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Everyone who had at least a tangential relation to the army service or the defense industry has heard about the “time of life in battle” - a fighter, tank, unit. But what is the reality behind these numbers? Is it really possible to start counting down the minutes before going into battle? The ideas that exist among the broad masses of military personnel about the time of life in battle were successfully portrayed by Oleg Divov in the novel "The Weapon of Retribution" - a book about the service of "Ustinov students" at sunset Soviet power: “They, proudly: our division is designed for thirty minutes of battle! We openly told them: we found something to be proud of! Everything came together in these two proposals - pride in one’s own mortality, and the transfer of a misunderstood tactical assessment of the unit’s viability in time to the life of its personnel, and the rejection of such false pride by more literate comrades ...
The idea that there is a calculated life expectancy for individual units and formations came from the practice of staff work, from understanding the experience of the Great Patriotic War. The average period of time during which a regiment or division, according to the experience of the war, remained combat-ready was called the "time of life." This does not mean at all that after this period all the personnel will be killed by the enemy, and the equipment will be burned.
Let's take a division - the main tactical unit. For its functioning, it is necessary that there be a sufficient number of fighters in the rifle units - and they leave not only killed, but also wounded (from three to six per one killed), sick, with their legs worn to the bones or injured by the armored personnel carrier hatch ... It is necessary that the engineering battalion had a supply of the property from which bridges would be built - after all, the supply battalion would carry everything that the units and subunits needed in battle and on the march along them. It is required that the repair and restoration battalion has the necessary amount of spare parts and tools to keep the equipment in working / combat-ready condition. And all these reserves are not unlimited. The consumption of heavy mechanized bridges TMM-3 or links of the pontoon-bridge park will lead to sharp decline offensive capabilities of the connection, will limit its "life" in the operation.

Deadly meters
These are the factors that affect the viability of the connection, but are not related to the opposition of the enemy. Now let's turn to the estimation of the "life in combat" time. How long can an individual soldier live in a battle fought with the use of one weapon or another, using one or another tactic. The first serious experience of such calculations was presented in the unique work The Future War in Technical, Economic and Political Relations. The book was published in six volumes in 1898, and its author was the Warsaw banker and railroad worker Ivan Bliokh.

Accustomed to numbers, the financier Bliokh, with the help of a unique team he assembled, consisting of officers of the General Staff, tried to mathematically evaluate the impact of new types of weapons - repeating rifles, machine guns, artillery pieces on smokeless powder and with a blasting charge - on the then types of tactics. The technique was very simple. From the French military leadership of 1890, they took the battalion offensive scheme. They took the probabilities of hitting a growth target by a entrenched shooter from three-line rifles obtained at the training ground. The speeds with which the chain of shooters moves to the beat of drums and the sounds of horns were well known - both for the step and for the run, to which the French were going to switch when approaching the enemy. Then came the most ordinary arithmetic, which gave an amazing result. If from a line of 500 m, 637 infantrymen begin to approach a hundred entrenched shooters with magazine rifles, then even with all the speed of the French impulse, only a hundred will remain at the line of 25 m, from which it was then considered appropriate to move into a bayonet. No machine guns, which then passed through the department of artillery, - ordinary sapper shovels for digging in and magazine rifles for shooting. And now the position of the shooters is no longer able to be taken by a six-fold superior mass of infantry - after all, hundreds of those who ran half a verst under fire and in bayonet fighting have little chance against hundreds lying in the trenches.
Pacifism in numbers
At the time of the release of The Future War, peace still reigned in Europe, but in Blioch's simple arithmetic calculations, the whole picture of the coming World War I, its positional impasse, was already visible. No matter how learned and devoted to the banner the fighters, the advancing masses of infantry will be swept away by the fire of the defending infantry. And so it happened in reality - for specifics, we will refer the reader to Barbara Tuckman's book "The Guns of August". The fact that in the later phases of the war the advancing infantry was stopped not by the arrows, but by the machine gunners who had sat out the artillery preparation in the dugouts, essentially did not change anything.

Based on the Blioch technique, it is very easy to calculate the expected lifetime of an infantryman in battle when advancing from a line of 500 m to a line of 25 m. As you can see, 537 out of 637 soldiers died or were seriously wounded during overcoming 475 m. From the diagram in the book, you can see how the life time was reduced when approaching the enemy, as the probability of dying increased when reaching the lines of 300, 200 m ... The results turned out to be so clear that Blioch considered them sufficient to justify the impossibility of a European war and therefore took care of the maximum distribution of his work. Reading Blioch's book prompted Nicholas II to convene in 1899 in The Hague the first peace conference on disarmament. The author himself was submitted for Nobel Prize peace.
However, Blioch's calculations were not destined to stop the coming massacre ... But there were a lot of other calculations in the book. For example, it was shown that a hundred shooters with repeating rifles would disable an artillery battery in 2 minutes from a distance of 800 m and in 18 minutes from a distance of 1500 m - doesn't it look like the artillery paratroopers described by Divovy with their 30 minutes of division life?

Third world? Better not!
The works of those military specialists who were preparing not to prevent, but to successfully conduct a war, to develop a cold war into a hot World War III, were not widely published. But - paradoxically - it was these works that were destined to contribute to the preservation of peace. And so, in the narrow and not inclined to public circles of staff officers, the calculated parameter "lifetime in battle" began to be used. For a tank, for an armored personnel carrier, for a unit. The values ​​for these parameters were obtained in much the same way as Blioch once was. They took an anti-tank gun, and at the training ground they determined the probability of hitting the silhouette of a car. This or that tank was used as a target (at the beginning of the Cold War, both opposing sides captured German equipment was used for these purposes) and checked with what probability a shell hit would pierce the armor or an armored action would disable the vehicle.

As a result of the chain of calculations, the very lifetime of a piece of equipment in a given tactical situation was displayed. It was purely a calculated value. Probably, many have heard of such monetary units as the Attic talent or the South German thaler. The first contained 26,106 g of silver, the second - only 16.67 g of the same metal, but both of them never existed in the form of a coin, but were just a measure of counting smaller money - drachmas or pennies. Similarly, a tank that will have to live in an oncoming battle for exactly 17 minutes is nothing more than a mathematical abstraction. We are talking only about time-friendly adding machines and slide rules integral assessment. Without resorting to complex calculations, the staff officer could determine how many tanks would be needed for a combat mission, during which it was necessary to cover one or another distance under fire. We bring together distance, combat speed and life time. We determine according to the standards how many tanks in the ranks should remain in the width of the front after they go through the hell of battle. And it is immediately clear what size unit should be entrusted with the combat mission. The predicted failure of the tanks did not necessarily mean the death of the crews. As the driver Shcherbak cynically argued in the story of front-line officer Viktor Kurochkin “In war as in war”, “It would be happiness if the Fritz rolled a disc into the engine compartment: the car is kaput, and everyone is alive.” And for the artillery battalion, the exhaustion of half an hour of battle, for which it was designed, meant, first of all, the depletion of ammunition, overheating of the barrels and recoilers, the need to leave positions, and not death under fire.
neutron factor
The conditional "time of life in battle" successfully served staff officers even when it was necessary to determine the combat capability of advancing tank units in the conditions of the use of neutron warheads by the enemy; when it was necessary to estimate what power nuclear strike burn out enemy anti-tank missiles and extend the life of their tanks. The tasks of using gigantic powers were solved by the simplest equations: it was they who gave an unambiguous conclusion - nuclear war on the European theater of operations must be avoided.
well and modern systems combat operations management, from the highest level, such as the National Defense Control Center of the Russian Federation, to tactical ones, such as one system Constellation Tactical Command uses more differentiated and more accurate simulation parameters, which are now conducted in real time. However, the objective function remains the same - to make both people and machines live in combat for the maximum time.

Of course, the trunk is long, life is short

But artillery is far from being limited to armor-piercers.

Well, it’s clear that the artillerymen from the artillery of special power of the RGK had a much greater survival rate than the IPTAPs. It is possible that they lived longer than the rest.

As for anti-tank weapons, there are interesting recollections of one gunner on iremember.ru:

To me and, as far as I can judge from the then conversations with comrades, to my brother-soldiers, the picture of the battles seemed like this. After short but powerful artillery raids, the Germans attacked with tanks. Heavy vehicles, "Tigers" and "Ferdinands" went to the heights in the depths of the German positions and stopped at a distance of one - one and a half kilometers from our positions. Lighter and more maneuverable T-IVs continued to move along with a few infantry. It was pointless for us to fire at the vehicles behind us. Even in the case of a direct hit, the projectile could not cause serious damage at such a distance. AND German tankers we waited until our anti-tank defenses were forced to open fire on advancing tanks. A gun that started firing, found itself, immediately became the victim of an accurate shot from stationary heavy vehicles. It should be noted that the "Tigers" had very accurate sights and a very accurate 88-mm gun. This explained the advice I received not to shoot until the last moment. By opening fire at "pistol distance", you can count on hitting the first or, in extreme cases, the second shell, and then, even if the gun is broken, you still get an unfavorable "exchange of pieces" for the Germans - a tank for a light gun. If you show your position prematurely, then, most likely, the gun will be lost in vain.

That is, it really turns out that the life of anti-tank guns on the battlefield was very short

But the death of the gun did not always mean the death of the calculation. In 1645 IPTAP found a way out:

This also explains the additional changes made to the typical device of the gun trench. To the right and left of the gun, near the wheels, two slots were made - one for the gunner, the second for the loader. The ZIS-3 gun practically does not require the simultaneous presence of all crew at the gun. Moreover, the simultaneous presence of only one person is quite enough. The gunner, having fired a shot, could hide in the gap while the loader drives another cartridge into the barrel. Now the gunner takes a place, points, shoots, and the loader at this time is in cover. Even with a direct hit on the gun, at least one of the two has a chance to survive. The rest of the calculation numbers are scattered over the cracks, side "pockets" of the trench. The practical experience that this regiment had accumulated since the Kursk Bulge made it possible to reduce losses to a minimum. For a month and a half of fighting on the bridgehead, the regiment changed three times material part, receiving new or repaired guns to replace the damaged and destroyed ones, and retained its combat capability, almost without receiving additions in people.

Of course, it was the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad that allowed the Soviet Union to make a radical change in the Great Patriotic War.

Imagine the picture: From the explosion of bombs and mines lays ears, hand grenades deafeningly explode with an echo, at a distance of 300-500 meters from each other automatic and machine-gun bursts rumble. Snipers are constantly at work. Streets and houses turned into a huge pile of garbage and ruins. The city was shrouded in black, acrid smoke. The screams of people. The war is going on everywhere, there is no clear front. Combat actions are conducted nearby, behind you and in front of you. Everywhere destruction and death. This is how Soviet and German soldiers remember the Battle of Stalingrad.

Soviet soldiers are fighting in Stalingrad

As a result of this epic battle, 1.5 million people died on the Wehrmacht side, and approximately 1.1 million people on the Soviet side. The scale of the losses is appalling. For example, the United States for the entire Second world war lost about 400 thousand people. Do not forget about the civilian population of Stalingrad and its environs. As you know, the command forbade the evacuation of civilians, leaving them in the city, ordering them to participate in the construction of fortifications and defensive structures. According to various sources, between 4,000 and 40,000 civilians died.

Soviet gunners are shelling German positions

After the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad, the Soviet command pulled the initiative over to its side. And the victory in this battle was made by ordinary Soviet people - officers and soldiers. However, what sacrifices the soldiers made, in what conditions they fought, how they managed to survive in this hellish meat grinder, what were the feelings of the German soldiers who fell into the Stalingrad trap, was not widely known to society.

Video: Battle of Stalingrad. German look.

Into hell Battle of Stalingrad the Soviet command sent elite troops- 13th Guards Division. On the first day after arrival, 30% of the division died, and in general, the loss was 97% of soldiers and officers. The fresh forces of the Soviet troops made it possible to defend part of Stalingrad, despite the constant offensive actions of the Germans.

German soldiers in Stalingrad. Pay attention to the exhausted faces of people.

Order and discipline in the Red Army was very strict. All cases of non-compliance with an order or leaving a position were dealt with. All soldiers and officers who independently retreated from the front line without orders were considered cowards and deserters. The perpetrators were brought before a military tribunal, which in most cases imposed a death sentence, or it was replaced by suspended sentences or a penal battalion. In some cases, deserters leaving their positions were shot on the spot. Demonstrative executions were carried out before the formation. Also, there were detachments and secret detachments that "met" deserters who swam across the Volga, shooting them in the water without warning.

Photograph of Stalingrad taken by a German war photographer from a transport plane.

Given the superiority of the Germans in aviation, artillery and firepower, the Soviet command then chose the only correct close combat tactic, which the Germans strongly disliked. And as practice has shown, it was tactically advantageous to keep the front close to the enemy's line of defense. The German army could no longer use tanks in street combat, dive bombers were also ineffective, since the pilots could "work out" on their own. Therefore, the Germans, like the Soviet soldiers, used small-caliber artillery, flamethrowers and mortars.

Another shot of Stalingrad from a bird's eye view.

Soviet soldiers turned every house into a fortress, even if they occupied one floor, it turned into a defendable fortress. It used to be that there were Soviet soldiers on one floor, and Germans on the other, and vice versa. It is worth remembering the "Pavlov's House", which was staunchly defended by the platoon of Y. Pavlov, for which the Germans called him the name of the commander who defended him. For 6 hours, the railway station passed up to 14 times from the hands of the Germans to the Russians and back. Fighting even took place in the sewers. Soviet soldiers fought with a dedication that boggles the imagination of the average person.

The position of the Soviet Headquarters was as follows: the city of Stalingrad would be captured by the Germans if not a single defender remained alive in it. The capture of Stalingrad by the Germans was primarily ideological in nature. After all, the city bore the name of the leader of the USSR - Joseph Stalin. Also, Stalingrad stood on the Volga River, which was the largest transport artery, through which numerous cargoes, Baku oil and manpower were delivered. Later, the encircled grouping of Paulus in Stalingrad pulled back the forces of the Red Army, this was necessary for the withdrawal of German troops from the Caucasus.

The results of the Battle of Stalingrad: hundreds of thousands of dead on both sides.

The dedication of the Soviet fighters was massive. Everyone understood what the surrender of Stalingrad could turn out to be. In addition, the Soviet soldiers and officers had no illusions about the outcome of the battles, they understood that either they or the Germans would destroy the Russians.

Soviet soldiers in Stalingrad

In Stalingrad, the movement of snipers intensified, since in close combat they were the most effective. One of the most successful Soviet snipers was a former hunter - Vasily Zaitsev, who, according to confirmed data, destroyed up to 400 German soldiers and officers. He later wrote memoirs.

Two variants of sleeve patches "For the Capture of Stalingrad". On the left is a variant of the Eigeiner patch. However, he did not like Paulus, who personally made the changes.

at the cost of great loss and great strength will, the Soviet soldiers held out until the arrival of large reinforcements. And reinforcements came in mid-November 1942, when the counteroffensive of the Red Army began during Operation Uranus. The news that the Russians first attacked from the north, then from the east instantly spread to german army.

Soviet troops encircled the 6th army of Paulus in an iron vice, from which few managed to get out. Upon learning of the encirclement of the advanced 6th Army, Adolf Hitler flatly forbade breaking through to his own (although he later allowed this, but it was already too late), and took a tough stance on the defense of the city by German troops. According to the Fuhrer, the German soldiers had to defend their positions to the last soldier, which was to reward the German soldiers and officers with admiration and eternal memory the German people. In order to preserve the honor and "face" of the encircled German army, the Fuhrer awarded Paulus the high rank of field marshal. This was done on purpose so that Paulus committed suicide, since not a single field marshal in the history of the Reich surrendered. However, the Fuhrer miscalculated, Paulus surrendered and being captured, he actively criticized Hitler and his policies, after learning about this, the Fuhrer said gloomily: "The God of War has switched sides." What Hitler meant by this was that Soviet Union seized the strategic initiative in the Great Patriotic War

Tanks are outdated as weapons for modern warfare. Why then spend billions on the development of new models of these weapons?

On the Internet, the statement “The average life of a tank in modern combat- 2 minutes". Even if this is not true, all the same, tanks are burning in modern combat, against an equal enemy (God may not send a deliberately weak enemy, therefore we will not consider it). Even the very best. Crews are burning in tanks. As of 2012, the cost of the tank under the contract for the US Army is 5.5-6.1 million dollars. The crew of the tank should consist of contractors who, within three to five years, acquire the necessary skills necessary for the competent and efficient operation of such an expensive vehicle, which is also not cheap. And the lives of the crew are the lives of the crew. From the point of view of weapons created in the 70s and 80s of the last century, nothing can be changed. Everything is as it should be. Everything is logical. The technique of military operations with the use of tanks was worked out during the Second World War, and assumes a certain percentage of losses. There are even formulas for calculating this dropout rate.

I propose to speculate why tanks are needed in a modern theater of operations. We all know perfectly well that today's tanks are designed to destroy other tanks. And here everything is more or less clear. But classic tank duels happen less and less, because the classic full-scale wars of regular armies are a thing of the past. Global modern conflicts can only be with the use of atomic weapons, but in this case tanks are not needed. The time of "tank armadas" and "tank wedges" has passed (if the goal of the Russian Army is not the fastest advance ground forces on the territory of Europe, and its exit to the border of the Rhine, and then the Channel). Tanks have long been used for local battles, i.e. in the city and residential areas, against the enemy armed with small arms, hand grenade launchers, heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles and anti-tank systems. Shelling from ambush of columns of equipment and convoys. Breakthroughs through checkpoints not covered by a tank or ATGM crew. Destruction of light armored vehicles. Short raids to destroy certain objects from a distance, such as launchers, transformer stations, water towers, warehouses. Destruction of firing positions of machine gunners, snipers and positions of spotters. Those. the main task of the tank was to support the advancing infantry units.

The experience of local conflicts has shown that tanks without infantry cover are instantly set on fire by enemy anti-tank systems. Even the most best tanks. Israel's second Lebanese campaign turned into a real nightmare for armored vehicles. IDF ground operations using Merkava tanks have become one of the most terrible pages in the history of Israeli tank formations. The Lebanese Hezbollah made the main emphasis on anti-tank weapons and did not lose. About a thousand fighters were divided into groups of 5-6 people with a variety of weapons. From the earliest ATGM "Malyutka" to the already Russian "Fagot", "Konkurs", "Metis-M", "Kornet-E" and the most unpleasant for the Israelis - RPG 29 "Vampire". All of the IDF's biggest losses were from anti-tank weapons. Officially, the IDF recognized 46 tanks and 14 armored personnel carriers as destroyed. 22 cases of penetration of armor in tanks and about a dozen - in armored personnel carriers were recorded. Official data is scarce, but unofficial data suggests that the number of knocked out tanks is underestimated by about 20-30%. Along with the Merkava-MK2 and Merkava-MK3, the latest Merkava-MK4 also participated in the operation, which, despite their ultra-high protective properties, were just as easily penetrated by Russian ATGMs as their previous modifications of this tank.

By May 9, 2015, information hysteria was hyped in Russia on the performance characteristics of the newest Russian tank platform "Armata", which was shown to us at the Victory Parade on Red Square. A wonderful car, if you look at it as further development tank doctrine of military operations. And if you look at the need to develop this doctrine in general. Isn't she outdated?

If, in the conditions of local wars in densely populated residential areas, tanks do not ensure the safety of the crew's life and are clumsy and expensive military mechanisms, isn't it better to build unmanned, silent, lightly armored, nimble, inexpensive combat drones?

Moreover, the level technological development industry, this quite allows, and has long been used in aviation. American drones can fly thousands of kilometers, bomb from 10,000 meters, return and land on an aircraft carrier. The U.S. drones used to spy on al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden were flown from a German-based military base NATO Rammstein. And in ground assault equipment, why do you need a crew? Tankers still control the tank from the capsule, on the monitors of the same outdoor cameras as the operator. Why risk the lives of tankers, if you can do it sitting in safety, miles away from the fighting?

You will immediately object to me that electronic warfare equipment will easily suppress the communication between the operator and the drone, and then the car becomes a useless target. Not at all, I will answer you. Since the appearance of drones that broadcast complex optical and radio signals, remaining in the line of sight of both the operator and the unit, this problem has become irrelevant. The optical alternative to Wi-Fi has speeds up to 15 Gb / s, and does not depend on electronic warfare.

I foresee the following argument of the opponent: “An optical alternative, you say .... have you heard about the smoke screen? And not just ordinary smoke, but with a suspension of special dispersed particles that tightly cut off not only the optical, but also the electromagnetic component of any radiation.” So, in this case, there is an autopilot. On November 15, 1988, the Buran space shuttle made its unmanned flight. Hasn't the hardware and software evolved since then? Not at all. “In Russia, a system has been developed that allows you to drive a car without human intervention. According to the developers, the new technology is several years ahead of the developments of Google and other foreign manufacturers and is being successfully implemented on KamAZ trucks.” Those. the drone, having such an autopilot, will be able to get out of the smoke zone into the zone of confident reception of operator commands.

The advantages of a combat robot are:

Silence and the ability to accelerate quickly, due to the use of hybrid engines,

Lightness, due to the use of composite armor that protects only from small arms, due to the lack of a pilot capsule, due to the lack of the need to have a powerful engine, a large-caliber gun, a large supply of fuel and ammunition,

High maneuverability due to six-wheel drive, with independent steering and independent drive of each wheel, or crawler chassis,

Small overall dimensions (dimensions of the kitchen table), which reduce the area of ​​damage,

The possibility of fire use, both against armored vehicles and against infantry, as well as against low-flying air targets.

Possibility of collective coordinated actions of an unlimited number of drones in an operation,

The relatively low cost of the robot (compared to the tank),

100% safety of the crew, located outside the fire damage by the enemy,

The ability to quickly and inexpensively train the operator to remotely control the drone (in video game mode).

Looking at the total insanity and hype raised around the future adoption Russian Army"SECRET combat platform" Armata "", I dare to assume that in the depths of the military-industrial complex, weapons of the sixth technological order are quietly maturing.

Dmitry Rogozin, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, on June 23, 2013, on the air of the Iron Ladies talk show on NTV, admitted: “We now have few people in Russia now, we have 140 million people in total, so we also have soldiers a little, and it will be difficult to defend a huge territory. Therefore, we are moving on to the principles of combat, when one soldier, using robotics and automated combat control systems, will be able to fight for five, for ten. Everything that you saw in all sorts of Hollywood fairy tales is now becoming a reality.”

And now, let's ask ourselves the question: "Why waste labor and material resources, time and money on something that is not modern weapons? Let it be even the most advanced model in the world.”

Explosions of shells are torn around, bullets and fragments whistle. Tanks are rushing forward, behind them, behind them, infantry is advancing, and aircraft are beating in the sky. During the battle, life expectancy on the battlefield is measured in minutes and seconds, and everything is decided by chance - someone remains alive, passing through fire and flame, and someone dies from a stray shot.

Nevertheless, constant military conflicts have shown that there is a certain pattern in the war: the losses during the assault differed from the losses during the defense. The picture of the battle is strongly influenced by the armament of the soldiers, their training, and morale. Reports from the fields were carefully studied, processed and analyzed. [S-BLOCK]

life calculator in money

This went on for centuries, until late XIX century, the Russian banker and entrepreneur Ivan Bliokh did not publish the book “The Future War and Its Economic Consequences”, in which he combined and analyzed the military experience of all the leading European powers of that time. And although the main goal of the book was to show the incredible wastefulness, cruelty and uselessness of wars, it became a desktop for all military leaders.

Blioch was an entrepreneur and approached the war not so much from the side of tactics or strategy, but from the side of economics. He calculated how much money is spent on arming a soldier, how much it costs for his training, transportation and maintenance. And then he made calculations based on data from training firing, and simulated various combat situations.

For example, consider the situation of an attack on a trench held by a hundred shooters. It turned out that if the soldiers start attacking the line from a distance of 500 meters, then 100 people who are needed for a conditionally equal fight already in position will get to it only if the number of attackers initially is almost 650 people - i.e. almost seven times the number of defenders! And these figures were at the end of the century before last, when it was a question of weapons with manual reloading, and the situation did not involve the support of artillery and other means of reinforcement.

As conceived by the author, the book was a universal calculator, where, no matter how terrible it seemed, there was a translation human lives into money. Blioch hoped that these arguments would force politicians to abandon wars as effective way solving problems, but instead he gave them a handy tool for more accurate calculation. [S-BLOCK]

Account for minutes

Much has changed in modern warfare - weapons have become more powerful and faster-firing. Artillery support is more mobile, even its hand-held models appeared. Equipment is better protected and more heavily armed. But as before, calculations for combat missions are carried out on the basis of the Blioch theory.

For example, during the Great Patriotic War calculations for a defense breakthrough were based on the following indicators - they took the number of enemy guns located in the attack area, calculated the rate of fire, armor penetration and took the percentage of misses, added to this the average speed of the tanks and the thickness of the armor, and based on these indicators made calculations. It turned out that the average time of a tank in battle during an attack was 7 minutes, and in defense 15 minutes.

It was even harder for the infantrymen - in battle they were not protected by tank armor and powerful fire from large-caliber guns, therefore, in individual cases, their life time was calculated from the moment they arrived at the front line, and during the battle the unit's life time was calculated. For example, the famous sniper Vasily Zaitsev in his memoirs “There was no land for us beyond the Volga” mentions that an infantryman who arrived in Stalingrad lived for about a day. And the infantry company (about 100 people) lived in the attack for about half an hour.

With aviation, the situation is different - there is a big difference in what kind of aircraft we are talking about, and life expectancy is measured not by time, but by the number of sorties. For example, bombers in combined arms combat live in one sortie. Attack aircraft - one and a half, and fighters - two and a half sorties. [S-BLOCK]

However, one must understand that all these figures are abstract and have a rather mediocre relation to reality. Life time does not mean mandatory death and death at all - if a soldier is wounded and cannot continue to fight, then he is also recorded as a loss. In addition, there are many examples when soldiers went through the entire war from the first to last day. The concept of "average life time in combat" was introduced to calculate the forces needed to solve a combat mission, but in reality, many more factors influence the execution of an order.