and artillery by more than 2 times, in tanks - 2.5 times, in aviation - 1.5 times, in the direction of the main attack, the army commander concentrated four rifle divisions out of six, two tank and one cavalry corps, a tank brigade, a tank battalion, sixteen artillery and mortar regiments of the RGK. This made it possible to achieve superiority in people by 2.7 times, in artillery - by 5 times, in tanks - absolute. In the same direction, the overwhelming majority of Soviet aviation. Approximately the same was the ratio of forces and means in the zone of the Romanian troops defending south of Stalingrad.

It is quite clear that the defense, which has such weak flanks, did not succeed in holding back the attacks of the Soviet troops in the Stalingrad region. On November 19, 1942, the shock groups of the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, having gone on the offensive, broke through the main defense lines of the Romanians, brought tank corps into battle, which on November 23 united in the area of ​​​​the city of Kalach. The enemy defense was broken through in a 300-kilometer section, the depth of advance of the Soviet troops in the first 12 days of the operation reached from 40 to 120 kilometers.

After Stalingrad, the German command was still trying to advance (Kursk - in the summer of 1943, Balaton - in the spring of 1945, etc.), but since that time the main type of military operations of the Wehrmacht has become defense. A. Hitler on February 1, 1943 told the chief General Staff ground forces of Germany to General K. Zeitzler: “I must say that the possibility of ending the war in the East by an offensive no longer exists. This we must be clear about.”

Thus, the first place of the two main types of military operations is given to defense, the art of preparation and conduct of which was constantly improved in subsequent years.

The goals pursued by the Wehrmacht in this type of hostilities have also changed. The defense in the winter of 1941/42 and 1942-1943 was carried out, as a rule, with the aim of disrupting the offensive of the Soviet troops, holding the captured lines (regions), gaining time to prepare a new offensive (counteroffensive). In subsequent years, in the strategic plan, it pursued a different goal: to exhaust and bleed the Soviet Armed Forces, to prolong the war and thereby gain time in the hope of splitting the anti-Hitler coalition.

With the enormous length of the Soviet-German front, the limited number of forces and means, the German command tried to solve the problem of the stability of strategic defense by concentrating the main efforts on holding the most important areas in military, economic and political terms (city boundaries as road junctions); the location of the overwhelming majority of forces and assets in the first strategic echelon and the direction of the main efforts of army groups to hold the tactical zone of defense of fortress cities.

A characteristic feature of the organization of the enemy's defense in 1941 was the creation of strongholds ("hedgehogs") adapted for all-round defense. They were in fire interaction with each other and blocked the path of the advancing troops in the main directions. In connection with this reception of the enemy in the tactics of offensive combat of the Soviet troops, a desire appeared to bypass enemy strongholds at intervals and to act against them from the flanks.

In 1942, the Wehrmacht troops in some sectors of the front began to gradually create a deeper and more developed defense in terms of engineering. Separate strongholds began to be connected with each other by trenches, as a result of which a solid position appeared. There were strongholds and areas of defense in the depths. This immediately increased the requirements for the methods of organizing offensive combat by the Soviet troops. Already in the spring and summer of 1942, they began to use the actions of shock groups to a much greater extent than before, massaging equipment in the directions of the main attacks.

Starting in the spring of 1943, the Wehrmacht began to pay great attention to the use of lines prepared in the depths, strips, natural defensive lines, which were major rivers- Dnieper, Danube, Vistula, Oder. The use of large settlements to strengthen the defense, such as Mozhaisk, Velikie Luki, Orel, Belgorod, Vyazma, Smolensk, Odessa, Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Vilnius, Brest, Kaunas, Riga and others, is noted. It is noted that the lack of reserves was the weakest link in the strategic defense of the Wehrmacht. They were created mainly at the expense of formations and units withdrawn to the rear for resupplying after the losses suffered, and were intended mainly to restore the damaged front of the defense by delivering counterattacks and occupying important defensive lines in depth. In some cases, they were used to go on the counteroffensive.

Significant changes took place in the construction of the defense of the Wehrmacht in the summer of 1943, after the failure of the offensive near Kursk. Its tactical zone, up to 8–15 kilometers deep, included the main line of defense (“main battlefield”) and the second line of defense (“positions of corps reserves”). The defense of the tactical zone was assigned to the army corps of the first echelon of the field army.

The main line of defense consisted of three positions. It was occupied by divisions of the first echelon. The basis of the first position was the strongholds of the companies, which formed the battalion defense areas. They were equipped with two or three lines of continuous trenches. The first position was usually occupied by battalions of the first echelons of regiments. The second position was also equipped with trenches, sometimes with separate strongholds. Within its boundaries were regimental reserves and artillery firing positions. The third position was a system of strongholds in which divisional reserves were located.

At a distance of 10-15 kilometers from the front edge of the main defense line, a second line was built. The reserve of the commander of the army corps could be located on it. The depth of the position of the corps reserves reached 2-5 kilometers.

Improving the construction of the defense lines of the German troops went along the lines of the development of engineering structures, the creation of intermediate and cut-off positions, a system of pillboxes, bunkers, anti-tank ditches, reinforced concrete caps. Within the main line of defense, all three positions began to be equipped with lines of continuous trenches.

Thus, the main line of defense of the German troops in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge (January 1944) had a depth of 6–8 kilometers and was built to hold individual strongholds and resistance centers, which were covered by minefields and barbed wire. Many of the strongholds were connected by fire, and only a few of them were connected by trenches, which were more suitable for maneuvering forces and means in battle than for the conduct of the battle itself.

In the summer of 1944, German troops, during the transition to the defense in Belarus, concentrated a grouping there consisting of 63 infantry divisions and 3 infantry brigades. But, being sure that the Soviet command was preparing the main blow in Ukraine, the main formations of tank and motorized troops were sent to this direction.

It must be remembered that at that time the territory of Belarus, which was characterized by the presence of large forest areas, rivers, swamps with a poorly developed road network, contributed little to major military operations. In addition, numerous partisan detachments and groups operated in Belarus, which controlled a significant part of its territory. Therefore, the forces at the disposal of the German command in Belarus were concentrated in the areas of the cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk and Kovel, which were considered the most important operationally.

In order to maintain a broad front of defense in the absence of a sufficient number of forces and means, the command of Army Group Center was forced to deploy its troops in one echelon, concentrating the main efforts on maintaining a well-prepared tactical defense zone with a depth of 8 to 12 kilometers, which was occupied infantry divisions. In addition, in the depths along the western banks of numerous rivers with wide swampy floodplains, the forces of the local population also prepared defensive lines that could be occupied by troops in the event of a withdrawal. The total depth of defense, according to Soviet sources, reached 250–270 kilometers.

But the defense built by the German command in this way did not fulfill its task. There were several reasons for this. The main thing is that the Soviet command by that time already had experience in preparing and conducting large-scale offensive operations with decisive goals. Secondly, by the beginning of the operation, the superiority of Soviet troops in Belarus was 2 times in personnel, 3.6 times in artillery, 3.9 times in aviation, and 5.8 times in tanks and self-propelled guns. Thirdly, the operational and even tactical rear of the German troops were pinned down by Soviet partisans, the total number of which reached 143 thousand people.

Under these conditions, the Soviet command decided to conduct an operation to encircle several enemy groupings spaced along the front and in depth with the aim of dismembering and defeating the main forces of Army Group Center. The encirclement and defeat of the Vitebsk grouping were planned by the forces of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts. The encirclement and defeat of the Bobruisk grouping were entrusted to the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front and the Dnieper River Flotilla. Taking into account the concentration of efforts on narrow sectors of the front, the superiority of Soviet troops in the directions of the main attacks increased several times more.

To prevent German troops from maneuvering along the front between the indicated fronts, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were to advance, which, together with other fronts, were to encircle and defeat the retreating enemy troops in the Minsk region.

The defeat of the German troops as a result of the Belarusian operation was very significant. According to Soviet sources, in the Vitebsk region during the first five days, as a result of a breakthrough and encirclement, they lost 20 thousand people killed and 10 thousand prisoners. In the Bobruisk region, their losses in killed and captured reached 74 thousand people. There are 105 thousand people in the Minsk region.

In total, during the Belarusian operation, German troops lost about 400 thousand people. In Hitler's entourage, this defeat was regarded as a catastrophe, equal to that which the Wehrmacht suffered at Stalingrad.

At the same time, it must be admitted that the victory in the Belarusian operation went to the Red Army at a high price. Only the irretrievable losses of the troops of the fronts amounted to 178 thousand people, to which more than half a million wounded must be added.

Schematic diagram of the defense of the Wehrmacht in 1943-1945.

Failures in the Byelorussian region forced the German command to pay even more serious attention to defense. But the forces of the Wehrmacht were dwindling every day, and it became more and more difficult to replenish them. Hopes for the allies were very weak.

A big point in German-Romanian relations was put by the Iasi-Kishinev operation, carried out by the Soviet command in August 1944 against the Southern Ukraine Army Group, which consisted of German and Romanian formations.

In the Yassko-Kishinev direction, by August 1944, the defense of the German and Romanian troops had been preparing for four months, was echeloned in depth and well developed in terms of engineering. In front of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, where the 6th German and 4th Romanian armies were defending, it consisted of three lanes 25–25 kilometers deep. In the operational depth, several lines and cut-off positions were equipped, and fortified areas were erected near Tirgu Frumos and Yass. In front of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, the enemy also prepared three lines of defense with a total depth of 40–50 kilometers.

However, this defense did not fulfill the tasks assigned to it. The main reasons are the significant numerical superiority of the Soviet troops and the extremely low combat capability of the Romanian troops, in the bands of which the Soviet command delivered its main blows. In addition, it must be remembered that the Iasi-Chisinau operation was launched on August 20, and on August 23, forces opposed to Berlin raised an uprising in Bucharest. The pro-fascist government of Antonescu was overthrown on the same day, and the new government immediately declared war on Germany. What kind of resistance of the defense of the Romanian troops, mainly consisting of peasants and industrial workers, at the front in such conditions could be discussed?

Then the Bulgarians acted in exactly the same way, starting a “popular uprising” in Sofia when the Soviet troops approached. On September 8, Soviet troops crossed the Romanian-Bulgarian border without firing a shot, and on September 9, the new Bulgarian "government" declared war on Germany.

Under such conditions, the leadership of Germany had no choice but to defend the territories of the remaining allied Hungary and the territory of its own state. Nevertheless, in 1944 and 1945, the defense of the German troops received its further development, primarily due to the development of its operational depth. The operational defense zone at that time included the third army line of defense ("positions of army reserves") and the rear defensive line ("positions of army group reserves"). Its total depth reached 50–60 kilometers or more. It was characterized by careful selection of terrain for the construction of defensive lines and their skillful engineering equipment.

With the transfer of hostilities to the territory of Poland and Germany, pre-equipped intermediate lines and fortified areas began to be included in the defense system of the army group, its depth increased to 120-150 kilometers. The system of "city-fortresses" became very saturated. Operational densities on the main axes ranged from 3 to 12 kilometers per division. The density of artillery ranged from 15–20 to 50 guns and mortars per kilometer.

The activity of the defense on an operational scale was manifested in the delivery of counterattacks, which were carried out mainly by mobile formations. The operational density during the counterattack was: one division per 3.5-4 kilometers of the front. Counterattacks were most often delivered under the base of an enemy grouping that had penetrated from one or more directions. This was how counterattacks were delivered when Soviet troops penetrated the German defenses north of Orel in July and south of Belgorod in August 1943, in Eastern Pomerania in 1945 and in a number of other operations. Sometimes counterattacks were carried out in the form of a frontal strike. In order to create counterattack groupings, the German command, in a limited time, carried out regroupings of large forces from various directions, and above all from non-attacked sectors of the front.

The enemy's defensive tactics, which were constantly being improved, underwent significant changes. At the beginning of it, only a small number of on-duty forces and means were usually at the forefront. The rest of the personnel were located in shelters at a depth of up to 1500 meters, in such a way as to occupy their areas within 15–20 minutes. But then, as the defense front was reduced, solid trenches were created and a second position was created, the units no longer left their areas to rest, but were located here, in dugouts and shelters. The activity of the defense increased as a result of the participation in counterattacks not only of divisional, but also of regimental reserves, as well as due to the maneuver of forces and means on the scale of the strongholds of the companies of the first echelon. As a result, the struggle for each defensive line and stronghold became more fierce. When wedging into the defense, the battle was transferred to the communication moves. It was combined with decisive and daring counterattacks, even with small forces (before secession).

During the war, the Headquarters of the Wehrmacht High Command sought to make the most of the experience gained. She developed special "Instructions for the combat training of infantry based on the experience of fighting on the Eastern Front", which were essential for further development defensive tactics. Exceptional attention was paid to the role of fire in combat, especially against attacking tanks and self-propelled guns. It was necessary to quickly concentrate fire various kinds weapons using flat and mounted fire. “By concentrating the fire of all types of weapons in place and time,” the document emphasized, “the fastest and most effective impact is achieved, all types of weapons must be able to maneuver and simultaneously operate in the lanes indicated by them.” Short-range fire, especially against attacking tanks, was considered more effective than long-range fire. It should be emphasized that in the third period of the war, during the artillery preparation of the attack by the Soviet troops, the enemy began to practice the withdrawal of the main forces from the advanced platoon strongholds to the second and even third trenches. He also used other elements of military cunning.

Also, the art of building defense and the tactics of the defensive battle of the Wehrmacht were constantly improved. The strengths of the enemy's defense can rightly be attributed to a developed network of engineering barriers, long-term and wood-and-earth structures. A major step aimed at increasing the stability and activity of the defense was the creation of cut-off trenches and positions adapted for the occupation of reserves and equipped taking into account the formation of flanking fire lines and fire "bags", as well as the presence of mobile reserves in the depths of the defense. Skillfully used various engineering barriers, as well as protective and other terrain conditions. It should be noted that the enemy's defense also had weaknesses. This is a relatively low density of anti-tank weapons, a significant distance from the front edge of the firing positions, a low degree of massaging of artillery fire. The desire to counterattack within the first position with relatively weak reserves (the strength of an infantry platoon) often did not give positive results. Therefore, starting from 1943, a completely new phenomenon came to the fore in the actions of German troops, connected with the art of timely disengagement from battle and a systematic retreat to the rear defensive lines.

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