The history and heroes of the elite type of troops, born during the Great Patriotic War

The fighters of these units were envied and - at the same time - sympathized with. “The trunk is long, life is short”, “Double salary - triple death!”, “Farewell, Motherland!” - all these nicknames, hinting at high mortality, went to the soldiers and officers who fought in the anti-tank artillery (IPTA) of the Red Army.

The calculation of the anti-tank guns of senior sergeant A. Golovalov is firing at German tanks. In recent battles, the calculation destroyed 2 enemy tanks and 6 firing points (the battery of Senior Lieutenant A. Medvedev). The explosion on the right is the return shot of a German tank.

All this is true: both the salaries increased by one and a half to two times for the IPTA units on the staff, and the length of the barrels of many anti-tank guns, and the unusually high mortality among the artillerymen of these units, whose positions were often located near, or even in front of the infantry front ... But the truth and the fact that anti-tank artillery accounted for 70% of the destroyed German tanks; and the fact that among the artillerymen awarded the title of Hero during the Great Patriotic War Soviet Union, every fourth is a soldier or officer of anti-tank units. In absolute terms, it looks like this: out of 1744 gunners - Heroes of the Soviet Union, whose biographies are presented in the lists of the Heroes of the Country project, 453 people fought in anti-tank fighter units, the main and only task of which was direct fire at German tanks ...
Keep up with the tanks

In itself, the concept of anti-tank artillery as a separate type of this kind of troops appeared shortly before the Second World War. During the First World War, conventional field guns were quite successful in fighting slow-moving tanks, for which armor-piercing shells were quickly developed. In addition, until the beginning of the 1930s, tank reservations remained mainly bulletproof, and only with the approach of a new world war began to intensify. Accordingly, specific means of combating this type of weapon were also required, which became anti-tank artillery.

In the USSR, the first experience of creating special anti-tank guns came at the very beginning of the 1930s. In 1931, a 37 mm anti-tank gun appeared, which was a licensed copy of a German gun designed for the same purpose. A year later, a Soviet semi-automatic 45 mm cannon was installed on the carriage of this gun, and thus a 45 mm anti-tank gun of the 1932 model - 19-K appeared. Five years later, it was modernized, resulting in a 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1937 model of the year - 53-K. It was she who became the most massive domestic anti-tank gun - the famous "forty-five".

Calculation of the M-42 anti-tank gun in battle. Photo: warphoto.ru

These guns were the main means of combating tanks in the Red Army in the prewar period. Since 1938, anti-tank batteries, platoons and divisions were armed with them, which until the autumn of 1940 were part of rifle, mountain rifle, motorized rifle, motorized and cavalry battalions, regiments and divisions. For example, the anti-tank defense of the rifle battalion of the pre-war state was provided by a platoon of 45-millimeter guns - that is, two guns; rifle and motorized rifle regiments - a battery of "forty-five", that is, six guns. And as part of the rifle and motorized divisions, since 1938, a separate anti-tank division was provided - 18 guns of 45 mm caliber.

Soviet gunners are preparing to open fire with a 45-mm anti-tank gun. Karelian front.

But the way the fighting began to unfold in World War II, which began on September 1, 1939 with the German invasion of Poland, quickly showed that anti-tank defense at the divisional level may not be enough. And then the idea came up to create anti-tank artillery brigades of the High Command Reserve. Each such brigade would be a formidable force: the regular armament of the 5,322-man unit consisted of 48 76 mm guns, 24 107 mm caliber guns, as well as 48 85 mm anti-aircraft guns and another 16 37 mm anti-aircraft guns. At the same time, there were no actual anti-tank guns in the staff of the brigades, however, non-specialized field guns, which received regular armor-piercing shells, more or less successfully coped with their tasks.

Alas, by the beginning of World War II, the country did not have time to complete the formation of anti-tank brigades of the RGC. But even unformed, these units, which came at the disposal of the army and front commands, made it possible to maneuver them much more efficiently than anti-tank units in the state of rifle divisions. And although the beginning of the war led to catastrophic losses throughout the Red Army, including in artillery units, due to this, the necessary experience was accumulated, which rather soon led to the emergence of specialized anti-tank units.

Birth of artillery special forces

It quickly became clear that regular divisional anti-tank weapons were not capable of seriously resisting the Wehrmacht’s tank spearheads, and the lack of anti-tank guns of the required caliber forced light field guns to be rolled out for direct fire. At the same time, their calculations, as a rule, did not have the necessary training, which means that they sometimes acted insufficiently efficiently even in favorable conditions for them. In addition, due to the evacuation of artillery factories and the massive losses of the first months of the war, the shortage of main guns in the Red Army became catastrophic, so they had to be disposed of much more carefully.

Soviet artillerymen roll 45-mm M-42 anti-tank guns, following in the ranks of the advancing infantry on the Central Front.

Under such circumstances, the only right decision there was the formation of special reserve anti-tank units, which could not only be put on the defensive along the front of divisions and armies, but they could be maneuvered, throwing them into specific tank-hazardous areas. The experience of the first war months spoke about the same. And as a result, by January 1, 1942, the command of the army in the field and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had one anti-tank artillery brigade operating on the Leningrad Front, 57 anti-tank artillery regiments and two separate anti-tank artillery divisions. And they really were, that is, they actively participated in the battles. Suffice it to say that following the results of the battles of the autumn of 1941, five anti-tank regiments were awarded the title of "Guards", which had just been introduced in the Red Army.

Soviet gunners with a 45 mm anti-tank gun in December 1941. Photo: Museum of Engineering Troops and Artillery, St. Petersburg

Three months later, on April 3, 1942, a resolution of the State Defense Committee was issued, introducing the concept of a fighter brigade, the main task of which was to fight Wehrmacht tanks. True, its staff was forced to be much more modest than that of a similar pre-war unit. At the disposal of the command of such a brigade was three times less people- 1795 fighters and commanders against 5322, 16 guns of 76 mm caliber against 48 in the pre-war state and four 37-mm anti-aircraft guns instead of sixteen. True, twelve 45-mm cannons and 144 anti-tank rifles appeared in the list of standard weapons (they were armed with two infantry battalions that were part of the brigade). In addition, in order to create new brigades, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered within a week to review the lists of personnel of all military branches and "withdraw all junior and private personnel who previously served in artillery units." It was these fighters, having undergone a short retraining in the reserve artillery brigades, that formed the backbone of the anti-tank brigades. But they still had to be understaffed with fighters who did not have combat experience.

The crossing of the artillery crew and the 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K across the river. The crossing is carried out on a pontoon of landing boats A-3

By the beginning of June 1942, twelve newly formed fighter brigades were already operating in the Red Army, which, in addition to artillery units, also included a mortar battalion, an engineering mine battalion and a company of machine gunners. And on June 8, a new GKO decree appeared, which reduced these brigades to four fighter divisions: the situation at the front required the creation of more powerful anti-tank fists capable of stopping German tank wedges. Less than a month later, in the midst of the summer offensive of the Germans, who were rapidly advancing to the Caucasus and the Volga, the famous order No. 0528 was issued “On renaming anti-tank artillery units and subunits into anti-tank artillery units and establishing advantages for the commanders and rank and file of these units.”

Pushkar elite

The appearance of the order was preceded by a great deal of preparatory work, concerning not only calculations, but also how many guns and what caliber the new units should have and what advantages their composition would enjoy. It was quite clear that the fighters and commanders of such units, who would have to risk their lives daily in the most dangerous areas of defense, needed a powerful not only material, but also a moral incentive. They did not assign the title of guards to the new units during the formation, as was done with the units of the Katyusha rocket launchers, but decided to leave the well-established word “fighter” and add “anti-tank” to it, emphasizing the special significance and purpose of the new units. For the same effect, as far as we can judge now, the introduction of a special sleeve insignia for all soldiers and officers of anti-tank artillery was calculated - a black rhombus with crossed golden trunks of stylized Shuvalov "unicorns".

All this was spelled out in the order in separate paragraphs. The same separate clauses prescribed special financial conditions for new units, as well as norms for the return of wounded soldiers and commanders to duty. So, the commanding staff of these units and subunits was set one and a half, and the junior and private - a double salary. For each downed tank, the crew of the gun was also entitled to a cash bonus: the commander and gunner - 500 rubles each, the rest of the calculation numbers - 200 rubles each. It is noteworthy that initially other amounts appeared in the text of the document: 1000 and 300 rubles, respectively, but the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin, who signed the order, personally reduced the prices. As for the norms for returning to service, the entire commanding staff of the anti-tank destroyer units, up to the division commander, had to be kept on special account, and at the same time, the entire staff after treatment in hospitals had to be returned only to the indicated units. This did not guarantee that the soldier or officer would return to the very battalion or division in which he fought before being wounded, but he could not end up in any other units other than anti-tank destroyers.

The new order instantly turned the anti-tankers into the elite artillery of the Red Army. But this elitism was confirmed by a high price. The level of losses in anti-tank fighter units was noticeably higher than in other artillery units. It is no coincidence that anti-tank units became the only subtype of artillery, where the same order No. 0528 introduced the position of deputy gunner: in battle, crews that rolled out their guns to unequipped positions in front of the defending infantry and fired at direct fire often died earlier than their equipment.

From battalions to divisions

The new artillery units quickly gained combat experience, which spread just as quickly: the number of anti-tank fighter units grew. On January 1, 1943, the anti-tank artillery of the Red Army consisted of two fighter divisions, 15 fighter brigades, two heavy anti-tank regiments, 168 anti-tank regiments and one anti-tank battalion.

Anti-tank artillery unit on the march.

And for the Battle of Kursk, Soviet anti-tank artillery received a new structure. Order No. 0063 of the People's Commissariat of Defense dated April 10, 1943 introduced in each army, primarily the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, South-Western and Southern Fronts, at least one anti-tank regiment of the wartime army staff: six batteries of 76-mm guns, that is, a total of 24 guns.

By the same order, one anti-tank artillery brigade of 1215 people was organizationally introduced into the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, South-Western and Southern Fronts, which included an anti-tank regiment of 76-mm guns - a total of 10 batteries, or 40 guns, and a regiment of 45-millimeter guns, which was armed with 20 guns.

Guards artillerymen rolling a 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K (model 1937) into a prepared trench. Kursk direction.

The relatively quiet time that separated the victory in Battle of Stalingrad from the beginning of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the command of the Red Army used it to the fullest in order to complete, rearm and retrain anti-tank units as much as possible. No one doubted that the coming battle would largely rely on the massive use of tanks, especially new German vehicles, and it was necessary to be prepared for this.

Soviet gunners at the 45 mm M-42 anti-tank gun. In the background is the T-34-85 tank.

History has shown that the anti-tank units had time to prepare. The battle on the Kursk Bulge was the main test of the artillery elite for strength - and they withstood it with honor. And the invaluable experience, for which, alas, the fighters and commanders of anti-tank fighter units had to pay a very high price, was soon comprehended and used. It was after the Battle of Kursk that the legendary, but, unfortunately, already too weak for the armor of the new German tanks, the "magpies" began to be gradually removed from these units, replacing them with 57-mm ZIS-2 anti-tank guns, and where these guns were not enough, on the well-proven divisional 76-mm guns ZIS-3. By the way, it was the versatility of this gun, which proved to be good both as a divisional gun and as an anti-tank gun, along with the simplicity of design and manufacture, that allowed it to become the most massive artillery gun in the world in the entire history of artillery!

Masters of "firebags"

In ambush "forty-five", 45-mm anti-tank gun model 1937 (53-K).

The last major change in the structure and tactics of using anti-tank artillery was the complete reorganization of all fighter divisions and brigades into anti-tank artillery brigades. By January 1, 1944, there were as many as fifty such brigades in the anti-tank artillery, and in addition to them, there were 141 anti-tank artillery regiments. The main weapons of these units were the same 76-mm ZIS-3 guns, which the domestic industry produced at an incredible speed. In addition to them, the brigades and regiments were armed with 57-mm ZIS-2 and a number of "forty-fives" and 107 mm caliber guns.

Soviet artillerymen from the units of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps fire at the enemy from a camouflaged position. In the foreground: 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K (model 1937), in the background: 76-mm regimental gun (model 1927). Bryansk front.

By this time, the fundamental tactics of the combat use of anti-tank units were also fully developed. The system of anti-tank areas and anti-tank strongholds, developed and tested even before the Battle of Kursk, was rethought and finalized. The number of anti-tank guns in the troops became more than sufficient, experienced personnel were enough for their use, and the fight against Wehrmacht tanks was made as flexible and effective as possible. Now the Soviet anti-tank defense was built on the principle of "fire bags", arranged on the paths of movement of German tank units. Anti-tank guns were placed in groups of 6-8 guns (that is, two batteries each) at a distance of fifty meters from each other and were masked with all care. And they opened fire not when the first line of enemy tanks was in the zone of sure defeat, but only after virtually all attacking tanks entered it.

Unknown Soviet female soldiers from the anti-tank artillery unit (IPTA).

Such "fire bags", taking into account the characteristics of anti-tank artillery guns, were effective only at medium and short combat distances, which means that the risk for gunners increased many times over. It was necessary to show not only remarkable restraint, watching how German tanks were passing almost nearby, it was necessary to guess the moment when to open fire and fire as quickly as the capabilities of technology and crew forces allowed. And at the same time, be ready to change position at any moment, as soon as it was under fire or the tanks went beyond the distance of confident defeat. And to do this in battle, as a rule, had to be literally on hand: most often they simply did not have time to adjust the horses or cars, and the process of loading and unloading the gun took too much time - much more than the conditions of the battle with the advancing tanks allowed.

The crew of Soviet artillerymen fires from a 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1937 model (53-K) at a German tank on a village street. The number of the calculation gives the loader a 45-mm sub-caliber projectile.

Heroes with a black diamond on the sleeve

Knowing all this, one is no longer surprised at the number of heroes among the fighters and commanders of anti-tank fighter units. Among them were real gunners-snipers. Such as, for example, the gun commander of the 322nd Guards Anti-Tank Regiment of the Guard, Senior Sergeant Zakir Asfandiyarov, who accounted for almost three dozen fascist tanks, and ten of them (including six "Tigers"!) He knocked out in one battle. For this he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Or, say, the gunner of the 493rd anti-tank artillery regiment, Sergeant Stepan Khoptyar. He fought from the very first days of the war, went with battles to the Volga, and then to the Oder, where in one battle he destroyed four German tanks, and in just a few January days of 1945 - nine tanks and several armored personnel carriers. The country appreciated this feat: in April, the victorious forty-fifth, Khoptyar was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Hero of the Soviet Union gunner of the 322nd Guards Fighter Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment of the Guard Senior Sergeant Zakir Lutfurakhmanovich Asfandiyarov (1918-1977) and Hero of the Soviet Union gunner of the 322nd Guards Fighter Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment of the Guard Sergeant Veniamin Mikhailovich Permyakov (1924- 1990) are reading the letter. In the background, Soviet gunners at the 76-mm ZiS-3 divisional gun.

Z.L. Asfandiyarov on the front of the Great Patriotic War since September 1941. Particularly distinguished himself during the liberation of Ukraine.
On January 25, 1944, in the battles for the village of Tsibulev (now the village of Monastyrishchensky district of the Cherkasy region), a gun under the command of the guards senior sergeant Zakir Asfandiyarov was attacked by eight tanks and twelve armored personnel carriers with enemy infantry. Having let the enemy attacking column into direct range, the gun crew opened aimed sniper fire and burned all eight enemy tanks, of which four were Tiger-type tanks. The senior sergeant of the guard Asfandiyarov himself destroyed one officer and ten soldiers with fire from personal weapons. When the gun went out of action, the brave guardsman switched to the gun of the neighboring unit, the calculation of which failed and, having repelled a new massive enemy attack, destroyed two tanks of the Tiger type and up to sixty Nazi soldiers and officers. In just one battle, the calculation of the guards of senior sergeant Asfandiyarov destroyed ten enemy tanks, of which six were of the Tiger type and over one hundred and fifty enemy soldiers and officers.
The title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 2386) was awarded to Asfandiyarov Zakir Lutfurakhmanovich by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 1, 1944.

V.M. Permyakov was drafted into the Red Army in August 1942. At the artillery school he received the specialty of a gunner. From July 1943 at the front, he fought in the 322nd Guards Anti-Tank Regiment as a gunner. He received his baptism of fire on the Kursk salient. In the first battle, he burned three German tanks, was wounded, but did not leave his combat post. For courage and steadfastness in battle, accuracy in defeating tanks, Sergeant Permyakov was awarded the Order of Lenin. He especially distinguished himself in the battles for the liberation of Ukraine in January 1944.
On January 25, 1944, in the area at the fork in the road near the villages of Ivakhny and Tsibulev, now the Monastyrishchensky district of the Cherkasy region, the calculation of the guards of senior sergeant Asfandiyarov, in which sergeant Permyakov was the gunner, was among the first to meet the attack of enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers by infantry. Reflecting the first onslaught, Permyakov destroyed 8 tanks with accurate fire, of which four were tanks of the Tiger type. When the positions of the artillerymen approached the enemy landing, he entered into hand-to-hand combat. He was wounded, but did not leave the battlefield. Having beaten off the attack of machine gunners, he returned to the gun. When the gun failed, the guards switched to the gun of a neighboring unit, the calculation of which failed and, repelling a new massive enemy attack, destroyed two more Tiger-type tanks and up to sixty Nazi soldiers and officers. During a raid by enemy bombers, the gun was broken. Permyakov, wounded and shell-shocked, was sent to the rear unconscious. On July 1, 1944, Sergeant Veniamin Mikhailovich Permyakov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 2385).

Lieutenant General Pavel Ivanovich Batov presents the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal to the commander of an anti-tank gun, Sergeant Ivan Spitsyn. Mozyr direction.

Ivan Yakovlevich Spitsin has been at the front since August 1942. He distinguished himself on October 15, 1943 when crossing the Dnieper. Direct fire, the calculation of Sergeant Spitsin destroyed three enemy machine guns. Having crossed to the bridgehead, the artillerymen fired at the enemy until a direct hit broke the gun. Artillerymen joined the infantry, during the battle they captured enemy positions along with cannons and began to destroy the enemy from his own guns.

On October 30, 1943, Sergeant Spitsin Ivan Yakovlevich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 1641).

But even against the background of these and hundreds of other heroes from among the soldiers and officers of anti-tank artillery, the feat of Vasily Petrov, the only one among them twice Hero of the Soviet Union, stands out. Drafted into the army in 1939, right on the eve of the war he graduated from the Sumy Artillery School, and met the Great Patriotic War as a lieutenant, platoon commander of the 92nd separate artillery battalion in Novograd-Volynsky in Ukraine.

Captain Vasily Petrov earned his first "Gold Star" of the Hero of the Soviet Union after crossing the Dnieper in September 1943. By that time, he was already deputy commander of the 1850th anti-tank artillery regiment, and on his chest he wore two orders of the Red Star and a medal "For Courage" - and three stripes for wounds. The decree on awarding Petrov the highest degree of distinction was signed on the 24th, and published on December 29, 1943. By that time, the thirty-year-old captain was already in the hospital, having lost both hands in one of the last battles. And if not for the legendary Order No. 0528, which ordered the return of the wounded to anti-tank units, the freshly baked Hero would hardly have got a chance to continue fighting. But Petrov, who was always distinguished by firmness and perseverance (sometimes dissatisfied subordinates and superiors said that he was stubborn), achieved his goal. And at the very end of 1944 he returned to his regiment, which by that time had already become known as the 248th Guards Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment.

With this regiment of the guard, Major Vasily Petrov reached the Oder, crossed it and distinguished himself by holding a bridgehead on the western bank, and then participating in the development of the offensive on Dresden. And this did not go unnoticed: by decree of June 27, 1945, for the spring exploits on the Oder, artillery major Vasily Petrov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the second time. By this time, the regiment of the legendary major had already been disbanded, but Vasily Petrov himself remained in the ranks. And he remained in it until his death - and he died in 2003!

After the war, Vasily Petrov managed to graduate from Lviv State University and the Military Academy, received a PhD in military sciences, rose to the rank of Lieutenant General of Artillery, which he received in 1977, and served as Deputy Chief of Missile Forces and Artillery of the Carpathian Military District. As the grandson of one of General Petrov's colleagues recalls, from time to time, going for a walk in the Carpathians, the middle-aged commander managed to literally drive his adjutants who could not keep up with him on the way up ...

Memory is stronger than time

The post-war fate of anti-tank artillery completely repeated the fate of all the Armed Forces of the USSR, which changed in accordance with the changing challenges of the time. Since September 1946, the personnel of anti-tank artillery units and subunits, as well as anti-tank rifle subunits, ceased to receive increased salaries. The right to a special sleeve insignia, which the anti-tankers were so proud of, remained ten years longer. But it also disappeared over time: the next order to introduce a new uniform for the Soviet army canceled this patch.

Gradually, the need for specialized anti-tank artillery units also disappeared. Cannons were replaced by anti-tank guided missiles, and units armed with these weapons appeared on the staff of motorized rifle units. In the mid-1970s, the word “fighter” disappeared from the name of the anti-tank units, and twenty years later, the last two dozen anti-tank artillery regiments and brigades disappeared along with the Soviet army. But whatever the post-war history of Soviet anti-tank artillery, it will never cancel the courage and feats with which the fighters and commanders of the anti-tank artillery of the Red Army glorified their kind of troops during the Great Patriotic War.

“Artillery is the god of war,” I. V. Stalin once said, speaking of one of the most significant branches of the military. With these words, he tried to emphasize the great importance that this weapon had during the Second World War. And this expression is true, since the merits of artillery can hardly be overestimated. Its power allowed the Soviet troops to mercilessly smash enemies and bring the much-desired Great Victory closer.

Further in this article, the artillery of the Second World War, which was then in service with Nazi Germany and the USSR, will be considered, starting with light anti-tank guns and ending with super-heavy monster guns.

Anti-tank guns

As the history of the Second World War showed, light guns by and large turned out to be practically useless against armored vehicles. The fact is that they were usually developed in the interwar years and could only withstand the weak protection of the first armored vehicles. But before World War II, technology began to rapidly modernize. The armor of tanks became much thicker, so many types of guns turned out to be hopelessly outdated.

mortars

Perhaps the most accessible and effective infantry support weapon was mortars. They perfectly combined such properties as range and firepower, so their use was able to turn the tide of the entire enemy offensive.

German troops most often used the 80mm Granatwerfer-34. This weapon earned a grim reputation among the allied forces for its high speed and the utmost accuracy of firing. In addition, its firing range was 2400 m.

The Red Army used the 120 mm M1938, which entered service in 1939, to provide fire support to its infantrymen. He was the very first mortar with such a caliber that was ever produced and used in world practice. When the German troops encountered this weapon on the battlefield, they appreciated its power, after which they put a copy into production and designated it as the Granatwerfer-42. M1932 weighed 285 kg and was the heaviest type of mortar that the infantrymen had to carry with them. To do this, it was either disassembled into several parts, or pulled on a special cart. Its firing range was 400 m less than that of the German Granatwerfer-34.

Self-propelled installations

In the very first weeks of the war, it became clear that the infantry was in dire need of reliable fire support. The German armed forces ran into an obstacle in the form of well-fortified positions and a large concentration of enemy troops. Then they decided to strengthen their mobile fire support with the Vespe self-propelled 105-mm artillery mount mounted on the PzKpfw II tank chassis. Another similar weapon - "Hummel" - was part of the motorized and tank divisions since 1942.

In the same period, the Red Army was armed with the SU-76 self-propelled gun with a 76.2 mm caliber gun. It was installed on a modified chassis of the T-70 light tank. Initially, the SU-76 was supposed to be used as a tank destroyer, but during its use it was realized that it had too little firepower for this.

In the spring of 1943, Soviet troops received a new car - ISU-152. It was equipped with a 152.4 mm howitzer and was intended both to destroy tanks and mobile artillery, and to support infantry with fire. First, the gun was mounted on the KV-1 tank chassis, and then on the IS. In combat, this weapon proved to be so effective that it remained in service with the Warsaw Pact countries until the 70s of the last century.

This type of gun was of great importance during the conduct of hostilities throughout the Second World War. The heaviest of the then available artillery, which was in service with the Red Army, was the M1931 B-4 howitzer with a caliber of 203 mm. When the Soviet troops began to slow down the rapid advance of the German invaders on their territory and the war on the Eastern Front became more static, heavy artillery was, as they say, in its place.

But developers have been looking all the time best option. Their task was to create a weapon in which, as far as possible, such characteristics as a small mass, a good firing range and the heaviest projectiles would harmoniously merge. And such a weapon was created. They became the 152-millimeter howitzer ML-20. A little later, a more modernized M1943 gun with the same caliber, but with a weighted barrel and a large muzzle brake, entered service with the Soviet troops.

The defense enterprises of the Soviet Union then produced huge batches of such howitzers, which fired massively at the enemy. Artillery literally devastated German positions and thereby thwarted enemy offensive plans. An example of this is Operation Hurricane, which was successfully carried out in 1942. Its result was the encirclement of the 6th German army near Stalingrad. More than 13 thousand guns were used for its implementation different types. Artillery preparations of unprecedented power preceded this offensive. It was she who largely contributed to the rapid advance of the Soviet tank troops and infantry.

German heavy weapons

According to after the First World War, Germany was forbidden to have guns having a caliber of 150 mm or more. Therefore, the specialists of the Krupp company, who were developing the new gun, had to create a heavy field howitzer sFH 18 with a 149.1-mm barrel, consisting of a pipe, a breech and a casing.

At the beginning of the war, the German heavy howitzer moved with the help of horse traction. But later, its modernized version was already dragging a half-track tractor, which made it much more mobile. german army successfully used it on the Eastern Front. By the end of the war, sFH 18 howitzers were mounted on tank chassis. Thus, the Hummel self-propelled artillery mount was obtained.

Rocket troops and artillery is one of the divisions of the ground armed forces. The use of missiles during the Second World War was mainly associated with large-scale hostilities on the Eastern Front. Powerful rockets covered large areas with their fire, which compensated for some of the inaccuracy of these unguided guns. Compared to conventional shells, the cost of rockets was much less, and besides, they were produced very quickly. Another advantage was their relative ease of use.

Soviet rocket artillery used 132 mm M-13 rounds during the war. They were created in the 1930s and by the time Nazi Germany attacked the USSR, they were in very small quantities. These rockets are perhaps the most famous of all such shells used during the Second World War. Gradually, their production was established, and by the end of 1941, the M-13 was used in battles against the Nazis.

It must be said that the rocket troops and artillery of the Red Army plunged the Germans into a real shock, which was caused by the unprecedented power and deadly effect of the new weapon. Launchers BM-13-16 were placed on trucks and had rails for 16 rounds. Later, these missile systems would be known as "Katyusha". Over time, they were modernized several times and were in service with the Soviet army until the 80s of the last century. With the advent of the expression "Artillery is the god of war" began to be perceived as true.

German rocket launchers

A new type of weapon made it possible to deliver explosive explosive parts both over long and short distances. Thus, short-range projectiles concentrated their firepower on targets located on the front line, while long-range missiles attacked objects located behind enemy lines.

The Germans also had their own rocket artillery. "Wurframen-40" - a German rocket launcher, which was located on the Sd.Kfz.251 half-tracked vehicle. The missile was aimed at the target by turning the machine itself. Sometimes these systems were introduced into battle as towed artillery.

Most often, the Germans used the Nebelwerfer-41 rocket launcher, which had a honeycomb structure. It consisted of six tubular guides and was mounted on a two-wheeled carriage. But during the battle, this weapon was extremely dangerous not only for the enemy, but also for their own calculation because of the nozzle flame escaping from the pipes.

The weight of projectiles with had a huge impact on their range. Therefore, the army whose artillery could hit targets located far behind the enemy line had a significant military advantage. Heavy German rockets were useful only for indirect fire when it was necessary to destroy well-fortified objects, such as bunkers, armored vehicles or various defensive structures.

It is worth noting that the German artillery fire was much inferior in range rocket launcher Katyusha because of the excessive heaviness of the shells.

Super heavy guns

Artillery played a very important role in the Nazi armed forces. This is all the more surprising since it was almost the most important element of the fascist military machine, and for some reason modern researchers prefer to focus their attention on studying the history of the Luftwaffe (air force).

Even at the end of the war, German engineers continued to work on a new grandiose armored vehicle - a prototype of a huge tank, in comparison with which all other military equipment would seem dwarfed. Project P1500 "Monster" did not have time to implement. It is only known that the tank was supposed to weigh 1.5 tons. It was planned that he would be armed with an 80-cm Gustav gun from the Krupp company. It is worth noting that its developers have always thought big, and artillery was no exception. This weapon entered service with the Nazi army during the siege of the city of Sevastopol. The gun fired only 48 shots, after which its barrel wore out.

Railway guns K-12 were in service with the 701st artillery battery, stationed on the coast of the English Channel. According to some reports, their shells, and they weighed 107.5 kg, hit several targets in southern England. These artillery monsters had their own T-shaped track sections, necessary for installation and targeting.

Statistics

As noted earlier, the armies of the countries that participated in the hostilities of 1939-1945 came to grips with obsolete or partially modernized guns. All their inefficiency was fully revealed by World War II. Artillery urgently needed not only to be updated, but also to increase its number.

From 1941 to 1944, Germany produced more than 102,000 guns of various calibers and up to 70,000 mortars. By the time of the attack on the USSR, the Germans already had about 47 thousand artillery pieces, and this is without taking into account assault guns. If we take the United States as an example, then over the same period they produced about 150 thousand guns. Great Britain managed to produce only 70 thousand weapons of this class. But the record holder in this race was the Soviet Union: during the war years, more than 480 thousand guns and about 350 thousand mortars were fired here. Prior to this, the USSR already had 67 thousand barrels in service. This figure does not include 50mm mortars, naval artillery and anti-aircraft guns.

During the years of World War II, the artillery of the warring countries has undergone great changes. Constantly, either modernized or completely new guns came into service with the armies. Anti-tank and self-propelled artillery developed especially rapidly (photographs of that time demonstrate its power). According to experts from different countries, about half of all losses of the ground forces are accounted for by the use of mortars during the battle.

In the second part of my article, I want to briefly review the development of Soviet self-propelled artillery, including self-propelled mortars, SPAAGs, as well as flamethrower systems.

The purpose of my article is to briefly highlight the controversial military-technical decisions, the mistakes made in the development of Soviet self-propelled artillery. To show that sometimes very dubious, illogical decisions were made, because of which, until the 70s, the USSR did not have normal self-propelled artillery.

Then, in some 7 years, perfect samples were created, which are still actively used. I tried to show what could be changed in this industry, taking into account the experience of the USSR both NATO designers and specialists from the Socialist camp. In addition, I will show that some design solutions were simply in sight, but the Soviet designers and / or the military, for some reason, did not appreciate or notice them.

To facilitate understanding, I will briefly describe the structure of the Soviet post-war artillery. As part of the division of the 70-80s, artillery was available at 3 levels: the actual division - an artillery regiment of 3 divisions of 152mm self-propelled guns or howitzers, a MLRS division, as well as an anti-aircraft missile or anti-aircraft artillery regiment, anti-tank battalion. Regimental level - division of 122mm howitzers, anti-aircraft division or battery, anti-tank battery, sometimes a MLRS battery was added.

Battalion level - a company of 120mm mortars, sometimes some of the mortars were represented by 82mm Cornflowers.

Since the 80s, airborne divisions have had in each regiment a division of self-propelled guns "Nona", and at the divisional level an artillery regiment of self-propelled guns Nona, D-30 howitzers, a battery of MLRS and an anti-tank division.

It is clear that in different years the states differed significantly, there were too many divisions in the USSR. For example, the post-war divisions' artillery was rather weak: 76-85mm divisional guns and 122mm howitzers, as well as a relatively small number of mortars and MLRS.

Anti-aircraft armament regiment of 24 37mm anti-aircraft guns. The states of the tank division were different: for example, the artillery armament of one of the TDs for 1955: 4 57, 76, 85 mm guns, 37 122 mm howitzers, 4 120 mm and 13 160 mm mortars, 9 MLRS, 4 ZSU-37, 6 DShK machine guns, 6 ZPU-2, 3 ZPU-4, 2 25 mm, 29 37 mm, 6 85 mm anti-aircraft guns. Honestly, such states shocked me a little, for me the artillery weapons are very weak.

At the level of armies and districts, there were separate artillery divisions and brigades, armed, as a rule, with corps guns, high-powered guns, heavy MLRS and mortars.

The value of artillery of various types is enormous, it must be understood that real combat experience has shown that it is artillery, on a par with tanks, that is the main striking force of the ground forces, and even the main striking force in general.

The value of anti-aircraft artillery has fallen, but ZSU and ZU confidently occupy their niche, while becoming an important means of fire support for troops. Another advantage of artillery is its conservatism and slow obsolescence.

For example, mortars and many WWII artillery systems are quite combat-ready for local conflicts of our time, while armored vehicles, especially pre-war ones, are hopelessly outdated. The 120mm mortar model 1938 or the 122mm M-30 howitzer still look menacing, remaining in service with a number of countries, but the tanks developed in 1938 have been preserved only in museums.

I also want to note that the purpose of the article is not digging in the trash, or savoring the mistakes of the Soviet military and designers, the author is a patriot of the USSR and a fan of Soviet weapons, but I still need separate criticism.

For convenience, the problems of Soviet weapons are considered by type. military equipment. I also consider some systems to be masterpieces of military-technical thought that have no analogues so far, for example, 2S7 Pion, 2S4 Tulip, 2S6 Tunguska, TOS-1.

1. Airborne self-propelled guns.

The first and most massive airborne self-propelled gun was the ACS-57, adopted by the Airborne Forces in 1951 and produced until 1962. First, the airborne division received a division of 35 self-propelled guns (in fact, a battalion), then the self-propelled guns were transferred to the regimental level: each regiment had a battery of 10 self-propelled guns.

The car was compact, fairly reliable passable. The small mass allowed it to be effectively landed with the advent of the An-8/12, as well as the Mi-6 helicopters. It is clear that the car had weak armor, which protected only from small fragments, as well as ordinary bullets, but this was a fee for low weight. The only question for the self-propelled guns was how optimal was the choice of weapons?

The fact is that the self-propelled guns had to solve a whole range of tasks, from fighting armored vehicles to hitting enemy firing points, destroying his infantry. In my opinion, an automated control system with a 76mm gun would be the best tool for solving such problems. Moreover, it was developed simultaneously with the ASU-57, but they chose the system with a 57mm gun, guided by its best armor penetration: a 57mm gun at a distance of 500/1000/1500/2000 meters pierced 115/105/95/85 mm of armor with a caliber projectile, and with a post-war sub-caliber projectile 155/140/125/100mm of armor.

For comparison, a 76mm cannon pierced 95/80/70/60mm with a caliber projectile, and 125/110/90/75mm with a sub-caliber projectile. It would seem that the advantage of the ASU-57 is obvious, and there is nothing to discuss, but at the same time, at least 3 factors must be remembered: firstly, that a 57mm cannon, which is 76mm, could not effectively deal with NATO medium tanks M-47/48, Centurion, and so, the first MBT M-60.

If the first modifications of these tanks were still affected by the BPS in the forehead from 500m, then the subsequent ones were invulnerable in the frontal projection. The sides were confidently hit by shells of both calibers.

Airborne self-propelled guns were not intended for open combat with enemy MBTs, but had to operate from ambushes, where the main thing was to confidently penetrate an enemy tank into the side and have small dimensions for stealth. Secondly, a cumulative projectile was developed for the 76mm gun, penetrating 180-200mm of armor. Thirdly, the mass of the OFS 57mm gun is only 3.75 kg, and 76mm 6.2 kg, i.e. more than one and a half times heavier, which is especially important for the destruction of infantry targets.

However, there was an even more interesting option proposed by the designers in the mid-50s, re-equipping the ASU-57 with a 107mm recoilless gun. By the way, a similar self-propelled gun was created in the USA, "Ontos", armed with 6! 106mm recoilless, it is clear that the Soviet Airborne Forces did not need such a perversion, but it is not clear why the military refused such rearmament?

The B-11 penetrated 380mm armor (that is, it hit any tank of the 50-60s), and its OFS weighed about 8 kg. Thus, such a self-propelled gun could effectively deal with both armored vehicles and non-armored targets. But, for unknown reasons, ASU-107 was also rejected.

The second airborne self-propelled gun of the USSR was the ASU-85 (officially - SAU-85 or Su-85). In fact, the Soviet "Hetzer", armed with a long-barreled 85mm cannon, i.e. in terms of firepower, he caught up with the JagdPanther.

When creating the self-propelled guns, the PT-76 chassis was used. A self-propelled gun battalion -31 pieces was attached to the Airborne Forces. What can be said about this system? She is quite well armed for her mass and well armored: 90mm of reduced forehead armor, 20mm of reduced side armor. She had self-propelled guns and an anti-aircraft machine gun, which increased her survival rate.

However, the devil is in the details. Let's start with what is not clear, but how was it planned to use the ACS-85 for its intended purpose? The mass of the system is 15.5 tons. Those. An-8, Mi-6 cannot physically lift it, like the first modifications of An-12. For more advanced modifications of the An-12, it is also too heavy, their maximum carrying capacity is 20 tons, but the mass of a monocargo is less.

So, in reality, the ACS-85 began to be transported by air 8 years after it was put into service, and such a rare aircraft as the An-22, then another Il-76 could lift it. So at the beginning of its service, the ASU-85 was not very suitable for landing due to excessive weight.

Was there a way out? Apparently, it was necessary to abandon the creation of the landing "Hetzer", and return to the roots. If the ASU-57/76 was preceded by the development of the war years of the OSU-76, then the Su-85B (the development of the famous Su-76M) could be taken as the basis for the 85mm airborne self-propelled guns.

It is clear that the amphibious version would be much lighter, by reducing the armor, to a bulletproof, denser layout. But the new self-propelled guns would weigh about 8 tons (like the BMD-2) and be fully amphibious.

It is clear that armor penetration would have fallen: an 85mm cannon with post-war shells pierced at a distance of 500/1000/1500/2000 m, respectively, 135/120/110/100 mm with an armor-piercing projectile and 210/180/150 mm with a sub-caliber projectile. But, firstly, such a self-propelled gun could support our landing not in theory, but in reality.

Secondly, with the adoption of a cumulative projectile, armor penetration increased to 250mm, and the capabilities of the BCS did not depend on the length of the barrel, and thirdly, such an ACS was not supposed to engage in open battles with the enemy’s MBT, but to act from ambushes. From 2 km, it easily hit any NATO tank on board, and, for example, the M-48 hit the M-48 in the tower from 1000m, into the lower frontal part of the hull from 1200 meters or more, and the well-armored forehead from 400m.

Finally, let me remind you that until the mid-80s, the VDD artillery regiment was armed with SD-44, 85mm divisional guns, whose carriage was crossed with a motorcycle, and they became self-propelled. If such a system suited the Airborne Forces, then why is a similar gun worse, only as part of an armored self-propelled gun?
As for the original ASU-85, with a long-barreled 85mm cannon, a reinforced version of this vehicle for the ground forces is of interest. But more on that in the next chapter.

2. Turretless tanks (tank destroyers and assault guns).

Self-propelled guns of this purpose showed themselves very clearly during WWII. Due to their design features, they made it possible to install more powerful weapons on the chassis of the corresponding tank than the basic model had, in addition, such self-propelled guns were cheaper and easier to manufacture tanks.

As the experience of WWII, especially German, showed, it was these machines that were the most effective tool anti-tank defense and support for infantry, and even tanks. The advantages of a tank destroyer over an anti-tank self-propelled gun like the Su-76M or Marder are obvious, tank destroyers are better protected, however, they are significantly heavier and more expensive.

Well, there is no need to talk about towed anti-tank missiles. Of course, they are much cheaper and more compact, so they outnumbered self-propelled guns by several times, but they also suffered huge losses: for example, in 1944-45, the victorious Red Army lost -11700 45 mm guns, 1600 57mm ZIS-2, 16600 76mm guns (although some of these are regiments) and about 100 BS-3. And in total, without taking into account regimental guns, up to 27000 anti-tank guns and divisional guns.

Let's add to them another 8000 light self-propelled guns, mainly Su-76s. For comparison, medium and heavy self-propelled guns were lost 3800 pieces. What is the reason for such large losses of towed anti-tank missiles? The thing is that a competent enemy very rarely sent tanks into battle without strong artillery and / or air support, so a significant part of the anti-tank guns was destroyed or suppressed without even having time to enter the battle.

And then such an anti-tank gun, due to its low mobility on the battlefield and the lack of protection, was very vulnerable to the return fire of enemy tanks and self-propelled guns. To disable an anti-tank gun, a close rupture of the OFS is enough, while a tank destroyer can only be disabled by a direct hit of a projectile, and either a very powerful one or in vulnerable places. It was the German Stugs and tank destroyers, as well as the Soviet Su-85/100 and heavy St. John's wort, that best cemented the defense.

Unfortunately, this direction of development of armored vehicles in the post-war USSR frankly died out. Yes, separate samples were created, some, like the SU-122-54, were even produced in a small series, the ASU-85 fully met these criteria, which physically could not be a landing force until the end of the 60s.

In reality, until the end of 1979, the self-propelled guns of the Great Patriotic War - SU-100 and ISU-152 - remained the basis of such equipment. These systems were the best in the world for 1946, and remained adequate until the mid-60s. The thing is that until 1965, the Soviet army actively used the T-34-85, T-44, IS-2/3, to support which these self-propelled guns were needed. The produced T-54/55 and T-10 tanks were only enough to equip the tank divisions, as well as the MSDs of constant combat readiness. And the rear rifle and motorized rifle divisions were mainly armed with WWII equipment.

It is clear that the ACS-85 in its original form was not needed by the ground forces. In terms of armament, security, mobility, it was inferior to the good old Su-100. Was it possible to create a tank destroyer worthy of ground forces? I think yes, here we could anticipate the Bundeswehr, for which they created the Jaguar tank destroyer, armed with a 90mm cannon.

To do this, instead of the ACS-85, it was necessary to create a machine weighing up to 20 tons with a reinforced undercarriage and a powerful B-105-B engine, thanks to which the new ACS could accelerate to 65 km / h, in addition, it should have been possible to install it in an ACS more powerful advanced weapons.

But the main thing is the increased security: the side armor should be strengthened to 25 / 30mm, the upper and lower armor plate, which corresponds to 33 / 30mm of the reduced armor, allowing you to protect the sides of the self-propelled guns from fragments and fire from 12.7mm heavy machine guns, and bring the forehead to 70mm of armor , which corresponds to 140mm of reduced armor.

Such a self-propelled gun would be somewhat inferior to the SU-100 in terms of firepower (slightly, armor penetration is 10 mm lower, and OFS power, but it would be faster). At the same time, the Su-85 would have been better protected in the frontal projection (140mm of armor versus 115mm) of the SU-100, at a lower height, although it would have had weaker side protection; but surpassed the Su-100 in maneuverability and efficiency.

But this is the first modification of the self-propelled guns, a trial one, and the main one could get the 100mm T-19 Rapira smoothbore gun as the main armament, which would allow the self-propelled guns to confidently hit all enemy tanks of 1-2 generations. For me, the 100mm tank destroyer is much more effective than the regular Rapiers that the AT-P and MTLB armored tractors carried.

Its survivability is much higher than that of a towed anti-tank gun, and its mobility is higher than that of an MTLB with an attached gun. Like the German Jaguar, it is also possible to create an ATGM on a similar chassis, for the Phalanx or Shturm-S ATGMs. Moreover, such an ATGM would be an order of magnitude better protected, and carried more ammunition.

Medium self-propelled guns on the T-54 chassis were presented by the limited-edition self-propelled guns Su-122-54. The fact that this machine did not go into a large series is quite understandable and fair: its armament is a cannon - D-49, modernization of the IS D-25, which at distances of 500/1000/1500/2000 m pierced 155/145/135/125mm, respectively armor.

That is, a self-propelled gun created to support a medium tank had less armor penetration than the main medium tank T-54 at a distance of 500-1000m, while before the adoption of the SU-122-54, a new 100mm armor-piercing projectile BR-412D appeared, which provided greater armor penetration than 122mm at all firing distances.

The D-25 simply did not penetrate the American M-47/48 tanks in the forehead. The need for a more powerful OFS is also debatable. assault guns with 122mm guns were relevant when the main tanks were T-34-76 and T-34-85.

Their 21 kg shells were several times larger than the 76-85mm shells, but the gap between 100 and 122 mm shells was only 60%. Then, the self-propelled guns were worse protected, only about 160mm of reduced frontal armor, versus 200mm for the T-54. So there is no question of any qualitative enhancement.

Here it was necessary to decide what to get: a tank destroyer or an assault gun? If it is an assault weapon, then the easiest way is to make a self-propelled gun based on a 152mm D-1 howitzer, 40 kg OFS was 2,5 times heavier than a 100mm projectile, and the presence of a concrete-piercing projectile in the ammunition load made it possible to effectively break through the enemy’s URs.

Such a self-propelled gun in a modernized version (chassis up to the level of the upgraded T-55, reinforced armor and DZ) would be quite relevant for both Afghanistan and Chechnya, a powerful 152mm projectile could sweep away militants settled in any building, and enhanced protection would cover from fire anti-tank light weapons. In reality, it was necessary to put on direct fire 2S3 "Acacia", which is very weakly protected.

If the military needed a tank destroyer, then they should have waited until 1957, when the new 122mm M-62 gun appeared. She only weighed 380 kg more than the D-25, but at the same time, at a distance of 2000m, she pierced 214mm of armor. This armor penetration was enough for all American tanks until the advent of the M-60A1. She could hit this tank only from 1000m.

When the BCS and BPS were created for the M-62, it was able to effectively hit the M-60A1 in the forehead. So a sub-caliber projectile, for example, pierced 320mm armor at 2000m, i.e. practically corresponded in terms of armor penetration to a 125mm shell, and surpassed the 115mm shells of the late 60s. In the 70s, this self-propelled gun could also be re-equipped with a 125mm gun with an AZ, which would make it possible to support the Soviet T-54/55 and T-62 with fire.

By the way, it was possible to smoothly switch to the production of vehicles based on the T-55, and due to the powerful engine, increase the mass of self-propelled guns and increase security. In some ways, such self-propelled guns would be similar to the Swedish turretless Strv 103 tank, in terms of firepower the SU-125-55 is more powerful, the Swede is better in terms of security, and the mobility is approximately equal.

Where is the place for such an ACS? Logically, IT looked good in the composition of self-propelled tank regiments, where one of the battalions was re-equipped with self-propelled guns. Well, it would be better to concentrate assault guns as part of self-propelled breakthrough regiments, giving them to the armies.

Now let's talk about heavy tank destroyers and assault guns. There was no need for new assault guns, there were enough numerous ISU-152s, into which even ISU-122s were converted.

But the new tank destroyers could well come in handy, the fact is that at the end of WWII, the Germans created well-protected tanks and self-propelled guns: the Royal Tiger and the JagdTigr, which were slightly vulnerable in the frontal projection.

After the war, the United States and Great Britain actually abandoned medium tanks, launching into mass production the actually heavy Pattons and Centurions, as well as the super-heavy tanks M-103 and Konkerror. It was extremely difficult to fight them with ordinary Soviet tank guns.

Interestingly, at the end of the war, a new ISU-130 tank destroyer was created in the USSR, but they did not start mass production.

In this decision, the factor of the end of the war, and the discontinuation of the IS-2, and the huge length of the tank barrel, and, finally, frankly stupid arguments that, they say, the 130mm caliber is someone else’s for the army, there will be difficulties with ammunition, etc. .

The last argument can be easily disorganized: what about a 100mm caliber, isn’t it a naval one?
Did the 85mm caliber appear so long ago? In fact, of course, the army needed a 130mm self-propelled gun, another question is that the self-propelled guns could be rearranged according to the type of Ferdinand, Su-101, i.e. place the gunhouse in the stern of the self-propelled guns, and make the machine itself on the IS-3 chassis.

As a weapon, use the 130mm S-70 cannon developed for the IS-7. This gun at a distance of 500/1000/1500/2000m had armor penetration of 217/207/197/188mm, and its OFS were a third heavier than 122mm shells. In addition, it must be understood that these data refer to shells of the 40s, while shells with better capabilities were adopted in the 50s.

So, for example, armor penetration increased to 250/240/225/210mm, even 180mm armor was hit at 3 km! But instead of this logical step, they tried to create a self-propelled gun - a monster on the IS-7 chassis, object 263. Why the army needed a tank and self-propelled guns with the same gun is not clear.

A similar 130mm self-propelled gun had to be created on the T-10 chassis, but then it was possible to produce an even more powerful self-propelled gun on the T-10M chassis. Ironically, such a self-propelled gun was created on the original T-10 chassis, object 268, armed with a powerful 152mm M-64 rifled gun.

But for me, it was the T-10M chassis that was best suited, thanks to a powerful engine and a perfect chassis, because the production of the initial modifications of the T-10 was being completed, and if the self-propelled guns entered service, then anyway, it should have been released on a new chassis.

Such a SU-152-10M would be the most powerful Soviet assault gun and tank destroyer. In terms of power, the new gun was significantly superior to the ML-20, which was armed with the ISU-152, the military claimed that its power was insufficient against Western MBTs, but who prevented the creation of a BPS or BKS for this gun, and that hitting 43kg OFS is dangerous for any tank , even without breaking through the armor.

The armor protection of the 268M object is also quite strong: frontal armor 187-248mm, wheelhouse armor about 200mm, side armor about 110mm. For comparison, the ISU-152 had a frontal armor of about 105mm, side armor of 80-90mm, which is just a laugh for the level of anti-tank weapons of the late 50s. And the speed at the 268M object allowed him to move on an equal footing with the T-54/55.

However, there was another option: the creation of a tank destroyer on the T-10M chassis with a completely new gun - a 152mm M-69 smoothbore gun was developed, which weighed only 200 kg more than 130mm systems.

At the same time, her sub-caliber projectile had monstrous armor penetration for the late 50s: at a distance of 1000/2000/3000m, it pierced 370/340/310 mm of armor, respectively.

Thus, he could hit the M-60A1 almost from 5000m. And the most powerful OFS was dangerous to any MBT. For comparison, the first 125mm BPS pierced 300mm armor from 2000m.

Accordingly, a 152mm sub-caliber projectile, which would have been put into service in the 70-80s, would have significantly greater armor penetration, surpassing 125mm shells.

Unfortunately, they wanted to install this miracle gun on a weakly armored self-propelled gun - object 120. Object 120 was a typical anti-tank self-propelled gun, with thin anti-fragmentation armor, and would be very vulnerable to NATO MBT fire, 90-120mm guns hit it from almost any fire distance, and 90-155mm OFS were very dangerous with a direct hit.

So, unlike the tank destroyer on the T-10M chassis, the 120 object was contraindicated to engage in open battle with enemy tanks.

3. Classic self-propelled guns - self-propelled artillery systems.

Almost all modern self-propelled guns are of this type - self-propelled artillery systems. This is, as a rule, an ordinary howitzer or cannon mounted on a lightly armored chassis and designed for fire support and escort of troops, firing from closed firing positions (some anti-tank self-propelled guns are exceptions).

Unlike turretless tanks, its armor is not capable of withstanding projectile hits, but is bulletproof and anti-fragmentation in nature, so a self-propelled carriage should not engage in open combat with enemy armored vehicles.

The first such self-propelled guns were created back in the years of WWI, when heavy guns began to be mounted on the chassis of heavy tractors, which is why the USSR produced a small series of 122mm self-propelled howitzer SU-5, on the T-26 chassis. Wheeled self-propelled guns SU-12 were also created. But, the Soviet military did not appreciate the huge potential of such systems, and this stupidity continued until the end of the 60s.

The mass use of self-propelled artillery systems, or as the Germans also called them self-propelled carriages, or self-propelled escorts, began during WWII by the Germans and Americans.

The Germans produced a rather large series of 105mm Vespe howitzers, 150mm Hummel howitzers and 150mm Grille mortars. The Yankees created the following systems: 105mm self-propelled howitzer, 155mm self-propelled howitzers and guns, 203mm howitzers. This was the first generation of American escort self-propelled guns. As we can see, the Germans, in fact, created self-propelled divisional artillery, and the Yankees, in addition, corps.

The idea of ​​creating such systems is quite logical, and was proposed by Guderian. It was he who proposed the thesis that tank forces only then they become such when, in addition to tanks, they include a combination of infantry, reconnaissance, artillery, air defense, sappers, rear services with increased mobility, maneuverability, and preferably security.

The advantages of self-propelled guns over towed ones are obvious: it is much less vulnerable to enemy fire due to the presence of armor, as well as the ability to quickly take up and then leave firing positions.

It is clear that it is impossible to completely abandon towed guns, and it is not necessary, but, of course, it is self-propelled guns that dominate the battlefield.

Unfortunately, the Yankees realized this very quickly, and during the years 1943-1963 they changed 3 generations of self-propelled artillery systems, and one of the 3rd generation self-propelled guns M-109 is the most massive self-propelled guns in the world, and is still in service with many countries, and is, by the way, the basis of US artillery.

Until the 70s, there were no such self-propelled guns in the USSR, the country had the most tanks in the world, but it was quite far behind the enemy in saturating the troops with armored vehicles and self-propelled artillery. But in the 70s, a whole series of "flowers" was created: "Carnation", "Acacia", "Hyacinth", "Peony", which at the time of creation was the best in the world.

The first post-war self-propelled artillery systems were created in the USSR in 1949: SU-100P and SU-152T. SU-100P, in my opinion, is very interesting for two reasons.

Firstly: the military did not see its huge potential, considering it as an anti-tank self-propelled gun; secondly: the chassis of the SU-100P is unique for its time, later, on its basis, self-propelled guns "Acacia", "Hyacinth-S", "Tulip", as well as a number of machines were developed.

Why didn't the self-propelled guns go into production? I will quote Shirokorad: “Despite all the advantages of the SU-100P, one can say about it: “neither a candle to God, nor a poker to hell.” As an anti-tank weapon, it did not surpass the T-54 tank, it was not suitable for howitzers, and for a long-range gun it had a short firing range and a weak projectile.

Is the master right? Yes and no. It is clear that the anti-tank self-propelled guns of the Soviet army were not needed, medium and heavy tanks and self-propelled guns were enough for these tasks, especially since it was inferior to the SU-76M in terms of security. The question is, what is the survival rate of such an anti-tank self-propelled gun if its frontal armor did not exceed 30mm?

Yes, Sherman could hit her from the utmost distance, and through and through. The closest our self-propelled guns were to the German "Nashorn", she would have appeared in 1943-44, but she was very necessary for post-war tasks. But at the same time, this system could become very relevant.

To do this, it was necessary to stop looking at the SU-100P as an anti-tank gun, and make it a self-propelled divisional gun. To begin with, it was necessary to install the BS-3 instead of the D-10/50 tank gun, the thing is that the tank gun had a maximum firing range of 15800m, while the BS-3, thanks to the large angles of inclination, could shoot at 20600m, which is longer-range "Acacia" .

As for the weak projectile, let me remind you: in terms of performance characteristics, the BS-3 was superior to the German 105mm corps gun, with which the Germans fought through the entire Second World War.

The SU-152G is even more promising, it is our Hummel in general, it is not clear why this modification of the SU-100P, armed with the 152mm D-1 howitzer, was not accepted into service?!

Logically, it was necessary to revise the armament of tank and mechanized divisions of the SA, instead of a regiment of 36 towed 122mm howitzers, it was necessary to create a regiment of 24-122mm self-propelled guns, 12 SU-100P, 12 SU-152G. And in the 60s, to make artillery regiments from 24 (36) SU-152G and 12 (18) SU-100P, making all artillery of tank and part of motorized rifle divisions self-propelled. At the same time, 122mm self-propelled guns are transferred to regimental artillery.

The question arises, where can I get a 122mm light self-propelled gun? Here, once again, there is no need to reinvent the wheel, but by analogy with the German Vespe self-propelled gun, create a system on the SU-85B chassis, which is a development of the SU-76M.

I think that before the advent of the 122mm howitzer D-30 and Gvozdika, such a system would be very relevant. Then, as an intermediate option, it was possible to build a 122mm self-propelled gun with a D-30, on the BTR-50 chassis. By the way, in the DPRK and China they created a whole range of self-propelled guns on the chassis of clones of this armored personnel carrier, including 122mm howitzers.

In the 50-60s, 152mm self-propelled guns were developed on the reinforced SU-100P chassis, I wrote about the 120 object above, the SU-152P is more interesting, for which the M-53 gun was created, which roughly corresponded to the M-47 in ballistics.

In my opinion, it was necessary to go further and create a whole range of self-propelled guns on a reinforced chassis, the predecessors of the Acacia and Hyacinth, by installing on self-propelled guns Soviet systems D-20/74 and M-46/47. Such self-propelled guns could be used to strengthen tank armies, as well as Soviet troops in Europe and the Western districts.

But the T-54/55 chassis could well have been used to create self-propelled guns of special power: 180mm guns, this is the Grabinskaya S-23. The firing range of a conventional projectile is 30.4 km, ARS -43.8 km. This formidable system was designed to replace the high powered 152mm BR-2 cannon, but due to lobbying by Khrushchev missile weapons re-equipment of the SA with new guns slowed down greatly, and heavy guns never went into production.

They resumed the production of such systems in the early 70s for export, so that our allies were able to withstand the American 175mm self-propelled guns M-107. Our proposed self-propelled guns on the T-55 chassis would be structurally close to the North Korean M-1978 Kokusan, but surpassed it in the quality of the artillery system and power, our caliber is 180mm, against 170mm for the Kokusan.

As for the M-107, the SU-180-55 would have surpassed it with a projectile weight of 88 kg of OFS and 84 kg of ARS, against 66.8 kg for the American system, as well as range, because. the American system did not have an ARS, but fired a conventional projectile at 32.7 km. In terms of the power of a conventional OFS, our system also surpasses the American 203mm self-propelled guns M110, which fired 90.7 kg shells.

Making a 203mm self-propelled gun based on the famous B-4 does not make sense: its OFS is only 12 kg heavier than 180mm, and in terms of range it loses more than 1.5 times. In addition, according to the logic, the self-propelled guns could also use marine 180mm shells weighing up to 97.5 kg.

So it was technically quite possible to create strong self-propelled artillery 15-20 years earlier. It would look like North Korean or Chinese self-propelled artillery of the 70s and 80s. Their systems are essentially our unborn self-propelled guns of the 50-60s.

Soviet self-propelled artillery of the 70-80s was generally optimal, in a fairly short period of time a whole series of excellent self-propelled guns was created, but the Msta-S became the crown of Soviet technical thought and at the time of the creation of the best 6 inch self-propelled guns in the world. Could anything be added to this SAU flower garden?

If we talk about machines on a tracked chassis, then two systems are interesting. The first is the 2S15 "Norov", a 100mm anti-tank self-propelled gun based on the chassis of the famous Gvozdika, in fact it is a self-propelled Rapira-R equipped with a sophisticated FCS. Did such an anti-tank self-propelled gun have the right to exist?

For all my dislike for lightly armored anti-tank self-propelled guns, I must admit that there was a certain reason for creating such a self-propelled anti-tank gun.

Such self-propelled guns had better fire accuracy than a conventional towed gun; the cross-country ability was also better than that of the towed version, simply attached to the MTLB, the calculation was at least protected from fragments and bullets, which increased its survival.

Finally, the self-propelled guns could quickly leave the firing position, avoiding enemy artillery fire. Unfortunately, work on the creation of this system began only in 1976, and the prototype was ready as early as 1983, the machine was ready for production in 1985, but then the Rapier was already considered obsolete
system and its release was completed, so 9 years of work went to the archives ...

What should have been done? To begin with, immediately develop a duplex of two vehicles: a 122mm self-propelled howitzer and a 100mm anti-tank gun immediately after the creation of the 2S1, which would allow the 2S15 to be put into production 10 years earlier. MSA "Rapiers-S" to unify, if possible, with the then tanks, for example, the T-64B.

Since 1981, release a modification with a radar sight, which in reality was created this year. As for the obsolescence of the Rapier, let me remind you that 30 years have passed since its production was discontinued, and the 2A29 anti-tank gun is still in service and firmly included in the states.

But I can’t resist criticizing the towed gun itself, it’s known that the “Rapier” is a modification of the PTO 2A19, which differed from it only in a new gun carriage, adapted for faster towing. The question arises why it was impossible to put anti-tank guns on the carriage of the legendary D-30A howitzer?

It is interesting that OKB No. 9 developed such a PTO, but the D-60 lost to 2A29, so who interfered with making a hybrid design, or even easier to give a command to unify the gun carriages of two mass systems ?!

The most annoying thing is that in the 80s, the Yugoslavs did just that, converting their anti-tank guns to D-30 gun carriages (modification M87 TOPAZ), in addition to facilitating operation, the D-30 gun carriage allows for circular fire, which is very useful for anti-tank guns. A self-propelled 100mm anti-tank self-propelled gun was created by the North Koreans

The second alternative self-propelled gun is 122 mm self-propelled gun, created together with the 2S3 "Acacia", based on the towed D-74. This gun was developed in duplex with the 152mm D-20 howitzer-gun, the new guns were supposed to replace the veterans A-19 and ML-20, however, in the 60-70s, the main SA hull guns were 130mm M-47 and 152mm "Hyacinth- B", so that the D-20 became the main divisional system of the Soviet motorized rifle divisions.

Unfortunately, the D-74 was produced in small batches and was more exported, and most of all it was produced by the Chinese. It is clear that the need for such a corps gun has disappeared, but who prevented the D-74 from being made a divisional gun? By analogy with the D-1 and BS-3, the stereotyped thinking of our generals deprived the divisional artillery of an excellent system.

The main advantage of the D-74 is its huge range by the standards of the 60-70s of 23900m, it shoots 6.5 km further than the D-20 / 2S3 and 3.3 km farther than the Grad. Even the 152 mm Msta-B howitzer, which appeared 30 years later, shoots only 800 meters further than the D-74, despite the fact that it weighs 1.5 tons more.

So a very relevant system and the creation of an ACS for it similar to the Akatsiya. It is sad that such a system was created, but again, our brothers in the socialist camp - in the DPRK, both visually and in terms of characteristics, it resembles the 2S3, but is armed with the D-74. This is the M-1991 system.

As for the 2S18 "Pat-S" self-propelled guns on the BMP-3 chassis, I consider the abandonment of this self-propelled guns to be quite reasonable. Only excellent chassis are good in this self-propelled guns, but the artillery part is surprising, the new 152mm howitzer has worse ballistics than the outdated D-20 / Akatsiya, the range does not exceed the D-30 / Gvozdika, the only advantage is a powerful 152mm projectile.

But in the realities of the late 80s, the Msta became the main divisional howitzer, and numerous Acacias were transferred to the regiments, for example, they armed the Moscow region "ceremonial" divisions.

Now let's talk about wheeled self-propelled guns. For the 50s, the installation of a 107mm recoilless gun on the BTR-40 chassis was most relevant. I wrote about the merits of this weapon above, it remained to combine it with a fairly successful and cheap armored personnel carrier.

In the next period, the 2S14 Sting-S system, a light anti-tank self-propelled gun on the BTR-70 chassis, armed with a unique 85mm 2A62 smoothbore system, is very interesting.

Apparently, it was planned to adopt both a self-propelled and a towed system, which was supposed to solve the tasks of anti-tank weapons at the battalion level in motorized rifle troops and marines, and the towed version was intended for air assault brigades. It is believed that Sting-S did not go into production due to insufficient armor penetration, which was 1.5 times inferior to a 125mm tank gun.

What can be said here? The armor penetration of Soviet 125mm shells of the 60-70s was in the range of 300-420mm at a distance of 2000m, so an 85mm shell of the mid-70s could penetrate up to 280mm at the same distance. Thus, he confidently hit in the forehead at a long distance all NATO tanks except for the latest modifications of the Chieftain.

However, the Soviet military was afraid of the 3rd generation tanks: Abrams, Leopard-2, Challenger. Nevertheless, there are many reasons to defend the 2S14: firstly, 85mm shells would be improved, reaching 360-400mm, while the rate of fire of self-propelled guns was 2 times higher than that of MBT.

Secondly, for some reason, the military likes to take on extreme situations, just like that, they see hordes of Abrams or Leo-2 going to the poor Sting-S, in fact, even in 1990. The arsenal of NATO countries was dominated by 1-2 generation tanks, and the PLA was represented mainly by T-54/55 clones and light tanks.

Then, why should a light self-propelled guns conduct open battles with modern MBTs. Her destiny is ambush actions, the defeat of NATO carcasses on board and stern. Thirdly, for the "Sting-S" there were many tempting targets in addition to tanks - infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armored vehicles.

Personally, the only thing that confuses me in this system is the need to adopt new types of ammunition and weapons. Can this be avoided? Yes, of course: the self-propelled guns had to be armed with the good old Rapier.

Is it possible? I used to consider such a move a gamble, but again the decisions were prompted by the brothers in the Socialist camp, now the Cubans. The Cubans created self-propelled guns on the chassis of the BTR-60, installing on them ... 100mm guns from the T-54/55, of course, having upgraded them.

If the Cuban “Kulibins” succeeded, then what prevented our most powerful military-industrial complex from installing the lighter 100mm smoothbore “Rapier” on the more powerful BTR-70/80 chassis?

I think only lack of imagination. What is the place of such a self-propelled gun or cannon armored car? Logically, this is a strengthening of motorized rifle battalions by including platoons of such vehicles, in addition, the Sting-S company could also be included in the reconnaissance battalions, there is also a reason to transfer some anti-tank units from the motorized rifle brigades to these self-propelled guns, as well as to strengthen marines.

Now consider wheeled self-propelled guns on automobile chassis. The first self-propelled gun, which actually could become the base one, is the famous Czech "Dana", it was tested in the USSR and limitedly adopted by the TsGV.

Moreover, the GRAU opposed the adoption of this system for service, not seeing the advantages of "Dana" over "Acacia". For me, the advantages of Dana for the European theater are obvious:

- “Dana” had greater speed and power reserve than “Acacia”, therefore, it was much more mobile, which is important for a rapid breakthrough to the English Channel. The worst cross-country ability is not critical, the roads of the Central and Western Europe by Soviet standards, simply incomparable.

Yes, and in the shroud of Africa, such a self-propelled gun is preferable. Then, for some reason, no one discusses the patency of the Soviet MLRS, because they are all wheeled, but at the same time they somehow served in all climatic zones and are now running successfully.

- “Dana” has a significantly higher rate of fire than “Acacia”, 8 v / m, compared to 3 v / m for our self-propelled gun.

- "Dana" is much cheaper and more economical to operate. For 100 km, it consumes 65 liters of fuel, and "Acacia" 165 liters. Finally, the undercarriage life of wheeled vehicles is much higher than that of tracked vehicles.

There were, of course, the advantages of our Akatsiya, its undercarriage is stronger, it can withstand heavy loads more easily, its cross-country ability is higher, its ability to fire shells from the ground is not unimportant, and the Tatra chassis is still alien to our army.

For me, it was necessary to organize barter with the Czechs, with the aim of supplying a large number self-propelled guns for parts of the Soviet troops in Europe in exchange for the supply of air defense systems and tanks, and "Acacia"
save for the troops on the territory of the USSR and seriously approach the creation of self-propelled guns on Soviet chassis.

In real history, one brigade of 120 "Dan" was formed as part of the TsGV. But for me, this is an erroneous decision: individual artillery formations were armed with more powerful systems, and the Dana was still a divisional self-propelled gun.

The Soviet automobile self-propelled guns began to be created in the mid-80s, based on the Msta-B howitzer and the KrAZ-6130 or KamAZ-5320 chassis, officially they were engaged in this work for 2 years (1985-87), but in fact they began back in 1983.

Why was all work stopped in 1987? Here and the reluctance of the Ministry of the Automotive Industry to engage in new chassis, making changes to existing designs, and the indifference of the military to this topic.

For me, the retrograde of our military and officials was clearly manifested here, having an example of a successful Dana, they did not bother to create its Soviet counterparts as soon as possible. Work should have begun as early as 1980, with the maximum use of Czech design solutions, subject to the due perseverance of military customers, by 1987 our versions of the Msta-K should be ready for serial production, which would be a serious addition to the towed and tracked option.

The advantages over tracked ones are the same as those of the Dana compared to the Acacia. Cheap chassis, with many times more mileage before overhaul; high mobility - a speed of 85 km / h and a cruising range of 1000 km, versus 60 km / h and 500 km for Msta-S, and finally, efficiency - fuel consumption of 45 liters per 100 km versus ... 260 liters for a caterpillar version.

The most annoying thing is that subsequently many countries created their wheeled self-propelled guns: G6 - South Africa, Nora-B Yugoslavia, Caesar France, Archer Sweden, SH1 China. Fortunately, there is great hope that a wheeled "Coalition" will be created.

At the end of this topic, I want to say that it made sense to create a 122mm wheeled self-propelled gun on the Ural-4320 chassis. Such a self-propelled gun would occupy an intermediate niche between a towed howitzer and a caterpillar self-propelled gun. Already in our time, such a system was created jointly by Israel and Kazakhstan, however, on the KAMAZ-63502 chassis.

May I ask, is it easier to tow the D-30? The advantage of such an installation is the ability to quickly open fire on the enemy and quickly leave the position before returning fire.

It takes about 3 minutes for a towed howitzer to deploy and return to the traveling position. Then, on the self-propelled guns, it is possible to provide automation of some processes, which would increase the rate of fire and accuracy of fire.

4. Self-propelled mortars and combined guns.

Mortars are the cheapest, lightest for the same caliber, easy to use and at the same time very effective. artillery pieces.

Due to their cheapness, lightness and simplicity, they penetrated many military levels: from arming a company to equipping RGK units.

The USSR was the leader in the creation of mortars: during the Second World War, its 120mm was so good that the Germans simply copied it, but 160mm mortars simply had no analogues (except for the German 150mm infantry gun, but these are different systems, the German gun is a mortar), after the war there were a new type of 160mm mortar and a heavy-duty 240mm mortar were created.

Unfortunately, because of Khrushchev, the development of mortars was abandoned. In the 70-80s, the situation somehow improved, the Vasilek automatic 82mm mortar and the first Tulip self-propelled mortar appeared, but at the same time there was complete stagnation with conventional mortars, the army used 120mm mortars from the Second World War, 160mm were gradually removed from service, and 82mm mortars of the war years were replaced by "Cornflowers" and automatic grenade launchers.

Only when the "rooster pecked", or rather Afghanistan began, new 82mm and 120mm mortars appeared. Unfortunately, apart from the "Tulip", the Soviet Army did not receive self-propelled mortars, although its opponents in NATO used 81 and 106mm, and then 120 self-propelled mortars, on the chassis of armored personnel carriers. Moreover, self-propelled mortars appeared during WWII in Germany and the USA, on the chassis of half-tracked mortars.

What kind of self-propelled mortars could be created in the USSR? In the post-war years, the creation of a whole range of mortars was most relevant.

For an 82mm mortar, the BTR-40 chassis is most convenient, while it is more reasonable to install a 160mm mortar on a chassis from the SU-85B, for a 240mm mortar, the installation from the SU-100P is suitable (especially since in 20 years it will be on these chassis that the Tulip will be created). the Airborne Forces were armed with a 107mm mountain mortar, the ASU-57 chassis is suitable for it, the most effective remains - a 120mm mortar, the BTR-50 chassis would be guaranteed to fit for it, but main question was, of course, in the installation of this mortar on the chassis of the BTR-152.

Outwardly, it may seem that this mortar for the BTR-152 is heavy, since only 81mm mortars were placed on half-tracks, on the other hand, much heavier ZPU-2, and even ZPU-4, were installed on the BTR-152. Well, the Cubans created a modification of the 120mm mortar on the chassis of a much lighter BRDM-2, so that by strengthening the chassis of this armored personnel carrier, you can get a completely perfect 120mm self-propelled mortar.

In the 60s, it was possible and necessary to create 120mm self-propelled mortars on the BTR-60 and MTLB chassis. By the way, in Bulgaria in 1981 they created and launched into mass production a 120mm self-propelled mortar on the chassis of the MTLB "Tundzha", which turned out to be very successful, for unknown reasons, this mortar did not enter service with the Soviet army, although its modification was created with a 120mm mortar "Sani" .

It is obvious that they planned to equip the Soviet army with combined self-propelled guns, so such a cheap and simple self-propelled mortar was not needed. But such self-propelled guns began to enter service with motorized rifle units only in Lately Self-propelled guns 2S34 "Khosta", and our motorized rifles did not receive a 120mm self-propelled mortar for several decades.

I think there is no need to prove that when receiving the assignment, our designers created a similar mortar 10 years earlier than the Bulgarians, and a mortar on the BTR-60 chassis back in the 60s. In the 2000s in Russia, for some reason, they created an 82mm self-propelled mortar 2K32 "Deva".

For me, it looks like a mockery of common sense, it’s stupid to install such a weak mortar on the MTLB chassis. The brothers created a similar mortar 30 years earlier, only it shoots pood mines, though it has a slightly smaller ammunition load of 60 minutes, instead of 84 for the "Virgo", but a smaller crew - 5 people, instead of 6.

In the 70s in the USSR they tried to create a 120mm mortar on the BMP-1 chassis, and in 2 versions - the usual one - muzzle-loading, and breech-loading, with installation in the tower. But for some reason, the first, simple option did not go into the series, although it directly asks for the arsenal of a mortar company of a motorized rifle battalion on an infantry fighting vehicle, and a combined gun was preferred to a breech-loading mortar.

And here the question arises, why weren't self-propelled mortars based on the Cornflower created? Usually, ersatz self-propelled guns were created, on the MTLB or BTR-D chassis, where the Vasilek stood openly on the roof of the car.

Logically, it would be necessary to create a self-propelled company mortar, respectively, on the chassis of the BMP-1, BTR-70, BRDM-2 and BMD-1, with the installation of "Cornflower" in the tower. It turns out a mini-Nona, but such a mortar is not its replacement, but an addition, 2 self-propelled automatic mortars per motorized rifle company would greatly increase its combat capabilities, especially in combating the enemy’s entrenched manpower. Such a machine is very relevant today.

Now let's move on to our unique combo guns. I believe that the 120mm "Nona" was a masterpiece of design thought, and only the inertia of the military did not allow us to correctly assess its universal capabilities.

This self-propelled gun is at the same time a light howitzer, and its OFS have a very strong high-explosive effect due to a powerful explosive charge of -4.9 kg, surpassing the 122mm howitzer projectile, as well as cluster, volumetric detonating and other shells. At the same time, "Nona" is also a mortar capable of using all 120mm mines.

And, finally, it can play the role of anti-tank guns, having cumulative shells in the ammunition load. The Nona has all these capabilities with a low weight, its towed version weighs 1200 kg, 2.5 times less than the D-30, which facilitates its installation on different chassis.

In 1981, the Nona-S on the BTR-D chassis entered service with the Airborne Forces and went into mass production, becoming the basis of the landing artillery, the Airborne Forces needed 72 new self-propelled guns.

IN ground forces, and the marines quickly appreciated new system, enthusiasts suggested starting a wide range of R&D to saturate motorized rifle battalions with Nona batteries, at the rate of 6 self-propelled guns, instead of 8-120mm towed mortars.

Work began on Nonami on the 2S1 Gvozdiki chassis, BRM-1K and BTR-70, the so-called. 2S17, 2S17-2 and Nona-SV. But, unfortunately, the first two vehicles were not even created in metal, the second was ready for mass production by 1984, but it was decided to develop a new Nona-SVK system on the chassis of the new BTR-80. Why didn't these excellent systems go into production? The principle “The best is the enemy of the good” worked.

It was decided to create a new generation combined gun, with improved ballistics and automated. This system was to be created on the chassis of the future BMP-3 and BMD-3 systems.

As a result, all the work was delayed for a long time, new systems were created, respectively, by 1995 and 1990! The system for the Airborne Forces "Squeezing" remained in a single copy, 2S31 "Vienna" was brought up for a long time, but it has not really entered service with the army so far. Instead, a simplified 2S34 Hosta system based on 2S1 was recently developed.

Logic suggests that the GRAU, on the contrary, should have given the task of creating new combined self-propelled guns as soon as the process of adopting the Nona-S entered the finish line, i.e. since 1980, and immediately in 3 versions, to equip motorized rifle battalions armed with the appropriate type of armored vehicles.

Already in 1984, it was possible to launch mass production of 2S17, 2S17-2 and Nona-SV, and they could be produced until the very collapse of the USSR, regularly modernizing, the only thing is that the release of Nona-SV would smoothly switch to the release of " Nony-SVK", already in 1987.

Soviet, and then Russian motorized riflemen and marines, these self-propelled guns in Afghanistan and Chechnya would be very useful, but in the 2000s the army would receive various modifications of the Vienna.

5. Flamethrower systems.

By flamethrower systems we mean flamethrower tanks and flamethrower MLRS. It should be noted that it was the USSR that was the leader in the creation of flamethrower tanks; before the war, more than 1000 flamethrower tanks on the T-26 and T-37 chassis were in service with the Red Army.

During the Second World War, medium flamethrower tanks OT-34 and OT-34-85 appeared, as well as heavy KV-8, and 1640 Soviet flamethrower tanks were produced, more than any other country.

Soviet flamethrower tanks favorably differed from their German and American counterparts by retaining the main cannon armament. In the post-war years, for obvious reasons, the value of flamethrower armored vehicles began to decline, although in local conflicts it was sometimes used very actively.

The strengthening of anti-tank weapons of the infantry had an effect here: if the flamethrowing range remained within 200 m, then the saturation of the infantry with RPGs and recoilless rifles made the use of flamethrower tanks quite difficult, however, for counterguerrilla operations, flamethrower tanks were very effective, but again, the appearance and massive use of napalm , sent them to supporting roles.

In the United States, after the war, they created the M-67 (based on the M-48) and M-132 (based on the M-113 armored personnel carrier) built in small batches of flamethrower tanks, they did not show themselves badly in Vietnam, but very few of them were produced, and indeed the massive introduction of the RPG-7 made it difficult to use, so after this war they quickly disappeared from the scene.

In the USSR, flamethrower tanks OT-54 and TO-55 were created. And here the riddles begin: very few of these cars were produced. As I wrote above, the main difference between Soviet flamethrower tanks and American tanks there was a standard cannon armament, it was placed instead of a coaxial machine gun.

So our vehicles were universal and could fight like ordinary tanks, which is especially important when breaking through the enemy’s defense line or fighting in populated areas, and they could fight on equal terms with enemy tanks. Therefore, nothing prevented the creation of starting the creation of strong flamethrower units in each tank and motorized rifle unit.

Logically, it was possible to have a company of 10-13 flamethrower tanks in each tank or motorized rifle division, but to form breakthrough tank flamethrower regiments as part of the armies. Such units could effectively cooperate with heavy tanks and self-propelled guns when breaking through the enemy front. Well, light flamethrower companies could have flamethrower armored personnel carriers based on the BTR-152 and BTR-60, armed with a TPO-50 flamethrower.

It would be a very versatile weapon, equally good in case of a dash to the English Channel, grinding hordes of Chinese infantry, or destroying dushmans. However, only 110 OT-54s were produced, which means that, taking into account the OT-34-85, there were about 300-400 flamethrower tanks left for the entire army, despite the fact that an order of magnitude more was needed. TO-55 produced much more, but also not enough, only 830 cars.

Although it was necessary and possible to release 2-3 times more. At the same time, taking into account the increased engine power compared to the original T-54 tank, as well as the fact that a flamethrower tank is a weapon for a methodical breakthrough, it was necessary to bring the mass of the tank to 40 tons, adding 3.5 tons of armor.

This would make it possible to bring the reduced frontal protection to 300mm, which would make the tank invulnerable to the use of RPG-2 and 82mm recoilless guns, and the first modifications of the RPG-7 would pierce the TO-55M to the limit.

Vulnerability would also be reduced from the fire of tank guns, especially 90mm. The first combat test of the OT-54 could have been carried out in Budapest-56, greatly demoralizing the local Salashists, of course, our OT-54 and TO-55M tanks could have shown themselves effectively in Damansky and in Afghanistan, and in other local conflicts.

They would also come in handy in Chechnya (of course with reinforced engines and DZ), by the way, ordinary T-55s and T-62s fought on our side in the Second Chechen Company, and it was these tanks that stormed Grozny in 2000. It seems that additional flamethrower weapons would not hurt them. But in reality, our OT-54 and TO-55 were withdrawn from service in 1993.

However, this is all a hint. In the 70s, a new flamethrower weapon began to be developed in the USSR: a heavy flamethrower system. In fact, this is an armored MLRS on the T-72 chassis, firing rockets with incendiary or thermobaric fillings at short distances.

The predecessor of this system can, to some extent, be considered the Sturmtigr, whose 380mm gun was a rocket-propelled bomber that fired rocket-propelled 350kg bombs filled with 125kg of TNT. It is clear that in street battles this monster could sweep away entire blocks.

The Germans were summed up by excessive booking, the self-propelled gun was overloaded and often broke down, but it was a couple of years late.

In our country, they went a different way, and created a 30-charge MLRS on the chassis of a mass tank. Surprisingly, already in 1980, TOS-1 successfully completed military tests and was recommended for mass production. And silence…

A unique combat sample was forgotten at the training ground for several years! They managed to release the first experimental batch only in 1987, and one car was sent for combat testing in Afghanistan, in the next 1988.

To be honest, these facts shocked me: by 1981, the USSR already had the perfect weapon of counterguerrilla warfare, but they forgot about it for 7 years, and threw it into battle at the end of the war, then, despite successful tests, they didn’t put it into mass production . Why?

Here, in my opinion, two factors played a role: to create new weapons for the war, they considered it superfluous with some kind of spooks, conventional equipment should have been enough; for the war with NATO and the PLA, these weapons were considered superfluous, it was planned to break through their defenses with strikes of tactical nuclear weapons, masses of T-64/72/80. Why else, some kind of TOS?

The Soviet army had little interest in local wars and could not overcome stereotypes. Then, the range of the TOS-1 is only 3500m, in order to suppress the enemy’s positions, he had to drive up to 2000-3000m, which made him vulnerable to enemy ATGM and MBT fire, but it was not taken into account that the terrain often does not allow a direct shot further than 1500-2000m, while TOS-1 is capable of firing from closed positions.

Yes, and in the conditions of an urbanized area, especially with an ATGM, you cannot shoot at extreme ranges, but to support the assault on a settlement, TOS is ideal. In Afghanistan, TOS-1 had simply unique capabilities: dushmans practically did not use ATGMs, with 2000-2500 m RPGs and recoilless are practically not dangerous, armor at the T-72 level made it generally invulnerable, but a salvo of 30 OD or incendiary rockets demolished any village with the militants.

It is clear that TOSs had to be applied massively, with batteries for each regiment or brigade. Due to the late adoption of TOSs, they did not get into the First Chechnya, and only in the Second Chechnya did they finally deserve recognition.

But they could be mass-produced and used since 1981, and they could also be exported. I think that TOS-1 would play a big role in the Iran-Iraq war, Eritrea, Angola. By the way, for export it was possible to create a lightweight system on the T-55 chassis. But it's just a shame that this car was stolen from the army for almost 20 years.

6. Self-propelled anti-aircraft installations.

ZSU is a fairly massive and effective air defense weapon, and, unlike air defense systems, it is universal, since it can be effectively used to support infantry and tanks, combat manpower, firing points and armored vehicles of the enemy. Anti-aircraft self-propelled guns are especially effective during operations in mountainous areas, as well as during the assault on a settlement.

During the war years, the USSR had only anti-aircraft guns and machine guns mounted on trucks or armored trains. Real ZSU were in service with the Reich, the USA and Great Britain, both on the chassis of tanks and armored personnel carriers, half-tracked tractors.

Lend-Lease anti-aircraft self-propelled guns based on half-tracks were very popular in the Red Army.

In the first post-war years, for reasons that are difficult for me to explain, the Soviet army did not receive enough ZSUs on tank chassis. Only 75 were produced! ZSU-37 on the SU-76M chassis.

It is not clear what prevented them from releasing 10 times more? The SU-76 was well studied by the troops, and there should be no problems with the operation, the 37mm 61-K anti-aircraft gun also fully justified itself, moreover, in the post-war years, it accounted for hundreds of downed American aircraft in Korea and Vietnam. So why wasn't this symbiosis put into mass production?

It can be assumed that it was decided to curtail the production of the chassis, the army was reduced and received mainly medium and heavy tanks. But then what prevented us from making a large number of ZSUs on the T-34-85 chassis, or even easier, converting some of the large number of remaining T-34-76s, produced in 1943-44, into self-propelled guns, which were still outdated and went mainly to tractors or meltdown?!

In the 60s, the PRC, and from China to the DPRK and Vietnam, received ZSU type "63", which was a remake of serial T-34s, with the installation of a twin 37mm B-11 gun on them. These systems performed well in Vietnam War, I think that nothing prevented them from being created in the USSR 15 years earlier and tested in Korea and Budapest. But, unfortunately, until 1955 in the USSR there was no mass-produced tracked anti-aircraft self-propelled gun, despite the fact that they were urgently needed.

In 1955, the ZSU-57-2 on the T-54 chassis was finally put into relatively mass production, about 830 of them were produced, which was enough to create a regimental air defense of tank divisions, 4 vehicles for each tank and motorized rifle regiment, as well as arm part of the tank regiments of motorized rifle divisions.

Ideally, of course, there were all tank regiments of the MSD, and, if possible, motorized rifle regiments, as well as considering the issues of modernizing the ZSU-57-2. The question of its effectiveness is debatable, the accuracy of fire on jet aircraft was small, there was no radar, on the other hand, for 1955 it was a completely perfect anti-aircraft gun.

You need to understand that in addition to its division, it was covered by a lot of anti-aircraft weapons: an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, a ZPU on an armored personnel carrier chassis (more on them below) and, finally, heavy machine guns on armored vehicles, and infantry small fire at low altitudes is very dangerous. Then, you need to take into account the power of the Soviet fighter aircraft.

However, the ZSU-57-2 was considered insufficiently effective, its production was stopped in 1960, before the Shilka was put into production, although it was possible to continue production on the T-55 chassis for another 3 years, after upgrading according to project 520.

The modernization consisted in the installation of 57-mm cannons SV-68 "Berezina" and small-sized radio-optical instrumentation systems for autonomous fire control "Desna". "Desna" combined optical sighting of the target - and a radar system for measuring the range and parameters of the aircraft's flight, with automatic adjustments to the position of the gunners' sights.

It is clear that the accuracy of the fire of such a machine is several times higher than its predecessor, and it could dramatically increase the capabilities of divisional air defense. And there, as an option, giving the ZSU-57-2 battery a mobile radar.

Such machines could already be produced for quite a long time, up to the 80s, both for the SA and for export. With the advent of the Shilka, the ZSU-57-2M had to be transferred to anti-aircraft artillery regiments to replace the towed S-60s, for any reason their accuracy and security were higher. But, unfortunately, such modernization was not carried out and most of these machines were transferred to the allies in the Socialist camp and countries of socialist orientation. By the way, the firing range of 57mm ZSU 6000m, which allowed them to hit helicopters of the 70s equipped with ATGMs, is only a matter of target designation.

Now let's talk about the wheeled ZSU of the 50s. There are no questions about the BTR-40A, this is a successful anti-aircraft gun, as the main armament is a 2x14.5mm machine gun ZPTU-2, it’s a pity that they were released a little, but questions arise for the older colleague BTR-152A.

Why is the armament of twice as heavy an armored personnel carrier the same as that of its light counterpart? After all, a version of this machine with ZPTU-4 was developed, but for unknown reasons it did not go into series. Was it even possible to double the mass of weapons of our anti-aircraft armored personnel carrier?

We look at the neighbors of the Czechs, they created their ZSU Prague-53/59 on a chassis close to our ZIS-151 / ZIL-157, only the armament of the Czech machine is a 30mm twin gun, whose towed version weighed as much as our quad anti-aircraft gun . Well, the Arabs and Vietnamese installed a quad installation based on the DShK without any problems, which is not much easier. So, the BTR-152A should be armed with a 4x14.5mm mount.

Other weapon options are also possible: for example, a 2x25mm anti-aircraft gun, based on the 2M-3 ship system, but the quad ZPU is still more interesting, due to the higher rate of fire, the mass of a second salvo of the ZPU-4 is only 10% less than the 2M-3, armor-piercing practically the same. But the probability of hitting 40 bullets per second is higher than that of 10 shells.

By the way, similar systems were also developed on the BTR-50 chassis, for example, the BTR-50P4, armed with the ZPU-4. The air defense version of the division looks like this: the tank division has 4 ZSU-37-2 or ZSU-57-2 in each regiment, as well as 4 BTR-152A-4 or BTR-50A-4, and the anti-aircraft regiment is armed with 32 57mm anti-aircraft guns S- 60. In the MSD, only the tank regiment is so armed, and 3 SMEs each have 4 BTR-152A-4 and 4 BTR-40A, and the anti-aircraft regiment of the division is equipped with 32 37mm anti-aircraft guns 61-K. The airborne division has an anti-aircraft battalion of 18 BTR-40A.

The next interesting ZSUs are Shilka and Yenisei. If "Shilka" is well known, then it's worth talking about "Yenisei". This is a twin 37mm anti-aircraft self-propelled gun based on the SU-100P chassis. In terms of firepower, the Yenisei is more powerful than the best Western ZSU Gepard.

It was planned that the Yenisei would become the basis of the air defense of tank divisions, and the Shilka of motorized rifle divisions, and the ZSU-37-2 variant should cover the Krug air defense system, blocking their dead zones. The Shilka has advantages in shooting at targets flying at low altitude, up to 1000m, as well as lower weight and cost. The Yenisei has the best range and reach in height, 4 times heavier shells, in addition, it is 10 km / h faster.

For me, the rejection of the Yenisei was far-fetched, both ZSU had the right to exist and complemented each other. But there was also a more reasonable, compromise option, the creation of a ZSU based on the Shilka, but with the artillery part of the excellent AK-230 naval installation.

Her 30mm projectile weighed 390g. against 190g. at 23mm Shilka assault rifles, the range of fire was not much inferior to the capabilities of the Yenisei, and the AK-230 could be immediately installed on the ZSU-23-4 chassis, which, by the way, was done in the DPRK. The mass of a second salvo is the largest for the AK-230 (13 kg), why is the Yenisei (12.8 kg), the Shilka has 10.8 kg. I think that such a ZSU would deserve fame and respect even more than the original Shilka.

However, the 23mm caliber would not have been forgotten either: the thing is that in 1960 the even more legendary ZU-23-2 system was created in the USSR. This system, with a mass of about 1 ton, had a rate of fire of 2000 rpm, i.e. her second salvo is 6.3 kg! For comparison, twice as heavy installation ZPU-4 had a second salvo of 2.56 kg.

The ZU-23 was losing almost to the Soviet anti-aircraft guns of those years. At the same time, the system turned out to be quite reliable and easy to manufacture. The ZU-23 was actively exported, but in the Soviet army it played a small role, being in fact a regular anti-aircraft gun only for the airborne forces, as well as covering anti-aircraft missile units.

Glory to ZUShka came in Afghanistan, it quickly became clear that Soviet armored vehicles were not very suitable for war in the mountains, the angles of the guns and machine guns BMP-1, BMD-1, BTR-60, BRDM-2 did not allow them to effectively hit targets on mountain peaks due to the small elevation angle.

In a few better situation there were only BTR-60s, and T-62s, which had anti-aircraft machine guns. In addition, there was a permanent task of defending motorcades. So I had to use Shilka and ZU-23 for these tasks. Anti-aircraft guns mounted on trucks of all kinds turned out to be a necessary weapon, moreover, the ZU-23 was actively installed on the MT-LB, BTR-D, BTR-60P, in fact, the army received hundreds of ersatz ZSUs. In modern wars, this anti-aircraft gun is used massively, and often on both front lines.

It turned out to be a very versatile weapon, even in the unmodernized version of the ZU-23 they shot down a lot of aircraft, they are especially dangerous for helicopters, and even for medium UAVs. But at the same time, the 23mm anti-aircraft gun has become the most important means of combating enemy manpower and light armored vehicles, being a de facto battalion weapon.

Almost all ZSU based on it have a serious drawback: the calculation and the installation itself are poorly protected, or even located openly. Logic suggests that from the very beginning, the ZU-23 could and should have been installed on the BTR-152A / BTR-40A instead of the ZPU-2.

I already wrote in the first part of the article that, in my opinion, the production of these armored personnel carriers, as well as vehicles based on them, was terminated prematurely. The SA lost a large number of cheap and very roomy armored personnel carriers, and therefore the ZSU on their chassis.

For me, such vehicles are better than ordinary non-armored trucks with anti-aircraft guns in the back. As an option, this is the production of simple anti-aircraft self-propelled guns on the BTR-60/70, MTLB and BTR-D chassis, equipped with the ZU-23-2, but this is a specialized ZSU, with the installation of anti-aircraft guns in the body of an armored vehicle, with a crew covered by armor and ammunition, with additional equipment for air defense tasks.

This can be a tablet for lighting the air situation, like for MANPADS calculations, and a radio direction finder, like for Strela-10. It is not excluded, and the classic installation of the ZU-23-2 on a truck. The only question is the number of ZU-23s used and their place in military air defense. In my opinion, ideally, it was necessary to have an anti-aircraft platoon of 4 ZSU-23-2s as part of each motorized rifle battalion, as well as engineering and reconnaissance battalions divisions.

In addition, the battery (8 ZU-23) should be attached to the division's anti-aircraft regiment and the supply vehicle battalion. MSD in this version receives 64 ZSU / ZU-23-2, a tank division 48 anti-aircraft guns. The Airborne Forces should receive a battery of 6 ZSU-23-2s on the BTR-D chassis in each airborne regiment and division of 18 such self-propelled guns per division.

Moreover, the ZUshki of motorized rifle battalions should be placed on armored chassis. This will strengthen the air defense of the division (they write that the probability of hitting a target is 0,023% in one span, with a target speed of up to 50 m / s.), I think that a mistake was made in the text, the target speed is 250 m / s, not 50 m / s , the accuracy of fire on helicopters is many times higher.

Then, barrage fire from dozens of ZU / ZSU-23-2 is capable of disrupting enemy raids at low and ultra-low altitudes, forcing enemy aircraft to rise above 2-2.5 km, which will reduce the accuracy of strikes and increase losses from the use of air defense systems. In addition, the massive use of these installations was equally dangerous for the motorized armies of NATO, for the masses of the PLA infantry, and for militants like dushmans.

The only drawback of the ZU-23 is its rather weak armor penetration: at a distance of 500/1000m, only 25/20mm. But here is a question for the military-industrial complex, which was supposed to give our army powerful armor-piercing shells for 23mm guns.

Even before the collapse of the USSR, such shells were first created in Finland, they hit 40mm armor from 500m, then Bulgaria, whose shells pierced 40mm from 1000m. It is clear that with such shells, the 23mm gun became a dangerous opponent for any NATO or PLA light armored vehicles.

So the mass of the ZSU-23-2 would be an important help to the Soviet motorized riflemen, paratroopers, and marines. By the way, in the divisions of the Bundeswehr there were from 50 to 144 20-mm twin anti-aircraft guns, and illogical ZU-23 (Rh202 system). I think that a similar approach would not hurt the Soviet army.

Conclusions.

It should be objectively recognized that the Soviet post-war self-propelled artillery reached a very high level, first anti-aircraft, then the rest, being the best in the world in a number of parameters.

Even 24 years after the collapse of the USSR, Soviet self-propelled artillery serves and fights in many countries of the world, remaining very common. Well, TOSs are experiencing a real flowering.

It is clear that there were shortcomings that were both objective and subjective. The objective disadvantages include the sharpness of the SA for maintaining global war with the massive use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, therefore, the army was not prepared for local conflicts, the fight against partisans or rebels.

Another drawback was the bias in favor of the production of tanks, until the 70s the rest of the armored vehicles were produced according to the residual principle, which slowed down the equipping of the SA with self-propelled artillery and armored vehicles.

Subjective factors include the decision of Khrushchev and his entourage to stop the development of self-propelled artillery, which slowed down its development for many years. Although even earlier, the Soviet military did not bother to correctly assess the experience of the Wehrmacht and the allies in creating self-propelled artillery systems and ZSU.

It is very difficult to explain the refusal to adopt the Object 268 heavy assault gun to replace the ISU-152, or the inability to deploy the production of combined guns on different chassis, in the hope that a new generation combined gun will be created.

As a result, only in the 2010s, our army received what it could have had already in the 80s. Similarly, only subjective factors can explain the neglect of light ZSU or the refusal to modernize the ZSU-57-2.

And finally, there is no justification for the delay in the adoption of the TOS-1, which was already ready for production at the very beginning of the Afghan war.

It remains only to shrug and grieve that our army did not receive so many interesting samples of self-propelled artillery, or received it very late, or this weapon was created by the more backward allies of the USSR, and the superpower used primitive or weak samples.

In the USSR, despite numerous design work in the prewar and war time, anti-aircraft guns with a caliber greater than 85 mm were never created. The increase in the speed and altitude of the bombers created in the west required urgent action in this direction. As a temporary measure, it was decided to use several hundred captured German anti-aircraft guns of 105-128 mm caliber. At the same time, work was accelerated on the creation of 100-130-mm anti-aircraft guns. In March 1948, the 100-mm anti-aircraft gun sample 1947 (KS-19). It ensured the fight against air targets, which had a speed of up to 1200 km / h and a height of up to 15 km. All elements of the complex in a combat position are interconnected by an electrically conductive connection. Guiding the gun to a preemptive point is carried out by the GSP-100 hydraulic power drive from POISO, but it is possible to point it manually. In the KS-19 gun, the following are mechanized: setting the fuse, sending the cartridge, closing the shutter, firing a shot, opening the shutter and extracting the cartridge case. The rate of fire is 14-16 rounds per minute. In 1950, in order to improve the combat and operational properties, the gun and hydraulic power drive were modernized. The GSP-100M system is designed for automatic remote guidance in azimuth and elevation of eight or less KS-19M2 guns and automatic input of values ​​​​for setting the fuse according to POISO data. The GSP-100M system provides the possibility of manual guidance on all three channels using an indicator synchronous transmission and includes GSP-100M gun sets (according to the number of guns), a central distribution box (CRYA), a set of connecting cables and a battery giving device. The source of power supply for the GSP-100M is a regular power station SPO-30, which generates a three-phase current with a voltage of 23/133 V and a frequency of 50 Hz. All guns, SPO-30 and POISOT are located within a radius of no more than 75 m (100 m) from the CRYA.  Gun-guided radar KS-19 - SON-4 is a two-axle towed van, on the roof of which a rotating antenna is installed in the form of a round parabolic reflector with a diameter of 1.8 m with asymmetric rotation of the emitter. It had three modes of operation: - all-round view for detecting targets and monitoring the air situation using the all-round view indicator; - manual control of the antenna for detecting targets in the sector before switching to automatic tracking and for rough determination of coordinates; - automatic tracking of the target by angular coordinates for accurate determination of azimuth and angle together in automatic mode and slant range manually or semi-automatically. The detection range of a bomber when flying at an altitude of 4000 m is at least 60 km. Accuracy of determination of coordinates: in range 20 m, in azimuth and elevation: 0-0.16 da.  From 1948 to 1955, 10,151 KS-19 guns were manufactured, which, before the advent of air defense systems, were the main means of combating high-altitude targets. But the mass adoption of anti-aircraft guided missiles far from immediately supplanted the KS-19. In the USSR, anti-aircraft batteries armed with these guns were available at least until the end of the 70s. KS-19s were delivered to countries friendly to the USSR and participated in the Middle East and Vietnam conflicts. Part of the 85-100-mm guns being removed from service were transferred to anti-avalanche services and used as hail-killers. In 1954, mass production of the 130 mm KS-30 anti-aircraft gun began. The gun had a reach in height - 20 km, in range - 27 km. Rate of fire - 12 rds / min. Loading is separate-sleeve, the weight of the equipped sleeve (with charge) is 27.9 kg, the weight of the projectile is 33.4 kg. Weight in combat position - 23500 kg. Weight in the stowed position - 29000 kg. Calculation - 10 people. To facilitate the work of the calculation on this anti-aircraft gun, a number of processes were mechanized: setting the fuse, bringing the tray with the elements of the shot (projectile and loaded cartridge case) to the loading line, sending the elements of the shot, closing the shutter, firing a shot and opening the shutter with the extraction of the spent cartridge case. Guidance of the gun is carried out by hydraulic servo drives, synchronously controlled by POISOT. In addition, semi-automatic aiming at indicator instruments can be carried out by manually controlling hydraulic actuators. Production of the KS-30 was completed in 1957, with a total of 738 guns produced. Anti-aircraft guns KS-30 were very bulky and low-mobile. They covered important administrative and economic centers. Often, the guns were placed on stationary concrete positions. Before the advent of the S-25 Berkut air defense system, about a third of the total number of these guns was deployed around Moscow. On the basis of the 130-mm KS-30, in 1955, the 152-mm anti-aircraft gun KM-52 was created, which became the most powerful domestic anti-aircraft artillery system. To reduce recoil, the KM-52 was equipped with a muzzle brake, the effectiveness of which was 35 percent. Wedge gate of horizontal design, operation of the gate is carried out from the energy of the roll. The anti-aircraft gun was equipped with a hydropneumatic recoil brake and knurler. A wheeled carriage with a carriage is a modified version of the KS-30 anti-aircraft gun. The weight of the gun is 33.5 tons. Reachability in height - 30 km, in range - 33 km. Calculation-12 people. Loading separately-sleeve. The power and supply of each of the elements of the shot was carried out independently by mechanisms located on both sides of the barrel - on the left for shells and on the right for cartridge cases. All drives of the feed and feed mechanisms were powered by electric motors. The store was a horizontal conveyor with an endless chain. The projectile and cartridge case were located in stores perpendicular to the firing plane. After the automatic fuse installer was triggered, the feeding tray of the projectile feed mechanism moved the next projectile to the chambering line, and the cartridge case feed mechanism feed tray moved the next cartridge case to the chambering line behind the shell. The layout of the shot took place on the ramming line. The chambering of the collected shot was carried out by a hydropneumatic rammer, cocked when rolling. The shutter was closed automatically. Rate of fire 16-17 rounds per minute. The gun successfully passed the test, but was not launched into a large series. In 1957, a batch of 16 KM-52 guns was made. Of these, two batteries were formed, stationed in the Baku region. During the Second World War, there was a "difficult" level of heights for anti-aircraft guns from 1500 m to 3000. Here, the aircraft turned out to be inaccessible to light anti-aircraft guns, and this height was too low for heavy anti-aircraft artillery guns. In order to solve the problem, it seemed natural to create anti-aircraft guns of some intermediate caliber. The 57-mm S-60 anti-aircraft gun was developed at the TsAKB under the direction of V.G. Grabin. Serial production of the gun was started in 1950. The S-60 automatics worked due to recoil energy with a short barrel recoil. The power of the gun is store-bought, there are 4 cartridges in the store. Rollback brake hydraulic, spindle type. The balancing mechanism is spring, swinging, pulling type. On the platform of the machine there is a table for a clip with chambers and three seats for calculation. When firing with an eye on the platform, there are five people of the calculation, and when the POISO is running, two or three people. The course of the wagon is inseparable. Torsion suspension. Wheels from a ZIS-5 truck with spongy tires. The mass of the gun in the combat position is 4800 kg, the rate of fire is 70 rds / min. starting speed projectile - 1000 m / s. Projectile weight - 2.8 kg. Reachability in range - 6000 m, in height - 4000 m. The maximum speed of the air target is 300 m / s. Calculation - 6-8 people. The ESP-57 follower battery set was intended for azimuth and elevation guidance of a battery of 57-mm S-60 guns, consisting of eight or less guns. When firing, the PUAZO-6-60 and the SON-9 gun-guided radar station were used, and later the RPK-1 Vaza radar instrumentation system. All guns were located at a distance of no more than 50 m from the central distribution box. ESP-57 drives could carry out the following types of gun aiming: - automatic remote aiming of battery guns according to POISO data (the main type of aiming); - semi-automatic aiming of each gun according to the automatic anti-aircraft sight; - manual aiming of battery guns according to POISO data using zero-indicators of accurate and rough readings (indicator type of aiming). The S-60 received its baptism of fire during the Korean War in 1950-1953. But the first pancake was lumpy - a massive failure of the guns immediately came to light. Some installation defects were noted: breakages of the extractor legs, clogging of the food store, failures of the balancing mechanism. In the future, there were also noted non-setting of the shutter on the automatic sear, skew or jamming of the cartridge in the magazine when feeding, the transition of the cartridge beyond the firing line, the simultaneous supply of two cartridges from the magazine to the firing line, jamming of the clip, extremely short or long rollbacks of the barrel, etc. Design flaws The S-60 was fixed, and the gun successfully shot down American aircraft. Later, the 57-mm S-60 anti-aircraft gun was exported to many countries of the world and was repeatedly used in military conflicts. Guns of this type were widely used in the air defense system of North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, showing high efficiency when firing at targets at medium altitudes, as well as by the Arab states (Egypt, Syria, Iraq) in the Arab-Israeli conflicts and the Iran-Iraq war. Morally obsolete by the end of the 20th century, the S-60, in the case of massive use, is still capable of destroying modern fighter-bomber class aircraft, which was demonstrated during the war in Persian Gulf 1991, when Iraqi crews from these guns managed to shoot down several American and British aircraft. According to the Serbian military, they shot down several Tomahawk missiles from these guns. S-60 anti-aircraft guns were also produced in China under the name Type 59. At present, anti-aircraft guns of this type are mothballed at storage bases in Russia. Last military unit , which was armed with S-60s, was the 990th anti-aircraft artillery regiment of the 201st motorized rifle division during the Afghan war. In 1957, on the basis of the T-54 tank, using S-60 assault rifles, mass production of the ZSU-57-2 was started. Two guns were installed in a large tower open from above, and the details of the right machine gun were a mirror image of the details of the left machine gun. The vertical and horizontal guidance of the S-68 gun was carried out using an electro-hydraulic drive. The guidance drive was powered by a DC motor and used universal hydraulic speed controllers.  The ZSU ammunition consisted of 300 cannon shots, of which 248 shots were loaded into clips and placed in the turret (176 shots) and in the bow of the hull (72 shots). The rest of the shots in the clips were not equipped and fit into special compartments under the rotating floor. The clips were fed by the loader manually. Between 1957 and 1960, about 800 ZSU-57-2s were produced. ZSU-57-2 were sent to armament of anti-aircraft artillery batteries of two-platoon tank regiments, 2 installations per platoon. The combat effectiveness of the ZSU-57-2 depended on the qualifications of the crew, the training of the platoon commander, and was due to the lack of a radar in the guidance system. Effective fire to kill could only be fired from a stop; firing "on the move" at air targets was not provided. ZSU-57-2s were used in the Vietnam War, in the conflicts between Israel and Syria and Egypt in 1967 and 1973, as well as in the Iran-Iraq war. Very often, during local conflicts, the ZSU-57-2 was used to provide fire support to ground units. In 1960, the 23-mm ZU-23-2 mount was adopted to replace the 25-mm anti-aircraft guns with clip-loading. It used shells previously used in the Volkov-Yartsev (VYa) aircraft gun. An armor-piercing incendiary projectile weighing 200 grams, at a distance of 400 m normally penetrates 25 mm armor. rotary and balancing mechanisms and anti-aircraft automatic sight ZAP-23. Power supply of automatic machines is tape. The belts are metal, each of them is equipped with 50 cartridges and is packed in a quick-change cartridge box. The device of the machines is almost the same, only the details of the feed mechanism differ. The right machine has the right power supply, the left one has the left power supply. Both machines are fixed in the same cradle, which, in turn, is located on the upper carriage machine. On the basis of the upper carriage machine there are two seats, as well as a handle for the rotary mechanism. In the vertical and horizontal planes, the guns are guided manually. The rotary handle (with brake) of the lifting mechanism is located on the right side of the gunner's seat. The ZU-23-2 uses very successful and compact manual vertical and horizontal aiming drives with a spring-type balancing mechanism. Brilliantly designed units allow you to transfer the trunks to the opposite side in just 3 seconds. The ZU-23-2 is equipped with a ZAP-23 anti-aircraft sight, as well as a T-3 optical sight (with a 3.5x magnification and a 4.5° field of view), designed for firing at ground targets. The installation has two triggers: foot (with a pedal opposite the gunner's seat) and manual (with a lever on the right side of the gunner's seat). Automatic fire is carried out simultaneously from both barrels. On the left side of the trigger pedal is the brake pedal of the rotating unit of the installation. Rate of fire - 2000 rounds per minute. Installation weight - 950 kg. Firing range: 1.5 km in height, 2.5 km in range. A two-wheeled chassis with springs is mounted on road wheels. In the combat position, the wheels rise and deviate to the side, and the gun is installed on the ground on three base plates. A trained crew is able to transfer the memory from traveling to combat in just 15-20 seconds, and back in 35-40 seconds. If necessary, the ZU-23-2 can fire from the wheels and even on the move - right when transporting the ZU-23-2 behind the car, which is extremely important for a fleeting combat clash. The unit has excellent mobility. ZU-23-2 can be towed behind any army vehicle, since its weight in the stowed position, together with cases and equipped cartridge boxes, is less than 1 ton. The maximum speed is allowed up to 70 km / h, and off-road - up to 20 km / h . There is no standard anti-aircraft fire control device (POISO) that provides data for firing at air targets (lead, azimuth, etc.). This limits the possibilities of anti-aircraft fire, but makes the gun as cheap as possible and accessible to soldiers with a low level of training. The effectiveness of firing at air targets has been increased in the ZU-23M1 - ZU-23 modification with the Sagittarius set placed on it, which ensures the use of two domestic Igla-type MANPADS. The ZU-23-2 installation has gained rich combat experience, it has been used in many conflicts, both against air and ground targets. During the Afghan war, the ZU-23-2 was widely used Soviet troops as a means of fire cover when escorting convoys, in the version of installation on trucks: GAZ-66, ZIL-131, Ural-4320 or KamAZ. Mobility anti-aircraft gun mounted on a truck, coupled with the ability to fire at high elevation angles, proved to be an effective means of repelling attacks on convoys in the highlands of Afghanistan. In addition to trucks, the 23-mm installation was installed on a variety of chassis, both tracked and wheeled. This practice was developed during the "Counter-Terrorist Operation", ZU-23-2 was actively used to destroy ground targets. The ability to conduct intense fire proved to be very useful in the conduct of hostilities in the city. The airborne troops use the ZU-23-2 in the version of the Skrezhet gun mount based on the tracked BTR-D. The production of this anti-aircraft installation was carried out by the USSR, and then by a number of countries, including Egypt, China, the Czech Republic / Slovakia, Bulgaria and Finland. The production of 23 mm ZU-23 ammunition at various times was carried out by Egypt, Iran, Israel, France, Finland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and South Africa. In our country, the development of anti-aircraft artillery went along the path of creating self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery systems with radar detection and guidance (Shilka) and anti-aircraft gun-missile systems (Tunguska and Pantsir).

Played one of the most important roles in the defeat Nazi Germany. An equally important place was assigned to artillery in ensuring the defense capability of the Soviet Union in the first post-war years.

The direct control, training, education and provision of combat, operational-tactical and special training of artillery command and personnel, the development of plans for the development and improvement of all artillery, as well as providing it with the necessary weapons and military equipment, was entrusted to the Artillery Commander of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

To implement the tasks assigned to the commander, the following governing bodies were subordinate: the Headquarters of Artillery, the Main Artillery Directorate, the Combat Training Directorate, the Directorate of Artillery Military Educational Institutions and the Personnel Directorate. In addition, the artillery commander was responsible for the development of the country's air defense plan and the implementation of measures to prepare the territory of the USSR for air defense. In this regard, the commander of the country's air defense forces was subordinated to him. Under the leadership of the Commander of Artillery, Marshal of Artillery N.N. Voronov, plans were prepared for the transfer of artillery to peacetime states and artillery weapons Soviet army, the implementation of which began after the completion of the demobilization of the personnel of the army in the field.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, the artillery of the Soviet Army underwent significant changes. The number of artillery units increased due to the creation of additional formations in rifle corps and divisions. Each of the surviving rifle corps received at its disposal a corps artillery brigade consisting of cannon and howitzer artillery regiments (they were created, among other things, by reorganization from anti-tank ones), as well as a reconnaissance artillery battalion.

In addition, each of the corps included a guards mortar regiment and an anti-aircraft artillery division (later a regiment). Rifle divisions reinforced by a mortar and howitzer regiment, and the existing artillery regiment became known as a cannon regiment. All these regiments were reduced to an artillery brigade. In addition, each of the divisions received at its disposal 2 more separate artillery divisions - anti-aircraft and self-propelled. In the late 1940s - early 1950s. a number of artillery formations and units were disbanded.

So, most of the directorates of artillery corps, a number of divisions and brigades ceased to exist. The number of regiments also decreased, mainly due to their enlargement. At the same time, about 70% of the units remained (especially anti-aircraft artillery), and some of the individual brigades and regiments were reduced or converted into divisions. So, by 1948, 11 cannon divisions were additionally formed from separate regiments and brigades. Changes also took place in the composition of artillery divisions - the number of brigades and regiments decreased, the staff of the division's command and control changed.

Thus, anti-aircraft artillery divisions were transferred from four regiments to three regiments. Many of the compounds have changed numbers and partly composition. Thus, in the first post-war years, the activities of the Commander of Artillery were aimed at improving the organizational and staffing structure of artillery units, which resulted in their disaggregation, as well as the adoption of the latest artillery systems, communications and various vehicles, which contributed to increased mobility and firepower artillery formations of the ground forces.

S.Yu. Kondratenko