The development of artillery during the years of the Second World War. Soviet artillery in the decisive battles of the Great Patriotic War. Development of the material part of artillery

Introduction

Despite the fundamental transformations that have taken place in the development of weapons, all types of weapons and military equipment, the progress of modern artillery weapons and the theory of the combat use of rocket troops and artillery is unthinkable without a deep study and use of the experience of the Great Patriotic War.

Soviet artillery in the Great Patriotic war played an exceptionally important role and became the main firepower ground forces. She was the backbone of the defense of the Soviet Army and was the force that helped stop the enemy. In the battle near Moscow, the myth of the invincibility of the fascist army was dispelled. formidable fighting qualities demonstrated Soviet artillery in the great battle on the Volga. In the battles near Kursk, artillery played a decisive role with its fire in creating a turning point in the course of hostilities, and then ensured the advance of our troops.

The strategic offensive of the Soviet Army after the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk continued until the very end of the Great Patriotic War. Each operation of our troops began under the thunder of artillery cannonade of hundreds and thousands of guns and developed with continuous artillery escort. In defense, anti-tank artillery was the main one. It accounts for over 70% of the destroyed enemy tanks. Respect for artillery was so great that since 1940 it was called the "god of war".

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, our artillery increased quantitatively by 5 times. The Soviet Union surpassed Germany in the production of guns and mortars by 2 and 5 times, respectively, the USA - by 1.3 and 3.2 times, England - by 4.2 and 4 times. During the war, our industry provided the front with 775.6 million shells and mines, which made it possible to inflict crushing fire strikes on the enemy. The power of artillery, mass heroism and the military skill of Soviet artillerymen together ensured victory in this difficult war.

The paper considers the development of ground artillery during the Great Patriotic War.

The development of artillery on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War

Development of the material part of artillery

During the years of the pre-war five-year plans, various design bureaus carried out work to modernize the existing materiel of artillery, which was aimed at increasing the firing range, increasing the rate of fire, increasing the angles of fire, increasing the power of ammunition, etc. At the same time, new systems were being developed.

The first new weapon of our Soviet artillery was the 76-mm regimental gun of the 1927 model. And although the gun was heavy and had an insufficient horizontal angle of fire, it remained the best regimental gun of that time.

In the 1930s, 37 mm and 45 mm anti-tank guns were adopted. The latter was a powerful means of dealing with all types of tanks of that time.

A major achievement of Soviet scientists and Soviet industry was the creation of a 76-mm gun mod. 1939 (USV), 122-mm howitzers mod. 1938 (M-30), 152 mm howitzer-cannon 1937 (ML-20), 203 mm howitzer mod. 1931 (B-4) (Figures 1, 2).

The main tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War are given in Table 1.

In the prewar years, mortars were recreated. The number of mortars in the Red Army increased sharply after the military conflict with Finland, where the fighting showed the high effectiveness of these weapons.

Table 1 - The main tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War

	Organizational affiliation	Firing range, km	Projectile mass kg	Initial projectile speed	Gun weight kg
45 mm anti-tank gun 1937
76 mm gun 1927
76 mm gun 1939 (USV)
122-mm howitzer 1938 (M-30)
152 mm howitzer 1938 (M-10)
107 mm gun 1940 (M-60)
122 mm gun 1937 (A-19)
152 mm howitzer gun 1937 (ML-20)
152 mm gun 1935 (Br-2)
203 mm howitzer 1931 (B-4)
210 mm gun 1939 (Br-17)
280 mm mortar 1939 (Br-5)
305 mm howitzer 1939 (Br-18)

So, if during the whole of 1939 1678 82-mm battalion mortars were produced, then from January to April 1940 they were released 5322. At the beginning of the war, mortars of caliber 37 mm, 50 mm, 82 mm, 107 mm were in service and 120 mm.

The first work on the creation self-propelled artillery began back in the 1920s in the Commission for Special Artillery Experiments, the most complete research and experiments unfolded in the 1930s. Some samples were tested in a combat situation on the Karelian Isthmus, but for a number of reasons, none of the self-propelled artillery mounts was not adopted.

Much attention was paid to the creation and development of jet weapons. By the beginning of 1941, an experimental batch of BM-13 combat units was manufactured, in February they switched to their factory production, and already on June 21, 1941, a decision was made to develop all-round multiple launch rocket systems and to immediately deploy their mass production.

Thus, thanks to the care on the part of the party and the government, the Red Army entered the Great Patriotic War, having, in the main, modern artillery materiel. A number of guns fully met the requirements of wartime, some of them were in service until the end of the war. But combat practice required the presence of new types of artillery, ammunition, instruments and means of propulsion.

By the end of the war, in ground artillery, the share of anti-tank guns was 14%, for firing from closed firing positions - 86%. In artillery for firing from closed firing positions, guns accounted for 36%, mortars - 61% (excluding 50-mm mortars), BM RA - 3%.

The main anti-tank gun of the Soviet Army in the first period of the war is a 45-mm cannon mod. 1937 (Figure 3)

The modernization of this gun in 1942 further increased its anti-tank capabilities. In 1943, a new system entered service - a 57-mm anti-tank gun of the 1942 model ZIS-2. During the Second World War, not a single army in the world had an anti-tank gun whose combat characteristics would exceed those of the ZIS-2.

To improve the armor of enemy tanks, Soviet designers responded with the creation of a 100-mm field gun of the 1944 model BS-3. The gun had high ballistic data, combined the qualities of an anti-tank and hull gun (firing range of 20 km). The gun was distinguished by the originality of the design of the nodes and their layout.

In 1943, to replace the regimental 76-mm cannon mod. In 1927, a new system arrived, which was distinguished by ease of production and higher maneuverability. By imposing a 76-mm barrel on a carriage of a 45-mm gun mod. In 1942, a regimental 76-mm cannon mod. 1943 (ob-25).

Starting in 1942, the divisional artillery was put into service, instead of the 76-mm cannon mod. 1939 (USV), a new 76-mm gun mod. 1942 ZIS-3. It became not only the best, but also the most massive gun of the Second World War - the artillery of the Red Army received over 48 thousand of these guns. The rate of fire of the ZIS-3 was 25 rounds per minute, and the firing range was 13 km. If necessary, the gun could be controlled by one person. Many gunners from the ZIS-3 crews became Heroes of the Soviet Union for single-handed fights with several enemy tanks.

With the restoration in 1943 of the corps control link, it became necessary to have a corps howitzer. Along with the modernization of the samples created in the pre-war period, a hull 152-mm howitzer of the 1943 model D-1 was developed. This gun was also created by imposing the barrel of a 152-mm howitzer of the 1938 model (M-10) on the carriage of a 122-mm howitzer of the 1938 model (M-30) with the introduction of a number of design changes. The main performance characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army, produced during the Great Patriotic War, are shown in Table 2.

On the basis of pre-war developments and experience in the use of rockets in pre-war conflicts, the development of rocket artillery continued. Dozens of types of unguided missiles and launchers were used in the Great Patriotic War. The best known are BM-8, BM 13 (Figure 4). In March 1944, a self-propelled launcher for M-31 shells on the Studebaker chassis - BM-31-12 was put into service.

The main direction of improving rockets during the war was to improve accuracy, as well as to increase the weight of the warhead and the range of the projectile. The main tactical and technical characteristics of the rockets of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War are given in Table 3.

Table 2 - The main performance characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army, produced during the Great Patriotic War

Name	Weight in combat position, kg	Firing range, km	Projectile weight, kg	Muzzle velocity, m/s	Rate of fire, rds / min
45 mm PTP (M-42) arr. 1942
57 mm PTP (ZIS-2) arr. 1943
76-mn P (ZIS-3) arr. 1942
76 mm P (ob-25) arr. 1943
100 mm P (BS-3) arr. 1944
152 mm D (D-1) arr. 1943
160 mm M arr. 1943

During the war, the number of mortars increased by almost six times. This is due to the high combat qualities and the ability to ensure their mass production at a lower cost. The 82-mm battalion and 107-mm mountain pack mortars (1943) underwent modernization. 37mm and 50mm mortars further development did not receive and were withdrawn from service. 120-mm regimental mortar mod. 1938 in 1943 (Figure 5) was also upgraded. The result was a system that to this day, with minor improvements in combat formation. In 1944, a 160-mm mortar was adopted. The design feature of the mortar was that it had an inseparable wheeled carriage and was loaded from the breech.

Table 3 - The main performance characteristics of rockets of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War

Projectile type
Adoption time	January 1943	April 1944	April 1944	October 1944
Caliber, mm
BB weight, kg
Table range, max., m
Range deviation at max. range, m
Deviation in direction at max. Range, m

Self-propelled artillery received its development, in essence, only during the war years. At the end of 1942, the SU-76 light self-propelled gun was put into service, based on the T-70 tank, equipped with a 76-mm ZIS-3 gun. The gun was located in an armored wheelhouse open at the top and rear. It was first used in combat in January 1943 and was successfully used until the end of the war.

At the end of 1942, the production of self-propelled guns SU-122 began on the basis of the T-34, from August 1943 the medium SU-85 entered the fight against enemy tanks, which at the end of 1944 was replaced by the new SU-100.

Heavy installations such as ISU-122 and ISU-152, which were nicknamed "St. John's Wort", were created in 1944 on the basis of the heavy tank IS-2. There are cases when ISU-152 shells tore down towers from heavy enemy tanks. These self-propelled guns were used to escort all types of tanks and infantry in battle, successfully fought against heavy tanks and self-propelled guns of the enemy, and were also used to destroy other defensive structures, having perfectly shown their fighting qualities during the assault on the forts of Koenigsberg and during street fighting in Berlin.

Since 1943, self-propelled artillery was withdrawn from the subordination of the Commander of Artillery of the Red Army and subordinated to the Commander of Armored and Mechanized Troops, in combat use it was equated with tanks and is not considered further in this work.

SOVIET ARTILLERY

IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Report 35 pages, 9 figures, 5 tables, 9 sources.

combat use of artillery, grouping of artillery, artillery offensive, artillery preparation for attack

The object of the study is domestic artillery, the history of its development during the Great Patriotic War, the improvement of the material part, forms and methods of its combat use.

The aim of the work was to study the experience in solving issues of combat use: maneuver and massing of artillery, grouping and control of artillery, planning and organizing an artillery offensive, organizing anti-tank defense, planning and conducting counter-training during the Great Patriotic War in all types of military operations.

Based on the results of the work, it is being prepared for publication. teaching aid and made a report at the military-scientific conference.

Introduction

2 Artillery combat

Conclusion

List of sources used

Introduction

Soviet artillery played an exceptionally important role in the Great Patriotic War and became the main firepower of the Ground Forces. She was the backbone of the defense of the Soviet Army and was the force that helped stop the enemy. In the battle near Moscow, the myth of the invincibility of the fascist army was dispelled. Formidable fighting qualities were demonstrated by Soviet artillery in the great battle on the Volga. In the battles near Kursk, artillery played a decisive role with its fire in creating a turning point in the course of hostilities, and then ensured the advance of our troops.

The paper considers the development of ground artillery during the Great Patriotic War.

1 The development of artillery on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War

1.1 Development of the materiel of artillery

In the 1930s, 37 mm and 45 mm anti-tank guns were adopted. The latter was a powerful means of dealing with all types of tanks of that time.

The main tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War are given in Table 1.

Table 1 - The main tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War

	Organizational affiliation	Firing range, km	Projectile mass kg	Initial projectile speed	Gun weight kg
45 mm anti-tank gun 1937
76 mm gun 1927
76 mm gun 1939 (USV)
122-mm howitzer 1938 (M-30)
152 mm howitzer 1938 (M-10)
107 mm gun 1940 (M-60)
122 mm gun 1937 (A-19)
152 mm howitzer gun 1937 (ML-20)
152 mm gun 1935 (Br-2)
203 mm howitzer 1931 (B-4)
210 mm gun 1939 (Br-17)
280 mm mortar 1939 (Br-5)
305 mm howitzer 1939 (Br-18)

The first work on the creation of self-propelled artillery began in the 1920s at the Commission for Special Artillery Experiments, the most complete research and experiments unfolded in the 1930s. Some samples were tested in a combat situation on the Karelian Isthmus, but for a number of reasons, none of the self-propelled artillery mounts was put into service.

The main anti-tank gun of the Soviet Army in the first period of the war is a 45-mm cannon mod. 1937 (Figure 3)

Table 2 - The main performance characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army, produced during the Great Patriotic War

Name	Weight in combat position, kg	Firing range, km	Projectile weight, kg	Muzzle velocity, m/s	Rate of fire, rds / min
45 mm PTP (M-42) arr. 1942
57 mm PTP (ZIS-2) arr. 1943
76-mn P (ZIS-3) arr. 1942
76 mm P (ob-25) arr. 1943
100 mm P (BS-3) arr. 1944
152 mm D (D-1) arr. 1943
160 mm M arr. 1943

During the war, the number of mortars increased by almost six times. This is due to the high combat qualities and the ability to ensure their mass production at a lower cost. The 82-mm battalion and 107-mm mountain pack mortars (1943) underwent modernization. 37-mm and 50-mm mortars did not receive further development and were withdrawn from service. 120-mm regimental mortar mod. 1938 in 1943 (Figure 5) was also upgraded. The result was a system that to this day, with minor improvements in combat formation. In 1944, a 160-mm mortar was adopted. The design feature of the mortar was that it had an inseparable wheeled carriage and was loaded from the breech.

Table 3 - The main performance characteristics of rockets of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War

Projectile type
Adoption time	January 1943	April 1944	April 1944	October 1944
Caliber, mm
BB weight, kg
Table range, max., m
Range deviation at max. range, m
Deviation in direction at max. Range, m

1.2 Development of artillery organization

The development of the organizational forms of Soviet artillery took place depending on the economic capabilities of the country and the specific conditions of warfare. Two stages can be noted in the development of artillery organization. At the first stage, which coincides with the first period of the Great Patriotic War, organizational forms adapted to the conditions of defense and the material capabilities of the state. The transition of the Soviet Army from defense to offensive operations marked the beginning of the second stage in the development of artillery organization. Naturally, at each stage, the decisive factor was our ability to provide the troops with materiel.

During the course of the war organizational changes occurred both in the military artillery and in the artillery of the RVGK. At the very beginning of the war, an imbalance was revealed between the military artillery and the RVGK. Their specific gravity was 5 and 95%. This was, as before, a consequence of ideas about the purely maneuverable nature of a future war. The mistake had to be corrected immediately.

Already in July 1941, due to the weakening of the artillery of rifle formations, the artillery of the RVGK was strengthened. It could be maneuvered, massaging artillery in the main directions. Thus, the overall degree of use of the capabilities of the armed forces in operations increased. In general, the artillery of the RVGK received the greatest development, especially with the transition of the Red Army to strategic offensive operations. By the end of the war, its share increased to 50%. By the way, in the Wehrmacht, measures to increase the artillery of the RGK were taken too late, and its share did not exceed 18%.

Military artillery developed evolutionarily. It was based on the regular artillery of rifle divisions. Corps artillery existed at the beginning of the war, in 1941 it was transferred to the RVGK artillery, and reappeared with the restoration of the corps. There was no army artillery before the war and at the beginning of the war; it began to be created in the spring of 1943.

The staff of the rifle division during the war years changed 6 times. During the course of the war, the artillery of the divisions was strengthened mainly by mortars. The main staff was established in December 1942. Fundamental changes relate to divisional artillery. So, in July 1941, the second (howitzer) artillery regiment was withdrawn, and at the end of 1944, an artillery brigade of three regiments (including a regiment of 160-mm mortars), an anti-aircraft battalion, a battalion of self-propelled installations, anti-tank division (armed with 76-mm guns). The number of guns and mortars in the division increased to 282.

In the rifle corps, according to the state of 1943, there was a corps artillery regiment. Since December 1944, the guards rifle corps usually had two artillery regiments or an artillery brigade of two regiments.

In April 1943, army artillery appeared as part of the combined arms army: cannon and anti-tank artillery regiments, and a mortar regiment. In 1944, on the basis of cannon regiments, two-regiment cannon artillery brigades began to be created in the armies.

The artillery of the RVGK grew especially rapidly. Its numbers increased primarily due to light artillery and mortars. In total, during the war years, the number of mortars in the artillery of the RVGK increased 17 times, guns - 5 times. Therefore, the artillery of the RVGK was a means, first of all, of quantitative reinforcement of the artillery of combined arms formations and associations in the main directions

In the artillery of the RVGK, the number of individual units continuously increased, especially in 1942. By the end of the first period of the war, it had 199 cannon regiments, 196 howitzer, 240 anti-tank, 256 anti-aircraft, 138 jet, 83 mortar. This led to a sharp increase in the number of reinforcement artillery in the fronts. Even in the defensive operation near Stalingrad, some fronts had up to 70 reinforcement regiments. To control such a mass of artillery and quickly create the necessary groupings, it was necessary to form fundamentally new artillery formations of the RVGK - artillery and guards mortar (rocket artillery) divisions, breakthrough artillery corps. Along with them, there were separate artillery, mortar and guards mortar brigades. In order to massively use artillery forces and means in the fight against tanks, anti-tank regiments and brigades were created in the artillery of the RVGK.

The first artillery divisions, created in the autumn of 1942, consisted of eight regiments (two cannon, three howitzer and three anti-tank, a total of 168 guns). Since 1943, brigade artillery divisions have been created, as well as breakthrough artillery corps. The breakthrough artillery division included six brigades (light, howitzer - all three regiments each, cannon - two regiments, heavy howitzer and howitzer of high power; a total of 356 guns and mortars), in 1944 the division included seven brigades.

IN anti-tank artillery in the summer of 1941, instead of 72-gun brigades, 16, 20, 36-gun regiments began to be created, armed with 37, 45, 76 or 85-mm guns. Since July 1942, all anti-tank artillery was renamed anti-tank artillery, and the regiments received a single organization (5 batteries, 20 guns). In 1943, a more expedient form of organization was found - an anti-tank artillery brigade. She had three regiments (60 guns) of 45, 57 and 76 mm caliber. In 1945, the brigades were partially rearmed with 100 mm guns.

The creation of large artillery formations was a new moment in the organization of artillery. They became in the hands of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command a powerful means of quantitatively and qualitatively strengthening the artillery of the fronts and armies operating in the direction of the main attack. With their creation, the possibilities of massing artillery and maneuvering its large masses in battle and operation have increased. It was due to her that it became possible to create artillery groups at all levels, from the regiment to the army. This orderly system of artillery groups lasted more than 50 years.

1.3 Development of the combat use of artillery in offensive and defensive operations

In the first major offensive operations of the Red Army in late 1941 and early 1942. serious shortcomings were identified in the combat use of artillery, in the organization and conduct of the offensive by formations and formations. Thus, in the counter-offensive near Moscow, artillery was distributed relatively evenly in the zones of the advancing armies, which did not make it possible to achieve fire superiority over the enemy.

One of the main requirements of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was the decisive concentration of forces and means in the area of the proposed breakthrough. Gradually, the maneuver and massing of artillery outgrew the tactical framework and was carried out on an operational, and even strategic, scale.

Since the second half of 1942, there has been an increase in the number of artillery in the breakthrough areas of formations (combinations) and an increase in the degree of its massing, which is characterized by the width of these areas and the number of guns, mortars and rocket artillery located on them.

In offensive operations in the breakthrough areas, the following operational densities were created: in 1941-1942. - up to 70-80; in 1943 - up to 130-200; in 1944 - up to 150-250; in 1945 - 250-300 guns and mortars per 1 km of the breakthrough area.

The decisiveness of the massing is evidenced by the fact that with the width of the breakthrough sections, which accounted for 10-15% of the total length of the front line, up to 80-90% of all artillery was concentrated on them.

The quantitative and qualitative growth of artillery as a branch of service during the war, the increased scale of maneuver and massing of artillery in the main directions of formations and formations in battles and operations forced the search for new forms of its combat use.

The basis of the combat use of artillery is the distribution of its forces (formations) and the choice of forms and methods of fire engagement of the enemy.

Until 1944, i.e. before the troops were saturated with RVGK artillery, artillery groups were created according to the nature of the tasks performed, i.e. on a target basis.

The grouping of artillery during this period is very diverse: infantry support groups (PP), long-range (DD), destruction artillery (AR), guards mortar units (GMCH), direct fire guns (OPN) and others. The development of the grouping is reflected in Table 4.

In 1944, an artillery grouping system was developed, created according to the organizational and tactical principle. In special instructions approved by the artillery commander of the Soviet Army, the most expedient, corresponding to nature, was determined. modern combat and operations, artillery grouping. It provided for the creation of a regimental artillery group (PAG) in a regiment, a divisional artillery group (DAG) in a division, a corps artillery group (KAG) in the corps, and an army artillery group (AAG) in the army.

Artillery groups created in combined arms formations from the regiment to the army were intended to solve problems in the interests of these formations. For example, the PAG supported rifle battalions, fought mortars, and sometimes enemy artillery. With the development of the offensive, part of the artillery from the regimental group was reassigned to the commanders of the battalions of the first echelon, which ensured closer interaction between artillery and combined arms units with the development of combat in depth and increased the independence of the advanced units of the regiments.

For divisional artillery groups, the main objects of destruction were artillery and enemy reserves. In addition, by decision of the division commander, in the most critical periods of the battle, the divisional group, in whole or in part, was involved in reinforcing the fire of regimental artillery groups, especially when breaking through the defenses of enemy first-echelon battalions, repelling counterattacks by his brigade (divisional) reserves, and breaking through intermediate defense lines on the move in depth, etc.

The army (corps) artillery group, created to solve problems in the interests of the main grouping of the army (corps), was able to successfully fight enemy artillery, inflict defeat on his reserves in concentration areas, on the march and during deployment, disrupt enemy control, increase artillery fire divisions of the first echelon and to support the entry into battle of divisions of the second echelon.

Depending on the situation, sometimes an army (corps) artillery group, by decision of the army commander (corps commander), was divided into subgroups of divisions operating in the main direction. Along with the AAG, a group of GMCH (Guards mortar units) was created in the army, later called the Army Rocket Artillery Group (AGRA).

Artillery anti-tank reserves (APTRez) were created in armies, corps and divisions to destroy enemy tank groupings that had broken through.

The new grouping of artillery had fundamental differences from the previously created one. Groups were to be created at all levels of the combined arms command and report directly to the combined arms commander. Groups have become an organic part of the combined arms combat formation and operational formation of troops. During the battle and operation, they did not disintegrate, but could only change their composition, supporting units and formations at all stages of the battle and operation.

The unification of artillery into artillery groups ensured the possibility of massive use of artillery assets by the corresponding artillery commanders and the continuity of interaction between artillery and infantry and tanks for the entire period of the battle. First of all, the effectiveness of fire destruction of the enemy by artillery increased.

The beginning of a new stage in the development of the combat use of artillery, primarily fire damage to the enemy, was the directive letter of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated January 10, 1942 No. 03 on an artillery offensive.

Its essence boiled down to three basic requirements, without the fulfillment of which one cannot count on the success of the offensive; this is a decisive massing of means and forces in the breakthrough sector, the continuity of artillery support for the offensive, and the organic combination of fire and strike by the advancing troops.

“Artillery should not act randomly,” the directive said, “but concentratedly, and it should not be concentrated anywhere on the front, but in the area of \u200b\u200boperation of the shock group of the army, the front. ... In order to make artillery support real and the infantry offensive effective, it is necessary to move from the practice of artillery preparation to the practice of artillery offensive. ... Artillery cannot be limited to one-time actions for an hour or two hours before the offensive, but must advance together with the infantry, must fire at short breaks throughout the offensive until the enemy’s defensive line is broken to the full depth. ”

For the first time, an artillery offensive was carried out in January 1942 in the offensive zone of the 20th Army of the Western Front when breaking through the enemy defenses on the river. Lama. And in full in the operation of the group of fronts, it was carried out in November 1942 in the counteroffensive near Stalingrad. In subsequent years, all issues of the artillery offensive developed and improved.

The artillery offensive was divided into three periods - artillery preparation, artillery support for the attack, and artillery escort by infantry and tank fire during the battle in depth.

The artillery preparation of the attack (APA) was planned in all cases in the most detailed way. Its duration and formation depended on the specific conditions and differed significantly from one another, which is presented in Table 5. This made it possible to avoid a pattern that could lead to the loss of tactical surprise. The achievement of tactical surprise also determined the desire to conduct a relatively short APA.

The duration of the artillery preparation of the attack, as a rule, was 1-2 hours. But depending on the specific conditions, the APA was planned to be both longer and shorter. So, the longest APA was in the Svir-Petrozavodsk operation of the Karelian Front in 1944 - 3 hours 32 minutes (including 30 minutes of fire control), a three-hour artillery preparation for the attack was carried out during the assault on the Konigsberg fortress. The shortest artillery preparation was in the 5th shock army in the Berlin operation - 20 minutes. By the end of the war, in view of the increase in the number of artillery involved, they sought to reduce the duration of artillery preparation to 40-20 minutes.

The main content of the APA was massive artillery strikes on the entire tactical depth of the enemy's defense. At the same time, depending on the nature of the enemy's defense (increase in depth, separation of battle formations, transition to trench, multi-position defense), as well as on the amount of artillery involved, the depth of simultaneous suppression of defense objects changed. So, in 1941-1942, when the enemy's defense was focal and shallow, massive artillery fire was conducted mainly to a depth of 1.5-2.5 km and on artillery batteries. In 1943, when the Nazi troops switched to trench defense and the depth of its main zone increased, massive artillery fire was carried out to a depth of 3-4 km or more, in 1944 - up to 6-8 km and in 1945 - up to 8-10 km.

Artillery preparation began, as a rule, with a sudden powerful fire raid, which was achieved in a short time by inflicting maximum losses on the enemy who did not have time to hide, and was directed primarily against manpower and fire weapons in the strongholds of the first line or in the first trench. By the end of the war, the duration of the first fire raids increased compared to 1941-1943. from 3-5 to 10-15 min.

In order to reduce artillery preparation, especially strong structures were destroyed in a few days or on the eve of the offensive. For example, in the Krasnoselsk and Vyborg operations of the Leningrad Front, the destruction period was one day; during the assault on Koenigsberg by the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, the period of opening and destruction was four days; during the Crimean operation 4th Ukrainian front- two days.

Carrying out (since 1942) on the eve or on the day of an offensive reconnaissance in force by the forces of advanced battalions or reconnaissance detachments required a partial re-planning in a limited time of the original version of the artillery offensive. In this regard, in 1945, advance planning of several options for artillery preparation and attack support was practiced, depending on the actions of the advanced battalions. Thus, the gap between the completion of the battle of the advanced battalions and the introduction of the main forces into battle was eliminated.

Artillery preparation ended with a powerful fire raid lasting 5-10 minutes (1941-1943) or 15-25 minutes (1944-1945).

The fire raid, which ended the artillery preparation for the attack, was planned to be powerful and was carried out with an increase to the maximum fire regime. In its power and character, it, in fact, did not differ from the artillery fire at the beginning of the artillery support of the attack. This sought to eliminate a noticeable transition from artillery preparation to attack support. As a rule, one of the fire raids on enemy artillery and mortar batteries blocked the moment of the end of artillery preparation and the beginning of artillery support. Consequently, the enemy's batteries were subjected to strong fire at the most crucial moment, when the infantry and tanks began the attack.

In a number of cases, to deceive the enemy, false transfers of fire were successfully used, which, if well organized (with a simultaneous demonstration of the attack), gave good results. However, the complexity of their implementation and the lengthening of the period of artillery preparation forced the abandonment of false transfers of fire.

Artillery support for an attack was carried out, as a rule, to the depth of defense of the regiments of the first echelon, and the method of its implementation depended on the nature of the enemy's defense. The main methods were sequential concentration of fire, a single fire shaft, and a combination of both. In addition, the gunners of the 1st Belorussian Front developed and first used in the Belorussian operation of 1944 a double fire shaft. Other types of attack support methods were also used - a growing barrage, a sliding method, a combing fire, a mortar barrage, etc.

Using various combinations of types of fire, massively attracting artillery, it was possible to achieve success. For example, in the Oryol offensive operation, artillery support for the attack in all armies was planned differently. So, in the 11th Guards Army, the following method of artillery support for the attack was chosen: combing artillery fire at the lines every 100 meters to a depth of 500-700 m was prepared. For each strong point or center of resistance, occupied by forces up to a battalion, the fire of 5-6 divisions was concentrated. The fire on each object was carried out for 5-10 minutes, and with repeated attacks - up to 15 minutes.

The depth of artillery support for the attack increased and reached 3-4 km by the end of the war. At the same time, Soviet artillery successfully coped with the task of organizing support for an attack by infantry and tanks at night (Berlin operation of the 1st Belorussian Front).

In the offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War, great experience was gained in the implementation of the third period of the artillery offensive - escorting infantry and tanks during battle in the depths of the enemy's defenses.

The fire support of the battle in depth was based on the principle of the continuity of the interaction of artillery with infantry and tanks. It was achieved by reinforcing the infantry units with direct escort guns, assigning artillery spotters to tanks, by creating artillery groups capable of providing fire support to the infantry at any time, and by timely massing artillery and its fire in the main directions of the offensive.

The escort of infantry and tanks during the battle in the depths of the enemy's defenses was carried out by escorting them with fire and wheels and was carried out by concentrated fire of divisions, individual batteries and guns at targets that prevented advance. For direct support of the formations during the battle in depth, they were given anti-aircraft artillery units, anti-tank regiments on mechanical traction, and when they were introduced into the gap, part of the howitzer regiments and rocket artillery regiments were reassigned to them. Artillery attached to mobile formations was successfully used to repel enemy counterattacks and deliver fire strikes against resistance nodes. She followed in the columns of tank and rifle formations closer to their heads, which made it possible to quickly put artillery into action. Detailed planning of the third period of the artillery offensive was carried out for the first time in the counter-offensive operation near Stalingrad.

One of the important problems in the use of artillery in the war was the organization of the fight against enemy artillery. The counter-battery battle was usually planned, depending on the situation, by the artillery headquarters of the corps, the army, and, more rarely, the front. The main goal of the counter-battery fight was to suppress the batteries. On the Leningrad front, the destruction of enemy artillery batteries was also used. In offensive operations, the fight against enemy artillery was usually assigned to long-range groups and began simultaneously with the artillery preparation for the attack. It was planned in most detail for the first two periods of the artillery offensive.

The organization of counter-mortar combat proved to be a more difficult problem, mainly due to the difficulties of reconnaissance of mortar batteries. Since the fight against mortars had its own specifics, special divisional and corps counter-mortar groups were created for its conduct, which consisted mainly of howitzer and mortar units.

The development of the combat use of artillery in defense took place in close connection with the development of forms and methods of conducting defensive battles and operations. Experience shows that the importance of artillery in defense has steadily increased. The main tasks solved by artillery were the fight against enemy artillery, its tanks, the defeat of advancing groupings, and covering the combat formations of troops from the air.

The difficult conditions in which the war began, the forced retreat of the Soviet troops, heavy losses in people and military equipment (including artillery), the need to conduct defense in wide bands led to a number of shortcomings in the combat use of artillery in the first period of the war (especially in summer- autumn campaign of 1941). The most serious shortcomings include: uniform distribution of artillery between divisions and within divisions along the entire defense front (including anti-tank artillery); insufficient organization of a wide and flexible maneuver by artillery means (especially in combat operations in the summer of 1941). But, despite the shortcomings that took place, artillery was of decisive importance in defeating the advancing enemy groupings.

Due to the heavy losses that the enemy suffered from the blows of our troops, he was forced to abandon the offensive in several directions and concentrate his efforts on one. This raised the problem of organizing the maneuver even more. Meanwhile, it could be successfully carried out only if the troops held the defensive lines occupied, preempting the enemy in concentrating additional forces and means.

Under these conditions, the task of artillery, especially military artillery, was to support the infantry while holding defensive positions and to promptly build up artillery resources at the expense of RVGK artillery. The High Command took every measure to concentrate the maximum amount of artillery to defeat the main enemy groupings. With the increase in the number of artillery, the possibilities for operational and tactical maneuver by artillery in defense also increased.

An example of a decisive maneuver by artillery on the defensive is the concentration of up to 50% of all artillery of the RVGK in the zones of operations of fronts in the western direction in the fall of 1941. The same picture - in the south-western and Stalingrad directions. So, in the summer of 1942, there were only 4282 guns in the Stalingrad direction, and by the end of defensive operations their number increased to 12000. Military artillery also participated in the maneuver.

As a result of the maneuver, the density of artillery in the defense increased. The operational density of artillery in operations in the main directions reaches 50-80, and in secondary directions - 15-20 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front. In the defensive operation of the 13th Army of the Central Front near Kursk in 1943, the density of artillery reached 105 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front (this was the highest density of artillery in defense during the war).

The grouping of artillery on the defensive did not qualitatively differ from its grouping on the offensive, but artillery groups had less artillery than on the offensive. However, there were exceptions. In 1942, during the period of defensive operations near Stalingrad, a front-line artillery group was created for the first time. In those specific conditions, when the most important task of the front was to hold a large city, the creation of such a group fully justified itself. In defensive operations near Leningrad, experience was gained in creating a front-line artillery group for counter-battery combat. Its basis was the 3rd Leningrad counter-battery artillery corps.

When creating an artillery grouping, as well as in an offensive, it became necessary to have artillery groups in the hands of each combined arms commander. In addition, the defense provided for the creation of various artillery reserves (anti-tank and general).

The artillery fire system was built for the entire depth of defense. The basis of the fire system was the fire of artillery and mortars from closed firing positions, combined with the fire of direct fire guns and machine gun fire. The artillery fire system included: long-range fire attacks, concentrated fire, mobile barrage fire, fixed barrage fire, direct-fire guns.

Artillery counter-preparation (AKP) occupied a special place in the fire defeat of the enemy in the defense. The AKP was prepared in the presence of a sufficient amount of artillery and time to prepare the fire system and was carried out on the scale of the army (and sometimes the front). In the autumn of 1941, it was carried out in the armies of the Northwestern and Western Fronts, in September-October 1942 - in the armies of the Stalingrad Front, in 1943 - on the Central and Voronezh Fronts near Kursk and in other defensive operations of the war.

Thus, powerful AKP, in order to disrupt the enemy's attack on Leningrad, which was being prepared, were carried out on September 12 and 21 in the zone of operations of the 42nd Army. Their duration ranged from 15 to 30 minutes. More than four artillery regiments were involved, as well as artillery of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and coastal artillery. They fully achieved their goal, the enemy attacks began scattered and were not successful.

In the defensive battle near Moscow, the command of the Western Front provided for artillery counter-preparation in the zones of operations of the 20th, 16th and 19th armies. The AKP was planned according to four options, depending on the possible directions of enemy attacks, up to 300 guns were involved. Enemy attacks in the center of the Western Front were weakened by artillery counter-preparation and were unsuccessful.

The defensive battle near Kursk began with a powerful artillery counter-preparation, which preempted the start of the enemy offensive by 10 minutes. The AKP was planned in advance on the scale of the Central and Voronezh fronts according to several options. The average density of artillery was 30 guns and mortars and 3 rocket artillery installations per 1 km. In the most important areas, the density reached 60-70 guns and mortars. The duration of counter-training is 30 minutes. Powerful artillery strikes were unexpected for the enemy, as a result, the enemy began his artillery preparation with a delay of 2 hours, disorganized and scattered. The first blow of the enemy was significantly weakened, his troops suffered losses even in their original position, were upset and demoralized. In total, 0.5 combat sets of ammunition were used for artillery counter-training.

In the organization and conduct of artillery counter-training, there is a noticeable tendency to increase the number of artillery used in it, which significantly increased the effectiveness of counter-training.

Anti-tank defense received great development during the war. Before the war, it was considered as a combination of fire from individual direct-fire guns on individual tanks and concentrated fire from indirect firing positions on groups of tanks in areas of their accumulation or during movement and attack. It was also envisaged the creation of anti-tank guns, and in the event of a breakthrough of tanks in the area of the main firing positions of artillery, direct fire with batteries at closed firing positions.

However, at the beginning of the war, significant shortcomings in the organization of anti-tank defense were revealed, the most important were: the lack of proper interaction between artillery and other means of combat (tanks), underestimation of engineering barriers and obstacles, insufficient density of anti-tank artillery and its even distribution along the front; shallow depth of anti-tank defense; artillery from closed firing positions fought tanks only sporadically.

Taking into account these shortcomings, in July 1941, the Red Army artillery headquarters developed for the troops "Instructions on the organization of the artillery fire system in the defense." Here the demand was put forward - to counter the massive use of enemy tanks with the massive use of anti-tank weapons and, first of all, artillery.

These problems, in the end, were solved by developing an anti-tank defense system, which is a system of anti-tank strongholds and areas, as well as anti-tank reserves.

Anti-tank strongholds, created by artillery, merged with infantry strongholds, representing single system combined arms defense. This gave them greater stability in the fight against enemy tanks, with submachine gunners on tanks and with infantry advancing behind tanks. For greater stability of the defense of individual strongholds, close cooperation was organized between them along the front and in depth, and the fire of the strongholds was linked into a single interacting system, first on the scale of divisions, then corps, armies, and, finally, the front.

Areas occupied only by artillery and prepared to fight tanks with direct fire became known as anti-tank areas. They were created, as a rule, in the depths of defense

An even more robust anti-tank defense system was developed in 1944. Since that time, it included company anti-tank strongholds, united in battalion anti-tank units, anti-tank areas (as part of anti-tank artillery, tanks and self-propelled artillery installations), artillery and anti-tank reserves. The role of artillery, which occupied closed firing positions, increased more and more in the fight against tanks. It was now located in tank-hazardous directions and conducted massive fire on enemy tank groups, and with a breakthrough of tanks into the depths of the defense, it hit them with direct fire.

Gradually, an insurmountable anti-tank defense was developed and created in the tactical and operational zones of the struggle. Already in the defensive period near Stalingrad, this system was quite perfect, but its classic expression was the anti-tank defense system in the Battle of Kursk.

New in anti-tank artillery defense was the gradual development of tactics for the combat use of artillery and anti-tank reserves. At first they were allocated in armies, divisions, then on the fronts. Artillery and anti-tank reserves began to be allocated in the operational zone for each (or two adjacent) directions. Hence the need arose to organize interaction between them and other reserves of divisions, corps, armies and fronts, as well as between them and the system of anti-tank strongholds and areas formed by the troops of the first echelons.

The developed anti-tank defense system proved its viability - it turned out to be insurmountable for enemy tank groups.

2 COMBAT ARTILLERY

2.1 Management of the artillery of the Soviet Army

In July 1941, the post of chief of artillery of the Red Army was reinstated, to which colonel-general of artillery N.N. Voronov was appointed, and the Main Directorate of Chief of Artillery of the Red Army was formed. It included a headquarters, a combat training department for ground and military anti-aircraft artillery, an inspector, a personnel department and several departments.

The Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army (GAU KA), which worked under the direct supervision of the GKO and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, as well as in close contact with the headquarters of the Logistics of the Red Army, was engaged in providing the army with weapons and ammunition. There were military representatives at industrial enterprises who were responsible for the quality of weapons and ammunition supplied to the troops. GAU KA also carried out maintenance, evacuation and repair of weapons and military equipment. To solve these problems, the GAU KA created the Artillery Supply Department, the Artillery Operations Department, the Artillery Repair Department, the Tractor Department and others.

On November 8, 1942, an NPO order was issued to increase the role of artillery commanders in directing the combat activities of artillery. The chiefs of the artillery of the Red Army, the front, the army became, respectively, the commanders of the artillery of the Red Army, the front, the army, the corps. The commander of the artillery of the Red Army was at the same time the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense.

By a GKO decree of April 29, 1943, the guards mortar units were subordinate to the commander of the artillery of the Red Army. The commander of the GMCH became the deputy commander of the artillery of the Red Army for guards mortar units. Major General of Artillery P. A. Degtyarev was approved for this position. The complete unification of the HMC with artillery contributed to a more precise planning of enemy fire engagement and their more expedient combat use, taking into account the fire capabilities of artillery.

By the same decree of the GKO, under the commander of artillery of the Red Army, a Military Council was created, consisting of Colonel General of Artillery N. D. Yakovlev, Major Generals of Artillery P. A. Degtyarev, L. M. Gaidukov and I. S. Prochko.

Colonel-General of Artillery N. N. Voronov was the Commander of the Artillery of the Red Army, the Commander of the Air Defense of the country and was the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on many fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

At the very beginning of the war, he personally developed and submitted to the State Defense Committee specific proposals on the organization of anti-tank defense. N. N. Voronov was the author of a new, more advanced artillery structure, which provided for the creation of artillery brigades and divisions of the RVGK, and then breakthrough artillery corps. Under his direct supervision, methods for the combat use of rocket artillery were developed, as well as a Directive letter from the Supreme Command Headquarters on an artillery offensive.

Under his leadership, the artillery headquarters, which was headed by Colonel-General of Artillery F.A. Samsonov throughout the war, developed and introduced new methods of combat use of artillery, methods of controlling concentrated, massive and accompanying fire into the troops. So, summarizing the first experience of using a double fire shaft on an operational scale, N. N. Voronov issued instructions on organizing and mastering it by all artillery commanders and headquarters.

N. N. Voronov rendered great and effective assistance to the chiefs of artillery of the fronts in the development and implementation of plans for an artillery offensive. During the liquidation of the encircled enemy grouping near Stalingrad, being the Representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command at the Don Front, he participated in organizing an artillery offensive, in which for the first time in the practice of the Great Patriotic War a fire shaft was used to a depth of 1.5 km.

January 18, 1943 N. N. Voronov, the first in the Soviet Armed Forces, was awarded the rank of Marshal of Artillery.

2.2 Artillery feats of arms

The success of artillery combat operations was determined not only by the presence of modern materiel, but also by its skillful use, the heroism of the artillerymen, and the high combat and moral qualities of all the personnel of our artillery.

The special merits of artillery to the Fatherland are marked by the assignment of honorary titles to a number of its units and formations, primarily guards. In January 1942, eight regiments that distinguished themselves in the battle near Moscow became the first in artillery to become guards. During the war years, this title was awarded to six artillery divisions, 7 divisions of rocket artillery, 11 anti-tank brigades, 64 artillery regiments and others. More than 2100 artillery formations and units were awarded military orders.

Artillery during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1943)

The states of the fascist bloc, having unleashed in 1939 the Second world war, June 22, 1941 made a robbery attack on the Soviet Union. The Great Patriotic War began, which lasted 1418 days and nights and ended with the complete defeat of the aggressor. Such military, physical and spiritual stamina, which the peoples of the USSR demonstrated when defending their homeland, history has not yet known.

The exposition of the hall begins with materials characterizing the military-political situation on the eve of the war.

The first stand presents a political map of Europe, photographs of German guns and tanks. There is also a photocopy of the plan for a "blitzkrieg" against the USSR (plan "Barbarossa"). In the center of the stand is placed the poster of the artist I. Toidze “The Motherland Calls!”, which became a symbol of those days, next to it are exhibited small arms and mortars that were in service with the Red Army. On the podium are samples of weapons from various European states, which were used by the Nazis in the war against the Soviet Union.

A prominent place in the exhibition is occupied by documentary sources from the first days of the war: the directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 29, 1941 to local authorities in the front-line regions and the Pravda newspaper of July 3, 1941 with a speech by the Chairman of the State Defense Committee ( GKO) I.V. Stalin.

The turnstile exhibits the Pravda newspaper of June 23, 1941 with decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 22, 1941 on martial law and mobilization of those liable for military service in 14 military districts, a joint resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars USSR dated June 30, 1941 on the creation of an emergency body - GKO, photographs of members of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated July 16, 1941 on the reorganization of political propaganda bodies and the introduction of the institute of military commissars of the Red Army, a number of other materials.

The documents presented in the turnstile make it possible to get acquainted with the report of the Commission for the Legal and Political Evaluation of the Soviet-German Treaty of 1939 at the II Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR in December 1989.

Thirty minutes allotted the fascist command to overcome the border of the Soviet state, but from the first minutes and hours the enemy faced the heroic resistance of the border guards and soldiers of the border garrisons, who selflessly defended the sacred borders of the Motherland. One example of courage and loyalty to the oath is the defense of the Brest Fortress. The enemy command sought to capture the citadel as quickly as possible, because this stronghold made it difficult for the enemy to use the railway junction and important highways in the Brest region, but the organized resistance of the fortress defenders continued until July 20, 1941.

On the stand dedicated to the beginning of the war, you can see the remains of weapons and equipment of the fortress defenders, discovered during excavations on its territory in the post-war years; photo portraits of the leaders of the defense of the Brest Fortress - Captain I.N. Zubachev, regimental commissar E.M. Fomin, Hero of the Soviet Union lieutenant-border guard A.M. political instructor S.S. Skripnik, who led the defense of the eastern fort.

The fighters of the 13th outpost of the 90th Vladimir-Volyn border detachment courageously defended themselves. Sixty soldiers under the command of Lieutenant A.V. Lopatin for 11 days held back the onslaught of the enemy, who was able to capture the outpost only after the death of all its defenders. On the stand there is a photo portrait of the Hero of the Soviet Union A.V. Lopatin. There are also photographs of the heroes-border guards A.V. Ryzhikov and V.V. Petrov.

Artillery operations in the complex dramatic situation of the first weeks and months of the struggle against the fascist aggressors were associated with considerable difficulties. This was explained by the fact that a number of artillery units and subunits were on ranges at a considerable distance from the border and separated from their formations. For this reason, artillery was not able to turn around in a timely manner everywhere and support the formations that entered the battle with fire. In addition, many artillery units and subunits turned out to be insufficiently prepared for combat operations due to a significant shortage of traction equipment, unpreparedness of artillery rear areas, and understaffing. In anti-aircraft artillery, some of the commanders were at district training camps.

However, in some areas, combined arms units and formations with their standard artillery, deployed in advance near the state border, met the Nazi troops with organized fire and inflicted significant damage on them.

Unique photographs and documents tell about the unparalleled resilience of artillery soldiers. The hall displays the Battle Banners of the 264th and 207th Corps Artillery Regiments, which went into battle on the very first day of the war. On June 23-24, the 9th anti-tank artillery brigade destroyed about 70 fascist tanks, the 1st anti-tank artillery brigade - more than 300 units of enemy armored vehicles. In the Murmansk direction, the fighters of the 6th battery of the 143rd artillery regiment heroically fought against the Nazis. On September 14, 1941, its commander, Lieutenant G.F. Lysenko, died a heroic death in hand-to-hand combat. He was posthumously awarded the Order of Lenin. The exposition presents a model of the monument to the 6th battery installed in Murmansk.

The first artillerymen - Heroes of the Soviet Union were B.L. Khigrin and Y.Kh. Kolchak. On July 5, 1941, during the fighting in the area of the Drut River, the commander of the division of the 462nd Corps Artillery Regiment, Captain B.L. Khigrin, replacing the wounded gunner, personally destroyed
4 enemy tanks. He died a heroic death in that battle. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 31, 1941, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The gunner of the anti-tank battery of the 680th Infantry Regiment of the 169th Infantry Division, Red Army soldier Y.Kh. .

The commander of the 18th Army, Lieutenant-General A.K. Smirnov, noting the valor and courage of Yakov Kolchak, wrote in his presentation for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union: "... He fought until his gun was crushed by an enemy tank ...". Yakov Kolchak was found not far from the crushed gun. He was wounded and shell-shocked, did not regain consciousness for a long time. On August 2, 1941, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Photo portraits of heroes can be seen in the hall.

The next two stands contain a diagram, photographs, documents and other exhibits covering the course of the Battle of Smolensk (July 10 - September 10, 1941), as a result of which the Nazi troops for the first time in World War II were forced to stop the offensive in the main direction and go on the defensive . In the fire of this battle, the Soviet Guard was born. By order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR of September 18, 1941, the 100th, 127th, 153rd and 161st Rifle Divisions were renamed the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Guards Divisions respectively. The stand presents photo portraits of division commanders, as well as the badge of the Guards.

The battle flag of the 305th cannon artillery regiment is placed in the hall. During the battle of Smolensk, this regiment fought hard battles with the enemy. In one of the battles, he was surrounded. The seriously wounded regimental commissar handed over the banner of the regiment to Olga Filippovna Piskareva, a resident of the village of Batala. For two long years, under the conditions of fascist occupation, the Russian peasant woman kept the regimental banner, and on September 8, 1943, after the liberation of the village, she handed it over to the command of the Red Army. For the salvation of the regimental banner O.F. Piskareva was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Particular attention is drawn to the famous "Katyusha" presented in the exposition - the BM-13 multiple launch rocket system, a unique weapon that no other army in the world possessed. BM-13 was developed in 1939 under the leadership of V. A. Artemyev, L. E. Schwartz, F. N. Poide, Yu. A. Pobedonostsev and others. In February 1941, the Main Artillery Directorate gave an order for manufacturing during 1941 40 BM-13 launchers. The machines were created at the Voronezh plant. Comintern. At field tests on June 15-17, 1941, which were attended by government representatives and leaders of the armed forces, launchers received the highest rating. On June 21, 1941, the government decided to launch their mass production and start the formation of rocket artillery units.

The first separate battery of rocket artillery (seven combat vehicles) was formed in the period from June 28 to July 1, 1941. A student of the Military Artillery Academy was appointed its commander
them. F.E. Dzerzhinsky captain I.A. Flerov. The baptism of fire of the battery took place in the Orsha region during the battle of Smolensk.

In order to delay the enemy advance, the deputy chief of artillery of the Western Front, General G.S. Cariofilli, on the morning of July 14, set the battery commander a combat mission - to launch a battery volley at the accumulation of enemy echelons with troops, military equipment, fuel and ammunition at the Orsha railway junction. A few minutes after the salvo, the railway junction turned into a sea of fire. Everything burned: people, iron and even the earth. The distraught Nazis rushed in a panic in hot smoke. Many soldiers and officers of the enemy were destroyed.

An hour and a half later, the battery deployed in combat formations of the 413th Infantry Regiment and fired a second volley at the enemy crossing across the river. Orsha. The crossing was disrupted, and for a long time the Nazis did not dare to overcome the water barrier here. In the future, the battery of I.A. Flerov destroyed the enemy near Smolensk, Yelnya, in the Roslavl region. However, on the night of October 7, 1941, south of the city of Vyazma, in the area of the village of Bogatyr, the battery was ambushed. By order of Captain I.A. Flerov combat vehicles were blown up. The commander and personnel of the battery were killed, but the enemy failed to capture secret weapon. In 1995, by the Decree of the President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin, Captain I.A. Flerov was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation (posthumously).

A large section of the exhibition hall is dedicated to the heroic 900-day defense of Leningrad. The Leningrad direction was one of the most important strategic directions of the offensive of the Nazi troops. The stand exhibits a map of battles on the far and near approaches to the city. The enemy's attempt to capture the city on the move failed due to the courage and stamina of the troops, especially those who defended the Luga line. One of the units that participated in the defense of the Luga line was the AKUKS regiment (Artillery advanced training courses for commanders), commanded by Colonel G.F. Odintsov, later commander of the artillery of the Leningrad Front. Numerous exhibits tell about the heroic defense of the city, the conditions in which the besieged Leningraders lived and worked: a 125-gram piece of besieged bread, photocopies of the pages of the diary of Tanya Savicheva, a Leningrad schoolgirl who lost her entire family in the blockade, and then she herself died from the consequences of dystrophy, a captured German map of Leningrad with targets marked on it, fragments of a Nazi high-explosive bomb dropped on the territory of the Artillery historical museum 11 September 1941, 400 mm unexploded German shell Artillery pieces that took part in the Battle of Leningrad are exhibited in the hall. The calculation of one of them - 76-mm gun mod. 1902/30 under the command of senior sergeant V.Ya.Yakovlev, in one of the battles, he repelled enemy attacks for 12 hours, while destroying 150 soldiers and officers, 2 self-propelled guns, 3 guns and 5 machine guns of the enemy.

The Nazis mercilessly bombed Leningrad, and its anti-aircraft gunners had to wage a fierce struggle against the fascist vultures. The 37-mm anti-aircraft gun presented in the exposition was part of the 632nd anti-aircraft artillery regiment and took part both in the defense and in lifting the blockade of Leningrad.

On its trunk, 18 tin five-pointed stars - 18 fascist aircraft were shot down by the crew commanded by senior sergeant I.A. Shalov. The Shalov gun is the second most effective gun during the Great Patriotic War (on average for each Soviet anti-aircraft gun accounted for 4-6 downed German aircraft). Now Ivan Afanasyevich Shalov, a retired colonel of the guard, lives in Ukraine, and one of the gunners, Yakov Eremeevich Prokhorov, a retired captain of the 2nd rank, is a resident of St. Petersburg.

In addition to air strikes, the enemy subjected the city to the most severe artillery shelling, which began on September 4, 1941 and lasted 611 days. On average, the enemy daily bombarded Leningrad with up to 245 artillery shells of various calibers, hundreds of high-explosive and incendiary bombs. And it is the artillery of the Leningrad Front that plays an outstanding role in preventing the barbaric shelling of the city - by order of the command of the Leningrad Front, a special artillery unit was created - the 3rd Leningrad artillery counter-battery corps. Major-General of Artillery N.N. Zhdanov was appointed its commander. The counter-battery corps, suppressing and crushing enemy artillery, made a significant contribution to saving the city on the Neva from destruction. The actions of artillery in counter-battery combat are demonstrated with the help of an electrified and sounded mock-up, models of aerial reconnaissance equipment and guns used to fight enemy artillery.

In the glass case and on the stand there are materials devoted to the sniper movement on the Leningrad front: photographs of the Hero of the Soviet Union, the initiator of this movement F.A. Smolyachkov, full cavalier of the Order of Glory N.P. Petrova, photographs and sniper rifles N.P. Lepsky and N.V. Nikitin.

Cut off from big land, Leningraders did not feel lonely - the defense of the city on the Neva became a nationwide affair. The schemes and photographs presented in the exposition testify to the enormous efforts of the government in organizing assistance to the besieged Leningrad. Documentary and material exhibits are evidence of the courage and labor heroism of Leningraders during the days of the blockade.

In June 1942, L.A. was appointed commander of the Leningrad Front. Govorov, whose photo portrait is presented in the exposition. The troops under his command carried out a number of offensive operations, exhausting the enemy and creating the prerequisites for future decisive actions to lift the blockade of Leningrad.

Separate stands are dedicated to the heroic defense of Kyiv, Odessa and Sevastopol. Photographs, personal awards of soldiers, land with fragments from Sapun Mountain, stained with the blood of the defenders of Sevastopol, clearly show the drama of the struggle on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front.

Decisive battles in the autumn and winter of 1941 unfolded on the outskirts of Moscow. The fascist command threw its main forces here, trying to take the capital at any cost before the onset of cold weather. The defeat of the enemy on its approaches put an end to the myth of invincibility German army. The exposition of the hall presents documents, photographs, diagrams, leaflets, paintings, posters, weapons, combat banners of the first guards artillery units of the High Command Reserve (RGK), as well as a number of other materials telling about the battle for Moscow. Particular attention is drawn to the photo panel depicting the famous parade on Red Square on November 7, 1941, after which the soldiers went straight to the front.

The stand, in the center of which is a painting by the artist V. Pamfilov, depicting the battle of Soviet artillerymen in the Volokolamsk direction, is completely devoted to the feat of the artillery soldiers who defended the capital. A 122-mm howitzer mod. 1938. She was in service with the 8th Guards Rifle Rezhitskaya Order of Lenin Red Banner Order of Suvorov Division named after Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General I.V. Panfilov. Senior sergeant P. T. Mikhailov commanded the calculation of the gun. The fighters of the crew heroically defended Moscow, and then with their guns went a glorious battle path to the shores of the Baltic, destroying about 500 Nazis, 4 tanks, 27 machine guns, 26 guns and mortars, 12 bunkers.

In the winter of 1941/42, the Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive and drove the enemy troops back from the walls of Moscow. The displayed map-scheme illustrates the course of offensive operations of the Red Army. The diorama by the artist P. Koretsky, depicting an episode of the Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow in December 1941, makes it possible to imagine the events of those harsh days.

In the fires of battles on the fields of the Moscow region, the regiments became famous, which laid the foundation for the guard in the Soviet artillery. The first were converted in January 1942 into the guards 440th and 471st cannon artillery regiments of the RVGK (commanders - majors A.I. Bryukhanov and I.P. Azarenkov). The personnel of both regiments were distinguished by a burning hatred for the enemy and the high art of wielding the weapons entrusted to them by the Motherland.

The turning point in the war was the Battle of Stalingrad. In this grandiose battle, 2 million people participated on both sides, 2 thousand. tanks, up to 25,000 guns and mortars, more than 2,300 aircraft. The exhibits, photographs and documents presented in the hall tell about the heroism of the defenders of the Volga stronghold.

The 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1937, the shield of which is covered with dents and holes - traces of heated battles with the enemy. The gun has no wheels - they were smashed in battle. The calculation of this surviving gun under the command of Senior Sergeant A. F. Alikantsev in August 1942 occupied a firing position in the area of the Tundutovo station. This fight is just one of thousands in the course Battle of Stalingrad. During the reflection of an enemy tank attack, only one of the gun crew remained alive - his commander. He himself brought the shells, pointed and loaded the gun, gave the command to himself: “Fire!” In total, 12 enemy tanks were hit, 8 of them were personally destroyed by Alikantsev. “So he fought and won, turning his position into a line of military prowess and glory, senior sergeant Alexander Alikantsev ...”, one of the army newspapers noted. It is impossible to look at Alikantsev's gun and the earth with fragments from Mamaev Kurgan without excitement. There were from 500 to 1250 such fragments per square meter.

Wearing down the enemy, destroying his manpower and military equipment in heavy defensive battles, the soldiers of the Red Army were preparing to go on the offensive. By mid-November, the number of ground and anti-aircraft artillery in the Stalingrad direction exceeded 17 thousand guns, mortars and rocket artillery combat vehicles. On November 19, the Red Army launched a decisive counteroffensive. Plentiful snowfall and fog that day, in essence, ruled out the actions of aviation, and the main burden of hitting enemy targets fell on artillery. The power of her blow stunned the enemy - the artillery offensive near Stalingrad was carried out in full. The enemy defense was successfully broken through in all directions, and then, accompanied by artillery fire, tank and mechanized corps rushed into the gap. A large enemy grouping (330 thousand people) was surrounded and defeated.

In total, during the counteroffensive of the Red Army near Stalingrad, the enemy lost 800 thousand people, up to 2 thousand tanks and assault guns, more than 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 3 thousand combat and transport aircraft, over 70 thousand vehicles, a huge number weapons, military equipment and military property. The enemy lost more than 30 divisions, and 16 divisions suffered such losses that they had to be withdrawn from the front for resupplying. It was such a defeat that the enemy had not yet experienced since the beginning of the Second World War.

The Soviet troops captured the banners of the Nazi units, a lot of military equipment and weapons. Some of these trophies are exhibited in the hall. Next to them are fascist awards, helmets, a typewriter on which the order of the Nazi command to surrender to the encircled group was printed.

In commemoration of the merits of artillery as the most important branch of the Armed Forces of the USSR, November 19 (the day the counteroffensive near Stalingrad began) became a holiday - Artillery Day (since 1964 it has been celebrated as the Day of Rocket Forces and Artillery).

In the exposition of the hall there are everyday uniforms with order blocks, personal belongings of the outstanding military leader, commander of artillery during the Great Patriotic War, representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Chief Marshal of Artillery N.N. Voronov, as well as the PPSh 41 submachine gun, presented to him by the team of the Moscow Order of Lenin Automobile Plant on the day of the release of the millionth sample of PPSh 41. A bust of the military leader (sculptor E. Zakharov) is also located here. N. N. Voronov took an active part in the development and planning of the counteroffensive near Stalingrad and others critical operations on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

Particular attention is drawn to the diorama "Storming Mamaev Kurgan" by artists A. Gorenko, P. Zhigimont and others. This monumental canvas depicts one of the brightest combat episodes of the operation to dissect the group of German troops surrounded near Stalingrad.

Victories at the front would not have been possible without selfless labor Soviet people in the rear. This is told by the materials of the next stand and large exhibits. Some examples of artillery equipment created during the war years are exhibited in the hall: 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1942, powerful rockets M-30, 76-mm cannon mod. 1942 (ZIS-3) No. 2812, developed under the direction of V.G. Grabin and passed the combat path from Stalingrad to Berlin. It had a number of important advantages over other guns of this caliber and was much easier to manufacture. This gun turned out to be more maneuverable, easy to use, adapted for effective fire on tanks.

A separate stand in the hall is dedicated to the Soviet-Czechoslovak military commonwealth. The materials placed here tell about the creation and combat path of the 1st Czechoslovak battalion under the command of Ludwig Svoboda. On the stand you can see a reproduction of the painting by the artist I. Shorzh "Fight near Sokolovo", a photo portrait of the Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant Otokar Yarosh, L. Svoboda's book "From Buzuluk to Prague". Among the exhibits in this section is a dummy banner of the 1st Czechoslovak battalion, formed on the territory of the USSR.

An extensive section of the exposition is devoted to the battle for the Caucasus. Particular attention is drawn to the 122-mm howitzer mod. 1938, the crew of which was commanded by senior sergeant I.E. Grabar. Having begun its combat path near Tula, the gun crew participated in breaking through the enemy’s defensive line on the river. Terek, the liberation of Mozdok, Stavropol and in other military operations in the North Caucasus, as well as in defeating the enemy in the Crimea and the Baltic states. The fighters of the calculation passed with their gun along the roads of war 11,750 km, destroying 2 anti-tank guns, 4 tanks, 5 armored personnel carriers and 4 firing points. For courage and courage, the entire crew was awarded military orders and medals.

In January 1943, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, with powerful blows south of Lake Ladoga, broke through the blockade of Leningrad. On the stand - a diagram of the battles and a photo panorama of the front line of the enemy's defense (in the Shlisselburg area). To the left of the stand, the layout shows artillery support for crossing the river. Neva near the village of Maryino. The feat of the commander of the 2nd division of the 596th anti-tank artillery regiment, captain N.I. Rodionov, is connected with the battle near this village. The division occupied firing positions in a tank-dangerous direction. As a result of many hours of stubborn battle, the fighters of the division did not allow the enemy to reach the rear of their units. Captain Rodionov died after replacing a dead gunner at a gunner at a critical moment and knocking out the enemy's lead tank with a well-aimed shot. For selfless actions, he was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
The exhibition presents a painting by the artist V. Iskam "The Feat of Captain Rodionov".

In a separate cabinet there is a red flag hoisted by Lieutenant M.D. Uksusov and junior political officer V. Mandrykin over Shlisselburg on January 18, 1943.

The hall also exhibits the weapons of the participants in the breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad. Among them is a 12.7-mm anti-aircraft heavy machine gun DShK mod. 1938, whose crew under the command of Sergeant I.V. Kubyshkin participated in breaking the blockade, and then in the battles to liberate the Leningrad, Novgorod, Pskov regions.

120 mm mortar mod. 1938 Crew commander senior sergeant A. Shumov.

Here is a 120-mm mortar mod. 1938. His calculation was made by the Shumov brothers, who voluntarily arrived at the front from distant Tuva. Of the six Shumov brothers, three died a heroic death in battles against the fascist invaders.

A large stand in the hall is dedicated to the defensive battles of the Battle of Kursk. Schemes, photographs, documents, posters reveal the preparation and course of defensive battles, the courage and heroism of the soldiers. An example of selflessness in battle was shown by a battery under the command of Captain G.I. Igishev. For two days, she fought with enemy tanks, repelling all attacks. At the end of the second day, the enemy attacked the battery with up to 300 tanks, supported by infantry. In this battle, her entire crew and commander died a heroic death, but did not let the enemy through, destroying 19 German tanks. In the hall you can see the bust of the Hero of the Soviet Union G.I. Igishev, the painting by the artist P. Shumilin "Repulse of the attack of tanks", which depicts a wounded captain, to get acquainted with photocopies of his letters to his relatives.

Of interest is the layout of the observation post of the commander of an artillery battery with observation devices, data preparation and communications equipment. Among the samples of artillery weapons, the 76-mm cannon mod. 1942, the crew of which was commanded by the Hero of the Soviet Union Sergeant A.D. Sapunov, who died a heroic death in battle in July 1943, and a 37-mm automatic anti-aircraft gun, the calculation of which, under the command of senior sergeant I.S. Korotkikh, shot down 7 enemy aircraft. The adjacent diorama shows how the anti-aircraft gunners of Korotkikh’s crew on July 5, on the first day of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, captured the crew of the enemy aircraft they shot down.

The stand next to the model of the observation post tells about the counter-offensive of the Red Army near Kursk. It presents documents, tables, photographs, including photographs of the commander of the Voronezh Front N.F. Vatutin.

The counteroffensive at Kursk developed into a general strategic offensive of the Red Army in the summer and autumn of 1943. The fascist German command took urgent measures to stabilize the situation on the Soviet-German front. Creating the "Eastern Wall", the enemy paid special attention to the strengthening of the Dnieper, considering this line impregnable. However, this time the calculations of the Nazis did not come true.

At the end of September, Soviet troops reached the Dnieper, crossed it with battles on a 750-kilometer front and captured 23 bridgeheads. On November 6, 1943, the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, was liberated. For the heroism shown during the crossing of the Dnieper, about 600 artillery soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Among the heroes, about whom the materials of the exposition tell, we should especially note the only two Heroes of the Soviet Union among the gunners - A.P. Shilin and V.S. Petrov. In October 1943, the commander of the battery control platoon of the 132nd Guards Artillery Regiment of the 60th Guards Rifle Division, Lieutenant A.P. Shilin, with a radio operator and a reconnaissance officer, was among the first to cross the Dnieper in the Zaporozhye region with the task of adjusting the fire of his artillery. During the landing, the troops engaged in hand-to-hand combat. Correcting the artillery fire, when repulsing one of the enemy counterattacks, Shilin caused fire on himself. The enemy counterattack was repulsed, and the captured bridgehead was held.

Having recovered from the shell shock received in that battle, Shilin soon again participates in crossing the river in another area. And again, when fierce battles broke out during the capture of the bridgehead, he, having shown ingenuity, opened fire at point-blank range on the Nazis from a captured howitzer. The fight was won. For the courage and heroism shown in these battles, A.P. Shilin was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. He received the second "Gold Star" of the Hero in January 1945, having distinguished himself in the battles for the liberation of Poland.

After the war, Lieutenant General of Artillery A.P. Shilin held responsible command positions in the artillery. Since 1976, he was Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of DOSAAF. Died 1982

Captain V.S.Petrov in the fall of 1943, as deputy commander of the 1850th anti-tank regiment, reached his native Dnieper (he was born in a village near Zaporozhye). On the eve of crossing the river, the regiment commander was seriously wounded, and Petrov took command of the regiment. On the night of September 23, he, along with the first guns of the regiment, crossed to the Bukrinsky bridgehead, captured by the infantry of the 309th Infantry Division, south of Kyiv. Here they all stood to death, repelling the fierce attacks of the enemy. On October 1, the battle was especially furious. The enemy stubbornly attacked the positions of the 2nd and 5th batteries. Already the soldiers-artillerymen of the 2nd battery stopped 3 enemy tanks, but the fire of the battery also weakened - two guns were hit, the third had the entire crew out of order. Then Petrov stood up to the gun for the gunner, and the battery commander Bogdanov - for the loader. An unequal battle lasted for several hours, during which Petrov knocked out three enemy tanks and one self-propelled gun. A direct hit by a fascist shell on Petrov's gun broke both hands, but, despite being wounded, the brave officer continued to command the regiment until the enemy's attack was repelled. In the hospital, he had to amputate his arms above the elbow. There, in the hospital, he was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to Petrov by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of December 24, 1943.

Vasily Stepanovich could not come to terms with the fate of an invalid. From the hospital, he sent a letter addressed to I. V. Stalin with a request to allow him to remain in the ranks of the armed forces. His request was granted, and in December 1944 Guards Major Petrov again went to the front - and not somewhere to headquarters, but to command the 248th Guards Anti-Tank Regiment of the 11th Guards Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade. He received the second "Gold Star" for heroism and courage in battles on the territory of Nazi Germany. He ended the war of the guards as a lieutenant colonel, and Vasily Stepanovich left for the reserve in the late 80s with the rank of lieutenant general of artillery. His last position was Deputy Commander of Artillery of the Carpathian Military District. In 1999, by decree of the President of Ukraine, V.S. Petrov was awarded the rank of colonel-general of artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The unparalleled courage of the gunners is also reminded by the 76-mm cannon mod. 1942, which was in service with the 5th battery of the 1217th light artillery regiment of the 31st artillery brigade. Participating in the battle for the Dnieper, the crew of this gun, led by Sergeant Kotelnikov, destroyed 12 enemy tanks, 4 self-propelled guns, 4 cannons, a large number of enemy soldiers and officers. On December 27, 1943, in the battle near Kirovograd, all the fighters of the crew died, having fulfilled their military duty to the end.

Nearby is a 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1943, developed under the direction of M.Yu. Tsirulnikov. It is installed on a raft similar to those used in crossing the Dnieper. This exhibit not only illustrates the method of crossing artillery pieces, but also to some extent creates a sense of authenticity, makes it possible to feel the atmosphere of those distant and heroic days.

The final stands tell about the partisan movement on the territory of Belarus, the formation and participation in the fight against the Nazi invaders of the 1st Polish division named after Tadeusz Kosciuszko.

The exposition of the hall ends with coverage of the work of the military industry of the USSR. Here are the samples small arms, artillery ammunition, photographs, diagrams, digital data, clearly showing the role of the rear during the war years. The exposition is crowned by the sculpture “Hardworker of the Home Front” by N. Gorenyshev, symbolizing the valiant labor of the people who forged weapons of victory over the enemy.

Annex 7

Deliveries and losses of artillery and ammunition in the Great Patriotic War

Table 46 Supply of artillery pieces to the fronts from June 22, 1941 to May 5, 1945

Table 47 Supply of artillery pieces to new formations in 1941–1944

Table 48 Deliveries of artillery systems by industry from June 22, 1941 to May 5, 1945

Table 51 Deliveries of tank weapons by the industry from June 22, 1941 to May 5, 1945

Table 53. Ammunition consumption in 1941–1945 (thousand pieces)

Table 54 Ammunition production 1941–1945 (thousand pieces)

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EXPERIENCE TEACHES GUNNERS

For centuries, artillerymen and engineers have striven to make artillery pieces technically perfect. How much effort, perseverance and hard work was required for this. But these works were not in vain. Now our artillery can successfully solve all the tasks that arise in front of it in battle.
A weapon, no matter how perfect, cannot by itself decide the fate of a battle. One must know how to use it correctly in combat, how to get the most out of it.
The greatest technical improvements in artillery usually came about as a result of wars; in battles and battles, new principles for the combat use of artillery were also born.
During the war, mistakes were corrected, new methods of combat use of artillery were tested in practice. The experience was very valuable in this regard. civil war.

At the beginning of the Civil War, artillery was used in combat in the old way, as they were used to using it at the end of the First World War. In connection with the new forms of warfare, it was necessary to use artillery in a completely new way. The old tactics of artillery were replaced by the tactics of flexible maneuver and decisive concentration of artillery in the direction of the main attack of the troops.
The following examples speak of how old obsolete traditions were broken in the combat use of artillery. In October 1918, the 70,000-strong White Guard army of General Krasnov, armed and equipped by the Germans, surrounded Tsaritsyn and pressed the heroic defenders of the city to the banks of the Volga. The number of Soviet troops defending Tsaritsyn did not exceed 50 thousand people. The supply of shells and cartridges from the defenders of the city was coming to an end, and the lines of communication with Moscow and the Caucasus were cut off by the Whites. The situation was difficult. On October 16, the White Guards occupied the Voroponovo station, located just 10 kilometers west of the city, and continued to move forward, showering shells on the Red Army units. Due to the lack of shells and rifle cartridges, the heroic defenders of Tsaritsyn increasingly had to fight back with bayonets and checkers. By the end of the day on October 16, the front was already 7 kilometers from the city. In the evening, our observers noticed that new military units arrived to help the Whites. As it turned out later, a White Guard officer brigade of about a thousand people approached the front.
Has come critical moment. Tsaritsyn was in mortal danger.
At this difficult moment, Comrade Stalin, who personally led the defense of Tsaritsyn on the instructions of the Central Committee of the Party, mobilized all forces and means to repel the enemy. Almost all artillery pieces and ammunition were concentrated in the central sector of the front against the Voroponovo station.
There were about 200 guns on the front stretching 40 kilometers. Almost all of them were now converging on the central sector of the front. Batteries stood only a few dozen steps from one another, preparing to repel the attack of the Whites.
At dawn, the white artillery opened fire, and soon their infantry also went on the attack. In full dress uniform, chain after chain, column after column, the officer regiments marched. An officer brigade was ahead, followed by the regiments of General Krasnov. The White Guards counted on the fact that the Red Army soldiers would not stand it, that the mere sight of a mass of armed men steadily moving forward would demoralize them. The artillery of the Red Army was silent: it was waiting for the prearranged signal. Now the advanced lines of the Whites are half a kilometer from our infantry ... Already only 400 meters remain ... Every second one could expect that the lines of the White Guards would change their fast pace to a swift run and go over to the attack. At that moment, a signal was given: 4 high bursts of shrapnel - 4 bright white smoke clouds hanging in the clear morning sky. And after that, the whole steppe rumbled. The sounds of shots and explosions of shells merged into a continuous continuous rumble. Each battery fired at the sector of the front assigned to it, and all together created a solid wall of fire. The shells were bursting in the very thick of the advancing enemy columns. Having suffered heavy losses, the Whites lay down. They were stopped, but not yet defeated. At this time, an armored train approached from the north along the ring railway line; on the right and left flanks of the front section, trucks converted into armored vehicles and armed with machine guns burst forward; the batteries shifted their fire deep into the location of the Whites in order to cut off the escape routes of their advanced units. The Red Infantry went on the counterattack. She moved forward quickly. And as the artillery carried the fire farther and farther, a still smoking battlefield, littered with the corpses of the White Guards and plowed up with shells, opened up before the eyes of the observers. The half-destroyed White Guard regiments retreated in disarray to the south and west, dispersed across the steppe. The ring of siege was broken. Red Tsaritsyn was saved. In 1919, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Party, Comrade Stalin led the defeat of the White Guard troops of General Yudenich, who were rushing to Petrograd. The position of the Soviet troops was complicated by the fact that in the rear of the Red Army at the forts Krasnaya Gorka and Gray Horse A counter-revolutionary revolt was raised. It was impossible to take well-armed forts by storm, advancing only from land with the support of small artillery. Comrade Stalin proposed to attack the rebellious forts with a combined attack from land and sea, using the powerful artillery of the ships of the Baltic Fleet. Comrade Stalin's plan was approved and put into practice. The suppression of the rebellious forts was carried out brilliantly. The rebellious forts, which could not withstand the powerful blows of naval artillery, were taken by the Red Army units and detachments of Baltic sailors and St. Petersburg workers. Yudenich's army was defeated and its remnants were driven back to Estonia. Artillery provided powerful support to the infantry on the Southern Front, when troops under the leadership of M.V. Frunze stormed Perekop. The artillery of the First Cavalry Army also acted boldly and decisively, showing examples of skillful interaction with cavalry and high maneuverability on the battlefield. The study of the experience of past wars helped our Party and the Soviet Government to correctly outline further steps along the path of development of Soviet artillery and clearly define the tasks that artillery must solve in battle. The re-equipment of artillery with new types of guns that followed in 1937 and 1938 contributed to a significant increase in its power. The force of the crushing blows of Soviet artillery was soon experienced by the enemies of our Motherland, who dared to encroach on the inviolability of the borders of the country of the Soviets. In the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River in 1939 and in the Soviet-Finnish war in 1939/40, our artillery provided powerful support to infantry and tanks, hit the enemy’s manpower, destroyed his military equipment and destroyed his powerful engineering structures.

After the First World War of 1914–1918, many military experts in Western Europe argued that artillery was no longer of decisive importance in battle and that in modern wars the success of the battle would be decided by tanks and aircraft - these new types of troops. So did the Nazis. main role on the battlefields, they diverted tanks and aircraft and believed that artillery fire could be replaced by mortar fire. The Nazis believed that the opportunity fast manufacturing mortars in mass quantities will make the mortar a decisive force in the infantry offensive. Reality showed that they miscalculated cruelly. The situation was no better in the artillery of the British and American armies. The British only after the defeat at Dunkirk began to rearm their artillery and completed it by the end of the war, and the American army entered the war, armed with light and anti-tank artillery, a slightly improved 75-mm French gun of the 1897 model. The development of our Soviet artillery went in completely different ways. The plan for creating the armed forces of our state was based on taking into account the experience of past wars and on the principle of close interaction of all branches of the armed forces in battle. In creating new types of troops—aircraft and tanks—our Party and the Soviet Government paid unflagging attention to the development of artillery, to the improvement of its combat equipment and to the increase in the power of its fire.
The Communist Party and the Soviet Government also tirelessly cared about the education of well-trained artillery personnel devoted to the cause of the Party and our Socialist Motherland. which pointed out the importance of artillery in modern warfare: “It is not only about aviation in modern warfare. The success of the war is decided not only by aviation. Who thinks that with the help of one powerful aircraft; you can win the war - he is deeply mistaken. If we look into history, we will see what an important role artillery played in all wars. Aviation on the battlefields appeared relatively recently; she begins the first fight with the enemy in the deep rear, inspires fear and panic, shakes the enemy morally, but this is not what is required for the final defeat and victory over the enemy. Artillery was always needed to decide the success of a war. How did Napoleon win? First of all, with their artillery. How were the French defeated near Sedan in 1870? Mostly artillery. How did the French beat the Germans near Verdun during the World War? - Mainly artillery. For the success of the war, an exceptionally valuable branch of the army is artillery. To make our artillery first-class, many conditions were required. First of all, a powerful industry, equipped with the latest technology, was needed. We needed experienced designers who fully mastered modern science; engineers, technicians and workers, metallurgists, mathematicians, mechanics, ootics, electrical engineers, radio technicians were needed ... The industrialization of the country, carried out under the leadership of our Communist Party, brought success to the cause. Without the development of heavy industry, we would not have had such powerful artillery, which deserved the honorary name - the main fire strike force of the Soviet Army. During the years of the first five-year plans, research work was widely developed, which ensured the high technical level of our artillery. Institutes and technical schools have trained thousands of engineers and technicians. A cadre of skilled artillerymen was also being trained. Thanks to the cares of the Communist Party, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Army had first-class artillery, which in all respects was superior to the artillery of any of the capitalist countries. During the war, work on the creation of new models of artillery weapons unfolded even more widely. As you know, in the first two years of the war, the Nazis had to strengthen the armor protection of their tanks: it turned out that their armor was easily penetrated by Soviet artillery shells. In 1943, new powerful tanks appeared on the Soviet-German front with the "terrifying" names "tiger" and "panther". Their armor was very thick and strong. It was necessary to quickly create a new anti-tank gun that could penetrate the armor of powerful fascist tanks. In a very short time, such a tool was created. The new gun appeared on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War and immediately gained great popularity among Soviet soldiers; this gun pierced the armor of all tanks and self-propelled guns that were in service with the Nazi army. Ground and anti-aircraft artillery were armed with new materiel. Reactive mortars were put into service, the appearance of which on the battlefield was a complete surprise for the Nazis. Soviet artillery was also well equipped with all types of reconnaissance and communications equipment and fire control devices.
Even during the period of defensive battles with superior enemy forces, the Communist Party foresaw a radical turn in the course of the war on the Soviet-German front and prepared the Soviet Army for the final defeat of the enemy. In the upcoming battles, artillery with its massive fire was supposed to destroy enemy fortifications, suppress enemy fire weapons, exterminate manpower and clear the way for our infantry, cavalry and tanks. In the battles of the Great Patriotic War, our artillery successfully coped with all these tasks,

THE REAR HELP THE FRONT

To conduct a modern war, a lot of military equipment and especially artillery weapons are needed. War requires constant replenishment of the material part and ammunition of the army, and, moreover, many times more than in peacetime. In wartime, not only defense factories increase their output, but also many "peaceful" factories switch to defense work. Without the powerful economic foundation of the Soviet state, without the selfless labor of our people in the rear, without the moral and political unity of the Soviet people, without their material and moral support, the Soviet Army would not have been able to defeat the enemy. The first months of the Great Patriotic War were very difficult for our industry. The unexpected attack of the Nazi invaders and their advance to the east forced the evacuation of factories from the western regions of the country to a safe zone - to the Urals and Siberia. The relocation of industrial enterprises to the east was carried out according to the plans and under the leadership of the State Defense Committee. At deaf stations and half-stations, in the steppe, in the taiga, new factories grew with fabulous speed. The machines began to work in the open air as soon as they were installed on the foundation; the front demanded military products, and there was no time to wait for the completion of the construction of factory buildings. Among others, artillery factories were deployed. A huge role in strengthening our rear and mobilizing the masses for the defense of the Motherland was played by the speech of the Chairman of the State Committee. Defense of I. V. Stalin on the radio on July 3, 1941. In this speech, JV Stalin, on behalf of the Party and the Soviet Government, called on the Soviet people to reorganize all work on a war footing as soon as possible. “We must,” said I.V. Stalin, “strengthen the rear of the Red Army, subordinating all our work to the interests of this cause, ensuring the intensified work of all enterprises, producing more rifles, machine guns, guns, cartridges, shells, aircraft, organizing the protection of factories, power plants, telephone and telegraph communications, to establish local air defense". The Communist Party quickly restructured the entire national economy, all the work of the Party, state and public organizations in a military way. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, our people were able not only to fully provide the front with weapons and ammunition, but also to accumulate reserves for the successful completion of the war. Our Party has turned the Soviet country into a single fighting camp, armed the home front workers with an unshakable faith in victory over the enemy. The productivity of labor has increased enormously; new improvements in production technology have drastically reduced the production time for armaments for the army; the output of artillery armaments increased significantly. The quality of artillery armament also improved continuously.
The calibers of tank and anti-tank artillery guns have increased. Significantly increased initial speeds. The armor-piercing ability of Soviet artillery shells increased several times. The maneuverability of artillery systems has been greatly increased. The most powerful self-propelled artillery in the world was created, armed with such heavy weapons as a 152-millimeter howitzer cannon and a 122-millimeter cannon. Especially great success was achieved by Soviet designers in the field of jet

Neither fascist artillery nor fascist tanks could compete with Soviet artillery and tanks, although the Nazis robbed all of Western Europe, and the scientists and designers of Western Europe mostly worked for the Nazis. The Nazis had the largest metallurgical plants in Germany (the Krupp plants) and many other plants in the European states occupied by the Nazi troops. Nevertheless, neither the industry of all of Western Europe, nor the experience of many Western European scientists and designers could provide the Nazis with superiority in the field of creating new military equipment.
Thanks to the care of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, a whole galaxy of talented designers has been bred in our country, who during the war created new models of weapons with exceptional speed.
Talented artillery designers V. G. Grabin, F. F. Petrov, I. I. Ivanov and many others created new, perfect models of artillery weapons.
Design work was also carried out at factories. During the war, factories produced many prototypes of artillery weapons; a significant part of them went into mass production.
For the Second World War, a lot of weapons were required, incomparably more than for previous wars. For example, in one of the greatest battles of the past, the Battle of Borodino, two armies - Russian and French - had a total of 1227 guns.
At the beginning of the First World War, the armies of all the warring countries had 25,000 guns, which were scattered along all fronts. The saturation of the front with artillery was insignificant; only in some areas of the breakthrough were collected up to 100-150 guns per kilometer of the front.
Things were different during the Great Patriotic War. When the enemy blockade of Leningrad was broken in January 1944, 5,000 guns and mortars took part in the battle from our side. When the powerful enemy defenses on the Vistula were broken through, 9,500 guns and mortars were concentrated on the 1st Belorussian Front alone. Finally, during the storming of Berlin, the fire of 41,000 Soviet guns and mortars was brought down on the enemy.

In some battles of the Great Patriotic War, our artillery fired more shells in one day of battle than the Russian army used during the entire war with Japan in 1904-1905.
How many defense factories were needed, how fast they had to work in order to produce such a huge amount of guns and ammunition. How skillfully and accurately the transport had to work in order to uninterruptedly transfer countless guns and shells to the battlefields!
And the Soviet people coped with all these difficult tasks, inspired by their love for the Motherland, for the Communist Party, for their Government.
Soviet factories during the war produced huge quantities of guns and ammunition. Back in 1942, our industry in just one month produced much more guns of all calibers than the Russian army had at the beginning of the First World War.

Thanks to the heroic labor of the Soviet people, the Soviet Army received a steady stream of first-class artillery weapons, which in the capable hands of our artillerymen became the decisive force that ensured the defeat of Nazi Germany and the victorious end of the war. During the war, our domestic industry increased its output from month to month and supplied the Soviet Army with tanks and aircraft, ammunition and equipment in increasing quantities.
The artillery industry annually produced up to 120,000 guns of all calibers, up to 450,000 light and heavy machine guns, over 3 million rifles, and about 2 million machine guns. In 1944 alone, 7,400,000,000 cartridges were produced.
Soviet people, selflessly working in the rear, helped the Soviet Army to defend the freedom and independence of our Motherland and saved the peoples of Europe from fascist enslavement.
The victory of our country in the Great Patriotic War speaks of the vitality of the Soviet social order about the invincibility of the cause for which the Soviet people fought under the leadership of our Party, making the Great October Socialist Revolution.
The great strength of the leadership of the Communist Party ensured the Soviet people a complete victory over a strong and treacherous enemy in the most difficult of all wars that mankind has ever had to fight.
During the Great Patriotic War, the Communist Party appeared before all the peoples of the Soviet Union as the inspirer and organizer of the nationwide struggle against the fascist invaders. The organizational work of the Party united and directed to a common goal all the efforts of the Soviet people, subordinating all forces and means to the cause of defeating the enemy. During the war, the Party has become even more closely related to the people, has become even more closely connected with the broad masses of the working people.

SOVIET ARTILLERY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR
We have already said that by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, our army had first-class artillery, which in all respects was superior to the artillery of any foreign army. Soviet artillery personnel were well trained and distinguished by high moral character.
In the initial period of the war, our artillery repulsed the attacks of enemy tanks, which were the main striking force of the fascist German army, with their fire, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment, helped our infantry stop the enemy and gain a foothold on advantageous lines.
How did artillery solve its combat missions?
When the Nazi armored hordes attacked our Motherland, they met stubborn resistance and well-aimed fire from the Soviet artillery, which took upon itself the brunt of the fight against enemy tanks. Our artillery was the force that helped the Soviet Army to thwart Hitler's plans for the "lightning" defeat of our Motherland.

For more successful fight with Nazi tanks, it was necessary to form new anti-tank artillery units. Special anti-tank artillery units were formed, which played a crucial role in defeating enemy tanks.
Bravely defending the prepared lines, the Soviet gunners dealt the enemy blow after blow. Each city approached by the enemy turned into a fortress, on the outskirts of which selected German fascist units perished. The legendary defense of the hero cities: Odessa, Leningrad, Sevastopol, Stalingrad has gone down in history forever.
In all defensive battles, artillery, with its fire, ensured the strength of the defense of our troops. In the defense of Leningrad and Sevastopol, along with hired artillery, coastal and naval artillery successfully operated, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy.
Soviet artillery was especially famous in the battles on the outskirts of Moscow, for the capture of which the Nazis sent 51 divisions, including 13 tank and 5 motorized divisions, to defeat the Soviet Army and, having captured Moscow, end the war before the onset of the winter of 1941.

For twenty days in a row, the battle on the outskirts of the capital of our Motherland did not subside for an hour. Artillerymen courageously fought against fascist tanks, tens and hundreds set fire to and knocked out armored vehicles. One of the anti-tank artillery regiments destroyed 186 enemy tanks on the outskirts of Moscow. For the courage shown in battles with the Nazi invaders, for the steadfastness, courage and heroism of the glorious destroyers of enemy tanks, this regiment was transformed into the 1st Guards Anti-Tank Fighter Regiment.

The Soviet troops, having crushed the enemy's strike forces, stopped him "and then, pulling up and concentrating reserves, on December 6, 1941, they launched a counteroffensive. Near Moscow and in other sectors of the enemy front, the enemy was defeated and thrown back far to the west. During these battles, the enemy suffered huge losses. During the first 40 days of our offensive, the Nazis lost only 300,000 soldiers and officers killed, hundreds of tanks, guns and mortars, thousands of vehicles and many other weapons and military equipment.
The defeat of the enemy armies near Moscow was of great importance for the further course of the war. For the first time during the Second World War, the fascist troops were not only stopped, but suffered a complete defeat. As a result of the defeat of the Nazis near Moscow, the myth of the invincibility of the Nazi army was dispelled.
Assessing the role of artillery in the defensive battles of the Soviet Army near Moscow and Leningrad, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union Stalin wrote in an order dedicated to the celebration of Artillery Day on November 19, 1944: “As you know, artillery was the force that helped the Red Army stop the advance of the enemy at approaches to Leningrad and Moscow.

SOVIET ARTILLERY IN THE BATTLE NEAR STALINGRAD
At the beginning of the book, we already mentioned what role the Soviet artillery played in the Battle of Stalingrad. The role of our artillery was so great that it is necessary to tell a little more about it.
Having suffered a defeat near Moscow and in other sectors of the Soviet-German front, the Nazis hastily began to prepare a new offensive against the Soviet Union. They wanted to break through our defenses, bypass Moscow from the east, cut it off from the Volga and Ural rear, and then strike at Moscow. In this adventuristic plan of the Nazis, the capture of Stalingrad was envisaged. To accomplish this task, the Nazi command concentrated huge forces of infantry, tanks, self-propelled artillery, aviation, and many other military equipment in the Stalingrad direction.
The Nazi command decided to launch an offensive with the expectation of capturing Stalingrad by July 25, and by August 15 to capture Kuibyshev and end the war in the east by the winter of 1942. The Nazis began to carefully prepare for the offensive. A breakthrough of the front was planned in the direction of Voronezh and Stalingrad.
In developing their plans, the Nazis counted that the American-British imperialists would not come to the aid of the Soviet Union, that they would not land their troops on the coast of France in order to create a second front against Nazi Germany.
Indeed, the American-British imperialists kept delaying the opening of a second front in Europe, they wanted to exhaust and weaken the Soviet Union in such a way that after the war our country would become economically dependent on the United States of America and Britain.
In addition, they expected that a difficult war with the Soviet Union would weaken Nazi Germany; which was the most dangerous competitor of the USA and England in the world market.
On July 24, 1941, in The New York Times, American Senator Truman, who later became President of the United States, wrote: “If we see that Germany is winning, then we should help Russia, and if Russia wins, then we should help Germany . And thus, let them kill as many as possible."
Violating their allied obligations, the US-British imperialists were secretly negotiating peace with fascist Germany from the Soviet Union.

In the days of heavy Stalingrad battles, the American-British imperialists had under arms about six million inactive soldiers and huge masses of military equipment. These forces and means could "provide substantial assistance to the Soviet Army, but in the summer of 1942 the American-British reactionaries raised a fuss in their newspapers that the American and British troops were not prepared for the opening of a second front in Europe.
By this they made it clear to Hitler that he could concentrate all his forces against our army without fear for his rear.
At the same time, the US and British imperialists supplied Hitlerite Germany with the most important military materials through the "neutral" countries.
Thus the US and British monopolists openly and secretly helped Hitlerite Germany in its struggle against the Soviet Union.
Choosing the Stalingrad direction, the Nazis hoped that in the Stalingrad steppes they would be able to make the most extensive use of tank and mechanized troops, quickly complete the capture of Stalingrad and Kuibyshev, and finally defeat the Soviet Army.
But they miscalculated cruelly, they did not take into account the ability of our army to resist for a long time; nor did they foresee the inexhaustible strength of our Soviet people, their unshakable will in striving to destroy the enemy.
The Supreme High Command promptly unraveled the plans of the Nazi command and developed a plan for the defeat of the fascist troops near Stalingrad. The Soviet troops were given the task of exhausting and bleeding the Nazi troops rushing to Stalingrad in stubborn battles, and then encircling them and destroying them. This plan was successfully implemented.

In the battles that unfolded between the bend of the Don and the Volga, our army dealt heavy blows to the Nazi troops, destroying the elite Nazi regiments and divisions and holding back the advance of the Nazi troops. To go the distance from the Don to Stalingrad, the Nazis had to fight bloody battles for about two months. Only in mid-September, the Nazi troops were able to approach the outskirts of the city.

At Stalingrad, the Nazis met resistance and stubbornness of the Soviet troops and workers of Stalingrad enterprises unprecedented in the history of wars.
The enemy threw division after division into battle, but all his attempts to capture the city were shattered against the staunch defense of our troops. The approaches to the city and the ruins of city blocks were littered with the corpses of the Nazis. The enemy's strength was fading. The heroic defenders of Stalingrad smashed the elite Nazi troops and prepared the conditions for their complete defeat.
Soviet artillery played a particularly important role in this battle; it waged a fierce and protracted struggle against the fascist German tank and mechanized troops on the far and near approaches to Stalingrad and delayed their advance. Artillerymen with the fire of their guns blocked the path of the infantry and tanks of the enemy, inflicting huge damage on him in manpower and equipment. By this, the artillery made it possible for our troops to prepare the defense of the city.
Artillery of all calibers took part in the heroic defense of Stalingrad, from small-caliber guns to high-powered guns. Together with ground artillery, our anti-aircraft artillery destroyed the enemy in the air and on the ground.
The interaction of artillery fire with infantry was very well organized. Defensive battles in Stalingrad were very active. Our units continuously counterattacked the enemy and kept him in a tense state, in constant expectation of an attack.
During September - October and the first half of November 1942, the Nazis made an average of 10 attacks per day. The struggle was for every inch of Soviet land, for every quarter, for every house, for every floor of the house. Soviet soldiers, including artillerymen, heroically defended the city. They turned every quarter, street, house into fortresses, which destroyed fresh reserves brought into battle by the Nazi command.
In the same months, the Nazis launched 4 offensive operations that lasted several days; they threw more than ten divisions into battle at the same time, supported by 400-500 tanks.
The German fascist invaders managed to break into the city, but they could not completely capture it.
The defenders of Stalingrad remembered the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - "Stalingrad must not be surrendered to the enemy" - and sought to defend the glorious Soviet stronghold on the Volga at any cost. The soldiers of the Stalingrad Front wrote to Comrade Stalin: “Before our battle flags, before the entire Soviet country, we swear that we will not disgrace the glory of Russian weapons, we will fight to the last opportunity. Under your leadership, our fathers won the battle of Tsaritsyno, under your leadership we will win now in the great battle of Stalingrad! The defenders of Stalingrad kept this oath with honor.
Thousands of Stalingraders - residents of the city - took part in street battles.
Here is one typical case. The Nazis tried to force the Russian woman to help them bypass the house, which was defended by our machine gunners. This attempt cost the Nazis dearly. The woman led the enemy soldiers into the courtyard under the fire of our shooters and shouted: “Shoot, comrades!” Almost all the Nazis were killed. One of the Nazis, wounded, shot at the woman. When our shooters ran up to her, she said: "Still, I was not mistaken." Glory to the nameless heroine!
The defensive battles of the Soviet Army near Stalingrad were only the first stage of the Battle of Stalingrad. Heroically resisting, the defenders of Stalingrad stopped the advance of the Nazis in the Stalingrad direction.

The destructive fire of the Soviet artillery produced enormous devastation in the disposition of the enemy.

During the defensive battle, which lasted from mid-July to November 19, the Nazi armies were bled dry. They lost 182,000 killed and over 500,000 wounded. In addition, our troops knocked out and destroyed 1,450 enemy tanks, 4,000 machine guns, over 2,000 guns and mortars. 1337 aircraft were destroyed by anti-aircraft artillery fire and fighter aircraft. All this affected the morale of the Nazis and made them talk about the "impregnability of the Stalingrad fortress", about the "Volga Verdun", about the "incomprehensible stubbornness of the Russians."
Corporal Walter wrote in a letter home: “Stalingrad is hell on earth, Verdun, Red Yerden with new weapons. We attack daily. If we manage to occupy 20 meters, then in the evening the Russians will push us back.”
But, despite heavy losses, the Nazis decided to hold their positions near Stalingrad during the winter, and in the summer to start the offensive again in order to achieve their crazy goal - to capture Moscow.
Even while fierce battles were going on in the streets of the city, our new units and formations armed with new military equipment capable of defeating the enemy were concentrated in the Stalingrad region.
To defeat the enemy, it was necessary to concentrate a large number of troops and military equipment. Especially much was needed for artillery, the main striking force of the advancing fronts. Artillery was supposed to crack the enemy defenses with its fire and ensure the transition of our troops to the counteroffensive. In the silence of the night, the roar of engines was constantly heard. It was guns, tanks, cars moving towards the front" and there was no end in sight to the long columns of people and equipment. All preparations for the offensive were carried out covertly. Troops approached the front only at night. During the day, they took refuge in settlements and in numerous beams, carefully disguising themselves from airborne observers! enemy. Our troops carefully prepared for the upcoming battles. A lot of work in the preparatory period was done by the Soviet artillery reconnaissance. She identified important targets on which artillery was supposed to bring down her fire. Much attention was paid to the organization of interaction between various branches of the armed forces.
Finally, by mid-November, preparations for the offensive were completed. The task was to surround and completely destroy all the enemy divisions that had broken through to Stalingrad.
To do this, our troops, in close cooperation, were to break through the front of the Nazis and defeat them in the sector of the middle reaches of the Don and south of Stalingrad, and then with a swift blow of the mobile troops in the direction of the Don, surround the Nazi hordes at Stalingrad and destroy them.
On November 19, 1942, according to the plan developed by the Supreme High Command, the Soviet troops launched a decisive counterattack.

Before the start of the offensive of the infantry and tanks, artillery preparation of an unprecedented force was carried out. Thousands of guns and mortars rained down on the enemy positions a huge number of shells and mines. A sudden powerful fire strike was inflicted on the enemy's centers of resistance on the front line and in the depths of the defense, on his mortars and artillery batteries, on command posts, on reserves. The whole area was, as it were, plowed up by a gigantic plow of war. The surface of the earth was pitted with many craters from explosions of shells, mines and aircraft bombs. Entire enemy units ran out of trenches and dugouts and rushed from side to side in a panic, finding no escape. The losses of the Nazis in manpower and equipment were enormous. Despite the fog, which limited visibility, our artillery did an excellent job with its tasks.
Enemy trenches and fortifications were destroyed by massive artillery fire. On the first day of the offensive, artillery from only one front destroyed and suppressed 293 heavy machine guns, 100 artillery and 60 mortar batteries, destroyed 196 dugouts, 126 defensive structures. Artillery fire destroyed a lot of enemy soldiers and officers.
Having broken through the front of the enemy, our troops began to move forward rapidly. Our artillery advanced along with the troops and did not lag behind them.
During the offensive, the Soviet gunners showed great skill in controlling massive fire. They smashed the enemy fortifications and accompanied our attacking infantry, cavalry and tanks with fire.
Thus began the rout of the Nazi army, a rout in which Soviet artillery played an outstanding role.
As a result of a well-organized infantry offensive in cooperation with artillery, tanks and cavalry on November 23, a 330,000-strong group of selected Nazi troops was surrounded. The history of wars knows no example of the encirclement and complete defeat of such a huge mass of troops armed with the latest technology.
In December 1942, Hitler addressed the encircled troops with a special order - he demanded at all costs to hold positions near Stalingrad.
The Nazi command made desperate attempts to save the encircled troops. To assist them in the areas of Tormosino and Kotelnikovo, the Nazis created two strong groupings of troops, 8 divisions each, which were supposed to break through the ring of Soviet troops around Stalingrad.
In December, our troops defeated both of these enemy groupings and continued to develop the offensive further and further to the west.

So ingloriously ended the attempts of the Nazis to free their encircled armies.
Meanwhile, our troops, who surrounded the main Nazi group near Stalingrad, were preparing to destroy it.
In the last, decisive battle, according to the plan of our Supreme High Command, it was necessary to dismember the encircled enemy troops into parts and then destroy each isolated enemy grouping separately. Artillery was entrusted with the task of paving the way for infantry and tanks through the enemy's fortifications, suppressing and destroying his firepower and manpower.
On January 10, at 08:50, from the point of the commander of the troops of the front, there was a command to begin the offensive. The air shuddered from the thunder of the artillery cannonade, which simultaneously began on the entire front. Squadrons of our bomber and attack aircraft appeared in the sky.
The offensive of our troops was supported by strong artillery fire. Artillery was used in large numbers and provided good fire for the actions of our infantry and tanks.
The sounds of shots and explosions of artillery shells, mines and air bombs merged into a continuous rumble. Losses inflicted on the enemy

the fire of our artillery, mortars and aircraft were very significant. According to the testimonies of the prisoners, "whole battalions knelt down and turned to God with a prayer, asking for mercy and to protect them from the fire of Russian artillery."
Our tanks with landing troops landed on them rushed at the enemy; after them went on the attack infantry units. For two weeks, units of the Soviet Army, advancing from the west, with fierce battles moved east to Stalingrad, and by the end of January 26, 1943, in the Mamaev Kurgan area, they joined with the troops of General Chuikov, advancing from Stalingrad.
The Nazi troops were cut into two parts: the northern one in the area of the tractor factory and the Barrikady plant, and the southern one in the northwestern half of the city.
On January 31, the southern grouping of Nazi troops was finally defeated; On February 1, our troops launched an assault on the northern grouping of enemy troops. After artillery preparation, the enemy defenses were broken through, and the next day our troops defeated this last enemy center of resistance. Our artillery honorably fulfilled the tasks assigned to it. Suffice it to say that in the period from January 10 to February 2, artillery fire

98 tanks were hit and burned, more than 70 batteries were suppressed and destroyed, about 1000 wood-and-earth firing points and over 1500 dugouts were destroyed. Several tens of thousands of fascist invaders died under the explosions of shells and mines.

Our anti-aircraft artillery provided great assistance to the advancing troops. In the battles near Stalingrad, anti-aircraft artillery shot down 223 enemy aircraft and disabled a large number of aircraft.
The front commander reported to the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief that the destruction of the encircled Stalingrad grouping of enemy troops had ended at 4 pm on February 2, 1943.
The battle of Stalingrad ended with the complete defeat of the 330,000-strong selective Nazi army, which consisted of 22 divisions.

The size of the battle, unprecedented in history, is indicated by the numbers of enemy losses. At the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, 147,200 corpses of the killed Nazis were picked up and buried in the ground. In the period from January 10 to February 2, the troops of the front destroyed about 120,000 and captured 130,000 Nazi soldiers and officers.

In addition, it was captured: guns - 5762, mortars - 1312, machine guns - 12701, tanks - 1666, armored vehicles - 216 and many other property.
Thus ended one of the greatest battles in the history of warfare - the Battle of Stalingrad. In the battles near Stalingrad, the role of artillery in modern warfare was especially clearly revealed as the most formidable weapon, as the main striking force of the Soviet Army. On the example of the Battle of Stalingrad, it became clear on what a large scale it is necessary to use artillery to achieve victory in modern warfare. The Stalingrad victory showed how much the military skill of our soldiers, officers and generals had grown.

The battle of Stalingrad put an end to the offensive of the Nazi troops deep into our country. The mass expulsion of the invaders from the Soviet land began. The word "Stalingrad" has become a symbol of the courage and heroism of the Soviet people. It echoed in the hearts of all honest people of the world and raised them to fight against fascism, to fight for their freedom and independence.

The defeat of the Nazi army at Stalingrad forced imperialist Japan and Turkey, a secret ally of fascist Germany, to refrain from any intention of openly opposing the Soviet Union.

SOVIET ARTILLERY IN THE BATTLE OF KURSK
Back in January-February 1943, our troops defeated the Nazis in the region of Voronezh and Kursk and pushed the Nazi troops far to the west.
A protrusion formed in the outlines of the front, which protruded deeply into the enemy's disposition. At this turn, the front stabilized, and both belligerents began to prepare for summer hostilities.

The Nazi army intended to once again break through the front of the Soviet Army. With blows from the north and south, the Nazis wanted to pincer the Kursk grouping of our army in order to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops concentrated in the Kursk region, to capture Kursk on the fifth day of the offensive, and then move on to Moscow.

In order to imagine the scale of this battle, it is enough to say that the Nazi command concentrated in the Kursk direction: over 430 thousand soldiers and officers, more than 3 thousand tanks, including new heavy tanks “Tiger” and self-propelled guns “Ferdi-nand”, 6763 guns, 3200 mortars and 1850 aircraft, including about a thousand bombers.
And this plan of the enemy was timely unraveled by the Soviet command. The necessary measures were taken to prevent the Nazi command from carrying out its plans. The troops defending Kursk were prepared both for defense and for the offensive.
The Soviet Army, taking into account its rich experience in the battles near Moscow and Stalingrad, was preparing for decisive battles with the enemy.
Our troops created powerful defenses in the areas of a possible offensive by the Nazis in order to wear down and bleed the enemy in defensive battles, and then go on to a decisive counteroffensive and defeat the enemy.

Artillerymen carefully prepared for the upcoming battles. They studied the experience of past battles, improved their skills, learned to beat the enemy for sure.
On the night of July 5, when the Nazis concentrated large forces in the initial areas for the offensive, our artillery, 10 minutes before the start of the offensive, made a powerful fire attack on the enemy. Several hundred guns suddenly rained their shells on the Nazi positions. The artillery smashed the enemy's infantry, its tank and motorized troops, which were preparing for the offensive, as well as the enemy's batteries, observation and command posts.

The crushing fire of artillery and mortars inflicted huge losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment and lowered the morale of the fascist troops. As a result of a powerful artillery fire raid, the Nazis lost 90 artillery and mortar batteries, 10 warehouses with ammunition and fuel were blown up, 60 observation posts were suppressed, many tanks and other military equipment were knocked out.

A sudden attack by our artillery and mortars upset the battle formations of the infantry and tanks of the enemy. Having suffered heavy losses in artillery, the Nazis were forced to shift part of the tasks of artillery to aviation. Only a few hours later the Nazis recovered from the unexpected blow and were able to launch their offensive.
And when the Nazis nevertheless went on the offensive with large forces of tanks and infantry, they met fierce resistance from the Soviet troops. The famous Battle of Kursk began.
South of Orel and north of Belgorod, battles flared up, unprecedented in their fierceness and in the amount of military equipment used in them. In the northern direction from the Orel region, the Nazis threw into battle 7 tank, 2 motorized and 11 infantry divisions, and from the Belgorod region - 10 tank, one motorized and 7 infantry divisions, the bulk of which operated along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. Tanks and self-propelled guns were the first to go on the offensive. The infantry moved behind the tanks in armored personnel carriers. Enemy bombers in large groups, wave after wave, covered their advancing troops.

Despite the huge forces, the Nazis were unable to break through our defenses. They were met by strong massed fire from our artillery and defending troops. Enemy tanks took off into the air, exploding in minefields, catching fire from well-aimed shots of artillerymen and armor-piercers. Five times the Nazis rushed to the attack, but to no avail. Fierce fighting continued throughout the day. The enemy failed to achieve major successes. On the Oryol and Belgorod directions, at the cost of heavy losses, the fascist troops only wedged a few kilometers into our location.
On July 11, a fierce tank battle of unprecedented size unfolded again, in which more than 1,500 tanks and large aviation forces participated from both sides. In one day of battle, the enemy lost over 400 tanks and did not advance a meter. Already on the seventh day after the start of the offensive, the northern grouping of troops was stopped, and on the twelfth day, the southern one. By July 13, the Nazis, as a result huge losses were forced to stop the offensive on all fronts. The new campaign against Moscow ended in complete failure for the Nazis.
The plan of the Nazi command collapsed. The stable, pre-prepared defense of the Soviet troops turned out to be really insurmountable.
An exceptionally large role in the battles near Kursk was played by our artillery, which took upon itself the brunt of the struggle against the masses of fascist heavy and light tanks, which were trying to make a breach in our defenses. The struggle of Soviet guns with enemy armored vehicles ended in victory for the Soviet gunners. In the first three days of fighting alone, Soviet artillerymen, together with other branches of the armed forces, destroyed 1,539 enemy tanks and self-propelled guns.
Artillerymen steadfastly and courageously fought against enemy tanks and heroic deeds increased the glory of Russian artillery. In some cases, the gunners fired to the last shell, and then switched to hand-to-hand combat. Here is an example of the courageous struggle of “Soviet artillerymen with enemy tanks.
In the battle near Ponyri, a large group of enemy tanks and infantry moved towards Sergeant Sedov's gun. Sergeant Major Sedov, letting the enemy within 200 meters, opened fire on the tanks. He fired from the gun at the most vulnerable places of the tanks, not allowing the enemy to come to his senses. In a short period of time, Sedov knocked out four "tigers" from his gun and destroyed up to 100 enemy soldiers. And when an enemy shell broke the gun, then Sedov and his comrades took anti-tank grenades and continued to fight with fascist tanks.
An invaluable service to the ground troops was provided by anti-aircraft artillery, which acted jointly with them on the battlefield. Anti-aircraft artillery in the battles near Kursk destroyed 660 enemy aircraft.
Having exhausted and bled the elite fascist divisions in the Battle of Kursk, our troops broke through the enemy front and themselves launched a counteroffensive, which then unfolded into a powerful offensive along a front stretching over 800 kilometers. Powerful defensive lines prepared in advance, deeply echeloned and fortified centers of resistance, created by the Nazis for almost two years, were destroyed by our artillery, which operated jointly with other branches of the armed forces.
As a result of the defeat of the Nazi armies near Kursk, the myth of the Nazis was dispelled that "Russians can only advance in winter." Soviet troops proved that in summer they break through enemy defenses and conduct an offensive just as well as in winter.
On August 5, 1943, the Soviet Army, after intense street fighting, captured Orel and Belgorod. On this day, in the capital of our Motherland - Moscow - the first artillery salute sounded in honor of the victory of our troops, who liberated Orel and Belgorod. Since then, every major victory of the Soviet troops began to be celebrated with artillery salutes.
The Battle of Kursk played an important role during the Great Patriotic War. On the significance of the battle of Kursk, the Chairman of the State Defense Committee, I. V. Stalin, said: “If the battle of Stalingrad foreshadowed the decline of the German fascist army, then the battle of Kursk put it before a catastrophe.”
After the defeat near Kursk and Kharkov, all the hopes of the Nazis to stay in the east collapsed.
The continuous offensive of the Soviet Army to the west began.
1943 was a turning point in the Great Patriotic War. The major victories of the Soviet troops were not only of great importance for the Soviet-German front, but they also influenced the entire course of the Second World War.
In 1944, the Soviet Army delivered ten crushing blows to the enemy, as a result of which up to 120 divisions of Nazi Germany and its allies were defeated and put out of action. In these decisive battles, the Soviet artillery, as always, honorably performed all the tasks assigned to it.
Having expelled the Nazi troops from the borders of our country, the Soviet Army shifted its combat operations to enemy territory. Soviet troops, advancing to the west, liberated one after another the countries enslaved by Nazi Germany. And only after it became obvious that the crushing blows of the Soviet Army were inevitably fatal and the Soviet Union alone would finish off Nazi Germany and its satellites, the American and British generals were forced to hurry up with the opening of a second front with a delay of two years.
However, despite the existence of a second front in Western Europe, the main forces of the fascist German armies were still on the Soviet-German front. Our army continued to bear the brunt of the war on its shoulders.
The offensive of the Soviet Army in the winter of 1944/45 was one of the largest in the entire war. In terms of the number of troops and military equipment participating in it, in terms of the strength of the blows, this was an offensive unparalleled in the history of wars. Suffice it to say that in just 40 days of our offensive, the Nazis lost: over 1,150,000 soldiers and officers captured and killed, about 3,000 aircraft, more than 4,500 tanks and self-propelled guns, and at least 12,000 guns. With a mighty blow, the artillery broke the enemy defenses on a 1,200-kilometer front from the Baltic to the Carpathians; by the end of January 1945, the Soviet Army cleared the territory between the Vistula and Oder rivers from enemy troops, thwarted the Nazi offensive on the Western Front in the Ardennes and reached the last fortified lines that covered the capital of Nazi Germany - Berlin.

SOVIET ARTILLERY IN THE BATTLE FOR BERLIN
The battle for Berlin began in the second half of April 1945, when our troops captured bridgeheads on the Oder and Neisse rivers.
The Nazi command understood that the fate of Berlin would be decided on the Oder, therefore, throughout the vast territory from the Oder to Berlin, a system of heavily fortified defensive lines with numerous concrete firing points and other engineering structures was created in advance.
Every inch of land in this area was prepared for defense; the presence of numerous lakes, rivers, canals, a dense network settlements with stone houses further strengthened the defense.
Berlin and the approaches to it were also turned into a fortified area. On the outskirts of Berlin, the Nazis built an additional three powerful lines of fortifications. Berlin was divided around the circumference into eight sectors of defense, the city center was most heavily fortified.
Barricades, anti-tank barriers and concrete emplacements were built on every street. To defend the approaches to Berlin, the Nazis put up several armies. All special units, military schools and academies were also sent to defend Berlin. To create tank destroyer brigades, which were armed with faust cartridges (new jet weapon to fight tanks), members of the Nazi Party were mobilized. Separate battalions were specially trained for street fighting. In total, in the Berlin direction, the Nazi command concentrated up to half a million troops with a huge amount of combat equipment.
Soviet soldiers were irresistibly striving for Berlin in order to quickly put an end to the fascist beast in its lair.
By order of the command in the artillery units, a struggle began for the honor of firing the first shot at Berlin. In the units, the appeal of the Military Council of the front was read with enthusiasm, which said: “Fighting friends! Comrade Stalin, on behalf of the Motherland and the entire Soviet people, ordered the troops of our front to defeat the enemy on the nearest approaches to Berlin, capture the capital of Germany - Berlin and hoist the banner of Victory over it.
To complete this last battle, such an amount of manpower and military equipment was concentrated that made it possible to break the resistance of the fascist troops in the shortest possible time and capture Berlin. No other operation involved so much artillery as it was concentrated for the attack on Berlin.
The preparation of the offensive was carried out very carefully and secretly,
The Nazis did not know when our offensive would begin.
On April 14, 1945, our artillery suddenly opened powerful hurricane fire along the entire front. The enemy took this as the beginning of the offensive of our troops. But there was no offensive from our side, and the Nazis calmed down, believing that the offensive had failed. In fact, artillery firing was undertaken for reconnaissance purposes.

The attack was scheduled for another day.
The beginning of the general offensive against Berlin was announced by a salvo of a huge mass of artillery and mortars. On the night of April 15-16, a blow of unprecedented force was suddenly dealt to the enemy's defensive lines.
After artillery and aviation preparation, the Soviet infantry, tanks and self-propelled guns went on the attack. The rapid offensive of our troops was supported by artillery fire and air bombing strikes.
Our attack turned out to be unexpected, stunning for the enemy. Our tanks quickly crushed the advanced positions and broke into the enemy defense zone. Destroying trenches, breaking barriers, destroying the enemy and his firepower, Soviet tanks and infantry advanced rapidly. The Nazis did not expect such a powerful blow, their resistance was quickly broken. The defeated Nazi divisions began to retreat to Berlin. Parts of the Soviet Army pursued the enemy on the heels and on April 20 approached the capital of Germany.
At 11 o'clock on April 20, the division commander, Major Zyukin, was the first to open fire on the lair of the fascist beast - Berlin. Artillery

the fire kept growing - following the batteries of Major Zyukin, other batteries entered the battle. The closer our troops approached Berlin, the more the resistance of the Nazis increased.
After five days of fierce fighting, our troops surrounded Berlin, and on April 21, the assault on the city itself began.
Our warriors met with pre-prepared defenses. The Nazis blocked the streets with numerous blockages and barricades. Groups of multi-storey buildings were turned into powerful strongholds with many firing points. Soviet troops had to knock out the enemy from every street, from every building. Fierce fights took place on the stairs of multi-storey buildings, in basements, on roofs. From building to building, from quarter to quarter, our infantrymen, artillerymen, mortarmen, tankers, sappers, and signalmen were advancing with a fight.
In these difficult conditions, our gunners brilliantly coped with the tasks assigned to them. Rolling out their guns for direct fire, they destroyed enemy firing points, destroyed their defenses and cleared the way for infantry and tanks. Brave Soviet artillerymen, under enemy fire, rolled their guns on their hands through dilapidated barricades and rubble.
Our artillery helped the infantry and tanks to cross the river Spree and canals, of which there are a lot in the city. Having suppressed the enemy's defenses on the opposite bank, artillery ensured the capture of coastal quarters.
So, clearing quarter after quarter, our troops, supported by artillery fire, made their way to the city center, to the Reichstag building.
Before the assault on the Reichstag, the last short artillery preparation was carried out, after which our infantry rushed to the attack and broke into the building. The battle for the capture of the Reichstag lasted several hours.
At 2:20 p.m. on April 30, 1945, the Reichstag was taken. The banner of the Victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany was hoisted over Berlin.
At 3 pm on May 2, 1945, the Berlin garrison unconditionally surrendered to the victorious Soviet troops.
With their crushing blows, Soviet artillery contributed to the final defeat of the Nazi troops defending Berlin.
41,000 artillery pieces and mortars took part in the battle for Berlin, firing a huge number of shells and mines with a total weight of over 26,000 tons.
In the bloody battles for Berlin, which lasted sixteen days, about 150,000 Nazi soldiers and officers were killed; over 300,000 Nazis were taken prisoner Soviet troops. {475}
The greatest offensive in history of the heroic Soviet Army ended in the complete defeat of the Nazis and brought the peoples of Europe liberation from the terrible tyranny of Hitlerism.
* * *
The victorious Battle of Berlin ended the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against Nazi Germany. To commemorate the victory over Nazi Germany on May 9, 1945, on Victory Day, the capital of our Motherland saluted the valiant troops of the Soviet Army with thirty artillery volleys from a thousand guns.
However, there was another threat of attack on our Motherland - from imperialist Japan, which for decades provoked military clashes in Far East.
On the borders with the Soviet Union, Japan concentrated its best, selected troops - the 1.5 million Kwantung Army, which relied on numerous field and long-term defensive fortifications.
In order to eliminate this last hotbed of war and secure the Soviet Far East from the threat of a military attack, it was necessary to defeat the Japanese Kwantung Army and force Japan to unconditional surrender.
Three months after the end of the war in Europe, the Soviet Army, true to its allied duty, began military operations against the Japanese Kwantung Army.
On the night of August 9, 1945, the Soviet Army, the ships of the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Flotilla dealt crushing blows to the enemy. The defeat of the Japanese army began.
Despite the difficult conditions, the fighting of our troops was distinguished by great swiftness. The retreating Japanese units did not have time to prepare for battle, as they were already overtaken by shells of Soviet artillerymen.
Thanks to such swiftness and high mobility, Soviet artillery, along with infantry and tanks, in a short time fought through the whole of Manchuria and ended its military campaign on the shores of the Yellow Sea.
By their combat actions, the Soviet artillery contributed significantly to the defeat of the Japanese army.
On September 2, 1945, militaristic Japan recognized itself as defeated and surrendered unconditionally.
The military war of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany in the West and against the Japanese militarists in the Far East was victoriously completed.
Having won the Second World War, the Soviet people defended the freedom and independence of our Motherland and saved the peoples of Europe from the threat of fascist enslavement.
The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War was the victory of the new Soviet social and political system, the victory of our Armed Forces.
Everything that is told in this book shows how varied and responsible the combat work of gunners is, how much knowledge they must have in order to successfully cope with their work.
“To be a good artilleryman,” said Comrade Voroshilov, “especially an artillery commander, means to be a comprehensively educated person. Perhaps not a single type of weapon requires such a discipline of mind, will and knowledge from the commander and fighter as artillery.
On the battlefield, gunners must be proactive, bold and courageous; the fate of the battle very often depends on their courage and heroism.
The Great Patriotic War showed that all these qualities are fully possessed by the gunners of our glorious Soviet Army who are selflessly devoted to their Motherland.
Having such a cadre of artillerymen, our artillery, armed with the most advanced artillery equipment, together with other branches of the armed forces, will ensure the victory of the Soviet Army over any enemy, if he dares to interfere with the peaceful and victorious movement of the Soviet people towards their great goal - communism.
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government have always shown and are showing tireless concern for the defense capability of our Motherland. The 19th Congress of the Communist Party, having outlined the majestic program for building communism in the Communist Party the task is to strengthen in every possible way the active defense of the Soviet Motherland against the aggressive actions of its enemies.
Our people, defending the cause of peace with all means, can boldly rely on their Soviet Army and its main striking fire force, artillery.

The development of artillery during the years of the Second World War. Soviet artillery in the decisive battles of the Great Patriotic War. Development of the material part of artillery

Introduction

The development of artillery on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War

Development of the material part of artillery

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