The Russian-Chinese rapprochement and the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway intensified the expansionist actions of other states. Germany in 1897 captured the port of Qingdao on the Shandong Peninsula. Russia decided to use the precedent and get an ice-free port in the Yellow Sea. Russian ships entered Port Arthur, and on March 15 (27), 1898, an agreement was imposed on China on a gratuitous lease by Russia for 25 years of the Liaodong Peninsula, according to which Port Arthur became the base of the Pacific Fleet.

In July 1903, Japan offered Russia to sign an agreement on the delimitation of mutual interests. Negotiations on the Russian side were not vigorous enough. Accusing St. Petersburg of unwillingness to negotiate, the government of Japan severed diplomatic relations with Russia on January 24 (February 6), 1904.

Start of hostilities

Remark 1

Russian troops on Far East then there were about 100 thousand people. The plan of the Russian command provided for adhering to defensive tactics in Manchuria until the numerical superiority of the Russian army over the Japanese was created.

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The Japanese army numbered 150 thousand people. The Japanese command assumed its phased landing in Korea, and then on the Liaodong Peninsula, followed by the capture of Port Arthur and the transition to the offensive against the group of Russian troops in Manchuria. It was unrealistic for the Japanese military to conduct ground operations without gaining dominance at sea. To solve this problem, Japan was able to implement a program to strengthen the fleet in less than ten years, as a result of which a naval force was created, which consisted of 6 battleships and 20 cruisers.

• On the night of January 27 (February 9), 1904, Japanese ships fired on the Russian squadron on the Port Arthur roadstead without an official declaration of war. Three Russian ships were damaged - the battleships "Tsesarevich" and "Retvizan" and the cruiser "Pallada".
• On the morning of January 27, in the Korean port of Chemulpo, the Japanese squadron (6 cruisers and 8 destroyers) attacked the Varyag cruiser and the Korean gunboat. The forces were unequal, but one Japanese cruiser was sunk. Russian ships were seriously damaged. "Korean" was blown up, and "Varyag" was flooded. The sailors were saved by English, French and American ships that were on the roadstead of Chemulpo.

The new commander of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral S. Makarov, who replaced Vice Admiral A. Stark, began preparing a squadron for a general naval battle. On March 31 (April 13), his flagship Petropavlovsk hit a mine. Most of the crew died, the entire staff of S. Makarov (647 officers and sailors with 727 crew members), as well as the famous battle painter V. Vereshchagin, who was on the ship. After the death of S. Makarov, the Russian fleet went on the defensive, because the commander of the Far Eastern forces, Admiral Alekseev, refused active operations at sea.

Fighting in the summer and autumn of 1904

In the summer, the Japanese army launched an offensive in two directions - against the main forces of the Russian army in Manchuria and on the Liaodong Peninsula (near the Port Arthur fortress). In early July 1904, three Japanese armies under the general command of Marshal I. Oyama launched an offensive against the concentrated in the city of Liaoyang Russian army headed by the commander ground forces in Manchuria by General A. Kuropatkin. During the August battles, Russian troops repelled all Japanese attacks and defended their positions along the entire front.

Favorable conditions were created for the counteroffensive of the Russian army, but Kuropatkin, fearing attacks from the flanks, issued an order to retreat. On September 22 (October 5), the Russian army, having a numerical advantage, launched an offensive operation on the river. Shah. During the 14-day battle, which took place in difficult conditions of mountainous terrain and with huge human losses, neither side was able to achieve success. The armies went on the defensive. The so-called "Shahee's seat" began, which lasted three months.

Assault on Port Arthur

By mid-July, the Japanese had concentrated 50,000 soldiers and about 400 guns on the Liaodong Peninsula. They were opposed by the forty thousandth garrison of Port Arthur, which was armed with 650 guns. The crew of the Pacific squadron, based in Port Arthur, consisted of 12 thousand officers and sailors. At the end of July, the Japanese army approached directly the defense line of Port Arthur, which was 29 km. The general command of the garrison was carried out by the head of the Kwantung Fortified Region, Lieutenant General A. Stessel, and the ground forces of the fortress were led by Major General G. Kondratenko (after his death, Major General A. Fok).

On August 6 (19), the first general assault on the fortress began, which lasted 6 days and led to heavy losses on both sides. After the fourth assault in November 1904, the Japanese captured Mount Vysokaya, from which they could conduct aimed fire at the fortifications of the fortress and the ships of the Pacific squadron. After the destruction of these ships, Port Arthur held out for several more weeks.

The last, sixth, assault on Port Arthur ended on December 20, 1904 (January 2, 1905) with the signing of the act of surrender. The garrison did not run out of ammunition and food. Most of them were destroyed on the night before the surrender. At the same time, the remnants of the squadron were sunk, with the exception of several destroyers that managed to break into Chinese ports.

Remark 2

Under the terms of surrender, the entire garrison of the fortress was captured (23,000 officers and lower ranks), forts, fortifications, ships, weapons and ammunition were to go to the Japanese.

After the war, Stessel, who surrendered Port Arthur, was sentenced to death, but later commuted to imprisonment in a fortress. He was pardoned by Nicholas II.

Offensive actions of the Russian army in Manchuria

The new commander-in-chief of the armed forces in the Far East, A. Kuropatkin (Alekseev was eliminated in mid-October 1904), decided to move on to active offensive operations in Manchuria. He and his staff developed an offensive against the Japanese armies concentrated on the approaches to Mukden.

From February 5 (18) to February 25 (March 10), 1905, the largest battle in the history of wars at that time continued, in which more than 660 thousand people and 2,500 guns participated on both sides on a 100-kilometer front. After the threat of encirclement of the three Russian armies arose, Kuropatkin gave the order to retreat. The Russian armies retreated 180 km north of Mukden. The Japanese did not pursue them. Both sides suffered heavy losses.

Naval battle off the island of Tsushima and the final defeat of Russia

The last significant event in the course of the war was the naval battle on May 14-15 (27-28), 1905 near Tsushima Island in the Sea of ​​Japan. Back in the spring of 1904, it was decided to send the Baltic Squadron to the Far East under the command of Rear Admiral Z. Rozhdestvensky, Chief of the Main Naval Staff. Preparations for the dispatch of the squadron dragged on for almost six months. In October 1904, the squadron, which was called the Second Pacific, consisting of 8 battleships, 11 cruisers and 9 destroyers left Libau.

In December, the squadron reached Madagascar. By that time, Port Arthur had surrendered, and the First Pacific Squadron had ceased to exist. The campaign to the Far East lost its meaning, because Rozhdestvensky's squadron was much weaker than the Japanese fleet. Then in February 1905, the Third Pacific Squadron of Rear Admiral M. Nebogatov, which was formed from low-speed battleships of coastal defense, was sent after her from Lyubava. At the end of April, Nebogatov caught up with Rozhdestvensky off the coast of Vietnam, and on May 14 (27) the combined squadron entered the Tsushima Strait and headed for Vladivostok. Here Russian ships met with the main forces of the Japanese fleet under the command of Admiral X. Togo.

Remark 3

The Japanese squadron prevailed over the Russian one both in the number of ships and in the quantity and quality of weapons.

During a fierce battle, out of 33 ships of the Rozhdestvensky squadron, 19 were flooded, 8 were captured by the enemy, 3 managed to withdraw to Manila, where they were interned, and only the Almaz cruiser, the destroyers Bravo and Grozny managed to break through to Vladivostok. Of the 14 thousand people of the team, more than 5 thousand died, almost 800 were injured, 5 thousand people were captured.

Synopsis on the history of Russia

The nature of war: imperialistic, unjust on both sides. The forces of the parties: Russia - 1 million 135 thousand people (total), actually 100 thousand people, Japan - 143 thousand people + navy + reserve (about 200 thousand). Japan's quantitative and qualitative superiority at sea (80:63).

Side Plans:
Japan- an offensive strategy, the purpose of which is dominance at sea, the capture of Korea, the possession of Port Arthur, the defeat of the Russian group.
Russia- there was no general war plan that would ensure the interaction of the army and navy. defensive strategy.

Dates. Events. Notes

January 27, 1904 - A surprise attack by a Japanese squadron of Russian ships off Port Arthur. Heroic battle between Varangian and Korean. Attack repulsed. Russian losses: Varyag is flooded. Korean is blown up. Japan ensured superiority at sea.
January 28 - Re-bombardment of the city and Port Arthur. Attack repulsed.
February 24 - Arrival in Port Arthur of the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov. Makarov's active actions in preparation for the general battle with Japan at sea (offensive tactics).
March 31 - The death of Makarov. The inaction of the fleet, the rejection of offensive tactics.
April 1904 - Landing of the Japanese armies in Korea, forcing the river. Yaly and entry into Manchuria. The initiative in actions on land belongs to the Japanese.
May 1904 - The Japanese began to lay siege to Port Arthur. Port Arthur was cut off from the Russian army. An attempt to release it in June 1904 was unsuccessful.
August 13-21 - Battle of Liaoyang. The forces are approximately equal (160 thousand each). Japanese attacks were repulsed. Kuropatkin's indecisiveness prevented him from building on his success. On August 24, Russian troops retreated to the Shahe River.
October 5 - The battle on the Shahe River began. Fog and mountainous terrain interfered, as well as Kuropatkin's lack of initiative (he acted only with part of the forces he had).
December 2 - The death of General Kondratenko. R.I. Kondratenko led the defense of the fortress.
July 28 - December 20, 1904 - The besieged Port Arthur heroically defended itself. December 20 Stesil gives the order to surrender the fortress. The defenders withstood 6 assaults on the fortress. The fall of Port Arthur was a turning point in the Russo-Japanese War.
February 1905 - Battle of Mukden. 550 thousand people participated from both sides. Kuropatkin's passivity. Losses: Russians -90 thousand, Japanese - 70 thousand. The battle was lost by the Russians.
May 14-15, 1905 - Naval battle at about. Tsushima in the Sea of ​​Japan.
Tactical mistakes of Admiral Rozhdestvensky. Our losses - 19 ships sunk, 5,000 killed, 5,000 captured. The defeat of the Russian fleet
August 5, 1905 – Peace of Portsmouth
By the summer of 1905, Japan began to clearly feel the lack of material and human resources and turned to the United States, Germany, and France for help. The US stands for peace. Peace was signed in Portsmouth, our delegation was headed by S.Yu. Witte.

Peace terms: Korea is Japan's sphere of interest, both sides withdraw their troops from Manchuria, Russia cedes to Japan Liaodong and Port Arthur, half of Sakhalin and railways. This treaty lost its force after the surrender of Japan in 1914.

Reasons for the defeat: the technical, economic and military superiority of Japan, the military-political and diplomatic isolation of Russia, the operational-tactical and strategic unpreparedness of the Russian army for combat operations in difficult conditions, the mediocrity and betrayal of the tsarist generals, the unpopularity of the war among all segments of the population.

The main reason for the outbreak of war between Japan and Russia in 1904 lies on the surface 1 . The geopolitical ambitions of these powers clashed in Northeast Asia. But, as in many other armed conflicts, the immediate causes of war are more confusing.

These are Russia's plans to build a railway in the Russian Far East, and Japan's victory in the war with China in 1895, and the project of some St. Petersburg guards officers to open a logging enterprise on the Yalu River, and Tokyo's fears about St. Petersburg's influence in Korea. Disorderly, inconsistent diplomacy also played a large role.

But, as with the outbreak of the First World War, a clear understanding of how the Russo-Japanese conflict broke out may take us beyond the scope of historical science.

The answer concerns an important but often elusive concept of diplomacy, namely honor 2 . When attempts to encroach on the international authority of a state can be considered as dangerous as a military invasion of its territory. Alexander II once said that in the life of states, as in the life of any person, there are moments when you need to forget everything except protecting your own honor 3 .

CONFUSION ON SINGING BRIDGE

Russia and Japan have been going to war since 1895, from the time the Japanese inflicted a spectacular defeat on the Chinese in a brief conflict over Korea. Russia's attempt to prevent Japan from gaining a foothold on Chinese territory caused extreme indignation in the island empire. And Russian intervention began after the conclusion of the Shimonoseki peace treaty on April 17, 1895, which marked the end of the Sino-Japanese war. Among the requirements of the Japanese side was the possession of the Liaodong Peninsula, located near Beijing, with the strategically important naval base of Port Arthur. The Qing dynasty agreed to cede the rights to the peninsula, but Petersburg enticed Berlin and Paris to jointly demand the cession of Liaodong to Russia.

The Russian demarche was made after heated debates among the dignitaries of Nicholas II, caused primarily by the proximity of Eastern Siberia to the theater of operations of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The main goal of the Romanovs was an ice-free access to the Pacific Ocean. Owning the Pacific port of Vladivostok, surrounded by freezing seas, Russia did not have a convenient harbor washed by warm waters for the terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was being built at that time. Prominent Russian naval commanders believed that the time had come to capture the port in Korea. This idea was enthusiastically shared by Nicholas II. Lacking the necessary backing to make such a move, Foreign Minister Prince Andrei Lobanov-Rostovsky proposed an agreement with Tokyo for a new port in the region.

But there was another point of view. Its most influential supporter was Finance Minister Sergei Witte, who believed a good relationship with China essential for the development of the Russian Far East. He had no doubt that in time the Romanovs would dominate China. But the empire must move towards this peacefully and by economic means. Russian and Chinese railways, banks, trading houses and not troops should compete with each other. Among other things, Witte often reminded Nikolai: "... for general position affairs within Russia, it is essential to avoid anything that could cause external complications" 4 .

As a result, after the Peace of Shimonoseki, Russia played more of the role of defender of Beijing. The finance minister quickly drew dividends from the goodwill of the Chinese. He secured the consent of the Zongli Yamen (Chinese Department of Foreign Affairs. - Approx. Per.) to lay the Trans-Siberian Railway through Manchuria, which significantly shortened the eastern segment of the railway. And on June 3, 1896, the two empires concluded a secret agreement on joint confrontation in the event of possible aggression from Japan 5 .

However, after only a year, Emperor Nicholas abruptly changed course. Imitating his cousin Wilhelm, who captured Qingdao, he occupied the southern part of the Liaodong Peninsula, which included Port Arthur. Three years later, the Cossacks suddenly entered the hereditary provinces of the Qing dynasty in Manchuria. Although Nicholas's diplomats officially promised to withdraw them, the military did not budge and even plotted a campaign against neighboring Korea.

Such inconsistency reflected deep divisions in the Far Eastern policy of St. Petersburg. Sergei Witte, who was supported by Count Vladimir Lamsdorf, Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1900 to 1906, remained an unshakable supporter of friendly relations with China. A coalition of "hawks" opposed at various times included naval commanders, Lamsdorf's predecessor, Count Mikhail Muravyov, a retired captain of the guards and a dubious businessman Alexander Bezobrazov and the imperial governor in the Far East. Russian Admiral Evgeny Alekseev. However, the differences did not prevent the opponents from agreeing on one thing: Russia should play an active role in Northeast Asia.

"KOREA FOR MANCHURIA"

Japanese dignitaries also agreed on one thing: the main goal of their country's geopolitics was Korea, a hermit state that had long been a tributary of the Qing dynasty. However, by the end of the 19th century, the progressive weakness of China led to the weakening of its rule on the peninsula and made it possible for stronger powers to operate here. The latter included Japan, which, during the Meiji Restoration, ended its medieval isolation and became a modern state with a Europeanized army and colonial aspirations of its own.

The simple logic of geography pointed to Korea as one of the main targets of the genro, the group of nine statesmen who determined the policy of the empire. At its narrowest point, only 60 kilometers separated Japan from Korea.

Already in 1875, Japanese troops clashed with the Koreans on the island of Ganghwado, and 20 years later, the empire started a war with China, weakening its influence on the hermit country. As the Western powers divided China into spheres of influence, the Genro decided they could fulfill their colonial ambitions by giving Russia a dominant role in Manchuria in exchange for their control of Korea. For the next eight years, the slogan "Man-Kan kokan" ("Korea for Manchuria") became one of the leading imperatives of the Japanese foreign policy 6 .

On April 13, 1898, Baron Rosen, the Russian envoy, and Japanese Foreign Minister Tokujiro Nishi signed a joint protocol in Tokyo recognizing Japanese economic dominance in Korea. But at the same time, both sides pledged to defend the country's political sovereignty. Rosen himself called the treaty "incomplete and meaningless", the Japanese were also not in the best opinion about it 7 .

The next four years, when Russia was increasingly moving away from Korean affairs, Japan made repeated attempts to achieve official recognition of its superiority on the peninsula. However, Russian diplomats were unable to obtain permission from the government for such a turn of policy. As Alexander Izvolsky, then envoy to Tokyo, explained, both the tsar and his admirals "were too interested in Korea" 8 . At the same time, Lamsdorf was wary of Japanese hostility, warning in letters to Witte, General Kuropatkin, and Naval Minister Tyrtov that if Russia failed to appease the new serious rival, "the clear danger of an armed clash with Japan" would remain.

When the Japanese government was headed by Marquis Hirobumi Ito, cold heads prevailed in Tokyo. From the time of the Peace of Shimonoseki in 1895, the marquis tended towards a cautious policy towards Russia. One of the most prominent statesmen of the Meiji era, Ito had great authority among both dignitaries and the emperor. But despite this, in May 1901, his cabinet lost the confidence of parliament, and a new prime minister, Prince Taro Katsura, took office. The younger members of his cabinet were much more aggressive towards Russia 10 .

True, the Marquis of Ito, who found himself outside the government, did not give up. During a private visit to St. Petersburg in November 1901, he looked for ways to carry out a policy of reconciliation. An experienced dignitary received a warm welcome in St. Petersburg and was awarded the Order of St. Nicholas II. Alexander Nevsky, and at meetings with Witte and Lamsdorf defended the Korean-Manchurian project. But while the Minister of Finance was sympathetic to this idea, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was still against it.

Most importantly, while Ito was negotiating with the tsar and his officials, the Japanese ambassador in London, Count Tadasu Hayashi, secretly concluded a defensive alliance with Great Britain 12 . Russian diplomats were taken by surprise by this news. The two main adversaries in the Far East have joined forces, changing the political landscape in the Pacific region at once.

PETERSBURG CONFUSION CONTINUES

The ministers of Nicholas II hastily assured the world that the Russian troops would leave Manchuria in the near future. However, even here opinions in St. Petersburg were sharply divided. Count Lamsdorf and Witte believed that Manchuria should be returned as soon as possible. They predicted that the unwillingness to calm the atmosphere in the region would cause new unrest there 13 . This point of view was also supported by many Russians - for the simple reason that there are at least 14 problems at home. In addition, the "Kingdom of Witte" - the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) - flourished, and the military presence in Manchuria was serious threat finance minister's plans.

However, the idea of ​​retaining Manchuria for Russia had no less influential defenders. The military believed that Manchuria would become part of Russian Empire like Khiva, Kokand and Bukhara, annexed in the second half of the 19th century 15 . The most prominent "hawk" was Admiral Evgeny Alekseev, who was in Port Arthur. This naval commander had authority not only in the Pacific Fleet, but also among the garrison of the Liaodong Peninsula. His irrepressible temperament and ambitions, together with rumors that Alekseev was the illegitimate son of Alexander II, ensured the enmity of many of his contemporaries. And above all, Sergei Witte, who saw him as a dangerous rival in the Russian Far East.

The pathologically indecisive Nicholas II hesitated. The confused and unstable policy of the empire sharply increased the hostility of other powers. Nevertheless, after a year of difficult negotiations with China, on April 8, 1902, Russia signed an agreement in Beijing, according to which the withdrawal of troops from Manchuria was to take place in three stages within 18 months 16 . On October 8, 1902, the first phase of the evacuation of troops began in the southern part of Fengtian Province, including in ancient capital Qing Dynasty Mukden (modern Shenyang). But the second stage, scheduled for April 1903, did not take place, the Russian dignitaries could not agree among themselves. Petersburg did not keep its word.

"VAIN NEGOTIATIONS"

In the summer of 1903, Russia and Japan again entered into debate, wanting to resolve their differences in East Asia. Moreover, the intractable Japanese Prime Minister Taro Katsura showed the initiative. By this point, the Russian line had hardened considerably as well, as the influence of Witte, a principled defender of peace in East Asia, had plummeted at court. The tsar called the hard line adopted in the spring of 1903 the "new course" 17 . Its goal was "to prevent the penetration of foreign influence into Manchuria in any form" 18 . Russia will emphasize its decisiveness, he wrote to Alekseev, as he embarks on a military and economic presence in East Asia.

Tired of the endless bickering among the ministers, Nikolai made two important decisions in the summer. On August 12, he appointed Admiral Alekseev as viceroy in the Far East, which effectively made him the tsar's personal representative in the Pacific region with full power here 20 . And two weeks later, Nikolay removed Alekseev's main opponent, Sergei Witte, from the post of Minister of Finance 21 .

Alekseev's rise provoked a sharp reaction in Tokyo. Baron Roman Rosen, the Russian envoy, reported that in Japan the appearance of the governor of the Far East was perceived as an act of aggression 22 . The Japanese were especially offended by the fact that the appointment came two weeks after their government had proposed to start a new round of negotiations.

Throughout 1903, European foreign ministers were confused, alarmed, and often irritated by constant sharp turns tsarist policy, subjecting Russia to ever greater international isolation. But a compromise was still possible even at this late stage. However, the king and his governor still did not take Japan seriously.

Nikolai, of course, did not consider endless negotiations a worthy reason to interrupt his long autumn trips abroad or hunting. And he believed that "there will be no war, because I don't want it" 24 . As a result of fruitless negotiations until the very winter, the Japanese cabinet finally came to the conclusion that a peaceful resolution of the conflict was impossible. On February 6, 1904, Foreign Minister Komura summoned Baron Rosen to his office to announce that the government had lost patience with all these "vain negotiations." Therefore, it decided to end them and break off diplomatic relations with Russia 25 .

Upon returning to his residence, the Russian envoy learned from the naval attaché that earlier that day, at 6 am local time, two Japanese squadrons had weighed anchor for unknown reasons. Shortly after midnight on February 8, 1904, Japanese destroyer torpedoes struck three Russian ships in the Port Arthur roadstead. Two empires are at war...

CONCLUSION

The Russo-Japanese War is often viewed as a classic imperialist conflict. This is only partly true. Although expansionist goals have led Petersburg and Tokyo to disagree over Northeast Asia, such a rivalry is not unique in an age of aggressive colonial wars. In the decades since the 1880s and before the outbreak of the First World War, in Asia and Africa there were repeated clashes between the great states of Europe. However, none of them escalated into open war. Differences were invariably resolved by "imperialist diplomacy," 27 an instrument for escaping colonial disputes that were gaining momentum in late XIX century.

An unwritten code determined the relationship between the great powers of Europe. Although strictly fixed rules did not exist here, they were quite clear. Based on hard calculation and feeling fair play, the diplomacy of imperialism was effective. Critical to its success was the understanding by the great powers that they all had legitimate interests outside of Europe. And this line successfully saved countries from open struggle on other continents.

But the diplomacy of imperialism itself was not without flaws. Chief among these was the inability of states to recognize new developing non-European countries. Like an old-fashioned gentlemen's club, only European governments received membership. Thus, the tiny Belgian monarchy was considered a colonial power, while the ambitions of the United States or Japan were called into question. It was precisely this inability of a member of this club - Russia - to take seriously the colonial aspirations of an outsider - Japan - that on February 8, 1904, led to the outbreak of war in East Asia.

Tokyo saw how Petersburg trampled on his honor. And statesmen who do not properly respect the interests of other countries have put their own at serious risk. And more than a hundred years later, this conflict has not lost its relevance in international relations.

Translation by Evgenia Galimzyanova

Notes
1. This article is based on the chapter Russia s Relations with Japan before and after the War: An Episode in the Diplomacy of Imperialism from the book: The Treaty of Portsmouth and its Legacies. Steven Ericson and Alan Hockley, eds. Hanover, NH, 2008. P. 11-23, and also in my monograph: Schimmelpenninck van der Oye D. Toward the Rising Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan. DeKalb, 2001.
2. Honor Among Nations: Intangible Interests and Foreign Policy. Elliot Abrams, ed. Washington, DC, 1998; Tsygankov A.P. Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations. Cambridge, 2012. P. 13-27.
3. Wohlforth W. Honor as Interest in Russian Decisions for War 1600-1995 // Honor Among Nations...
4. Witte to Nicholas II, memorandum, August 11, 1900 // RGIA. F. 560. Op. 28. D. 218. L. 71.
5. Collection of treaties between Russia and other states in 1856-1917. M., 1952. S. 292-294.
6. Nish I. The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War. London, 1985. P. 45.
7. Rosen R.R. Forty Years of Diplomacy. Vol. 1. London, 1922. P. 159.
8. A.P. Izvolsky L.P. Urusov. Letter dated March 9, 1901 // Bakhmetevsky archive. Box 1.
9. V.N. Lamsdorf S.Yu. Witte, A.N. Kuropatkin and P.P. Tyrtov. Letter dated May 22, 1901 // GARF. F. 568. Op. 1. D. 175. L. 2-3.
10. Okamoto S. The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War. N.Y., 1970. P. 24-31.
11. V.N. Lamsdorf, reports 11/20/1901 // GARF. F. 568. Op. 1. D. 62. L. 43-45; V.N. Lamsdorf to Nicholas II, memorandum, 11/22/1901 // Red Archive (M.-L.). 1934. T. 63. S. 44-45; V.N. Lamsdorf A.P. Izvolsky, telegram, 11/22/1901 // Ibid. pp. 47-48.
12. Nish I. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894-1907. L., 1966. P. 143-228.
13. V.N. Lamsdorf A.N. Kuropatkin. Letter dated March 31, 1900 // RGVIA. F. 165. Op. 1. D. 759. L. 1-2. See also: A.N. Kuropatkin V.V. Sakharov. Letter dated July 1, 1901 // Ibid. D. 702. L. 2.
14. Suvorin A. Small letters. New time. 1903. February 22. S. 3; Chinese Railway// New time. 1902. May 3. S. 2; Kravchenko N. From the Far East. // New time. 1902. October 22. C. 2.
15. For a good example of such opinions, see: I.P. Balashev to Nicholas II, memorandum, March 25, 1902 // GARF. F. 543. Op. 1. D. 180. L. 1-26.
16. Glinsky B.B. Prologue of the Russo-Japanese War: materials from the archive of Count S.Yu. Witte. Pg., 1916. S. 180-183.
17. Although Nikolai coined the term, B.A. Romanov popularized it among historians to describe the growing influence of Bezobrazov.
18. Romanov V.A. Russia in Manchuria. Ann Arbor, 1952. P. 284.
19. Ibidem.
20. Nicholas II E.I. Alekseev, telegram, September 10, 1903 // RGAVMF. F. 417. Op. 1. D. 2865. L. 31.
21. Nicholas II S.Yu. Witte, letter, August 16, 1903 // RGVIA. F. 1622. Op. 1. D. 34. L. 1.
22. Rosen R.R. Op. cit. Vol. 1. R. 219.
23. Gurko V.I. Facts and Features of the Past. Stanford, 1939. P. 281.
24. MacKenzie D. Imperial Dreams/Harsh Realities: Tsarist Russian Foreign Policy, 1815-1917. Fort Worth, 1994. P. 145.
25. Nish I. The Origins... P. 213.
26. Rosen R.R. Op. cit. Vol. 1. R. 231.
27. The phrase is taken from the title of William Langer's classic work on European diplomacy at the turn of the 20th century: Langer W.L. The Diplomacy of Imperialism. N.Y., 1956.

* Mikado is the oldest title of the secular supreme ruler of Japan.

The main events of the RUSSIAN-JAPANESE war of 1904-1905 January 26 - 27, 1904 March 31, 1904 February 1904 April 1904 July 17, 1904 July 28, 1904 August 1904 August 11 - 21, 1904 September - October 1904 October 1904 December 20, 1904 February 1905 February 25, 1905 May 14 - 15, 1905 June 1905 August 23, 1905 Sudden attack by Japanese destroyers on the Russian squadron on the outer roads of Port Arthur. Mining approaches to the port → The Russian fleet cannot influence the course of hostilities. Two Russian ships (the cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Koreets") opposed 15 enemy warships near the port of Chemulpo (Korea). In an unequal battle, cruiser commander V.F. Rudnev ordered to leave the ship; "Varyag" was sunk, and "Koreets" was blown up. The flagship battleship "Petropavlovsk" ran into a mine in battle: Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov, his staff (281 people) and V.V. Vereshchagin A series of defeats of the Russian army in unequal battles near the town of Tyurenchen → rus. troops retreated to Laoliang Japan captured the port of Dalniy (Liaodong Peninsula) - a springboard for operations against Port Arthur Beginning of the Japanese siege of Port Arthur. Rus. military base defended for 7 months under the leadership of General R.I. Kondratenko, having withstood 4 assaults The Russian fleet, which tried to break through to Vladivostok, is defeated Japan launched a forced attack on Port Arthur, but met stubborn resistance → cessation of the assault, siege of the fortress. Liaoyang battle: three Japanese armies attacked the Rus. position, but faced fierce resistance and suffered heavy losses. Commander of the Manchurian army A.N. Kuropatkin, reinsured, decided to retreat north to Mukden. Fights on the Shankh River (heavy losses on both sides) an attempt by the land army to help the besieged Port Arthur → The battle on the Shakh River ended unsuccessfully The 2nd Pacific squadron left the Baltic port of Libava under the command of Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky to the rescue of Port Arthur (she had to go around Africa) Capitulation of Port Arthur (Surrendered by General A.M. Stessel, despite the decision of the Fortress Defense Council to continue resistance) Fighting near Mukden → threat of complete encirclement рус. army → order (February 22) of Kuropatkin about the immediate encirclement The Japanese occupied Mukden Tsushima battle: the Japanese fleet, which had superiority in strength, artillery and speed, defeated the 2nd Pacific squadron Landing of two Japanese divisions on about. Sakhalin → the unequal struggle of the militias from hard labor lasted two months - evacuation of troops of both countries from Manchuria; - refusal of Russia from claims; - the right to fish along the Russian shores.

The Russo-Japanese War arose from the ambition to carry out the expansion of Manchuria and Korea. The parties were preparing for war, realizing that sooner or later they would go to battles in order to resolve the “Far Eastern issue” between the countries.

Causes of the war

The main reason for the war was the clash of the colonial interests of Japan, which dominated the region, and Russia, which claimed to be a world power.

After the "Meiji Revolution" in the Empire of the Rising Sun, Westernization proceeded at an accelerated pace, and at the same time, Japan increasingly grew territorially and politically in its region. Having won the war with China in 1894-1895, Japan received part of Manchuria and Taiwan, and also tried to turn economically backward Korea into its colony.

In Russia, in 1894, Nicholas II ascended the throne, whose authority among the people after Khodynka was not at its best. He needed a "small victorious war" to win back the love of the people. There were no states in Europe where he could easily win, and Japan, with its ambitions, was ideally suited for this role.

The Liaodong Peninsula was leased from China, a naval base was built in Port Arthur, and a railway line was built to the city. Attempts through negotiations to delimit spheres of influence with Japan did not produce results. It was clear that it was going to war.

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Plans and tasks of the parties

At the beginning of the 20th century, Russia had a powerful land army, but its main forces were stationed west of the Urals. Directly in the proposed theater of operations was a small Pacific Fleet and about 100,000 soldiers.

The Japanese fleet was built with the help of the British, and training was also carried out under the guidance of European specialists. The Japanese army was about 375,000 fighters.

The Russian troops developed a plan for a defensive war before the imminent transfer of additional military units from the European part of Russia. After creating a numerical superiority, the army had to go on the offensive. Admiral E. I. Alekseev was appointed commander-in-chief. The commander of the Manchurian army, General A.N. Kuropatkin, and vice-admiral S.O. Makarov, who assumed the post in February 1904, were subordinate to him.

The Japanese headquarters hoped to use the advantage in manpower to eliminate the Russian naval base in Port Arthur and transfer military operations to Russian territory.

The course of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905.

Hostilities began on January 27, 1904. The Japanese squadron attacked the Russian Pacific Fleet, which was stationed without much protection on the Port Arthur roadstead.

On the same day, the cruiser Varyag and the gunboat Koreets were attacked in the port of Chemulpo. The ships refused to surrender and took up battle against 14 Japanese ships. The enemy paid tribute to the heroes who accomplished the feat and refused to give up their ship to the delight of the enemies.

Rice. 1. The death of the cruiser Varyag.

The attack on Russian ships stirred up the broad masses of the people, in which even before that “hat-captive” moods were formed. Processions were held in many cities, even the opposition ceased its activities for the duration of the war.

In February-March 1904, the army of General Kuroka landed in Korea. The Russian army met her in Manchuria with the task of delaying the enemy without accepting a pitched battle. However, on April 18, in the battle of Tyurechen, the eastern part of the army was defeated and there was a threat of encirclement of the Russian army by the Japanese. Meanwhile, the Japanese, having an advantage at sea, carried out the transfer of military forces to the mainland and besieged Port Arthur.

Rice. 2. Poster The enemy is terrible, but God is merciful.

The first Pacific squadron, blockaded in Port Arthur, took the battle three times, but Admiral Togo did not accept the pitched battle. He was probably afraid of Vice Admiral Makarov, who was the first to use the new tactics of waging a naval battle "stick over T".

A great tragedy for Russian sailors was the death of Vice Admiral Makarov. His ship hit a mine. After the death of the commander, the First Pacific Squadron ceased to lead active actions on the sea.

Soon the Japanese managed to pull large artillery under the city and bring up fresh forces in the amount of 50,000 people. The last hope was the Manchurian army, which could lift the siege. In August 1904, she was defeated at the battle of Liaoyang, and it looked quite real. The Kuban Cossacks posed a great threat to the Japanese army. Their constant attacks and fearless participation in battles harmed communications and manpower.

The Japanese command began to talk about the impossibility to continue the war. If the Russian army went on the offensive, it would have happened, but Commander Kropotkin gave an absolutely stupid order to retreat. The Russian army had many chances to develop the offensive and win the general battle, but Kropotkin retreated every time, giving the enemy time to regroup.

In December 1904, the commander of the fortress, R. I. Kondratenko, died and, contrary to the opinion of soldiers and officers, Port Arthur was surrendered.

In the company of 1905, the Japanese outstripped the Russian offensive, inflicting a defeat on them at Mukden. Public sentiment began to express dissatisfaction with the war, unrest began.

Rice. 3. Battle of Mukden.

In May 1905, the Second and Third Pacific Squadrons formed in St. Petersburg entered the waters of Japan. During the Battle of Tsushima, both squadrons were destroyed. The Japanese used new types of shells filled with "shimosa", melting the side of the ship, and not piercing it.

After this battle, the participants in the war decided to sit down at the negotiating table.

Summing up, we will summarize in the table “Events and dates of the Russo-Japanese War”, noting which battles took place in the Russo-Japanese War.

The last defeats of the Russian troops had grave consequences, resulting in the First Russian Revolution. It is not in the chronological table, but it was this factor that provoked the signing of peace against Japan, exhausted by the war.

Results

During the war years in Russia, a huge number of Money. Embezzlement in the Far East flourished, which created problems with the supply of the army. In the American city of Portsmouth, through the mediation of US President T. Roosevelt, a peace treaty was signed, according to which Russia transferred southern Sakhalin and Port Arthur to Japan. Russia also recognized Japan's dominance in Korea.

The defeat of Russia in the war was of great importance for the future political system in Russia, where the power of the emperor will be limited for the first time in several hundred years.

What have we learned?

Speaking briefly about the Russo-Japanese War, it should be noted that if Nicholas II had recognized Korea for the Japanese, there would have been no war. However, the race for colonies gave rise to a clash between the two countries, although back in the 19th century, the attitude towards the Russians among the Japanese was generally more positive than towards many other Europeans.

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