Weapons of USSR soldiers during the Great Patriotic War. Ampulomet. Forgotten WWII weapons? WWII small arms ammunition
Here's a small illustration:
Let's say I read in a 12-volume book (which usually exaggerates the strength of the Germans and satellites opposing us) that by the beginning of 1944 on the Soviet-German front the ratio of forces in artillery guns and mortars was 1.7: 1 (95,604 Soviet versus 54,570 enemy). More than one and a half overall superiority. That is, in active areas it could be up to three times (for example, in the Belarusian operation, 29,000 Soviets against 10,000 enemy). Does this mean that the enemy could not raise his head under hurricane fire Soviet artillery? No, artillery piece it's just a tool for expending shells. There are no shells - and the gun is a useless toy. And providing shells is precisely a logistics task.
In 2009, on VIF, Isaev posted a comparison of ammunition consumption of Soviet and German artillery (1942: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/1718/1718985.htm, 1943: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/ forum/0/archive/1706/1706490.htm, 1944: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/1733/1733134.htm, 1945: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/ 0/archive/1733/1733171.htm). I collected everything in a table, supplemented it with rocket artillery, for the Germans I added from Hanna the consumption of captured calibers (often it gives a non-negligible addition) and the consumption of tank calibers for comparability - in Soviet figures, tank calibers (20-mm ShVAK and 85-mm non-aircraft) are present. Posted it. Well, I grouped it a little differently. It turns out to be quite interesting. Despite the superiority of Soviet artillery in the number of barrels, the Germans fired more shells in pieces, if we take artillery calibers (i.e. guns 75 mm and above, without anti-aircraft):
USSR Germany 1942 37,983,800 45,261,822 1943 82,125,480 69,928,496 1944 98,564,568 113,663,900
If we convert into tons, the superiority is even more noticeable:
USSR Germany 1942 446,113 709,957 1943 828,193 1,121,545 1944 1,000,962 1,540,933
Tons here are taken by the weight of the projectile, not the shot. That is, the weight of metal and explosives falling directly on the head of the opposing party. Let me note that I did not count armor-piercing shells from tanks and tanks as Germans. anti-tank guns(I hope it's clear why). It is not possible to exclude them on the Soviet side, but judging by the Germans, the amendment will be insignificant. In Germany, consumption is given on all fronts, which begins to play a role in 1944.
IN Soviet army On average, 3.6-3.8 shells were fired per day onto the barrel of a gun from 76.2 mm and above in the active army (without RGK). The figure is quite stable both by year and by caliber: in 1944 the average daily round for all calibers was 3.6 per barrel, for a 122 mm howitzer - 3.0, for 76.2 mm barrels (regimental, divisional, tank) - 3.7. On the contrary, the average daily fire per mortar barrel increases year by year: from 2.0 in 1942 to 4.1 in 1944.
Regarding the Germans, I do not have any guns in the active army. But if we take the general availability of guns, then the average daily round per barrel of 75 mm caliber and higher in 1944 will be about 8.5. At the same time, the main workhorse of divisional artillery (105-mm howitzers - almost a third of the total tonnage of shells) fired an average of 14.5 shells per barrel per day, and the second main caliber (150-mm divisional howitzers - 20% of the total tonnage) fired approximately 10. 7. Mortars were used much less intensively - 81 mm mortars fired 4.4 rounds per barrel per day, and 120 mm only 2.3. The regimental artillery guns gave a consumption closer to average (75 mm infantry gun 7 shells per barrel, 150 mm infantry gun - 8.3).
Another instructive metric is the consumption of shells per division.
The division was the main organizational building block, but typically divisions achieved reinforcement in units. It would be interesting to see how the middle division was supported in terms of firepower. In 1942-44, the USSR had approximately 500 estimated divisions in the active army (without RGK) (weighted average number: 1942 - 425 divisions, 1943 - 494 divisions, 1944 - 510 divisions). IN ground forces ah, the active army was approximately 5.5 million, that is, there were approximately 11 thousand people per division. This “had to” naturally, taking into account both the composition of the division itself and all the reinforcement and support units that worked for it both directly and in the rear.
For the Germans, the average number of troops per division of the Eastern Front, calculated in the same way, decreased from 16,000 in 1943 to 13,800 in 1944, approximately 1.45-1.25 times “thicker” than the Soviet one. Moreover, the average daily fire for a Soviet division in 1944 was about 5.4 tons (1942 - 2.9; 1943 - 4.6), and for a German division it was three times more (16.2 tons). If we count 10,000 people in the active army, then on the Soviet side, 5 tons of ammunition were spent per day to support their actions in 1944, and 13.8 tons on the German side.
The American division in the European theater of operations stands out even more in this sense. It had three times more people than the Soviet one: 34,000 (this does not include Supply Command troops), and the daily ammunition consumption was almost ten times more (52.3 tons). Or 15.4 tons per day for 10,000 people, that is, more than three times more than in the Red Army.
In this sense, it was the Americans who implemented Joseph Vissarionovich’s recommendation to “fight with little blood but with a lot of shells.” You can compare - in June 1944, the distance to the Elbe was approximately the same from Omaha Beach and from Vitebsk. The Russians and Americans also reached the Elbe at about the same time. That is, they provided themselves with the same speed of advancement. However, the Americans along this route spent 15 tons per day per 10,000 personnel and lost an average of 3.8% of troops per month killed, wounded, captured and missing. Soviet troops moving at the same speed, they spent (specifically) three times less shells, but they also lost 8.5% per month. Those. speed was ensured by the expenditure of manpower.
It is also interesting to look at the distribution of weight consumption of ammunition by type of gun:
Let me remind you that all the figures here are for artillery 75 mm and above, that is, without anti-aircraft guns, without 50 mm mortars, without battalion/anti-tank guns with a caliber from 28 to 57 mm. Infantry guns include German guns with this name, Soviet 76 mm regiments and an American 75 mm howitzer. Other guns weighing less than 8 tons in firing position are counted as field guns. At the upper limit this includes systems such as the Soviet 152 mm howitzer-cannon ML-20 and the German s.FH 18. Heavier guns such as the Soviet 203 mm howitzer B-4, the American 203 mm howitzer M1 or the German 210- mm mortar, as well as the 152-155-170 mm long-range guns on their carriages fall into the next class - heavy and long-range artillery.
It can be seen that in the Red Army the lion's share of fire falls on mortars and regimental guns, i.e. to fire in the near tactical zone. Heavy artillery plays a very minor role (more in 1945, but not much). In field artillery, the effort (based on the weight of the shells fired) is approximately evenly distributed between the 76 mm gun, 122 mm howitzer and 152 mm howitzer/howitzer-gun. Which leads to the fact that the average weight of a Soviet projectile is one and a half times less than a German one.
In addition, it should be noted that the further away the target, the less covered (on average) it is. In the near tactical zone, most targets are dug in/covered in one way or another, while in the depths such unsheltered targets appear as moving reserves, enemy troops in gathering places, headquarters locations, etc. In other words, a projectile hitting a target in depth on average causes more damage than a projectile fired along the front edge (on the other hand, the dispersion of projectiles at long distances is higher).
Then, if the enemy has parity in the weight of the fired shells, but at the same time holds twice as much at the front less people, thereby giving us half as many targets for our artillery.
All this works for the observed loss ratio.
(Like an extended commentary on
Universal low-ballistic rifle system for close combat of Red Army infantry units
The available information about the ampoulo-throwers of the Red Army is extremely scarce and is mainly based on a couple of paragraphs from the memoirs of one of the defenders of Leningrad, a description of the design in the manual for the use of ampoulo-throwers, as well as some conclusions and common speculations of modern search engines and diggers. Meanwhile, in the museum of the capital's Iskra plant named after I.I. For a long time, Kartukov’s amazingly high-quality view series of photographs from front-line years lay as a dead weight. The text documents to it are obviously buried in the depths of the archive of economics (or scientific and technical documentation) and are still waiting for their researchers. So, when working on the publication, I had to summarize only known data and analyze references and images.
Existing concept“ampulomet” in relation to the combat system developed in the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War does not reveal all the capabilities and tactical advantages of this weapon. Moreover, all available information relates only, so to speak, to the late period of serial ampulets. In fact, this “pipe on a machine” was capable of throwing not only ampoules from a tin or bottle glass, but also more serious ammunition. And the creators of this simple and unpretentious weapon, the production of which was possible almost “on the knee,” undoubtedly deserve much more respect.
The simplest mortar
In the flamethrower weapon system of the ground forces of the Red Army, the ampulomet occupied an intermediate position between backpack or mounted flamethrowers, firing at short distances with a jet of liquid fire mixture, and field artillery (barrel and rocket), which occasionally used incendiary shells with solid incendiary mixtures such as military thermite at full firing range brand 6. According to the developers (and not the customer’s requirements), the ampoule gun was mainly (as in the document) intended to combat tanks, armored trains, armored vehicles and fortified enemy firing points by firing at them with any ammunition of a suitable caliber.
An experimental 125-mm ampulomet during factory testing in 1940.
The opinion that the ampoule gun is a purely Leningrad invention is obviously based on the fact that this type of weapon was also produced in besieged Leningrad, and one of its samples is on display at the State Memorial Museum of the Defense and Siege of Leningrad. However, ampoules were developed (as, indeed, infantry flamethrowers) in the pre-war years in Moscow in the experimental design department of plant No. 145 named after SM. Kirov ( chief designer plant - I.I. Kartukov), which is under the authority of the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry of the USSR. Unfortunately, I do not know the names of the designers of the ampulettes.
Transportation of an experimental 125-mm ampoule gun in the summer when changing the firing position.
It is documented that with ammunition from ampoules, the 125-mm ampoule gun passed field and military tests in 1941 and was adopted by the Red Army. The description of the design of the ampulomet given on the Internet was borrowed from the manual and only in general outline corresponds to pre-war prototypes: “The ampulomet consists of a barrel with a chamber, a bolt, a firing device, sighting devices and a carriage with a fork.” In the version we added, the barrel of the serial ampulomet was a solid-drawn steel pipe made from Mannesmann rolled steel with an internal diameter of 127 mm, or rolled up from a 2-mm iron sheet, plugged in the breech. The barrel of the standard ampoule gun rested freely with trunnions on the lugs in the fork of the wheeled (summer) or ski (winter) machine. There were no horizontal or vertical aiming mechanisms.
The experimental 125-mm ampoule gun had a rifle-type bolt in the chamber that locked a blank cartridge from a 12-gauge hunting rifle with a folder sleeve and a 15-gram sample of black powder. The firing mechanism was released by pressing the trigger lever with the thumb of the left hand (forward or down - there were different options), located near the handles, similar to those used on heavy machine guns and welded to the breech of the ampulet.
125-mm ampoule gun in a combat position.
In the serial ampoule gun, the firing mechanism was simplified due to the manufacture of many parts by stamping, and the trigger lever was moved under thumb right hand. Moreover, the handles in mass production were replaced with steel pipes, curved like ram's horns, structurally combining them with a piston bolt. That is, now to load the bolt, turn both handles all the way to the left and pull it towards you with support on the tray. The entire breech with handles moved along the slots in the tray to the rearmost position, completely removing the spent cartridge case of the 12-gauge cartridge.
The sighting devices of the ampulomet consisted of a front sight and a folding sight post. The latter was designed for shooting at four fixed distances (apparently from 50 to 100 m), indicated by holes. And the vertical slot between them made it possible to shoot at intermediate ranges.
The photographs show that a crudely made wheeled machine welded from steel pipes and an angle profile was used on the experimental version of the ampulomet. It would be more correct to consider it a laboratory stand. For the ampulomet machine proposed for service, all the parts were more carefully finished and equipped with all the attributes necessary for use in the army: handles, openers, slats, brackets, etc. However, the wheels (rollers) on both the experimental and production samples were provided with monolithic wooden , upholstered with a metal strip along the generatrix and with a metal bushing as a sliding bearing in the axial hole.
In the St. Petersburg, Volgograd and Arkhangelsk museums there are later versions of a factory-produced ampulomet on a simplified, lightweight, wheelless, non-folding machine with a support of two pipes, or without a machine at all. Tripods made of steel rods, wooden blocks or oak crosses as carriages were adapted to ampoules already in war time.
The manual mentions that the ammunition carried by the crew of the ampoule gun consisted of 10 ampoules and 12 expelling cartridges. On the machine of the pre-production version of the ampoule gun, the developers proposed installing two easily removable tin boxes with a capacity of eight ampoules each in the transport position. One of the fighters apparently carried two dozen rounds of ammunition in a standard hunting bandoleer. At the combat position, the boxes with ammunition were quickly removed and placed in a shelter.
The barrel of the pre-production version of the ampoule gun had two welded swivels for carrying it on a belt over the shoulder. Serial samples were devoid of any “architectural frills”, and the barrel was carried on the shoulder. Many people note the presence of a metal divider grille inside the barrel, in its breech. This was not the case on the prototype. Obviously, the grid was needed to prevent the cardboard and felt wad from hitting the glass ampoule with a blank cartridge. In addition, it limited the movement of the ampoule into the breech of the barrel until it stops, since the serial 125-mm ampoule gun had a chamber in this place. The factory data and characteristics of the 125 mm ampoule gun differ somewhat from those given in the descriptions and instructions for use.
Drawing of a serial 125-mm ampoule gun, proposed for mass production in 1940.
A 125-mm ampoule filled with self-igniting KS liquid ruptures in the target area.
Stock finished products workshop for the production of ampoules at plant No. 455 NKAP in 1942
Incendiary ampoules
As indicated in the documents, the main ammunition for the ampoules were aviation tin ampoules AZh-2 of 125 mm caliber, filled with a self-igniting type of condensed kerosene of the KS brand. The first spherical tin ampoules went into mass production in 1936. At the end of the 1930s. their improvement was also carried out at the OKO of the 145th plant (in the evacuation this is OKB-NKAL of plant No. 455). In factory documents they were called aviation liquid ampoules AZh-2. But still right
it would be more accurate to call the ampoules tin, since the Red Army Air Force planned to gradually replace the AK-1 glass ampoules with them, which had been in service since the early 1930s. like chemical munitions.
There have been constant complaints about glass ampoules that they are allegedly fragile, and if they break prematurely, they can poison both the aircraft crew and ground personnel with their contents. Meanwhile, mutually exclusive requirements were imposed on the glass of ampoules - strength in handling and fragility during use. The first, naturally, prevailed, and some of them, with a wall thickness of 10 mm, even when bombed from a height of 1000 m (depending on the density of the soil) gave a very large percentage of those that did not crash. Theoretically, their thin-walled tin analogues could solve the problem. As tests later showed, the aviators' hopes for this were also not fully justified.
This feature most likely manifested itself when firing from an ampoule gun, especially along flat trajectories at short range. Please note that the recommended type of targets for the 125-mm ampoule gun also consists entirely of objects with strong walls. In the 1930s gt. Aviation tin ampoules were made by stamping two hemispheres from thin brass 0.35 mm thick. Apparently, since 1937 (with the beginning of austerity of non-ferrous metals in the production of ammunition), their transfer to tinplate with a thickness of 0.2-0.3 mm began.
The configuration of parts for the production of tin ampoules varied greatly. In 1936, at the 145th plant, the Ofitserov-Kokoreva design was proposed for the manufacture of AZh-2 from four spherical segments with two options for rolling the edges of parts. In 1937, production even consisted of AZh-2, consisting of a hemisphere with a filler neck and a second hemisphere of four spherical segments.
At the beginning of 1941, in connection with the expected transfer of the economy to a special period, technologies for the production of AZh-2 from black tin (thin rolled 0.5 mm decapitated iron) were tested. From mid-1941, these technologies had to be taken full advantage of. When stamped, black tin was not as ductile as white or brass, and deep drawing of steel complicated production, so at the beginning of the war, AZh-2 could be made from 3-4 parts (spherical segments or belts, as well as their various combinations with hemispheres).
Below: experimental AZ-2 ampoules with additional fuses. Photo 1942
Soldering the seams of products made of black tin in the presence of special fluxes then also turned out to be quite an expensive pleasure, and the method of welding thin steel sheets with a continuous seam was taught by Academician E.O. Paton introduced ammunition production only a year later. Therefore, in 1941, parts of the AZh-2 hulls began to be joined by rolling the edges and recessing the seam flush with the contour of the sphere. By the way, before the birth of ampoules, the filling necks of metal ampoules were soldered on the outside (for use in aviation this was not so important), but since 1940 the necks began to be attached inside. This made it possible to avoid different types of ammunition for use in aviation and ground forces.
The filling of ampoules AZh-2KS, the so-called “Russian napalm” - condensed kerosene KS - was developed in 1938 by A.P. Ionov in one of the capital’s research institutes with the assistance of chemists V.V. Zemskova, L.F. Shevelkin and A.V. Yasnitskaya. In 1939, he completed the development of technology for the industrial production of powdered thickener OP-2. How the incendiary mixture acquired the properties of instantly self-igniting in air remains unknown. I’m not sure that the trivial addition of white phosphorus granules to a thick petroleum-based incendiary mixture here would guarantee their self-ignition. In general, be that as it may, already in the spring of 1941, during factory and field tests, the 125-mm AZH-2KS ampoule gun worked normally without fuses and intermediate igniters.
According to the original plan, the AZh-2s were intended to infect the area with persistent toxic substances from aircraft, as well as to defeat manpower with persistent and unstable toxic substances, and later (when used with liquid fire mixtures) - to ignite and smoke tanks, ships and firing points. Meanwhile, the use of chemical warfare agents in ampoules against the enemy was not excluded by using them from ampoules. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the incendiary purpose of ammunition was supplemented by the smoking of manpower from field forts.
In 1943, to guarantee the operation of the AZH-2SOV or AZH-2NOV during bombing from any height and at any carrier speed, the developers of the ampoules supplemented their designs with fuses made of thermosetting plastic (resistant to the acid base of toxic substances). According to the developers, such modified ammunition affected manpower as if it were chemical fragmentation ammunition.
Ampoule fuses UVUD (universal impact fuse) belonged to the category of all-destructive fuses, i.e. worked even when the ampoules fell sideways. Structurally, they were similar to those used on aviation smoke bombs ADS, but it was no longer possible to fire such ampoules from ampoules: due to overloads, a non-safety type fuse could go off right in the barrel. During the war period and for incendiary ampoules, the Air Force sometimes used cases with fuses or with plugs instead.
In 1943-1944. AZH-2SOV or NOV ampoules, intended for long-term storage in equipped condition, have been tested. For this purpose, their bodies were coated inside with bakelite resin. Thus, the resistance of the metal case to mechanical stress increased even more, and fuses were mandatory installed on such ammunition.
Today, at the sites of past battles, “diggers” can come across only AK-1 or AU-125 (AK-2 or AU-260 - extremely rare exotic) glass ampoules in good condition. The thin-walled tin ampoules were almost all decayed. You should not try to discharge glass ampoules if you can see that there is liquid inside. White or yellowish cloudy - this is KS, which has not at all lost its properties for self-ignition in air even after 60 years. Transparent or translucent sediment with yellow large crystals is SOV or NOV. In glass containers combat properties can also persist for a very long time.
Ampoules in battle
On the eve of the war, units of backpack flamethrowers (flamethrower teams) were organizationally part of rifle regiments. However, due to the difficulties of using them in defense (extremely short flamethrowing range and the unmasking features of the ROKS-2 backpack flamethrower), they were disbanded. Instead, in November 1941, teams and companies were created, armed with ampoules and rifle mortars to throw metal and glass ampoules and Molotov cocktails at tanks and other targets. But, according to the official version, the ampoules also had significant shortcomings, and at the end of 1942 they were removed from service.
There was no mention of abandoning rifle-bottle mortars. Probably, for some reason they did not have the disadvantages of ampoules. Moreover, in other units of the Red Army rifle regiments, it was proposed to throw bottles with COP at tanks exclusively by hand. The bottle throwers of the flamethrower teams were obviously revealed a terrible military secret: how to use the sighting bar of a Mosin rifle to accurately fire a bottle at a given distance, determined by eye. As I understand it, there was simply no time to teach the rest of the illiterate infantrymen this “tricky business.” Therefore, they themselves adapted a three-inch cartridge case to the cut of a rifle barrel and themselves “outside school hours” learned how to accurately throw bottles.
When encountering a solid barrier, the body of the AZh-2KS ampoule burst, as a rule, at the solder seams, the incendiary mixture splashed out and ignited in air, forming a thick white
th smoke. The combustion temperature of the mixture reached 800°C, which, when it came into contact with clothing and open areas of the body, caused a lot of trouble for the enemy. No less unpleasant was the meeting of the sticky CS with armored vehicles - from changes in the physical and chemical properties of the metal when locally heated to such a temperature and ending with the inevitable fire in the engine-transmission compartment of carburetor (and diesel) tanks. It was impossible to clean the burning CS from the armor - all that was required was to cut off the air supply. However, the presence of a self-igniting additive in the combustor did not exclude spontaneous combustion of the mixture again.
Here are a few excerpts from combat reports from the times of the Great Patriotic War, published on the Internet: “We also used ampoules. From an inclined tube mounted on a sled, a shot of a blank cartridge ejected a glass ampoule with a flammable mixture. It flew along a steep trajectory at a distance of up to 300-350 m. Breaking as it fell, the ampoule created a small but stable fire, striking enemy personnel and setting fire to their dugouts. The combined ampoule-throwing company under the command of Senior Lieutenant Starkov, which included 17 crews, fired 1,620 ampoules during the first two hours.” “The ampoule throwers came here. Acting under infantry cover, they set fire to an enemy tank, two guns and several firing points.”
By the way, intensive shooting with black powder cartridges inevitably created a thick layer of soot on the walls of the barrel. So after a quarter of an hour of such a cannonade, the ampoule throwers would probably have discovered that the ampoule was being rolled into the barrel with increasing difficulty. Theoretically, before this, carbon deposits, on the contrary, would somewhat improve the sealing of the ampoules in the barrel, increasing their firing range. However, the usual range marks on the sight rail have probably “floated”. Banners and other tools and devices for cleaning the barrels of ampoules were probably mentioned in the technical description...
But here is a completely objective opinion of our contemporaries: “The crew of the ampulomet consisted of three people. Loading was carried out by two people: the first crew number inserted the ejector cartridge from the treasury, the second put the ampoule itself into the barrel from the muzzle.” “Ampulometres were very simple and cheap “flame-throwing mortars”; special ampoule-thrower platoons were armed with them. The 1942 infantry combat manual mentions the ampoule gun as a standard infantry fire weapon. In battle, the ampoule gun often served as the core of a group of tank destroyers. Its use in defense generally justified itself, but attempts to use it offensively led to large losses of crews due to the short firing range. True, they were used not without success by assault groups in urban battles - in particular, in Stalingrad.”
There are also memories of veterans. The essence of one of them comes down to the fact that at the beginning of December 1941, on the Western Front in one of the battalions of the 30th Army, Major General D.D. 20 ampoules were delivered to Lelyushenko. The designer of this weapon came here, as well as the army commander himself, who decided to personally try it out. new technology. In response to the comments of the designer on loading the ampulomet, Lelyushenko grumbled that everything was cunning and time-consuming, but german tank will not wait... At the very first shot, the ampoule broke in the barrel of the ampoule gun, and the entire installation burned down. Lelyushenko, already with metal in his voice, demanded a second ampoule. Everything happened again. The general “got angry”, switching to profanity, forbade the soldiers to use weapons that were so unsafe for crews, and crushed the remaining ampoules with the tank.
Using ARS-203 to fill AZ-2 ampoules with chemical warfare agents. A fighter bending down pumps out excess liquid, and standing near a tripod installs plugs on the filler necks of the AZh-2. Photo 1938
Quite a plausible story, although not very pleasant in the overall context. It’s as if the ampoules never went through factory and field tests... Why could this happen? As a version: the winter of 1941 (all eyewitnesses mentioned this) was very frosty, and the glass ampoule became more fragile. Here, unfortunately, the respected veteran did not specify what material those ampoules were made of. The difference in temperature of thick-walled glass (local heating), which is burned when fired by the flame of the expelling gunpowder charge, can also have an effect. Obviously, in severe frost it was necessary to shoot only with metal ampoules. But “in the hearts” the general could easily ride through ampoules!
Filling station ARS-203. Photo 1938
Front-line fire cocktail
It is only at first glance that the scheme for using an ampoule gun in the army seems primitively simple. For example, the crew of the ampulo gun at the combat position shot off the portable ammunition and dragged in the second ammunition... What’s easier - take it and shoot. Look, Senior Lieutenant Starkov’s two-hour unit consumption exceeded one and a half thousand ampoules! But in fact, when organizing the supply of incendiary ampoules to troops, it was necessary to solve the problem of transporting incendiary ammunition, which was far from safe to handle, over long distances from factories deep in the rear.
Tests of the ampoules in the pre-war period showed that these ammunition, when fully equipped, can withstand transportation no further than 200 km on peacetime roads in compliance with all rules and with the complete exception of “road adventures”. In wartime, everything became much more complicated. But here, without a doubt, the experience of Soviet aviators, where ampoules were equipped at airfields, came in handy. Before the mechanization of the process, filling ampoules, taking into account the unscrewing and tightening of the fitting plug, required 2 man-hours per 100 pieces.
In 1938, for the Red Army Air Force at the 145th NKAP plant, a towed aviation filling station ARS-203, mounted on a single-axle semi-trailer, was developed and later put into service. A year later, the self-propelled ARS-204 also entered service, but it was focused on servicing aircraft jet devices, and we will not consider it. ARSs were mainly intended for pouring chemical warfare agents into ammunition and isolated tanks, but they turned out to be simply irreplaceable for working with ready-made self-igniting incendiary mixtures.
In theory, in the rear of each rifle regiment there should have been a small unit working to equip ampoules with a mixture of KS. Without a doubt, it had the ARS-203 station. But the CS was also not transported in barrels from factories, but was prepared on site. To do this, in the front-line zone they used any petroleum distillation products (gasoline, kerosene, diesel fuel) and according to the tables compiled by A.P. Ionov, different amounts of thickener were added to them. As a result, despite the difference in the initial components, a CS was obtained. Next, it was obviously pumped into the ARS-203 tank, where the self-ignition component of the fire mixture was added.
However, the option of adding the component directly to the ampoules and then pouring the CS liquid into them cannot be ruled out. In this case, the ARS-203, in general, was not so necessary. And an ordinary soldier’s aluminum mug could serve as a dispenser. But such an algorithm required that the self-igniting component be inert for some time in the open air (for example, wet white phosphorus).
ARS-203 was specially designed to mechanize the process of loading AZH-2 ampoules to a working volume of field conditions. On it, liquid was first poured simultaneously from a large reservoir into eight measuring cups, and then eight ampoules were filled at once. Thus, in an hour it was possible to fill 300-350 ampoules, and after two hours of such work, the station’s 700-liter tank was emptied, and it was refilled with KS liquid. It was impossible to speed up the process of filling ampoules: all liquids flowed naturally, without pressurizing the container. The filling cycle for eight ampoules was 17-22 s, and 610 liters were pumped into the station’s working capacity using a Garda pump in 7.5-9 minutes.
The PRS station is ready to refill four AZH-2 ampoules. The pedal is pressed and the process has begun! Refilling incendiary mixtures made it possible to do without a gas mask. Photo 1942
Obviously, the experience of operating the ARS-203 in the ground forces was unexpected: the performance of the station, focused on the needs of the Air Force, was considered excessive, as, indeed, were its dimensions, weight and the need for towing by a separate vehicle. The infantry needed something smaller, and in 1942, the OKB-NKAP of the 455th Kartukov plant developed a PRS field filling station. In its design, measuring cups were abolished, and the filling level of opaque ampoules was controlled using a Glass SIG-an extremely simplified version of the PRS nasal tube. for use in the field. The capacity of the working re-
the tank was 107 liters, and the mass of the entire station did not exceed 95 kg. The PRS was designed in a “civilized” version of the workplace on a folding table and in an extremely simplified version, with the installation of a working container “on stumps”. The station's productivity was limited to 240 AZH-2 ampoules per hour. Unfortunately, when the field tests of the PRS were completed, the ampoule guns had already been removed from service in the Red Army.
Russian reusable "faustpatron"?
However, it would not be entirely correct to unconditionally classify the 125-mm ampoule gun as an incendiary weapon. After all, no one dares to consider a barrel artillery system or Katyusha MLRS as flamethrowers, which also fired incendiary ammunition when necessary. By analogy with the use of aviation ampoules, the designers of the 145th plant proposed expanding the arsenal of ammunition for the ampoules by using modified Soviet anti-tank bombs PTAB-2.5 with cumulative action, created at the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War.
In the book by E. Pyryev and S. Reznichenko “Bomber weapons of Russian aviation 1912-1945.” the PTAB section states that small cumulative aerial bombs in the USSR were developed only in GSKB-47, TsKB-22 and SKB-35. From December 1942 to April 1943, they managed to design, test and fully develop a 1.5-kg PTAB with cumulative action. However, at the 145th plant I.I. Kartukov took up this problem much earlier, back in 1941. Their 2.5 kg ammunition was called the AFBM-125 aviation high-explosive armor-piercing mine of 125 mm caliber.
Outwardly, such a PTAB strongly resembled Colonel Gronov’s small-caliber high-explosive bombs from the First World War. Since the wings of the cylindrical tail were welded to the body of the aircraft ammunition by spot welding, it was not possible to simply replace its tail to use the mine in the infantry. The new mortar-type tail was installed on aerial bombs with an additional propellant charge built into it in the capsule. The ammunition was fired as before, with a blank 12-gauge rifle cartridge. Thus, when applied to the ampoule, the system was obtained at a certain degree of fBM. 125 without additional NI active-reactive. contact fuze fuse.
For quite a long time, designers had to work on improving the reliability of arming a contact mine fuse along a trajectory.
BFM-125 mine without an additional contact fuze fuse.
Meanwhile, the problem is the above-mentioned episode of 1941 with the commander of the 30th Army D.D. Lelyushenko could also occur when firing high-explosive armor-piercing mines FBM-125 of early models from ampoules. This is indirectly indicated by Lelyushenko’s grumbling: “Everything hurts cunningly and for a long time, the German tank will not wait,” since inserting an ampoule into a regular ampoule and loading the cartridge did not require any special wisdom. In the case of using the FBM-125, before firing the ammunition, it was necessary to unscrew the safety key, opening fire access to the powder pressing of the safety mechanism that holds the inertial firing pin of the contact fuse in the rear position. To do this, all such ammunition was equipped with a cardboard cheat sheet with the inscription “Unscrew before shooting,” tied to the key.
The cumulative recess in the front part of the mine was hemispherical, and its thin-walled steel lining rather formed a given configuration when filling explosives, rather than playing the role of an impact core during the accumulation of a combat charge of ammunition. The documents indicated that the FBM-125, when fired from standard ampoule guns, is intended to disable tanks, armored trains, armored vehicles, vehicles, as well as to destroy fortified firing points (DOTov.DZOTovipr.).
An armor plate 80 mm thick, confidently penetrated by an FBM-125 mine during field testing.
The nature of the exit hole of the same pierced armor plate.
Field tests of the ammunition took place in 1941. Their result was the launch of the mine into pilot serial production. Military tests of the FBM-125 were successfully completed in 1942. The developers proposed, if necessary, equipping such mines with combat chemicals irritating action (chloroacetophenone or adamsite), but it didn’t come to that. In parallel with the FBM-125, the OKB-NKAP of the 455th plant also developed the BFM-125 armor-piercing high-explosive mine. Unfortunately, its combat properties are not mentioned in the factory certificates.
Cover the infantry with smoke
In 1941, the product developed at plant No. 145 named after passed field tests. CM. Kirov aviation smoke bomb ADS. It was designed to set up vertical camouflage (blinding the enemy) and poisonous smoke (fettering and exhausting enemy combat forces) curtains when dropping bombs from an aircraft. On airplanes, ADS were loaded into ampoule-bomb cassettes, having previously removed the safety plugs of the fuses. Checkers poured out in one gulp when the doors of one of the sections of the cassette were opened. Ampoule bomb cassettes were also developed at the 145th plant for fighters, attack aircraft, long- and short-range bombers.
The contact-action checker fuse was already made with an all-shot mechanism, which ensured its operation when the ammunition fell to the ground in any position. The checker was protected from being triggered by an accidental fall by a fuse spring, which did not allow the striker to puncture the igniter capsule under insufficient overload (when dropped from a height of up to 4 m onto concrete).
It is probably no coincidence that this ammunition also turned out to be made in 125 mm caliber, which, according to the developers, made it possible to use ADS from standard ampoules. By the way, when fired from an ampoule gun, the ammunition received an overload much greater than when falling from 4 m, which means that the saber began to smoke already in flight.
Even in the pre-war years, it was scientifically proven that it is much more effective to cover your troops if, when attacking a firing point, you smoke it, and not your infantry. Thus, the ampoule launcher would turn out to be a very necessary thing when, before an attack, it was necessary to throw several checkers a couple of hundred meters to a bunker or bunker. Unfortunately, it is not known whether ampoules were used at the fronts in this version...
When firing heavy ADS bombs from a 125-mm ampoule gun, its sights could only be used with adjustments. However, great shooting accuracy was not required: one ADS created an invisible creeping cloud up to 100 m long. And since it can be adapted to ADS
an additional expulsion charge was not possible; to fire at the maximum distance it was necessary to use a steep trajectory at elevation angles close to 45°.
Regimental propaganda activities
The plot for this section of the article about the ampulomet was also borrowed from the Internet. Its essence was that one day the political officer, coming to the sappers in the battalion, asked who could make a propaganda mortar mine? Pavel Yakovlevich Ivanov volunteered. He found the tools at the site of a destroyed forge; he made the ammunition body from a piece of wood, adapting a small powder charge to break it in the air, the fuse is made from a fuse cord, and the stabilizer is made from tin cans. However, the wooden mine for the mortar turned out to be lightweight and fell into the barrel slowly, without piercing the primer.
Ivanov reduced its diameter so that the air came out of the barrel more freely, and the primer stopped getting onto the firing pin. In general, the craftsman did not sleep for days, but on the third day the mine flew and exploded. Leaflets swirled over the enemy trenches. Later, he adapted an ampoule gun to fire wooden mines. And in order not to provoke return fire on his trenches, he took it to the neutral zone or to the side. Result: German soldiers once came over to our side in a group, drunk, in broad daylight.
This story is also quite plausible. It is quite difficult to make an agitator in a metal case in the field using available means, but it is quite possible from wood. In addition, such ammunition, according to common sense, should be non-lethal. Otherwise, what kind of propaganda is this! But factory propaganda mines and artillery shells were in metal cases. To a greater extent, so that they fly further and so as not to greatly disturb the ballistics. However, before this, it never occurred to the designers of the ampoule gun to enrich the arsenal of their brainchild with this type of ammunition...
but charging, with a piston bolt. The firing mechanisms are similar in systems of both calibers.
The Ampulomet mounted mortars were not put into service. According to the classification of artillery systems, samples of both calibers can be classified as hard-type mortars. Theoretically, recoil forces when firing high-explosive armor-piercing mines should not have increased compared to throwing ampoules. The mass of the FBM was greater than that of the AZh-2KS, but less than that of the ADS. And the expelling charge is the same. However, despite the fact that the Ampulomet mortars fired along more flat trajectories than classic mortars and bomb throwers, the former were still much more “mortar-like” than the Katyusha guards mortars.
conclusions
So, the reason for the removal of ampoules from the arsenal of the Red Army ground forces at the end of 1942 was officially their unsafe handling and use. But in vain: ahead of our army awaited not only an offensive, but also numerous battles in populated areas. This is where they would be fully useful
100-mm easel anti-tank mortar in the process of loading.
By the way, the safety of using a backpack flamethrower in an offensive battle is also very questionable. Nevertheless, they were returned “to service” and used until the end of the war. There are front-line memories of a sniper, where he claims that the enemy flamethrower is always visible from afar (a number of unmasking signs), so it is better to target him at chest level. Then, from short distances, a bullet from a powerful rifle cartridge pierces right through both the body and the tank with the fire mixture. That is, the flamethrower and flamethrower “cannot be restored.”
The crew of the ampoule launcher could find themselves in exactly the same situation when bullets or shrapnel hit incendiary ampoules. Glass ampoules could generally be smashed against each other by a shock wave from a close rupture. And in general, the whole war is a very risky business... And thanks to the “hussarism of General Lelyushenko”, such hasty conclusions were born about the low quality and combat ineffectiveness of individual types of weapons. Remember, for example, the pre-war ordeals of the designers of the Katyusha MLRS, mortar weapons, submachine guns, the T-34 tank, etc. Our gun designers, in the overwhelming majority, were not amateurs in their field of knowledge and no less than generals sought to bring victory closer. And they were “dunked” like kittens. The generals are also not difficult to understand - they needed reliable weapons with “foolproof protection.”
And then, the warm memories of infantrymen about the effectiveness of Molotov cocktails against tanks against tanks look somehow illogical against the backdrop of a very cool attitude towards ampoules. Both are weapons of the same order. Except that the ampoule was exactly twice as powerful, and it could be thrown 10 times further. It is not entirely clear what the “infantry” had more complaints about: the ampoule itself or its ampoules?
External suspended non-resettable container ABK-P-500 for salvo use of small-caliber aerial bombs from high-speed and dive bombers. In the foreground are AZH-2KS ampoules made of four spherical segments with edges sealed from the inside.
One of the variants of a hand-held (non-tank) flamethrower developed by the designers of plant No. 145 of the NKAP during tests in 1942. At such a range, this “aerosol can” can only be used to tar hogs.
At the same time, the same “very dangerous” AZH-2KS ampoules remained in service in Soviet attack aviation at least until the end of 1944 - beginning of 1945 (in any case, the attack air regiment of M.P. Odintsov used them already in the German territory along tank columns hidden in the forests). And this is on attack aircraft! With unarmored bomb bays! When all the enemy infantry hits them from the ground with whatever they can find! The pilots were well aware of WHAT would happen if just one stray bullet hit a cassette with ampoules, but, nevertheless, they flew. By the way, the timid mention on the Internet that in aviation ampoules were used when firing from such aircraft ampoules is absolutely untrue.
By the end of the 30s, almost all participants in the coming world war had formed common directions in the development of small arms. The range and accuracy of the attack was reduced, which was compensated by the greater density of fire. As a consequence of this, the beginning of mass rearmament of units with automatic small arms - submachine guns, machine guns, assault rifles.
Accuracy of fire began to fade into the background, while the soldiers advancing in a chain began to be taught shooting on the move. With the advent airborne troops There was a need to create special lightweight weapons.
Maneuver warfare also affected machine guns: they became much lighter and more mobile. New types of small arms appeared (which was dictated, first of all, by the need to fight tanks) - rifle grenades, anti-tank rifles and RPGs with cumulative grenades.
Small arms of the USSR World War II
On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the rifle division of the Red Army was a very formidable force - about 14.5 thousand people. The main type of small arms were rifles and carbines - 10,420 pieces. The share of submachine guns was insignificant - 1204. There were 166, 392 and 33 units of heavy, light and anti-aircraft machine guns, respectively.
The division had its own artillery of 144 guns and 66 mortars. The firepower was supplemented by 16 tanks, 13 armored vehicles and a solid fleet of auxiliary vehicles.
Rifles and carbines
The main small arms of the USSR infantry units of the first period of the war was certainly the famous three-line rifle - the 7.62 mm S.I. Mosin rifle of the 1891 model, modernized in 1930. Its advantages are well known - strength, reliability, ease of maintenance, combined with good ballistics qualities, in particular, with an aiming range of 2 km. 
The three-line rifle is an ideal weapon for newly recruited soldiers, and the simplicity of the design created enormous opportunities for its mass production. But like any weapon, the three-line gun had its drawbacks. The permanently attached bayonet in combination with a long barrel (1670 mm) created inconvenience when moving, especially in wooded areas. The bolt handle caused serious complaints when reloading.
On its basis it was created sniper rifle and a series of carbines of the 1938 and 1944 model. Fate gave the three-line a long life (the last three-line was released in 1965), participation in many wars and an astronomical “circulation” of 37 million copies.
Sniper with a Mosin rifle (with a PE optical sight, model 1931)
The target range of the SVT-40 is up to 1 km. The SVT-40 served with honor on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. It was also appreciated by our opponents. Historical fact: Having captured rich trophies at the beginning of the war, among which there were many SVT-40s, the German army... adopted it for service, and the Finns created their own rifle on the basis of the SVT-40 - TaRaKo.
The creative development of the ideas implemented in the SVT-40 became the AVT-40 automatic rifle. It differed from its predecessor in its ability to fire automatically at a rate of up to 25 rounds per minute. The disadvantage of the AVT-40 is its low accuracy of fire, strong unmasking flame and loud sound at the moment of firing. Subsequently, as automatic weapons entered the military en masse, they were removed from service.
Submachine guns
The Great Patriotic War was the time of the final transition from rifles to automatic weapons. The Red Army began to fight, armed with a small number of PPD-40 - a submachine gun designed by the outstanding Soviet designer Vasily Alekseevich Degtyarev. At that time, PPD-40 was in no way inferior to its domestic and foreign counterparts. 
Designed for a pistol cartridge cal. 7.62 x 25 mm, the PPD-40 had an impressive ammunition load of 71 rounds, housed in a drum-type magazine. Weighing about 4 kg, it fired at a rate of 800 rounds per minute with an effective range of up to 200 meters. However, just a few months after the start of the war it was replaced by the legendary PPSh-40 cal. 7.62 x 25 mm.
The creator of the PPSh-40, designer Georgy Semenovich Shpagin, was faced with the task of developing an extremely easy-to-use, reliable, technologically advanced, cheap to produce mass weapon. 
From its predecessor, the PPD-40, the PPSh inherited a drum magazine with 71 rounds. A little later, a simpler and more reliable sector horn magazine with 35 rounds was developed for it. The weight of the equipped machine guns (both versions) was 5.3 and 4.15 kg, respectively. The rate of fire of the PPSh-40 reached 900 rounds per minute with an aiming range of up to 300 meters and the ability to fire single shots.
To master the PPSh-40, a few lessons were enough. It could easily be disassembled into 5 parts made using stamping and welding technology, thanks to which during the war years the Soviet defense industry produced about 5.5 million machine guns.
In the summer of 1942, the young designer Alexey Sudaev presented his brainchild - a 7.62 mm submachine gun. It was strikingly different from its “bigger brothers” PPD and PPSh-40 in its rational layout, higher manufacturability and ease of manufacturing parts using arc welding. 
PPS-42 was 3.5 kg lighter and required three times less manufacturing time. However, despite its quite obvious advantages, it never became a mass weapon, leaving the PPSh-40 to take the lead.
By the beginning of the war, the DP-27 light machine gun (Degtyarev infantry, caliber 7.62mm) had been in service with the Red Army for almost 15 years, having the status of the main light machine gun infantry units. Its automation was powered by the energy of powder gases. The gas regulator reliably protected the mechanism from contamination and high temperatures.
The DP-27 could only fire automatically, but even a beginner needed a few days to master shooting in short bursts of 3-5 shots. Ammunition of 47 rounds was placed in a disk magazine with a bullet towards the center in one row. The magazine itself was mounted on top of the receiver. The weight of the unloaded machine gun was 8.5 kg. An equipped magazine increased it by almost another 3 kg.
It was powerful weapon with an aiming range of 1.5 km and a combat rate of fire of up to 150 rounds per minute. In the firing position, the machine gun rested on a bipod. A flame arrester was screwed onto the end of the barrel, significantly reducing its unmasking effect. The DP-27 was serviced by a gunner and his assistant. In total, about 800 thousand machine guns were produced.
Small arms of the Wehrmacht of World War II
Basic strategy German army- offensive or blitzkrieg (blitzkrieg - lightning war). A vital role it was assigned to large tank formations, carrying out deep breakthroughs of enemy defenses in cooperation with artillery and aviation.
Tank units bypassed powerful fortified areas, destroying control centers and rear communications, without which the enemy quickly lost their combat effectiveness. The defeat was completed by motorized units of the ground forces.
Small arms of the Wehrmacht infantry division
German state infantry division model 1940 assumed the presence of 12,609 rifles and carbines, 312 submachine guns (machine guns), light and heavy machine guns - 425 and 110 pieces, respectively, 90 anti-tank rifles and 3,600 pistols.Weapon The Wehrmacht generally met the high demands of wartime. It was reliable, trouble-free, simple, easy to manufacture and maintain, which contributed to its serial production.
Rifles, carbines, machine guns
Mauser 98K
Mauser 98K is an improved version of the Mauser 98 rifle, developed in late XIX century by the brothers Paul and Wilhelm Mauser, founders of the world famous arms company. Equipping the German army with it began in 1935. 
Mauser 98K
The weapon was loaded with a clip of five 7.92 mm cartridges. A trained soldier could shoot 15 times within a minute at a range of up to 1.5 km. The Mauser 98K was very compact. Its main characteristics: weight, length, barrel length - 4.1 kg x 1250 x 740 mm. The indisputable advantages of the rifle are evidenced by numerous conflicts involving it, longevity and a truly sky-high “circulation” - more than 15 million units.
MP-40 "Schmeisser" assault rifle
Perhaps the most famous Wehrmacht small arms of the Second World War was the famous MP-40 submachine gun, a modification of its predecessor, the MP-36, created by Heinrich Vollmer. However, as fate would have it, he is better known under the name “Schmeisser”, obtained thanks to the stamp on the store - “PATENT SCHMEISSER”. The stigma simply meant that, in addition to G. Vollmer, Hugo Schmeisser also participated in the creation of the MP-40, but only as the creator of the store. 
MP-40 "Schmeisser" assault rifle
Initially, the MP-40 was intended to arm the command staff of infantry units, but later it was transferred to the disposal of tank crews, armored vehicle drivers, paratroopers and special forces soldiers.
However, the MP-40 was absolutely unsuitable for infantry units, since it was exclusively a melee weapon. In a fierce battle in open terrain, having a weapon with a firing range of 70 to 150 meters meant for a German soldier to be practically unarmed in front of his enemy, armed with Mosin and Tokarev rifles with a firing range of 400 to 800 meters.
StG-44 assault rifle
Assault rifle StG-44 (sturmgewehr) cal. 7.92mm is another legend of the Third Reich. This is certainly an outstanding creation by Hugo Schmeisser - the prototype of many post-war assault rifles and machine guns, including the famous AK-47. 
The StG-44 could conduct single and automatic fire. Its weight with a full magazine was 5.22 kg. At a target range of 800 meters, the Sturmgewehr was in no way inferior to its main competitors. There were three versions of the magazine - for 15, 20 and 30 shots with a rate of up to 500 rounds per minute. The option of using a rifle with an under-barrel grenade launcher and an infrared sight was considered.
Not without its shortcomings. The assault rifle was heavier than the Mauser-98K by a whole kilogram. Its wooden butt sometimes could not withstand hand-to-hand combat and simply broke. The flame escaping from the barrel revealed the location of the shooter, and the long magazine and sighting devices forced him to raise his head high in a prone position.
The 7.92 mm MG-42 is rightly called one of the best machine guns of World War II. It was developed at Grossfus by engineers Werner Gruner and Kurt Horn. Those who have experienced it firepower, were very frank. Our soldiers called it a “lawn mower,” and the allies called it “Hitler’s circular saw.”
Depending on the type of bolt, the machine gun fired accurately at a speed of up to 1500 rpm at a range of up to 1 km. Ammunition supply was carried out using machine gun belt for 50 - 250 rounds. The uniqueness of the MG-42 was complemented by a relatively small number of parts - 200 - and the high technology of their production using stamping and spot welding.
The barrel, hot from shooting, was replaced with a spare one in a few seconds using a special clamp. In total, about 450 thousand machine guns were produced. The unique technical developments embodied in the MG-42 were borrowed by gunsmiths from many countries around the world when creating their machine guns.
We often find shell casings from the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars in the ground. Almost all of them have some kind of their own difference. Today we will look at the markings of cartridges, which are located on the cartridge capsule, regardless of the brand and caliber of the weapon.
Let's look at some types and markings of Austro-Hungarian types of cartridges from 1905-1916. For this type of cartridge case, the primer is divided into four parts using dashes, the inscriptions are embossed. The left and right cells are the year of production, the top is the month, and the bottom is the plant designation.
- In Fig. 1. – G. Roth, Vienna.
- Fig. 2. – Bello and Selye, Prague.
- Figure 3. - Wöllersdorf plant.
- Figure 4. - Hartenberg factory.
- Fig. 5. - the same Hartenberg, but the Kellery Co. plant.
Later Hungarian ones from the 1930s and 40s have some differences. Figure 6. - Chapel Arsenal, year of manufacture below. Fig. 7. – Budapest. Fig. 8. – Veszprem military plant.
Germany, imperialist war.
The German marking of cartridge cases from the imperialist war has two types with a clear division (Fig. 9) using dashes into four equal parts of the primer and with a conventional one (Fig. 10). The inscription is extruded; in the second version, the letters and numbers of the designation are directed towards the capsule.
At the top there is the marking S 67, in different versions: together, separately, with a dot, without numbers. The lower part is the month of production, on the left is the year, and on the right is the plant. In some cases, the year and plant are reversed, or the arrangement of all divisions is completely reversed.
Fascist Germany.
Sleeves and their markings in Nazi Germany(Mauser type) have many options, because the cartridges were produced in almost all factories of the occupied countries of Western Europe: Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Italy.
Consider Fig. 11-14, this sleeve is made in Denmark. The capsule is divided into four parts: at the top is the letter P with numbers, at the bottom is the week, on the left side is the year, on the right is the letter S and a star (five-pointed or six-pointed). In Figures 15-17 we see some more types of cartridges produced in Denmark.
In Fig. 18 we see capsules presumably of Czechoslovak and Polish production. The capsule is divided into four parts: at the top – Z, at the bottom the month of manufacture, on the left and right – the year. There is an option where “SMS” is written at the top, and the caliber at the bottom is 7.92.
- In Fig. 19-23 German cartridges G. Genshov and Co. in Durlya;
- Fig. 24. - RVS, Browning, caliber 7.65, Nuremberg;
- Figure 25 and 26 - DVM, Karlsruhe.
More options for Polish-made cartridges.
- Fig. 27 - Skarzysko-Kamienna;
- Figure 28 and 29 - "Pochinsk", Warsaw.
The marks on the Mosin rifle cartridges are not depressed, but convex. At the top there is usually the letter of the manufacturer, at the bottom - the numbers of the year of manufacture.
- Figure 30 – Lugansk plant;
- Fig 31 - plant from Russia;
- Figure 32 – Tula plant.
Some more capsule options:
- Figure 33 – Tula plant;
- Figure 34 – Russian plant;
- Fig 35 – Moscow;
- Rice 36 – Russian-Belgian;
- Figure 37 – Riga;
- Figure 38 – Leningradsky;
- Figure 39, 40, 41, 42 – different factories in Russia.
Any beginner or already experienced searcher knows how often they come across cartridges or cartridges from the Second World War. But besides shell casings, or cartridges, there are even more dangerous finds. This is exactly what we will talk about and about safety on the cop.
During my 3 years of searching, I dug up more than a hundred shells of various calibers. Starting from ordinary cartridges, ending with 250 mm aerial bombs. I have been in the hands of F1 grenades with the rings pulled out, mortar shells that did not explode, etc. My limbs are still intact thanks to the fact that I know how to behave with them correctly.
Let's talk about the cartridge right away. The cartridge is the most common and widespread find, found absolutely everywhere, in any field, farm, forest, etc. A misfired or unfired cartridge is safe as long as you don't throw it into the fire. Then it will work anyway. Therefore, this should not be done.
Next are more dangerous finds, which are also very often found and raised by our fellow search engines. These are RGD-33, F1, M-39, M-24 grenades and rarer varieties. Of course, with such things, you need to be more careful. If the pin or fuse of a grenade is intact, then you can easily pick it up and drown it in the nearest lake. If, however, the pin was pulled from the grenade and it did not work, which happens very often. If you accidentally stumble upon such a find with a shovel, it is better to bypass it and call the Ministry of Emergency Situations. But, as a rule, they will ignore your call and tell you not to go to such places.
Very often you come across mortar shells in battlefields. They are less dangerous than grenades, but you also need to be careful with such a find, especially if the mine did not work.
Up the mine, this is its dangerous place. There is a fuse there, when a mine was fired from a mortar, it flew out of the barrel with the fuse down, and when it hit the ground, that same fuse was triggered. But, if the mine fell into a swamp or very soft ground, it might not work. Therefore, if you find something similar to this shell in the ground, be careful with the top of the mine.
Of course, you can transport it and bring it to the nearest body of water to drown it. But you need to be careful. And under no circumstances should you drop it or hit it with a shovel.
And of course, larger shells are high-explosive fragmentation shells, which are best left untouched due to their size and the volume of the affected area. If you can tell by the copper belt whether it was fired or not. If it is not shot, then it can be taken to the river and drowned, but if it is shot and for some reason it does not work. It’s better not to touch it or move it.
The photo shows a 125 mm caliber projectile:
In general, shells are not as dangerous as everyone says about them. By following basic safety precautions and the short rules that you came across in this article, you will protect yourself from dangerous finds, and you can safely engage in excavations without fear of explosions.
And by the way, do not forget about the law of Art. 263 of the Criminal Code “illegal storage of ammunition and weapons”, this can include even a small cartridge.