Prussian war psychosis

By the autumn of 1806, the international situation in Europe had sharply deteriorated. It is possible that the state of “half-war” would have lasted longer if not for the war psychosis in the Kingdom of Prussia.

During the War of the Third Coalition in 1805, Prussia remained neutral, although Berlin was inclined to side with Vienna and St. Petersburg, and had already decided to act, but Austerlitz forced the Prussians to change their mind. However, in 1806, Berlin decided that France had gone too far in spreading its influence in Germany. The "War Party", led by Queen Louise, who had a special relationship with the Russian Tsar Alexander, came to the fore in Prussia.

In Berlin, high society started talking about long-forgotten concepts: “honor,” “duty,” “sword,” “the glory of Frederick the Great.” They began to remember the knightly valor of the Prussian nobility. Queen Louise rode around the parade regiments on horseback; the officers drew their swords and uttered war cries. In the court of the Hohenzollerns and the salons of the Prussian gentlemen, they began to assert that the Prussian army was the strongest in Europe and the world, that the Prussian officers were the bravest, that the Prussian monarchs were the most powerful and valiant dynasty.

Thus, a real war psychosis reigned in Prussia. Berlin, confident that the Prussian army was the true keeper of the covenants of the victorious Frederick the Great, hurried to start the war first, so as not to share the laurels of the victors of Bonaparte with anyone.

Declaration of war

On October 1, 1806, Berlin presented Napoleon with an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of French troops from German lands beyond the Rhine within ten days. The response deadline was set for October 8. In Berlin there was no doubt about victory. The highest nobility, generals and officers boasted with all their might that they would teach the Corsican upstart a lesson. In anticipation of a response to the ultimatum, the Prussians paraded with shouts of victory and ridicule of the French emperor. Prussian officers came to the hotel where the French envoy was located and “bravely” sharpened their sabers on the steps of the main staircase. Some of the generals declared that the war would end in a matter of days, with one blow (here they were not mistaken) and regretted that the Prussian army took guns and sabers with them to war. They say that only clubs would be enough to drive the French away. They were afraid of only one thing, that Frederick William III would not make peace before the military defeat of France. To inspire soldiers to heroic deeds, they were taken to the theater to see Wallenstein and The Maid of Orleans by Schiller.

The Prussian headquarters considered two options. The first was to adhere to a defensive strategy at the beginning of the war and, as the French army approached, slowly retreat beyond the Elbe and then beyond the Oder, link up with Russian troops and Prussian reserves and, ultimately, with the combined forces go on a counteroffensive and give a pitched battle to the enemy . That is, in general, this plan was reminiscent of the preliminary plan for the campaign of 1805, when the Austrians were supposed to wait for the Russian army and attack Napoleon together. But the Austrians did not wait for the Russians and went on the offensive on their own, which ultimately led to a military-political disaster in Austria and the defeat of the third anti-French coalition.

The Prussian generals turned out to be no smarter than the Austrian ones. The Prussian military considered the retreat shameful for themselves, and therefore this plan was decisively rejected. As a result, we settled on the second option. The Prussians planned to invade Bavaria, allied with France, attack the French at their bases, defeat the enemy corps one by one and thereby force Napoleon to retreat across the Rhine. By this time, Russian troops should have joined the victorious Prussian army and the allies could continue the offensive.

For the upcoming war, the Kingdom of Prussia could field about 180 thousand people. Just a few days before the start of the war, divisional and corps organization was introduced in the Prussian army. The Prussian army was consolidated into 4 corps (14 divisions).

The so-called main corps, which consisted of up to 60 thousand soldiers, according to the developed disposition of October 7, was located between Merseburg and Dornburg. It was led by the commander-in-chief of the Prussian army, Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick. This elderly commander (born in 1735) gained combat experience during the Seven Years' War and was a great supporter of the Friedrich school. In 1792, the Duke led the united Austro-Prussian army against revolutionary France, but was defeated at Valmy.

Prussian Commander-in-Chief Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand of Brunswick

The 2nd Corps consisted of 43 thousand Prussian and 20 thousand Saxon soldiers. It was located in the Chemnitz region, and was headed by Prince Friedrich Louis Hohenlohe, who lost his principality during the creation of the Confederation of the Rhine. The main and 2nd corps were tasked with attacking the French during their march into Saxony.

The 3rd Corps, under the command of General Rüchel, consisting of 27 thousand people, was located in the area of ​​​​Eisenach, Gotha and Erfurt. He was supposed to cover the direction to the Electorate of Hesse while remaining in place. The 4th Corps under the command of Prince Eugene of Württemberg - about 25 thousand people - was scattered in East Prussia, Poland and Silesia.

Meanwhile, the French Emperor Napoleon, concentrating his troops on the Main River, planned to cross the Franconian and Thuringian forests, bypass the left flank of the Prussian-Saxon position and force the Germans to take battle with an inverted front. For the upcoming maneuver, the emperor divided his troops into three columns, which were supposed to move in the form of a giant square battalion. The right column consisted of the corps of Soult, Ney and the Bavarian division of Wrede; center - the corps of Bernadotte, Davout, the imperial guard, Murat's cavalry; the left column is the corps of Lanna and Augereau. Almost the entire core of the French army was concentrated here. The emperor sent about 200 thousand people against Prussia. Thus, Napoleon traditionally led matters to one or two decisive battles that were supposed to decide the outcome of the war. He was not going to wait for the enemy to attack and unite Prussian and Russian troops. This is how this amazing war began.

Napoleon did not wait for the boastful Prussian army to go on the offensive, he did not even wait for the ultimatum to expire. On October 6, 1806, in a message to the Senate and an order for the army, he announced that France was entering the war with Prussia. Without wasting time, the emperor moved towards the enemy. On October 8, the order was given to invade Prussia's allied Saxony, and the Grand Army, concentrated in Bavaria, began to cross the border in three columns.

Napoleon at the Battle of Jena. Painting by Horace Vernet

Prussian army

To understand the causes of the disaster that befell the Prussian army and the kingdom, it is necessary to familiarize yourself with the state of the Prussian army of the early 19th century. If Napoleon's army was the brainchild of a new socio-economic structure generated by the bourgeois revolution, then the armies of his opponents reflected the feudal-absolutist system with underdeveloped industry and serfdom in the countryside. The typical Prussian soldier is a serf, given over entirely to the power of noble officers. It is clear that such a soldier went to war under duress and did not want to fight. War hysteria and propaganda reached only the top of Prussian society and did not affect the interests of the broad masses. While the French soldier went into battle, believing that he was defending the gains of the revolution, that is, he had moral and volitional superiority over the enemy (except the Russians), the recruited soldier of the Prussian monarchy went into battle under duress.

Only towards the end of the Napoleonic wars did the situation change: France was drained of blood and disillusioned by the endless wars of Napoleon's empire, and the revolutionary spirit faded away. The tired masses of soldiers of the French army lost their collective will to fight, while the opponents of France, humiliated by the French invasion, matured in a national liberation upsurge.

The armies of Napoleon's opponents were organized according to the Prussian model, built on the experience of the Seven Years' War with its linear tactics and brutal discipline with sticks. The soldier and officer of the Prussian army are an army reflection of the caste-class division of society. The relationship between them was based on the subordination of the serf to his master. A Prussian soldier served until he died or became disabled. Only after this was he subject to mobilization, and instead of a pension, he was given a special certificate for the right to beggary. There was nothing like the unity of soldier and officer that appeared in the French army, where any capable young man could become a senior officer and general. The Prussian generals, representatives of the landowning aristocracy, were unable to understand that the socio-economic and political changes that took place in France forever threw the Friedrich system into the depths. It's outdated.

However, the Prussian government led by King Frederick William III did not understand this. Reaping the laurels of the “glorious past” of the era of Frederick the Great and preserving the old order, Berlin did not allow any reforms. For example, command staff in the Prussian army stayed in their positions almost until natural death. In 1806, of the 66 colonels of the Prussian infantry, almost half were over sixty years of age, and of the 281 majors there were none under fifty. It is clear that in this environment it was difficult to find commanders capable of resisting Napoleon and his galaxy of brilliant generals.

Prussian military theory was strongly influenced by the theorist Lloyd, who attached exceptional importance to terrain, cultivating the “science of positioning.” The basis of Lloyd's theory is a careful study of geography in search of positions on the ground that would be inaccessible to the enemy and at the same time provide communications for his army. Convenient and advantageous positions were given special importance, calling them “position keys” and even “country keys.”

Based on the experience of the War of the Bavarian Succession of 1778-1779, which ended without a battle after a long trampling of opponents in potato fields, Lloyd's theory allowed for the possibility of waging war with one maneuver, without decisive battles. It was believed that the enemy's dependence on the 5-transition supply system made it possible to force him to retreat by constant threat to his communications.

IN early XIX century, the theory of Bülow, who “improved” Lloyd’s idea, became even more widespread in the armies of Europe. If Napoleon considered the enemy's manpower to be the object of the operation, then Bülow considered only enemy stores and convoys. Victory with the help, according to Bülow, did not promise serious results, but access to the enemy’s communications and deprivation of a large army of supplies should have led to the complete defeat of the enemy. Developing the theory of maneuver strategy, Bülow proposed operating in two groups, one of which attracts the enemy, tying him up, and the other at the same time acts on his messages, intercepting them. This theory also found its supporters in Russia.

Thus, the Bülow-Lloyd theory was quite in the spirit of absolutist monarchies. They say that a decisive battle with a strong enemy is dangerous in its consequences when a mercenary and recruited army predominates, which for the most part does not want to shed blood, and which is difficult to replenish if it is defeated and soldiers desert en masse.

As a result, until the defeat of 1806, the Prussian army retained the fundamentals of Friedrich's tactics - maneuvering in an open field with flawless execution of complex formations in linear battle formations. The column had no place in the battle formation of the Prussian army, and the loose formation was considered risky (being outside the supervision of the commanders, a forcibly recruited soldier could desert). The battalion, armed with smoothbore rifles of the 1782 model, lined up in three deployed ranks to fire volleys. Frederick's oblique battle formation - the advancement by maneuvering on the battlefield of a series of ledges against one of the enemy's flanks - was used as a once and for all established template.

The usual order of battle, adopted by almost all armies after Frederick I, was two lines of deployed battalions with artillery on the flanks or in front. The cavalry lined up behind both flanks, deploying squadrons in 2-3 ranks at a distance of 4-5 steps. Large cavalry formations were lined up in three lines of squadrons. The cavalry, forming an element of the general battle order, was chained to the infantry. The supply system is only shops.

Frederick's oblique battle formation

Only the hard lesson of Jena and Auerstedt forced Prussia to rebuild its army. These fundamental changes are associated with the Scharnhorst family name. At that time, he was almost the only officer of the Prussian army who understood the obsolescence of the Friedrich system. Even before the war of 1806, Scharnhorst submitted a memorandum to the king outlining the reorganization of the army, but the king and his “wise” advisers rejected almost all the proposals.

Although they did introduce some innovations: the Prussians adopted a corps and divisional organization. The corps were assigned reserve cavalry and artillery. The infantry regiment consisted of three battalions of four companies. The cavalry regiment consisted of 4 squadrons, artillery - of foot batteries, armed mainly with 12-pound cannons and 10-pound howitzers, and horse batteries, with 6-pound cannons and 7-pound howitzers. The infantry regiments had their own artillery - 6-pound guns. However, the reforms were late. The army has just begun perestroika.

Only after the military defeat and disgrace, when Prussia was preserved as an independent power only thanks to the goodwill of Alexander Pavlovich, who persuaded Napoleon to spare the Prussian kingdom, did they listen to Scharnhorst. Berlin took a course towards reforming the army. The national upsurge, which swept wide circles of the population, contributed to the creation of a mass army, the importance of which was finally realized.

Serfdom was partially abolished, and the system of corporal punishment in the army was abandoned. By the Treaty of Tilsit, Prussia's armed forces were reduced to 42 thousand people. However, Scharnhorst, who became Minister of War, on the eve of the inevitable war with Napoleon's empire, managed to bypass French control and create a military-trained reserve from part of the population. He acted by training young people recruited at the request of the French emperor to build fortifications on the North Sea coast against England, as well as by early dismissal of some active-duty soldiers and replacing them with recruits.

Subsequently, new reforms were carried out. After Napoleon's Grand Army died in Russia, Berlin introduced universal conscription and created the Landwehr (militia fielded by districts in Prussia) and Landsturm (militia called up in case of emergency), which trained on Sundays and holidays. The Landwehr could act together with the regular army. All men who were able to bear arms but were not included in either the Landwehr or the regular army were recruited into the Landsturm. Landsturm was intended mainly for rear service, but was also used for partisan warfare in enemy-occupied areas. Representatives of the bourgeoisie began to be admitted into the ranks of officers. In addition, after 1806, the Prussian command, based on the regulations of 1811, drawn up with the participation of Clausewitz, taking into account the experience of the Napoleonic wars, began to partially use the French battle formation - a combination of rifle lines with a column. The brigade's battle formation occupied a distance of 400 steps along the front and in depth.

Thus, the lesson of 1806 benefited the Prussian army. The army was seriously improved and by the time of the decisive battles with Napoleon in 1813 it numbered 240 thousand people in its ranks, in addition, there were 120 thousand Landwehr and Landsturm.

To be continued…

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English-language historians and popular writers for the most part completely do not understand the historical characteristics of the armed forces of Brandenburg-Prussia. They gave rise to many myths, of which the most ridiculous and groundless myths relate to the Prussian light infantry of the Napoleonic Wars. The goal of this work is to finally clarify all these fables about the “hard” and “outdated” tactics of the Prussian army before 1807, as well as about the “new” tactics in 1812-1815.

The generally accepted view is that the experience of the French Revolution and the 1806 campaign made the Prussian army wary of light infantry. In fact, light infantry appeared in Prussia under Frederick the Great (1740-1786) and continued to develop throughout subsequent years. During the Seven Years' War, Frederick was greatly impressed by the Austrian light infantry - the infantry of the border districts / Grenzregimenter. The Prussian king wanted to form similar units for himself. The experience of the War of the Bavarian Succession (1778-1779) confirmed this need. Three so-called ones were formed. "volunteer regiment", and the number of corps “foot rangers”, armed with rifled weapons, was brought to ten companies.

IN 1787 year “volunteer regiments” were reorganized into fusilier battalions, which will be discussed.

Initially, the attitude towards light infantry was wary. The reason for this is not difficult to understand. The “volunteer battalions” of the Seven Years' War were poorly disciplined gangs of robbers and had a high rate of desertion. Aristocrats did not want to serve in these units, so officers of ignoble origin had to be placed there. However, the fusilier battalions formed on their base were considered selected units; they were well trained and disciplined. They were led by carefully selected young and educated officers.

Huntsmen armed with rifled weapons have always been considered shock troops. Their professionalism was generously rewarded with various privileges that were unknown in the infantry regiments. Initially they acted as column leaders. The number of rangers grew from a small detachment to a full-blooded regiment (1806). They were recruited from among hunters and foresters. They knew how to shoot accurately and were armed with more accurate weapons. They were natural light infantry, designed for covert action in the forests. Often, huntsmen purchased weapons at their own expense; their uniforms were green, traditional for hunters. The contrast between the chasseurs and the “volunteer battalions” was very sharp, however, by the time of the Napoleonic Wars they merged, giving rise to the Prussian light infantry.

Initially, light infantry was a completely special branch of the army, having nothing in common with line infantry. However, by the end of the 18th century, it more and more turned into “universal” infantry, that is, infantry capable of operating in both scattered and closed formations. An important step in this direction was the emergence March 3, 1787 years of ten riflemen (Schuetzen), armed with rifled guns, in each company of infantry regiments. These were selected soldiers, candidates for non-commissioned officers. WITH 1788 year they received the right to wear non-commissioned officer insignia and stand in ranks next to non-commissioned officers. WITH December 5, 1793 year, each infantry battalion received a bugler, whose duty was to convey orders to the riflemen.

As was already said above in 1787 Fusilier battalions were formed in the year, consisting of three light regiments, five grenadier battalions, the 3rd battalion Leipzig Regiment (No. 3) and elected companies of garrison regiments. Fusilier battalions received their own drill regulations, published February 24, 1788 of the year.

The development of rifle squads in infantry regiments and fusilier battalions continued. Soon the fusilier battalions formed their own rifle squads. The number of these branches in 1789 year brought to 22 people. Some officers realized that there were not enough riflemen in the line regiments. Therefore in 1805 year, ten so-called “reserve riflemen” branches.

Attitudes towards light infantry in Europe continued to remain ambivalent. Some believed that in the future it would be the skirmishers who would decide the outcome of the battle. Others preferred conservative line infantry tactics. As time has shown, both sides were right in some ways. Indeed, the light infantry had rifled weapons - the weapons of the future. However, before the advent of breech-loading rifles, the process of loading rifled guns was extremely lengthy. Therefore, soldiers armed with rifled weapons could not operate without fire support from line infantry. And until the middle of the 19th century, skirmishers did not constitute an independent fighting force. In addition, the skirmishers' tactics required a high level of discipline from them. Given that the armies of the 18th century were staffed with recruits taken into military service by force, as well as mercenaries, soldiers were inclined to desert at the first opportunity, and skirmish tactics with its patrols and scattered formations provided such opportunities in abundance. However, during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, massive armies arose, many of whose soldiers served not out of fear, but out of conscience, driven by a sense of patriotism. In addition, the introduction of universal conscription and the emergence of numerous armies with a high level of desertion could be tolerated. Thus, favorable conditions developed for the development of light infantry.

The army of Brandenburg and Prussia took an intermediate path, gradually increasing the number of light infantry. Personnel for rifle units were carefully selected, trained and received various privileges. The Fusiliers were so well trained that they soon began to look like real elite units in the eyes of others. A well-trained soldier with good prospects will not desert. In campaigns 1793 And 1794 years against the French in the Palatinate - a wooded and hilly part of Germany - light infantry showed itself with the best side. The Palatinate provided ideal terrain for light infantry operations. The campaign of 1806, which took place in open terrain, followed a different scenario and light infantry played a much smaller role in it.

During Bonaparte's Italian campaign, another trump card of light infantry was fully revealed - the strong influence of a large number of allocated skirmishers on the morale of the enemy. The most effective tactic to combat enemy skirmisher lines was to use your own infantry in a scattered formation. Typically, a third of the infantry battalion (the last of the three ranks) was allocated for these purposes. Collected in separate platoons, these soldiers could act as a reserve for the battalion, cover its flanks, and also form a chain of skirmishers or support it.

A similar practice was introduced in 1791 Duke of Brunswick. IN 1797 In 1800, Prince Hohenlohe wrote a series of rules for the Inspectorate of Lower Silesia, published on March 30, 1803, under the general title “On the use of the third rank as skirmishers” ( Vom Gebrauch des 3ten Gliedes zum Tiraillieren). (...) Thus, even before the appearance “chains of skirmishers” During the Revolutionary Wars, a similar practice existed. Therefore, it is not clear why many historians allow themselves to call this tactics of the Prussian army “Frederichian”, “inflexible” and “outdated”.

However, the Prussian light infantry did not have sufficient military experience at the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars. (...)

Organization

Arrows/Schuetzen

By order of March 3, 1787 year, the presence of ten riflemen in each company was determined. Thus, there were 120 riflemen in the infantry regiment. WITH 5 May 1793 year, a bugler appeared in each regiment, whose task was to convey orders to the riflemen. In December of the same year, buglers appeared in every battalion. IN 1798 year, the number of rifle squads of fusilier companies was increased from 10 to 22 people. On November 23, 1806, the number of riflemen in a linear infantry company was increased to 20. Subsequently, rifle squads were abandoned, switching to the practice of the “third rank”.

In March 1809, a separate Silesian Rifle Battalion was formed, and on June 20, 1814, a Guards Rifle Battalion appeared, staffed by volunteers from the Neufchatel region, which had just been annexed to the possessions of the Prussian Crown.

Fusiliers / Füsilier

Fusilier battalions appeared in 1787 year. Each battalion consisted of four companies and numbered 19 officers. 48 sergeants, 13 musicians (each company had a drummer and bugler, plus a battalion bugler), 80 corporals, 440 privates and 40 reservists. The battalion support service consisted of a controller, a battalion quartermaster, four surgeons (including a battalion surgeon) and an armorer. The battalion had 40 riflemen. At one period, each fusilier battalion had a 3-pounder gun with a crew. The wartime strength of the battalion was 680 privates and 56 non-combatants, including 46 convoy soldiers and four artillery crew assistants. The total strength of the fusilier battalion was 736 people.

IN 1787 In the year 20 battalions were formed, organized into brigades. As of April 8, 1791, the structure was as follows:

1st Magdeburg Brigade: 1st, 2nd and 5th battalions

2nd Magdeburg Brigade: 18th, 19th and 20th battalions

East Prussian Brigade: 3rd, 6th, 11th and 12th battalions

West Prussian Brigade: 4th, 16th and 17th battalions

Upper Silesian Brigade: 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th battalions

Lower Silesian Brigade: 13th, 14th and 15th battalions

IN 1795 another battalion was formed. IN 1797 year, the number of battalions reached 27. The battalions were consolidated into 9 brigades, each of which was headed by a colonel and roughly corresponded in status to a regiment.

WITH 1797 year, each fusilier battalion had eight sappers. However, in 1806 only 24 battalions remained, organized as follows:

Magdeburg Brigade: No. 1 Kaiser-lingk, No. 2 Bila, No. 5 Graf Wedel

Westphalian Brigade: No. 18 Zobbe, No. 19 Ernest, No. 20 Yvernois

1st East Prussian Brigade: No. 3 Wakenitz, No. 6 Rembow, No. 11 Bergen

2nd East Prussian Brigade: No. 21 Stutterheim, No. 23 Schachtmeyer, No. 24 Bülow

1st Warsaw Brigade: No. 9 Borel du Vernet, No. 12 Knorr, No. 17 Hinrichs

2nd Warsaw Brigade: No. 4 Greifenberg, No. 8 Kloch, No. 16 Oswald

Upper Silesian Brigade: No. 7 Rosen, No. 10 Erichsen, No. 22 Boguslavsky

Lower Silesian Brigade: No. 13 Ra-beno, No. 14 Pelet, No. 15 Rühle

The names of the battalion commanders are given along with the numbers. In practice, battalions were called by the name of their commander, while the number was used only on formal occasions (...)

Jaegers / Jä eger

Drill and combat training

In some works you can see that their authors have a rather vague idea of ​​how the skirmishers acted. But they love to throw around terms like “skirmisher units”, “scattered formation” and “disband the formation”. It was they who created the myth that the “free” French soldiers used light infantry tactics, while the “downtrodden” soldiers of the “despotic” regimes acted only in tight formation to prevent desertion. Of course, like any other myth, there is some truth to this myth. However, this grain of truth is buried under a heap of flowery, mind-boggling lies. In reality, any European army of that time had more or less numerous light infantry units operating in scattered formations. And the main factor holding back the development of light infantry was not sociology or politics, but insufficiently developed technology.

Smooth-bore flintlock guns, loaded from the barrel, were too bulky, difficult to load and had low accuracy. Therefore, any significant results could be achieved only with a massive salvo. In addition, there were many other reasons, which will be discussed below, due to which the skirmishers had to act in close proximity to the main forces. To establish interaction between the dense formation of line infantry and the scattered formation of light infantry, a high level of experience of commanders and training of personnel was necessary.

Frederick the Great developed the first recommendations for the training of Prussian light infantry, published on December 5, 1783. According to these recommendations, the task of light infantry included fighting in populated areas and forests, acting in the vanguard, rearguard and on the flanks, attacking enemy positions located on high ground, storming artillery batteries and redoubts, as well as guarding convoys and winter quarters. This activity was called “war of outposts”. As mentioned above, the volunteer regiments were the predecessors of the fusilier battalions, passing on to them their methods and methods of training.

The regulations for fusilier battalions were published February 24, 1788 of the year. It remained in force until the 1806/07 campaign and formed the basis for the infantry regulations of 1812. This light infantry regulation called for light infantry to operate in two ranks instead of the usual three for line infantry. The fusilier battalions fired volleys from two ranks, so that the first rank did not need to kneel. Two-rank tactics also became widespread in the line infantry after the introduction of the 1812 regulations. Each fusilier company consisted of four divisions - eight platoons. The 1st and 8th platoons acted as skirmishers, which accounted for a quarter of the total strength of the battalion. If necessary, they could be supported by the 5th and 7th platoons. The buglers could transmit the following signals: advance, stop, close ranks, open fire, cease fire, move left, move right, deploy formations, retreat, call for help. Of course, what mattered more than any charter were experienced officers who knew how to conduct the “outpost war.” And there were such officers in the Prussian army. The officer corps consisted of commanders of volunteer battalions, officers who had experience in the War of Independence in America. Among them there were very talented commanders: York, Bülow and Müffling. These were professionals with high fighting spirit who showed their capabilities during the wars of the French Revolution.

Rifle squads of linear companies received their charter February 26, 1789 of the year. Shooters armed with rifled weapons and having very special combat missions required separate training. For two weeks a year, shooters practiced marksmanship. Specially appointed officers observed the shootings. One of the 12 company non-commissioned officers was also a rifleman and was armed with a rifled musket. It was assumed that the shooters would act like foot rangers.

The main emphasis was on marksmanship and the effective use of terrain features, primarily forests, small forests, ditches, rocks, crops, etc. In addition, riflemen could act as part of pickets and patrols, as well as guard the main forces of the regiment on the march. During an attack on enemy positions, the riflemen moved 100 steps forward. Their task was to disrupt the enemy's formations before the attack by the main forces of the battalion. When retreating, the arrows acted in a similar way.

Light infantry performed well during the Revolutionary Wars. The experience gained during these wars showed that the tactics were generally correct and only minor additions were needed. These additions were introduced by the charter of March 14, 1798 of the year. Instead of pushing forward flank platoons, fusilier battalions were instructed to move forward the rifle squads of each platoon, which made it possible to quickly form a line of skirmishers. The fusiliers, armed with smooth-bore weapons, also began to look for a target. The number of riflemen in a fusilier company was increased to 22. By order of June 18, 1801, the number of standard mountain signals reached 20, which brought order to the huge number of improvised signals used in practice. Although the light infantry was well trained and represented the elite of the Prussian army, during the 1806 campaign it became clear that their numbers were grossly inadequate. Very often the enemy achieved victory only due to his overwhelming numbers. Many German military experts foresaw this situation even before the start of the 1806 campaign and tried to take some measures. In practice, to strengthen the light infantry, they used the advancement of the third rank of infantry battalions. The Duke of Brunswick developed this maneuver for his 10th Regiment back in 1791. Prince Hohenlohe was also fascinated by this idea, describing it in instructions to the Lower Silesian inspectorate in 1797. The garrisons of Potsdam and Berlin were also trained to advance a third rank. Hohenlohe's instructions were published on March 30, 1803. Later statutes contained extensive quotations from this text. The Elector of Hesse, field marshal of Prussia and inspector general of the Westphalian regiments, issued a similar order for his units on April 11, 1806. The King of Prussia issued a similar order on October 5, 1805.

The deployment of a unit into a rifle chain did not mean that all the soldiers of the battalion acted as skirmishers. In reality, only a certain part of the soldiers moved forward, while the main forces of the battalion maintained close formation. main reason The reason why it was impossible to deploy the entire battalion in a chain was due to insufficiently developed rifle technology. The infantryman's weapon at that time was too ineffective to ensure the safety of the individual soldier. It took too long to load. Even if the skirmishers acted in pairs - one shoots, the other loads - the practical rate of fire still left much to be desired. The amount of ammunition that each soldier carried was limited, so it often happened that the infantryman used up all the ammunition before he could inflict any damage on the enemy. All this had a negative impact on morale. Having quickly shot through the ammunition, the soldier became completely defenseless on the battlefield, and the gun failed due to overheating of the barrel. Finally, it is most convenient to load muzzle-loading guns while standing, so the infantryman had to stand up to his full height, presenting a convenient target for the enemy.

The skirmish line was especially vulnerable to enemy cavalry. If the cavalry managed to take the shooters by surprise, then the entire chain could be destroyed. Platoons and squads of skirmishers changed each other. At the same time, not only did fresh soldiers enter the battle, but the chain also gained greater stability. Thus, the rifle chain was an integral part of the infantry formations. Only in rare and exceptional cases could shooters decide the outcome of a battle on their own. As a rule, the riflemen only started the battle, preparing the way for the line infantry.

Third rank platoons usually operated in two ranks. If the entire rank was involved in solving a combat mission at once, then it was led by a captain specially trained for these purposes. Each platoon was led by a second lieutenant and three non-commissioned officers. The lieutenant had a bugler at his disposal, who transmitted various commands to the soldiers. (...)

Armament

Among the models of muskets used by light infantry are the following:

1. Fusilier musket model 1787;
2. Fusilier musket model 1796;
3. “Old” Prussian rifled guns different types, including the 1796 model;
4. “New” 1810 model case rifle;
5. Small rifle rifle model 1787;
6. Various hunting rifles and carbines, rifled and smoothbore.

The third rank skirmishers were usually armed with the following types of standard infantry muskets:

1. Model 1782;
2. Model 1801 (Notard):
3. Model 1809 (“new” Prussian musket).

Fusiliers

Initially, fusilier battalions were armed with fusilier muskets, but since 1808, the battalions began to use any weapons they could get - due to an acute shortage of small arms. The French Charleville muskets, as well as the “new” Prussian muskets, were popular.

Jaegers

Since huntsmen were recruited from among foresters and hunters, they took their own hunting rifles with them to service, so it is very difficult to give any complete list of huntsman weapons. Attempts were made several times to restore order: in 1744, 1796 and 1810. However, for a variety of reasons, all attempts failed. (...)

The most important difference between a rifle and a musket is that the rifle barrel has several grooves that give the ejected bullet rotation along its longitudinal axis. Thanks to this, the range and accuracy of fire increases. Unlike smoothbore muskets, rifled rifles had a front sight and rear sight. (...) The disadvantage of rifled guns was their low rate of fire (it could even take several minutes to load the gun), as well as the rapidity of contamination of the barrel bore. To increase accuracy, the lead bullet was wrapped in a felt wad, so that the bullet cut more tightly into the grooves. To drive the bullet into the barrel, the ramrod was struck with a mallet. After several shots, smaller caliber bullets were used because the barrel became dirty. Very quickly the gun began to require thorough cleaning. Therefore, the shooters carefully selected the target, trying to shoot only with certainty. A few well-placed marksmen could act as snipers, but the dismal rate of fire of rifled rifles prevented them from becoming widespread.

Arrows

Rifle squads in line and light infantry companies were armed with rifled rifles of the 1787 model. The guns had a front sight and rear sight, and the rear sight was calibrated at a distance of 150 and 300 steps. About 10,000 of these guns were made. A bayonet could be attached to the barrel of the gun. The Silesian rifle battalions did not have uniform weapons; many Silesian riflemen had only infantry smoothbore muskets.

Non-commissioned officers

Theoretically, non-commissioned officers were armed with rifled carbines. Non-commissioned officers did not fire in volleys along with privates. However, in practice they usually carried the same guns as the rank and file. Sometimes non-commissioned officers used cavalry firearms. (...)

A uniform

Fusiliers

1789-1796

Fusiliers wore dark green camisoles of the same cut as the infantrymen, white vests, knee breeches, black leggings, eagle caps, black scarves and white belts. The color of the collar, lapels, cuffs and buttons determined the battalion affiliation.

» Table / » Table

Battalion No.	Applied color	Buttons
1	light green / hellgrün	yellow/gelb
2	pink/pink	yellow/gelb
3	white/white	yellow/gelb
4	blue / hellblau	yellow/gelb
5	dark green / dunkelgrün	yellow/gelb
6	orange	yellow/gelb
7	pink/pink	white / white
8	light green / hellgrün	white / white
9	straw/stroh	white / white
10	straw/stroh	yellow/gelb
11	white/white	white / white
12	orange	white / white
13	suede/sämisch	white / white
14	black/schwarz	yellow/gelb
15	suede/sämisch	yellow/gelb
16	black/schwarz	white / white
17	blue / hellblau	white / white
18	carmine / karmin	yellow/gelb
19	carmine / karmin	white / white
20	dark green / dunkelgrün	white / white

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Officers have dark green, black and carmine finishes

Was from velvet. Officers' cocked hats were decorated with a white and black plume, a cockade and a buckle with a small eagle.

Shoes - boots. The soldiers were armed with fusilier muskets and a short broadsword. Since 1793, the lanyard of the broadsword determined the company's affiliation: white, dark green, orange and purple. The officers armed themselves with a sword.

1797-1807

Instead of helmets, they introduced the wearing of cocked hats with white edging. The battalions differed in the color of the pompom:

White: 2, 6, 8, 10, 14, 17, 19,21

Red: 1,4,7,9, P. 15, 18,23

Yellow: 3.5, 12, 13, 16,20,22,24

WITH 24 August 1801 years, the wearing of a cylindrical black felt shako was introduced. The shako was decorated with an eagle in the same color as the buttons, a plume in the same color as the pompom on the cocked hat, and white piping along the top edge,

IN 1797 In 2010, a short camisole with a red lining appeared. The collar, lapels and cuffs are colored. Brigade “Kurmark”(since 1803 "Magdeburg") And "Magdeburg"(since 1803
of the year "Westphalia") had a crimson finish. Brigade “Upper Silesia” And “Lower Silesia”- black trim, 1st and 2nd East Prussian Brigades - light green. 1st Warsaw Brigade and Orshada “South Prussia”(battalions No. 7 and 8) - blue. 2nd Warsaw Brigade (battalions No. 4 and 16) - dark green. In 1800, the “South Prussia” brigade was disbanded, and its colors were transferred to the 2nd Warsaw Brigade (battalions no. 6, 8 and 16).

IN 1806 year, differences between battalions were carried out according to the following scheme:

Brigade	Battalion number	Applied color	Buttons
"Magdeburg"	1,2,5	carmine	yellow
"Westphalia"	18,19,20	carmine	white
1st “East Prussia”	3,6, 11	light green	yellow
2nd “East Prussia”	21,23,24	light green	white
1st “Warshavskaya”	4, 8, 16	blue	yellow
2nd “Warshavskaya”	9, 12, 17	blue	white
“Lower Silesia”	13, 14, 15	black	yellow
“Upper Silesia”	7, 10,22	black	white

In 1800, soldiers of the Silesian battalions received red neckerchiefs, while officers continued to wear black scarves. The white “shemizet” vest was replaced by a green vest, which, in turn, gave way to a white sleeveless vest in 1801. Long white trousers were worn with black leggings. There were work trousers made of twill. The belts were black, the saber was hung from the waist belt, and was not worn in a sling over the shoulder. The cut of the officer's jacket corresponded to the jacket of a line infantry officer, but had coattails with red lapels. A white vest, trousers and black boots completed the officer's uniform. The officer's cocked hat was decorated with a white plume. A silver-black sash was worn over the jacket. On a black belt there is a saber with a lanyard. Green raincoat and overcoat.

Jaegers

1789

In the foot ranger regiment they wore a simple cap with a green plume for privates and a black and white tip for non-commissioned officers. Camisole with green lapels and cuffs, green vest, leather trousers and boots. V officers' plume is white with a black base, cockade and buckle. Otherwise, the uniform has not changed since the time of Frederick the Great.

1797-1807

A three-cornered hat appeared with white and green cords, a black cockade and a gold buckle. The plume remained the same. In 1800, the wearing of white fabric knee-length breeches and high-topped boots was introduced. In 1802 the color of the vest was changed from green to white. During the mobilization of 1805, huntsmen received long green work trousers with buttons. In 1806, a gray version of these trousers appeared. The green camisole retained the red collar with cuffs and yellow woolen shoulder straps. The lapels are green. Black velvet neckerchief with white tie. In 1806 it was planned to introduce the shako, but this plan could not be implemented before the start of the war.

Publication: MILITARY-HISTORICAL ALMANAC New SOLDIER No. 213

Editor: Kiselev V.I.

The text is abbreviated (...)!

Tracing the origins of modern wars, we can conclude that they are based on two factors: the emergence of unitary states, with their tendency towards centralization; stability in the development of industry and trade, control of all income and... the invention of the bayonet. The first of these factors made it possible - or even inevitable - to organize regular armies on a permanent basis. The second allowed the use of these armies using strategy and tactics corresponding to the new types of weapons that were introduced into practice.

In a comparatively short period of time the whole art of war was completely changed. Wars no longer began with the gathering of gentlemen with servants and vassals to a certain place, nor with the arming and equipping of troops of barely trained militia. And weapons did not begin to be forged only after the start of the war - they were already lying ready, sharpened and cleaned, next to the hand of its owner. And the military leader no longer looked with a keen eye at the field of the future battle, choosing a better place where a mass of pikemen should be placed to cover the ranks of riflemen. Now the fire and the ramming strike were combined together. And the officers no longer worried that their rifle units could be scattered by cavalry if they found themselves without the cover of the forest of pikes. Now, figuratively speaking, every musket has grown a steel tip and every musketeer has become a pikeman.

When to this stunning innovation was added the adoption of an improved flintlock musket into service in European armies, firepower on the battlefield became a decisive factor. Long burning wicks, so dependent on wind and rain, are a thing of the past. And the temperamental wheel locks with their winding keys and pressure springs also went there. Now the musket, pistol and carbine all had the same mechanism, which could be kept in working order with the help of the simplest tools. At the same time, not only did the rate of fire increase, but the elimination of the pikemen made it possible to double the number of muskets in battle formations. Steady but constant progress was also made in the design and production technology of artillery pieces, as a result of which this type of military gradually became more and more mobile.

These were all new instruments of warfare that awaited the emergence of the great generals and brilliant soldiers of the 18th century. And these great commanders appeared in great numbers: Charles XII, Marlborough, Eugen, Sachs, Clive, Wolf, Washington, Suvorov and a whole galaxy of military leaders who wore the tricolor cockade. Their fate and glory, achieved by the soldiers they led, became part of the military traditions of their peoples. But, if an impartial judge of military merit were asked to name the general and soldiers who have earned the highest reputation in this century, he would not hesitate to select Frederick II - called the Great - and his peerless Prussian army.

This choice of his would not mean disdain for the generals and soldiers mentioned above. Frederick was not as successful on the battlefield as the Duke of Marlborough; Nor was he more courageous than Charles XII. His Prussians were no braver than the redcoats at Fontenoy, no more resilient than the hard-fought peasants of Count Alexander Suvorov, no more patriotic than those of Washington's army who died and froze to death at Valley Forge. But as a war machine, trained to march and fire, maneuver and advance faster and better than any soldier past or present, they had no equal. And the man who led them - statesman, poet, strategist, social reformer, philosopher and organizer - was, beyond comparison, one of the greatest military leaders of all time.

The rise of Prussia is an excellent example of the potential power contained in a small semi-militaristic state, governed by able and industrious people, thinking and caring only for the security and strengthening of their state. The history of Prussia as a state, in fact, begins only in 1701, when Frederick I, Margrave of Brandenburg, crowned himself as King of Prussia. But long before this, the rulers of Brandenburg, with the help of wars, marriages and treaties, managed to maintain the integrity of their lands, and from time to time also increase them. This policy found its most striking expression during the reign of the previous Margrave Frederick William, famous for his major victory over the Swedes at Fehrbellin and known as the “Great Elector” (the Margraves of Brandenburg were one of the nine princes who had the right to elect the Emperor of the Great Roman Empire German nation). Firmly convinced that a strong army was as necessary in diplomacy as on the battlefield, the Margrave wielded the sword as skillfully as he wielded the pen. With his reasonable rule and course towards religious tolerance in the country, he not only earned the love of his people (a rather unusual feeling in Germany of those days), but also attracted thousands of Protestant emigrants from France and Holland to the country (who over time became the purebred Teutonic ancestors of the master race) .

Under Frederick, the army continued to increase in numbers, and on the battlefields of the War of the Spanish Succession, Prussian troops gained an enviable reputation.

In 1713 he was succeeded by his son, Friedrich Wilhelm. This monarch remained in history as a fanatical despot - rude and cruel, with an unbalanced disposition - but at the same time as a major organizer and an extraordinary worker on the throne, fanatically devoted to the idea of ​​​​the rise of the Hohenzollerns and the expansion of Prussian power. The finances he amassed through the austerity that he introduced in every area of ​​government - including in the expenses of the royal court (the queen was forced to make do with only one court lady) - he spent mainly on the army. Its strength was increased from 50,000 to 80,000 people, recruited mainly through forced recruitment. Rogue recruiters and gangs of crooks became as common a sight in all Prussian possessions as in English ports during the war, and any gap between these methods of attracting new recruits to the army was filled by one form or another of conscription. All aristocrats were required to serve as officers, which tied the feudal nobility to the crown in close and rigid military ties. Their young sons attended military schools, and this cadet corps of young cadets was a personnel reserve for officers of the ever-increasing army. His special hobby, which he indulged in with all passion, was a regiment of giant grenadiers, whom he lured with money or even kidnapped from all countries of Europe. According to General Fuller, a certain Italian abbot, much taller than average, was kidnapped while celebrating mass in one of the Italian churches. Tall girls obtained in the same way were supposed to become worthy friends of these monster warriors. These beloved by Frederick " long guys“never visited the battlefield, and one of his first decrees, Frederick II dissolved this extremely expensive collection.

As might be expected from such a diligent, hard-working monarch, there were fourteen princes and princesses in the royal family. But death sees no difference between a prince and a pauper, and only the king’s fourth son, Karl Friedrich, became heir to the throne - and, as one could see, this title was more of a burden to him than a joy. Frederick William, who allowed himself to beat even the queen with a cane, not to mention any of the subjects who fell under his hot hand, be it the chancellor of the empire or a lackey, did not spare the rod for raising his children. Unfortunately, the sensitive child destined to become the heir to the throne was the exact opposite of what the good king believed a future ruler should be. Few children had such a difficult childhood as young Karl-Friedrich. Severe floggings, half-starvation, insults, humiliations and deliberate cruelty accompanied him until the very day of his father's death. Twice the king, in a blind rage, almost killed him - once he tried to strangle him with a cord from a curtain, and another time he barely managed to take the blade of his father’s sword away from the boy.

Driven almost to madness by such treatment, the young prince conceived an escape. His plan reached the ears of his father, and the young man was put under arrest, convicted of desertion and, at the insistence of his father, sentenced to death. Only the intervention of many famous personalities, including the emperor himself, prompted the old tyrant to pardon his son. The prince, however, was forced to witness the execution of his closest friend, a young lieutenant who had helped him prepare his escape.

Prussian horse grenadier

It seems simply a miracle that, having such a monster as a father, the young prince retained in his character the moderation and common sense that he usually demonstrated in relation to those with whom he associated. His actions as a statesman, on the contrary, were marked by such a stamp of cynicism, ruthlessness, deceit and outright fraud, which was rarely found even among the crowned heads of Europe.

But a thorough understanding of everything related to the Prussian possessions, from the construction of dams to the breeding of pigs - and all this knowledge was drummed into the young man who resisted such knowledge by force or through force - gave the young prince such a knowledge of his future kingdom, which rarely any monarch could boast of. Moreover, a strong feeling of affection and respect gradually arose between the prince and his people - which would become a very important factor when the kingdom was almost conquered by its enemies.

IN last years During the reign of the old king, a kind of truce was concluded between father and son, who, in fulfillment of his duty as a future monarch, married the bride chosen for him and began to show interest and even zeal in the study of various sovereign aspects of the Prussian state. He was allowed to have his own small court at his castle Rheinsberg. Here he immersed himself in his literary pursuits, played the flute and indulged in philosophical reflection with his friends, many of whom were French. (It was this Francophilia that at times drove his father into almost uncontrollable rages.) This hedonistic existence, which Frederick often said was the happiest period of his life, deceived many of his contemporaries, who envisioned a great new era of culture and enlightenment blossoming in Prussia , when the young poet and philosopher inherits the throne. How wrong they were!

Just six and a half months after his ascension to the throne, he deliberately dragged the kingdom into war. The conflict which Frederick so coolly began did not arise from a misunderstanding or from the young monarch's outburst of anger. On the contrary, it was a deliberate and calculated act of a man who carefully weighed all the odds. And the stimulus that most prompted him to take this step was the very foundations on which the Prussian state was built: a reasonable and healthy financial system and the army. Thanks to the strict financial measures of his father, the treasury was swollen with money, and the army was a brilliantly organized force of 80,000 men, drilled as never before had a soldier been drilled.

Prussian infantryman

Drill in the army was so severe - with flogging, beatings and other forms of corporal punishment meted out for the slightest breach of discipline or delay in carrying out an order - that participation in combat was perceived as a blessed relief. No soldier in those days was treated as anything other than a creature of a decidedly inferior class, but the relations between the ignorant, rude, narrow-minded nobility and the even more ignorant peasantry, from which the rank and file of the Prussian army were formed, were, as far as can be judged, especially bad ones. For the officers, the Prussian soldier was not a human being, but a piece of clay dressed in a blue uniform, which had to be beaten and drilled into an emotionless robot, incapable of independent thinking. (“If my soldiers begin to think,” Frederick once remarked, “there will not be a single one left in the ranks.”) His own position on soldiers and the relationship between officers and men was: “All that should be given to a soldier is to instill in him a sense of uniform honor, that is, the highest respect for his regiment, which stands above all other armed forces in the country. Since the officers will have to lead him towards the greatest dangers (and he cannot be driven by a sense of pride), he must feel greater fear of his own officer than of the danger to which he is exposed.

The brilliantly trained Prussian soldier, however, should not have been squandered unnecessarily. He was a pawn in the big one war game and in power politics, and one that is difficult to replace. Frederick wrote: “To shed the blood of a soldier when there is no need for it is to inhumanly lead him to the slaughter.” On the other hand, like any good general, he did not skimp on throwing them into battle when it served his purposes, and then the soldiers’ blood flowed like a river.

No matter how inhumane the Prussian system of drilling and combat training was, it gave great advantages on the battlefield. The tactics of that time did not at all encourage the personal initiative of a soldier or officer - quite the contrary, it demanded unconditional obedience to the will of a superior commander and literally automatic execution of the given order. The movements of loading and firing weapons were repeated countless times until the soldier could perform them with machine-like precision under any circumstances. Closed formation maneuvers, with an emphasis on speed of movement and maintaining formation, were practiced right up to the very day of battle, when difficult movements were carried out in the smoke and confusion of battle, when cannonballs mowed down the ranks of soldiers, and half the officers and sergeants were killed.

The Prussian cavalry - all large men on strong and durable horses - was prepared in accordance with the views on cavalry tactics that dominated Europe at that time, that is, moving in a solid avalanche of horses and advancing at a slow trot, firing from pistols and carbines. This did not correspond to Frederick’s inherent fighting style, and after his first military campaign, he retrained his cavalry to maneuver at high speed and attack with all available forces with sabers in their hands. The use of firearms by riders in the saddle was prohibited, and weapons and equipment were lightened. All possible measures were taken to ensure that the cavalry could move faster, while maintaining the established formation and alignment in the ranks.

A contemporary, talking about the excellent condition into which Frederick brought his cavalry, wrote: “Only in Prussia does a situation exist in which cavalrymen and their officers have such confidence, such skill in handling their horses that they literally merge with them and revive in memory of myths about centaurs. Only there can one see how sixty or eighty squadrons, each containing from 130 to 140 cavalry, maneuver so harmoniously that the entire cavalry flank can be perfectly controlled on the battlefield. Only here can one see how 8,000 or 10,000 cavalry rush into a general attack at a distance of several hundred yards and, having struck a blow, immediately stop in perfect order and immediately begin the next maneuver against a new line of enemy troops that has just appeared on the field battle."

In introducing this stunning change in accepted cavalry tactics, Frederick received the full cooperation of the two cavalry generals, Seydlitz and Ziethen, who directly led the Prussian cavalry from victory to victory, and completely discredited the old methods. Another military author of the same time wrote: “I have never seen anything like this before, but during the battles before my eyes, squadrons relying on their firearms, were overturned and defeated by squadrons that attacked at speed and did not fire.”

Colonel George Taylor Denison, a Canadian author, admitted in his History of the Cavalry: “Never before in ancient or modern history, even during the wars of Hannibal or Alexander the Great, the cavalry did not carry out such brilliant operations that could be compared with the actions of the cavalry of Frederick the Great in his recent wars. The secret of their success was careful preparation the individual soldier, in the constant maneuvers of large masses of cavalry, in the confidence in the saber and in the fiery energy, as well as in the careful calculation of the great military leaders who commanded it.”

He also mentions one of Frederick's notes in the margins of his memorandum on cavalry tactics. "N. B. If any soldier is found refusing to do his duty or wishing to escape, the first officer or non-commissioned officer who notices this should strike him with his saber" - a curative measure that has been preserved in the name of maintaining discipline from the very beginning of history and, as it seems, will be maintained in the future. One coward can carry away an entire company, and an unreliable company can cause defeat in battle. Dealing with a cowardly soldier right on the battlefield is a painful decision that any officer or non-commissioned officer may have to make at one moment. There are times, however, when people cannot be kept in line even by the fear of death (which largely explains why most people still remain in line, although all their instincts tell them to run). At such moments, the awareness that an honorable death may be ahead of them, and an inevitable, dishonorable death behind them, keeps them in place.

The Prussian cavalry was divided into three types: cuirassiers, dragoons and hussars.

Cavalry has always, since the beginning of history, been divided into three more or less separate groups - light, medium and heavy. Light cavalry was intended for reconnaissance, reconnaissance and quick attacks. The middle one, more heavily armed and better protected by armor, still retained its speed of maneuver. The heavy one - large warriors on large horses, often completely clad in armor - was much slower, but defeated the enemy with a shock blow due to its mass. During the time of Frederick the Great, this division was further aggravated by the use of firearms. There were cuirassiers, still retaining the cuirass of a backplate and breastplate, who were armed with two huge pistols and a heavy broadsword; dragoons, both heavy and light, were armed with a short musket with a bayonet and a saber and were capable of fighting on foot if circumstances so required; horse grenadiers, whose functions almost coincided with the functions of heavy dragoons; hussars - light cavalry - armed with a saber and an even shorter musket called a carbine; in some parts there are lancers, heavy and light.

Headgear of the Death's Head Hussars and the 2nd Hussars

However, from the very beginning of such a variety of types of cavalry, there was an increasing tendency (especially in Prussian units) to use light dragoons and hussars in the same formation with heavy cavalry regiments. This trend became particularly pronounced over the next century, and by the time cavalry had disappeared from the battlefield, there was almost no difference in armament, equipment or use between cavalry regiments. various types.

Frederick's cuirassiers and dragoons were organized into regiments of five squadrons, consisting of two companies of seventy people each. Each regiment consisted of seventy-five officers and twelve trumpeters. The hussar regiments, which were light cavalry, consisted of ten squadrons each. The squadron formation, adopted on the eve of the Seven Years' War, consisted of two ranks, and for the attack the regiment formed two lines, the squadrons in the first line were built at small intervals, and in the second, or reserve, line - in a looser order.

Since cavalrymen were often used in small groups, or pickets, which provided great opportunities for desertion, cavalry was recruited with some selection, with particular preference being given to the sons of prosperous farmers or owners of small plots of land. If a son deserted, his parents were responsible for the loss of both the soldier and the horse.

To support masses of cavalry in battle, Frederick created the first units of horse artillery, light guns transported by horse-drawn horses, and gun limbers with mounted gunners. This measure opened the way for new possibilities for cavalry tactics. For the first time, the firepower of the artillery was combined with the striking power of the charging horsemen. Until this time, the attacking cavalry, right up to the moment of direct contact with the enemy, was open to enemy artillery fire and suffered severe losses, sitting on horseback hour after hour, under devastating enemy fire, without being able to respond to it.

Artillery had already played a prominent role in the wars of the 18th century, and Frederick's armies had a significant number of 3-, 6-, 12- and 24-pounder guns. Frederick also made extensive use of the 18-pounder howitzer, which could fire a projectile over an obstacle such as a hill and hit enemy troops hiding behind it.

The artillery shell, however, although it appeared in the 16th century, did not change for the better - and was not capable of changes to such an extent as to become a decisive factor on the battlefield. The explosive charge in it was too small, and the fuses were too unreliable - to such an extent that the core sometimes exploded in the gun barrel or, what happened more often, did not explode at all. These projectiles became effective only with the advent of rifled barrel guns that fired cylindrical projectiles with impact fuses. The main means of destruction was shrapnel, which remained so until the end of Civil War in USA.

The infantry regiments of the Prussian army consisted of two battalions - each of them had eight companies. Of the latter, one company was a grenadier company. True, the grenades themselves were now used only in case of siege operations, but special companies, formed from the tallest and strongest warriors, nevertheless remained, although their personnel were armed with muskets. Such a company was considered the elite company of the regiment and often wore distinctive uniforms or a special headdress. For battle, the battalions formed a battle formation of three men deep.

The Prussian soldier was armed with a metal cleaning rod, although at that time other armies used wooden cleaning rods. The weight and reliability of the metal ramrod gave advantages when loading, but only as a result of endless training could the Prussian infantry fire five volleys per minute, while the command of other armies was happy if their soldiers managed to fire twice in the same time.

Such precision in handling weapons was rarely seen in any army, if at all it could be compared with the Prussian one. It was achieved only in professional armies, among long-serving soldiers who spent a fair share of their lives on such drills. During the Battle of Waterloo, British infantry musket fire was considered the deadliest in the world. Military training required that British soldiers could load and fire a musket fifteen times within three and three quarters of a minute—that is, four times per minute. But even at this rate of fire, their fire could not compare with the rate of fire of Frederick's Prussians; except that British shooting was somewhat more accurate, since British soldiers were trained to aim before pulling the trigger.

The fire was conducted in squadrons, not in ranks, and began from both flanks of the battalion. When the commander standing on the flank of the company gave the command “Fire!”, the commander of the next company commanded his subordinates “Get ready!” - and so on to the center. When the two companies standing in the center fired a volley, the flankers had already finished reloading their muskets and were getting ready to fire. When advancing, each company moved forward several steps before opening fire. Thus, the battalion’s offensive consisted of successive advances individual mouth, slowly walking forward and spewing flames and smoke at three-second intervals. At a distance of thirty steps from the enemy ranks, or at a greater distance, if the front rank lost formation under a hail of lead, a command was given, and the soldiers went on the offensive with fixed bayonets.

It has already been said that weapon of that period, that is, before the adoption of the rifled musket, was quite consistent with the tactics of that time. Or it would be more accurate to say that the tactics of that period, like any other period in history, were determined by the weapons existing at that time. By modern standards, this weapon looked quite primitive. The main weapon of the infantry was the smoothbore musket. Since this type of firearm was used by all countries until the second quarter of the XIX century, it makes sense to describe it in detail.

The flintlock gun, which replaced the matchlock and wheel guns of the 17th century, was, compared to its predecessors, a much more effective mechanism. His lock was more reliable and could be much easier to maintain and repair. The charge was ignited by a flint fixed in the trigger holder, which generated sparks when the flint hit a notched steel plate called a grater. If the gun was properly loaded, and the flint was in good condition (the soldier had spare flints. The British received three flints for every sixty shots) and correctly installed, the powder on the priming flange was dry, and the priming hole was not clogged with soot, the gun would serve its owner faithfully.

Brown Bess musket with percussion flintlock

One officer complained in 1796 that “the unreliability of the musket, and in particular the cover of its lock, leads to what the soldiers call a misfire. They happen so often that if you take any number of people at random, after ten or twelve volleys you will find that at least a fifth of the cartridges have not been used. Consequently, one person out of five practically did not participate in the shelling of the enemy. We see this every day during combat operations over and over again; I myself have repeatedly seen how, after the command “fire,” soldiers try to shoot, but in vain...”

Based on the number of operations required to fire a shot, we can say that a flintlock gun could be reloaded and made to fire a new shot quite quickly; the duration of this process depended entirely on the preparedness and self-control of each soldier individually. The Tower system musket, which became world famous under the nickname "Brown Bess", was a weapon that was widely used in all armies. Like other examples of contemporary weapons, it remained virtually unchanged since the beginning of the 18th century. Its weight was eleven pounds and four ounces, not counting the weight of the bayonet, and the spherical bullet itself weighed one ounce. Bullet along with powder charge was stored in a paper cartridge, the end of which the soldier bit off before firing and, pouring some of the gunpowder onto the priming shelf, poured the rest into the barrel. Then the bullet was driven into the barrel with a ramrod until it stops. Having left the barrel, the bullet followed in the direction that the last blow gave it when leaving the barrel. With such internal ballistics, there was no need to talk about any accuracy of hitting at a distance of more than a few meters. A single person at such a distance had a fairly significant chance of surviving. At long distances, accuracy dropped so quickly that at 137 meters, any hit was simply a miracle. A famous marksman, a major in the British army during the American Revolutionary War, wrote: “A soldier’s musket, provided its barrel is properly drilled and not bent, which is very often the case, makes it possible to hit a person’s figure at a distance of up to 73 meters - and sometimes up to 91.5 meters. But the truly exceptional failure will be that soldier who is wounded by an ordinary musket at a range of 137 meters; As for shooting at a person at a distance of 183 meters, you might as well shoot at the moon and hope to hit it.”

In many ways it was a pretty bad weapon. It is true that it was reliable and easy to use, and therefore was a completely suitable comrade for the strong and narrow-minded peasant armed with it. It also provided a very successful support for the bayonet, by which the outcome of many battles was still decided, but as a firearm it left much to be desired.

If a soldier was equipped with a weapon whose effective firing range did not exceed 36.5 or 45.7 meters, then it is not surprising that he went into many attacks with an unloaded musket, using only the steel of his bayonet. There was, however, another reason for bayonet attacks. It lies in the fact that it is not so easy to inspire large numbers of people to such an extent as to induce them to attack under heavy enemy fire, especially if they have already been in battle and suffered damage from this fire. The drums may beat, and the officers may shout and wave their sabers, but this cannot always overcome a certain hesitation in those who stand in the first rank and must take the first step. Therefore, if the formation has already begun to move, then it is very important that this movement is not interrupted until contact with the enemy occurs. If the first rank stops for a volley, there is always the possibility that the attack will turn into a skirmish, and the blow it inflicts will lose its power.

World at War

Returning to Frederick, it must be said that in May 1740 old Frederick William died and an essayist and poet, with a superbly trained army and a tightly packed treasury, found himself on the throne. There was also a temptation in the form of a weak neighbor - and not only a weak one, but not even a neighbor, but a neighbor, and a beautiful one at that.

When the figurehead of the loose Holy Roman Empire, Charles VI, died in October 1740, he had no male heirs - only a daughter, Maria Theresa. An agreement was drawn up, called the Pragmatic Sanction, which guaranteed her succession. This treaty was recognized by all states, with the exception of Bavaria alone. Frederick, who was also bound by this very important agreement, set his sights on the rich province of Silesia. He decided to seize it, justifying such an action with very precarious and half-forgotten rights. But for propaganda purposes, these rights were extracted from ancient acts and inflated in every possible way (the king was a master at such actions). Secretly, he admitted that “ambitions, interests and desires to encourage people to talk about me brought closer the day when I decided to go to war.”

The king sent a message to the Archduchess with a proposal, in exchange for legalizing his claims to the seized territories, to organize the defense of the rest of her possessions from the encroachments of any other power. Such a proposal, very reminiscent of the mafia proposal of the “roof,” was indignantly rejected, and the Austrians began to prepare for war. But Frederick so suddenly threw thousands of his soldiers across the border of Silesia that the young Archduchess learned about it only when this province of hers had already been captured. Completely unprepared for such a turn of events, her troops stationed in Silesia were quickly withdrawn from there. The capture of Silesia had far-reaching consequences. Let us quote the English historian McCauley: “The whole world took up arms. On the head of Frederick fell all the blood that was shed in the war that raged fiercely for many years and in every corner of the world, the blood of the soldier columns at Fontenoy, the blood of the highlanders who fell in the massacre at Culloden. The troubles created by his evil trick also engulfed those countries in which they had not even heard the name of Prussia; and, in order that he might plunder the neighboring regions which he had promised to defend, black men fought on the Coromandel coast, and red warriors scalped each other on the Great Lakes of North America.”

Rarely has the career of an outstanding general begun so inauspiciously as in the case of Frederick. The first big battle took place at Mollwitz (April 10, 1741). The Prussian cavalry was not yet in the best shape it would later achieve, so the attack of the more numerous Austrian cavalry drove it from the battlefield. The king was convinced that the battle was lost and hastily left the battlefield. Then the Austrian cavalry attacked again, this time the center of the Prussian forces, but the valiant Prussian infantry under the command of the seasoned veteran, Marshal Schwerin, was difficult to impress by any cavalry in the world. The brave Austrians attacked it five times, but each time they were driven back by musket fire. The Austrian infantry had no more success than the cavalry, and finally the marshal gave his soldiers the order to go on the attack. In orderly ranks, to the music of their orchestras, the Prussians moved towards the enemy, and the Austrians, unable to bear it, retreated, abandoning nine guns. The king, as Voltaire sarcastically noted, “covered himself with glory - and powder.”

The war continued. Secret agreements were signed, separate peaces were concluded, invasions, retreats and betrayals were made. The Prussians won several significant battles - at Chotusitz, Hohenfriedberg and Kesseldorf, which raised the prestige of their weapons even higher. In addition, Silesia became a possession of the Prussian crown for a long time.

For 11 years (1745–1756) peace reigned in Prussia, and Frederick was able to devote himself to the problems of the country. Buildings and bridges were designed and erected, swamps were drained, agriculture was developed, industry was encouraged, the ailing Academy of Sciences was revived, and public education was expanded. As might be expected, much attention was paid to the army. Its strength increased to 160,000 people, and by the beginning of the Seven Years' War the army represented the best trained and equipped armed forces in the world.

1 - cuirassier officer; 2 - broadsword; 3 - sling with a cart; 4 - cuirass made of simple steel of an ordinary cuirassier

This famous conflict, during which Prussia came to the brink of destruction more than once, was a direct consequence of the role played by Frederick in the previous war. Maria Theresa could not forget or forgive the rejection of Silesia; France, although Austria's traditional enemy, was concerned about the rise of Prussia (and many of Frederick's vitriolic remarks were directed at Madame de Pompadour, then the true ruler of France). With his caustic remarks, he did not spare the Russian Tsarina Elizabeth; one of her nicknames given to her was "the Pope's witch". Mary had to regain Silesia; in exchange for help from France, Austrian possessions in the Netherlands were promised; the queen was supposed to get East Prussia; Saxony was promised Magdeburg and Sweden and Pomerania. Thus, Frederick set all the states of the continent against himself; he could only count on the support of the English fleet and English money, since England automatically became an ally of France’s opponents. In fact, the battles between the two powers in their overseas possessions - in India, Canada and the West Indies - never stopped.

The insidious Frederick, without waiting for all his opponents to unite, struck first. Leaving some troops to look after the Russians and Swedes, he invaded Saxony (in August 1756), took Dresden and defeated the Austrian army at Lobositz. The following spring he defeated the Austrians again, began to besiege Prague, and rashly attacked an Austrian army almost twice his size at Kolín. Here the king suffered a serious defeat - he lost about 40 percent of the personnel of his army. After this, an unprecedented concentration of armed forces of various states began with the goal of crushing Prussia. The Russians invaded Prussia, occupying Berlin with a small part of their forces, and received 300,000 thalers as a ransom for leaving it intact. Meanwhile, Frederick, by maneuvering quickly, tried to check the advance of his opponents, but eventually came face to face with the combined Franco-Austrian army at Rosbach.

The French numbered about 30,000 soldiers in their ranks, who were significantly inferior in their fighting qualities to those who had once marched towards victories under the leadership of Moritz of Saxony. One of their own officers very unkindly described them as "murderers well deserving to be broken on the wheel," and predicted that at the first shot they would turn their backs on the enemy and begin to flee from the battlefield. It is quite possible that the 11,000 soldiers of the Austrian troops were no better than their colleagues. Frederick was able to gather only 21,000 warriors, but these were all proven veterans, and the king himself led them to fight.

Hussar sabers

The Battle of Rossbach (November 5, 1757), one of Frederick's most famous battles, took place on an open plain with two small rises that could hardly be called hills. The Prussians were just encamped directly in front of them when they saw their opponents moving in large forces so as to attack the king's army in flank and rear. The Prussian camp was immediately alerted, and the cavalry, numbering thirty-eight squadrons under the command of Seydlitz, began to advance under the cover of hills to meet the enemy. The infantry and artillery followed her. The Allies, deciding that these rapid movements meant the withdrawal of the Prussians, continued their offensive in three parallel columns. Now the attackers, without yet realizing it, exposed their unprotected flank to the Prussians. As soon as the dense columns were in front of low hills, Seidditz, whose squadrons were waiting for the enemy, hiding behind the hills, unexpectedly gave them the order to attack, crossing the tops of the hills. Taken by surprise, the enemy cavalry, marching at the head of the columns, barely had time to turn into battle formation when “the Prussian cavalry, advancing in close formation, like a wall, and with incredible speed,” cut into their ranks. After a fierce battle, the Allied cavalry squadrons were driven back and put to flight. Deprived of cavalry flank cover, the tightly packed columns of infantry came under heavy Prussian artillery fire, and seven battalions of Prussian infantry, advancing down the slope, engaged the leading Allied regiments. The infantry columns, coming under artillery fire and volleys from the advancing Prussian infantry, began to retreat in confusion. Unable to deploy into battle formation, they huddled in a dense crowd when Seydlitz and his cavalrymen struck them in the rear. The allied troops wavered and ran, and Seydlitz's soldiers saw them off with musket volleys in the back. Allied losses totaled 7,700, while the victors lost only 550.

This battle convincingly demonstrated the superiority of Prussian military training. The speed with which the camp was alerted and formed into columns (within half an hour), as well as the speed with which the Prussians moved, became Frederick's great advantage. The superiority of the Prussian cavalry was obvious. She not only won the initial fight, but then maintained discipline to such an extent that she was ready to deliver the decisive blow at any moment. The artillery staff of the battery of eighteen heavy guns did much to thwart all attempts by the enemy columns to attack up the hillside, in which they were greatly aided by the rapidity and effectiveness of the musket fire of the seven infantry battalions (the only infantry units that took part in the battle from the Prussian side). .

A month later, the Battle of Leuthen took place (December 5, 1757), which became another brilliant example of Frederick's tactics and the courage of the Prussian soldiers. The balance of forces at Leuthen was even more not in favor of the king - 33,000 versus 82,000. The formation of the Austrian and Saxon forces was too stretched, but covered by natural obstacles, the allies had about two hundred guns, most of them light. Frederick's plan was to march along the front of the enemy army and strike at its left flank, after conducting a preliminary diversion with a small force, which was supposed to look like an attack on the right flank. In accordance with this plan, the Prussian army approached the right flank of the Austrians in a solid formation, and then, finding itself under the cover of a small hill on the field, turned to the right, formed into two columns and quickly moved along the front of the Austrian troops. The Austrians, who apparently did not bother to monitor the Prussian maneuvers, still continued to strengthen their right flank, expecting an attack on it. Prussian columns, maintaining ideal alignment and distance, appeared on their left flank and changed from marching columns to a battle line. Each battalion had a 6-pounder gun, and a battery of 10 heavy siege mortars was pulled up along with the attacking columns.

Now these mortars began to destroy with their fire the abatis made of fallen tree trunks, with which the Austrians had strengthened their front, after which the Prussian battalions went on the attack. They advanced in oblique formation, known since the time of Epaminondas, in this case the battalions marched at a distance of fifty yards from each other and in such a way that the right flank of each of them was closer to the enemy, and the left seemed to lag behind. This attack swept through the Austrian positions from left to right. The Austrian reserves, located in the village of Leuthen, fought desperately; Reinforcements arrived from the right flank of the Austrians, and they made an attempt to level the front line. The mass of people concentrated here was so large that in some places the defenders stood a hundred people deep. Battalion after battalion of Prussians stormed the Austrian line, but not before the reserve battalions were thrown into battle did the village finally be cleared of the Austrians. The offensive, supported by the fire of heavy guns, continued. The commander of the Austrian left flank abandoned all the cavalry concentrated here in a desperate attempt to repel the stubborn advance of the Prussian infantry. But forty squadrons of Prussian cavalry, emerging from camouflaged shelters, intercepted them with a blow from the front, flank and rear. The Austrian cavalry scattered, and the triumphant Prussians on their horses attacked the rear of the Austrian infantry. As the day began to set, the Austrians wavered and fled, pursued by the cavalry. Others began to throw down their weapons and surrender, and the army ceased to exist as a fighting force. Austrian losses numbered up to 10,000 people, about 21,000 were captured, 116 guns, 51 banners and thousands of carts with supplies were captured. As if to add to this triumph, Breslau surrendered to Frederick two weeks later, along with 17,000 soldiers and 81 guns.

“The battle of Leuthen,” wrote Napoleon, “is a masterpiece of march, maneuver and analysis. This alone would be enough to immortalize the name of Frederick and place him among the greatest generals.”

Prussian hussars of the era of Frederick the Great. Private and officer

But continuous campaigns exhausted the Prussian army. Many of the best units fell on the battlefield; losses in the battles of Prague and Kolin were extremely heavy. Such victories as at Zorndorf (August 25, 1758), where the Prussians first had to experience the fortitude and fighting spirit of the Russians, came at a high price. Along with his victories, Frederick suffered a crushing defeat at Kunersdorf (August 11, 1759), losing about 20,000 men killed and wounded (almost 50 percent of the army) and 178 guns. Morale and discipline in the Prussian army continued to be excellent, but the veterans were largely replaced by newly recruited warriors or soldiers from enemy states, many of whom were enlisted en masse into the Prussian army after surrendering. Although organized into fighting units by strict Prussian discipline, they were not the kind of warriors who could march calmly as if on parade under a shower of shrapnel and musket balls or fire their muskets at a rate of five shots per minute. Discipline, caste spirit and faith in their generals partially compensated for the lack of training; and although desertion, the plague of all armies of that period, became a serious problem, the command still managed to compensate for the loss of rank and file. Moreover, these troops, although there were many recruits among the rank and file, were still capable of making such attacks as at Torgau (November 3, 1760), when they stormed an entrenched enemy with six hundred guns, spewing a shower of grapeshot at advancing until, out of six thousand grenadiers in one of the columns, only six hundred remained on their feet.

However, the war so depopulated the country that by the end of 1761 the Prussian army was reduced to 60,000 men. The complete catastrophe was prevented only by the death of the Russian Tsarina and the accession to the throne of her heir, the Germanophile Peter III. This “worthy” monarch not only offered to make an immediate peace, but also returned Pomerania to Frederick, and also ordered a Russian army of 18,000 men to be placed at his disposal. Upon news of this, Sweden immediately left the alliance. Saxony suffered a complete defeat, Austria and France were exhausted to the limit. The latter, in addition to defeats on the fields of Europe, lost Canada and India. Peace was finally concluded in 1763.

Prussia lay in ruins. According to contemporaries, four-fifths of all men who served in the army during this time were killed or wounded, and a little more than half of the people who lived in them before the war remained in the cities. Nevertheless, the kingdom was able to survive this storm and even emerge victorious from the war. All the might of Russia, France, Austria-Hungary, Sweden and Saxony was not enough to snatch from the Prussian king even one acre of space in his country. Having forces numerically incomparably smaller than his opponents, he waged an unequal struggle for seven for long years. Having experienced the bitterness of occasional defeats and sometimes being forced to retreat, he won many glorious battles. His fame eclipsed that of any other general of that time, and the slavish copying by military leaders throughout the world of everything Prussian was only another evidence of the reputation of the Prussian army and the Prussian soldier.

This soldier could be imperturbable and unimaginative; he may have lacked personal initiative, and without a firm guiding hand he was lost. But he had a habit of obedience and an innate steadfastness that impelled him to do his duty at any cost. To a large extent, the creation of this habit was influenced by the cruel system of Prussian drilling. Yes, she was extremely cruel, and the non-commissioned officers were ruthless and knew their job; but something more than fear of punishment impelled the columns of soldiers to attack at the Battle of Leuthen, singing the old German hymn to the beat of drums and the wail of flutes, or again and again hurling the Prussian grenadiers onto the blood-stained hillsides of Torgau.

Army of Prussia

If Napoleon's army was the brainchild of a new socio-economic structure generated by the bourgeois revolution, then the armies of his opponents reflected the feudal-absolutist system with underdeveloped industry and serfdom relations in agriculture. The Prussian soldier is a serf peasant, given entirely to the power of the noble-landlord officers.

While the French soldier went into battle believing that he was defending the gains of the revolution, the recruited soldier of the feudal monarchy went into battle under duress. Only towards the end of the Napoleonic wars did the balance of conditions change: the masses of soldiers of the French army, disappointed in Napoleon’s wars of conquest, long separated from the family hearth, lost their collective will to win, while a national liberation upsurge was brewing in the countries of Central Europe.

The armies of Napoleon's opponents were organized according to the Prussian model, built on the experience of the Seven Years' War with its linear tactics and brutal discipline with sticks. The soldier and officer of the Prussian army are antipodes, the relationship between which was based on the subordination of the serf to his master. A Prussian soldier served until he became disabled. Only after this was he subject to mobilization, and instead of a pension, he was given a special certificate for the right to beggary. There was nothing here similar to the bond that existed between the soldier and the officer of Napoleonic army. The Prussian generals - representatives of the landowning aristocracy - were unable to understand that the socio-economic and political changes made by the French Revolution forever threw the Friedrich system into the depths of history.

The government of Prussia, headed by King Frederick William III, reaping the laurels of the “glorious past” of the Frederick era and maintaining the order “sanctified” by the traditions of Frederick II, did not allow any reforms. The command staff in the Prussian army stayed in their positions until very mature age. In 1806, of the 66 colonels of the Prussian infantry, almost half were over sixty years of age, and of the 281 majors there were none under fifty. In this environment, of course, it was difficult to find a commander capable of resisting Napoleon.

Military theory was strongly influenced by the theorist Lloyd, who placed a premium on terrain, cultivating a “science of position.” Hence, a thorough study of geography in search of positions on the ground that would be inaccessible to the enemy and at the same time provide transportation routes for their army. Convenient and advantageous positions were given special importance, calling them “position keys” and even “country keys.”

Based on the experience of the War of the Bavarian Succession of 1778-1779, which ended without a battle after a long trampling of opponents in potato fields, Lloyd's theory allowed for the possibility of waging war with one maneuver, avoiding a decisive battle. The enemy's dependence on the five-transition supply system made it possible for a constant threat to his communications to force him to retreat.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the theory of Bülow, who “improved” Lloyd, became even more widespread in the armies of Europe. If Napoleon considered the enemy's manpower to be the object of the operation, then Bülow considered only the enemy's stores and convoys. Victory with the help of weapons, according to Bülow, did not promise serious results, but reaching the enemy’s messages and depriving a huge human collective of food supplies should have led to the complete defeat of the enemy. Developing the theory of maneuver strategy, Bülow proposed operating in two groups, one of which attracts the enemy, and the other at this time acts on his messages. This theory was also reflected in the operational plan of the Russian command in 1812.

The Bulow-Lloyd theory was quite acceptable for absolutist monarchies: a decisive battle was considered too dangerous in its consequences in the presence of mercenary and recruited armies, difficult to replenish and not interested in shedding their blood.

Frederick's oblique battle formation.

Until the Jena defeat of 1806, the Prussian army retained the basics of Friedrich's tactics - maneuvering in the open field with flawless execution of complex formations in linear battle formations. The column had no place in the battle formation of the Prussian army, and the scattered formation was risky: having settled in a shelter, a forcibly recruited soldier could desert. The battalion, armed with smoothbore rifles of the 1782 model, lined up in three deployed ranks to fire volleys. Frederick's oblique battle formation - the advancement by maneuvering on the battlefield of a series of ledges against one of the enemy's flanks - was used as a once and for all established template.

The usual order of battle, adopted by almost all armies after Frederick I, was two lines of deployed battalions with artillery on the flanks or in front. The cavalry lined up behind both flanks, deploying squadrons in 2-3 ranks at a distance of 4-5 steps. Large cavalry formations lined up in three lines of squadrons. The cavalry, forming an element of the general battle order, was chained to the infantry. The food system is only shops.

Only complete defeat at Jena and Auerstedt forced Prussia to rebuild. These changes are associated with the name of Scharnhorst - at that time almost the only officer of the Prussian army who understood the obsolescence of the Friedrich system. Even before the war of 1806, Scharnhorst submitted a memorandum to the king outlining the reorganization of the army, but the king and his decrepit advisers rejected all proposals.

Only after the defeat of feudal-serf Prussia was a course set for a series of social reforms. The national upsurge, which swept wide circles of the population, contributed to the creation of a mass army, the importance of which was finally realized. The ruling elite of Prussia was forced to take such a step as the partial abolition of serfdom and abandon the use of corporal punishment in the army.

The Treaty of Tilsit reduced Prussia's armed forces to 42,000 men, but Scharnhorst, who became Minister of War, on the eve of the inevitable war with Napoleon, managed to bypass French control and create a military-trained reserve from part of the population by training young men recruited at the request of the French Emperor for construction fortifications on the North Sea coast against England, as well as by early dismissal of some active-duty soldiers and replacing them with recruits.

The death of the Napoleonic army in Russia and the increased national upsurge in Central Europe prompted the Prussian government to establish universal conscription and create the Landwehr (militia deployed by districts in Prussia) and Landsturm (militia called up in case of emergency), which trained on Sundays and holidays . Representatives of the bourgeoisie began to be admitted into the ranks of officers.

The reforms greatly strengthened the Prussian army, and by the time of the decisive battles with Napoleon in 1813, the Prussian regular army numbered 240,000 men in its ranks, in addition to 120,000 Landwehr, intended to act on a par with the regular troops, and the Landsturm, in which all men were involved , capable of bearing arms, but not included in either the Landwehr or the regular army. Landsturm was intended mainly for rear service, but was also used for partisan warfare in enemy-occupied areas.

Before the outbreak of war in 1806, the Prussians adopted a corps and divisional organization. The corps were assigned reserve cavalry and artillery. The infantry regiment consisted of three battalions of four companies. The cavalry regiment consisted of 4 squadrons, artillery - of foot batteries, armed mainly with 12-pound cannons and 10-pound howitzers, and horse batteries, with 6-pound cannons and 7-pound howitzers. The infantry regiments had their own artillery - 6-pound guns.

After 1806, the Prussian command, based on the regulations of 1811, drawn up with the participation of Clausewitz, taking into account the experience of the Napoleonic wars, began to partially use the French battle formation - a combination of rifle lines with a column. The brigade's battle formation occupied a distance of 400 steps along the front and in depth.

The order of battle of the Prussian brigade according to the regulations of 1811.

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Brandenburg Friedrich Wilhelm I. He decided to move away from the system of recruiting an army from Landsknechts and, after becoming Elector (1640), he concluded a truce with Sweden and in 1644 began to create a regular army on the basis of conscription. The newly formed army was first tested on the battlefield during the Northern War. She took part in the Battle of Warsaw, where she made a good impression on observers both with her combat effectiveness and her humane attitude towards the local residents, which made her compare favorably with the allied Swedish army. Victories in this war allowed Frederick William to conclude the Wieliawsko-Bydgoszcz Treaty with Poland, according to which Poland ceded the Duchy of Prussia to Brandenburg. The military power of the army contributed to the promotion of Brandenburg-Prussia into the top five major European powers of the time.

• 1st Army Corps (Prussia): 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th East Prussian Regiments), 33rd (East Prussian Fusiliers regiment)
• 2nd Army Corps (Pomerania): 2nd, 9th, 14th, 21st Infantry Regiments (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Pomeranian Regiments), 34th ( Pomeranian Fusilier Regiment)
• 3rd Army Corps (Brandenburg): 8th, 12th, 20th, 24th Infantry Regiments (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Brandenburg Regiments), 35th ( Brandenburg Fusilier Regiment)

The reformed Prussian army in 1813-1815 took part in the War of Liberation against Napoleon and played decisive role in the liberation of the German states from French domination.

In 1815, after the annexation of Posen, North-West Saxony, Westphalia and the Rhineland to Prussia, five more army corps, 5 artillery and 5 fusilier regiments were formed:

• 4th Army Corps (Saxony): 26th and 27th (1st and 2nd Magdeburg Regiments), 31st and 32nd (1st and 2nd Thuringian Regiments) and 36th (Magdeburg Fusilier Regiment) infantry regiments
• 5th Army Corps (Posen): 6th (1st West Prussian), 18th (1st Posen), 19th (2nd Posen) and 37th (West Prussian Fusilier Regiment) infantry regiments
• 6th Army Corps (Silesia): 10th, 11th (1st and 2nd Silesian), 22nd and 23rd (1st and 2nd Upper Silesian) infantry regiments, 38th (Silesian Fusilier Regiment)
• 7th Army Corps (Westphalia): 13th, 15th, 16th and 17th (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Westphalian)
• 8th Army Corps (Rhineland): 25th, 28th, 29th and 30th (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Rhine), 39th (Lower Rhine Fusilier Regiment )

In 1860, the number of infantry regiments in each of the army corps, except the 5th, was increased from 4 to 8, and the number of Guards Infantry and Guards Grenadier Regiments was also doubled.

In 1866, after the annexation of Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, Hesse and Nassau to Prussia, three more army corps were formed:

• 9th Army Corps (Schleswig-Holstein): 86th (Schleswig-Holstein Fusiliers), 84th (Schleswig), 85th (Holstein), 89th (Mecklenburg), 90th (Mecklenburg Fusiliers) , 75th, 76th (1st and 2nd Hanseatic) infantry regiments
• 11th Army Corps (Hesse-Nassau): 80th (Elector of Hesse Fusiliers), 81st, 82nd, 83rd (1st, 2nd and 3rd Elector of Hesse), 87- th, 88th (1st and 2nd Nassau)
• 10th Army Corps (Hannover): 73rd (Hanoverian Fusiliers), 74th, 77th, 79th (1st, 2nd and 3rd Hanoverian), 78th (East Frisian) infantry regiments

Providing for old age and supplying the disabled

For the Prussian leadership, well-trained soldiers with combat experience were of great value. Therefore, it was decided to leave them in the companies. However, only a small number of soldiers could serve as models for young recruits. Most were seasoned, and were left with the company only for social reasons.

Veterans who were unable to perform their duties received an allowance of 1 taler from the disabled person's fund. After the Second Silesian War, Frederick II ordered the construction of nursing homes for retired soldiers in Berlin, Stop and Charles Harbor. On November 15, a nursing home opened in Berlin. In total this establishment was designed for 631 persons, of whom 136 were officers and 126 women for supervision and service. These houses provided shelter, supplies and food, clothing, as well as medical care - to wounded non-commissioned officers, commanders and officers free of charge. All homes for the disabled bore a military imprint - disabled people were required to wear uniforms everywhere (in full) along with the guard.

Officers unfit for combat service were given the position of governor or commandant position in fortresses, if necessary. If there were no places, the king paid the generals 1000 or 2000 thalers from the treasury, the staff officers several hundred, and the captains and lieutenants much less. However, there were no rules for this. Every supply was pure mercy.

To facilitate the existence of numerous widows with their numerous children, Frederick II allowed active officers to take patronage over them, or arranged for sons, at the appropriate age, mainly in the army. Frederick William I cared for numerous war orphans and even founded an army orphanage in 1724. At first, this house was intended only for orphans of his guard of “big guys.” Later, the children of other soldiers found an apartment there. The occupied space of the house grew, so that it had to be expanded already in 1742 and replaced in 1771. In 1758 the house received 2,000 orphans.