In the initial period of the war, our fighter aviation suffered heavy losses, and often could not cover the Soviet troops at the forefront and in the front line. Taking advantage of this, German fighter-bombers, dive bombers and attack aircraft inflicted heavy losses. Soviet troops and columns of refugees. The infantry units on the march, the trains on the hauls and transport columns suffered especially from the raids. The situation was further aggravated by the acute shortage of anti-aircraft weapons intended to directly cover the troops. The pre-war Soviet industry did not have time to fully equip the troops with the necessary anti-aircraft weapons; as of 06/22/1941, air defense units of the regimental and divisional level were only 61% equipped with anti-aircraft machine gun installations. For the most part, the troops had rifle-caliber installations created on the basis of the Maxim machine gun. The share of large-caliber 12.7-mm machine guns by the beginning of the war was very small.

In 1941, the main military air defense weapon was a quad 7.62-mm anti-aircraft machine-gun mount M4 arr. 1931 The installation consisted of four Maxim machine guns mod. 1910/30 g, mounted on an anti-aircraft machine in the same plane. For better cooling of machine-gun barrels during intensive shooting, a forced water circulation device was used. With a good density of fire, the M4 anti-aircraft gun was too heavy. Its mass in combat position, together with a forced water cooling system and a welded frame for installation in a car body, reached 400 kg.

The quadruple installation, as a rule, was installed on cargo lorries, on railway platforms, and even in horse-drawn sledges. In February 1943, 7.62-mm machine guns, as obsolete, were withdrawn from the anti-aircraft regiments and anti-aircraft divisions of the High Command Reserve. They were replaced by more effective 12.7 mm heavy machine guns, but on secondary fronts, the surviving M4s were used until the end of hostilities. Throughout the war, anti-aircraft Maxims were part of machine-gun platoons on anti-aircraft armored trains and were installed on anti-aircraft platforms that covered echelons and individual stations.

Twin anti-aircraft installation arr. 1930

In addition to quad installations, in smaller quantities, by the beginning of the war, the troops had twin arr. 1930 and single anti-aircraft guns mod. 1928. When they were created, Maxim infantry machine guns were also used. All of them were water-cooled, and the rate of fire was 600 rounds per minute per barrel. The tabular range of destruction of air targets was 1500 m. In practice, the effective range of fire on aircraft did not exceed 800 m. Quite often, Maxim machine guns on anti-aircraft mounts were forced to be used on the front line to repel enemy infantry attacks. In this case, rack-mounted sights, standard for infantry machine guns, were used for firing.

Calculation of anti-aircraft installation arr. 1928 firing at an air target in the Stalingrad area

A common drawback of anti-aircraft installations based on the Maxim machine gun was excessive weight and an unacceptably long time for transferring from marching to combat position. Before repulsing an enemy air raid, it was necessary to fill the casing with water, otherwise the barrel would quickly overheat and the machine gun could not fire.

In the 30s, a special anti-aircraft machine was produced for cavalry units, mounted on a machine-gun cart. The disadvantage of such a machine was the limited possible sector of anti-aircraft fire. In this regard, for cover from air strikes, cavalrymen needed anti-aircraft machine guns with circular fire. But since the quad M4 was excessively heavy and bulky, twin installations mod. 1930

For firing at an air enemy at the front, Maxim machine guns mod. 1910/30, on a universal tripod-wheel machine of the S.V. Vladimirov arr. 1931, which allowed firing on both ground and air targets.

Maxim machine gun on a universal machine S.V. Vladimirov arr. 1931

The machine gun was equipped with an annular anti-aircraft sight, which allowed firing at aircraft flying at speeds up to 320 km / h at an altitude of up to 1500 m. However, at its advanced installation, as a rule, they did not bother and fired at aircraft using a standard rack-mount sight, which of course reduced efficiency anti-aircraft fire. However, the mass production of machine guns on a universal machine began only in 1939. Due to the great complexity of Vladimirov's machines, not so many were produced. For this reason, there were many times fewer of them in the troops than machine guns on a wheeled machine A.A. Sokolova arr. 1910 Nevertheless, Maxim machine guns on a universal machine were used throughout the war.

In order to somehow cover themselves from air strikes, improvised anti-aircraft installations were created in the troops. Most often, Maxim machine guns were used for this, mounted on handicraft swivels or simply cart wheels with an axle dug into the ground.

Machine gun DT-29 in position for anti-aircraft fire on a light armored car BA-64

In the initial period of the war, part of the Soviet armored vehicles were equipped with P-40 anti-aircraft turrets with DT-29 machine guns. The tank version was created taking into account the installation of a machine gun in a cramped fighting compartment. Instead of a wooden butt, there was a retractable metal one. The casing designed to protect the shooter's hands from burns on the barrel was dismantled from the DT-29 machine gun, which made it possible to reduce the dimensions and improve cooling.

According to the regulations, one fighting machine in a tank or armored car company, it was supposed to be equipped with an additional anti-aircraft machine gun. The first anti-aircraft turrets on T-26 tanks were tested during the fighting in Spain. Due to the ease of installation and simplicity of design, the P-40 turrets have become quite widespread. They were also installed on armored trains, armored cars, motorcycles and off-road vehicles GAZ-64 and GAZ-67. Compared to the DA-27, the effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire from the DT-29 turret version was higher, which was due to better stability, the possibility of circular fire, a more capacious disk for 63 rounds and the presence of a special anti-aircraft ring sight. Not the last role was played by the best training of tankers when firing at aircraft.

P-40 turret with a DT-29 machine gun on an armored car

In the fall of 1941, a quadruple anti-aircraft installation of DT-29 machine guns was experimentally created at the design bureau of the Kovrov plant. Machine guns were mounted horizontally in two rows on the Kolesnikov machine. The total rate of fire was 2400 rds / min. However, according to the results of tests, the installation was not transferred to mass production.

By June 1941, a significant amount of obsolete aviation machine guns YES, YES-2 and PV-1. The first two had much in common with the infantry DP-27, and the second is the Maxim machine gun adapted for use in aviation, air-cooled and increased to 750 rounds per minute rate of fire. As for DA and DA-2, then single standard there were no installations for them to be used as anti-aircraft guns.

One of the options for anti-aircraft machine gun installation using DA-2

Machine guns were mounted on turrets or simple swivels, created at former civilian enterprises or in weapons workshops in the front line.

The surviving anti-aircraft gun DA-2 in the museum's exposition

The use of Degtyarev aircraft machine guns was facilitated by the fact that they were initially equipped with sights designed to fire at fast-moving air targets.

Since the principle of operation of the DA and DA-2 automation did not differ from the DP-27 and DT-29, surrogate anti-aircraft guns were quickly mastered by the troops. The machine guns were equipped with discs for 63 rounds. Noticeable external difference YES from the DT-29 was that instead of the stock, a notched wooden pistol grip and a rear grip were installed. The twin DA-2 had a shortened shoulder rest. Twin machine guns were equipped with large flame arresters to prevent blinding the shooter.

Anti-aircraft installation ShKAS in the weapons workshop

Single and twin ShKASs were mounted on tripod machines made in weapons workshops, providing circular firing and height adjustment. Responsibilities for firing and maintaining machine gun installations, as a rule, were assigned to aircraft technicians and gunsmiths.

In 1939, to replace the Maxim machine gun, the troops began to receive the DS-39 easel machine gun, developed by V.A. Degtyarev. Compared to the Maxim machine gun, the new machine gun was much lighter. For firing at air targets, designer G.S. Garanin developed an anti-aircraft tripod for the machine gun.

DS-39 on an anti-aircraft tripod

Outwardly, the DS-39 resembles a DShK heavy machine gun reduced in size. Compared to the Maxim machine gun, the DS-39 machine gun was much lighter and air-cooled; after intensive firing, its barrel could be quickly replaced with a spare one. The machine gun was equipped with a switch for the rate of fire at ground (600 rds / min) and air targets (1200 rds / min). Before the war, Degtyarev created a quadruple anti-aircraft gun, which was tested in the back of a lorry, but it was not mass-produced.

However, for all its merits, the DS-39 could not displace the obsolete Maxim machine gun. This is partly to blame for the military themselves, who are not ready to abandon fabric machine-gun belts, which ensured unification with the machine guns already in the troops. Initially, Degtyarev designed his easel machine gun for a metal belt, and the transition to canvas had a negative impact on the reliability of the automation. In addition, the DS-39 was more sensitive to low temperatures and dustiness. Degtyarev guaranteed that his heavy machine gun could be brought up to an acceptable level of operational reliability, but in June 1941, mass production of the DS-39 was stopped and the assembly of Maxim machine guns was returned to.

The Soviet leadership was well aware of the need to replace the Maxim machine guns. Although the existing heavy machine guns allowed for intense fire, were well mastered and loved by the troops, their excessive weight made it difficult to escort the advancing infantry. While our troops were engaged in defensive battles, this was not so critical, but with the transition to offensive operations, all the shortcomings of the outdated machine gun were fully manifested.

In 1943, the SG-43 designed by P.M. won the competition for a new easel machine gun. Goryunov. Unlike Maxim, the new machine gun had a replaceable air-cooled barrel. The machine gun was mounted on a Degtyarev wheeled machine, or on a Sidorenko-Malinovsky machine. Both options allowed firing at ground and air targets.

SG-43, prepared for anti-aircraft fire

The machine gun's accessories included a foreshortened anti-aircraft sight, designed to fire at air targets moving at speeds up to 600 km/h at ranges up to 1000 m.

In addition to domestic anti-aircraft machine guns in the Red Army during the war, foreign samples were used - captured and delivered under Lend-Lease: American 7.62 mm Browning М1919А4, 12.7 mm Browning М2, 7.62 and 7.7 mm British machine guns Vickers , as well as captured 7.92-mm machine guns MG-13, MG-15, MG-34 and MG-42.

Red Army soldiers capture a Bf 109 pilot who made an emergency landing

To reduce losses, German pilots were forced to increase the height of the bombing, and in case of strong rifle and machine gun fire from the ground, to avoid attack using machine gun and cannon weapons.

Fw 190, which made an emergency landing in the Soviet near rear

Anti-tank rifles significantly exceeded all other types of infantry in terms of firing range and destructive effect if they hit the target. small arms. Even the heaviest armor of the Hs-129 and Fw 190F attack aircraft did not save from heavy 14.5-mm bullets. Noticeable losses from the fire of Soviet anti-tank missiles in 1942 were carried by Ju 87 dive bombers.

Downed Ju 87

From anti-tank rifles, it was repeatedly possible to shoot down Fw 189 reconnaissance spotters, especially hated by our infantry, whose pilots kept an altitude of more than 1000 m - outside the zone of effective fire from rifles.

Here is how the war correspondent Lieutenant P. Kozlov described such an episode in the newspaper 236 rifle division"For the Glory of the Motherland" dated May 25, 1944:

“All the fighters quickly dispersed and lay down. Machine gunners, armor-piercers all. Whoever had a weapon adapted it for firing at an aircraft. Having made a circle over the bridgehead, the “frame” continued its course. Red Army soldiers vol. Drozhak and Lebed set up an anti-tank rifle designed by Simonov on a hillock and waited for the right moment to open fire. The Focke-Wulf was approaching their defense area.
Taking a lead of 3 figures, Drozhak fired several shots. The haze of thermite bullet explosions lay ahead of the fascist vulture.
Then Drozhak took the lead by 1.5 pieces less and fired.
The enemy aircraft shuddered slightly and squinted. And after a few seconds, the “frame” smoked and flew down like a burning torch.
- Hooray! - the fighters shouted with joy, - “Focke-Wulf” is on fire ...
This example convincingly shows that infantry weapons can successfully repel enemy air raids. In this case, the following requirements must be observed: be calm, take cover in a gap in time, disguise yourself. And as soon as the plane descends, conduct aimed fire at it.
Armor-piercers Drozhak and Lebed received gratitude from the commander of the unit and were presented for government awards.

During the Great Patriotic War, designed to protect large administrative and political centers, the most important industrial regions, communications and other strategic objects in the theater of operations and in the rear on the territory of the country from enemy air strikes.

Air defense fronts were created on the basis of GKO resolutions, depending on the operational-strategic tasks to be solved, the prevailing situation, and the available air defense forces and means. The front covered the frontal air defense area from air strikes and was strengthened by forces and means based on the importance of the defended areas and objects, and the actions of the opposing enemy.

The air defense front included: an air defense army (zone), an air defense air fighter army, up to 8 air defense corps (corps areas), 1–2 air defense corps, up to 7 air defense divisions, up to 12 air defense divisions, dep. air defense brigades. When performing their tasks, the formations and formations of the air defense fronts interacted with the air defense forces of the fronts, and in the coastal areas - with the fleets.

During various periods of the war, 8 air defense fronts operated.

Eastern Air Defense Front It was formed on 29/6/1943 by dividing the country's air defense forces into Western and Eastern F. PVO. The front carried out air defense of the most important centers of the Urals, the Middle and Lower Volga, the Caucasus and Transcaucasia. The Eastern Air Defense Front included: the Transcaucasian Air Defense Zone (including 2 brigades of the Baku Air Defense Army), 2 corps, 4 divisional and 1 air defense brigade areas, the 8th Istr. Air Defense Corps, 6 Istr. Aviation Divisions Air defense, training units (447 fighters, 3259 op., 1814 machine guns, 1142 searchlights and 491 barrage balloons).

Active defense of owls. troops in Battle of Kursk 1943 and subsequent offensive operations forced German-fascist. the command to send the main forces of its aviation to support the ground forces, as a result of which, from July 1943, the activity of enemy aviation against deep rear objects sharply decreased, massive raids on industrial and economic centers ceased. This led to a decrease in the tension of the military operations of the formations and units of the Eastern Air Defense Front, and it became, in essence, a strategic reserve of the country's Air Defense Forces. On March 29, 1944, the Directorate of the Eastern Front of Air Defense was reorganized into the Directorate of the Southern Front of Air Defense. Commanded - Gen.-Regiment. artillery G.S. Zashikhin.

Transcaucasian Air Defense Front had 2 formations, formed 5/6/1943. On June 29, 1943, it was included in the Eastern Air Defense Front, with the renaming of the Transcaucasian Air Defense Zone on July 10, 1943. Newly formed on 29.3.1944. The structure included the Baku Air Defense Army, 2 air defense brigades, an Istr.-aviation corps and an air defense division (326 fighters, 1229 anti-aircraft guns, over 350 anti-aircraft machine guns, about 300 searchlights and about 200 barrage balloons). The main task of the Transcaucasian Air Defense Front was air cover for the Baku region and the oil fields of the Apsheron Peninsula. The front mainly fought against enemy air reconnaissance. Was a reserve VGK rates(St. 200 units and formations were transferred to reinforce neighboring air defense fronts). Disbanded in Apr. 1945. Commanded - general lieutenant. artillery P.E. Gudymenko.

Western Air Defense Front had 2 formations, 29/6/1943 was formed by dividing the country's air defense forces into the Western and Eastern air defense fronts. The troops of the front covered Moscow, Murmansk, the Moscow and Yaroslavl industrial regions, etc. The Western Air Defense Front included the Special Moscow Air Defense Army, 3 corps, 8 divisional air defense regions (1012 fighters, 4172 op., 2280 machine guns, 1573 searchlights and 1834 barrage balloons ).

From sept. 1943 to March 1944 the front was transferred from the Eastern Front of the air defense of St. 100 sec. air defense units. IN summer-autumn campaign 1943 and the winter-spring campaign of 1944, the troops of the Western Air Defense Front shot down St. 1200 German s-comrade. On March 29, 1944, by decision of the State Defense Committee, the Northern Air Defense Front was formed on the basis of the Western Air Defense Front. 12/24/1944 The Western Front of Air Defense was restored as part of 5 corps, 4 air defense divisions and 8 air defense air divisions. It operated until the end of the war, covering troops and facilities in the front line from enemy air strikes. The troops of the Western Air Defense Front were also involved in covering the groupings of fronts in the operations of owls. troops (including the Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations of 1945). Commanded: Gen.-Regiment. M.S. Gromadin (June 1943 - March 1944), General-Regiment. artillery D.A. Zhuravlev (Dec. 1944 - May 1945).

Moscow Air Defense Front Formed 5/4/1942 on the basis of the Moscow Air Defense Corps District for the purpose of air defense of Moscow and part of important objects Central industrial region from the blows of German-Fash. aviation. The Moscow Air Defense Front included the 6th Istr. Air Defense Aviation Corps (23 regiments, 8 aviation-based areas), 19 anti-aircraft regiments (artillery, machine gun and searchlight), 13 det. anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 3 anti-aircraft machine-gun and 3 searchlight regiments, 2 VNOS regiments, 2 barrage balloon regiments, dep. communications battalion, training units (about 500 fighters, 1560 ordnance, 430 machine guns, 1300 searchlights, 1060 barrage balloons).

The troops of the front ensured the repulsion of raids on the capital by enemy aircraft, inflicting significant damage on it. At the same time, parts of the Moscow Air Defense Front covered communications, supply bases and groupings of troops of the North-Western, Kalinin, Western and Bryansk fronts. Significant forces of the front in the spring of 1943 were involved in the air defense of groupings of troops and rear facilities in the Kursk region. On June 29, 1943, the Moscow Air Defense Front was transformed into the Special Moscow Air Defense Army, which became part of the Western Air Defense Front. Commanded - Gen.-Leut. artillery D.A. Zhuravlev.

Northern Air Defense Front Formed on March 29, 1944 on the basis of the Eastern and Western Air Defense Fronts. It included the Special Moscow Air Defense Army, 3 corps, 7 divisions, 12th Det. istr.-aviation division and otd. air defense brigade (1150 fighters, approx. 5600 ord., 2750 machine guns, approx. 1700 searchlights and 1650 barrage balloons). The front acted from Barents Sea to the line Kuibyshev, Kursk, Lutsk, covering Moscow, the Central Industrial Region, Murmansk, communications of front troops and important objects of the front zone in the western and north-western directions from enemy air strikes.

The troops of the Northern Air Defense Front contributed to the successful conduct of the operations of the Red Army in the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, destroyed only during the preparation and conduct of the Belarusian operation of 1944, 320 enemy units. Of the 117 enemy air raids on objects and communications in the frontline zone, only in 7 cases did it manage to break through to the targets and strike at them. 12/24/1944 The Northern Air Defense Front was transformed into the Western Air Defense Front, part of the forces was transferred to the Central Air Defense Front. Commanded - Gen.-Regiment. M.S. Hulk.

Central Air Defense Front It was formed on December 24, 1944 on the basis of the Special Moscow Air Defense Army and part of the forces of the Northern Air Defense Front. The troops of the front were entrusted with the tasks of air defense of Moscow, Leningrad, Murmansk, objects of the Central Industrial Region, the Upper and Middle Volga from enemy air strikes. The front lasted until the end of the war. Commanded - Gen.-Regiment. M.S. Hulk.

Southwestern Air Defense Front Formed 12/24/1944 on the basis of the Southern Air Defense Front. The front included 7 air defense corps and 4 divisions, 2 Istr.-aviation corps and 6 Istr. The troops of the front were entrusted with the tasks of air defense of the most important industrial regions and facilities in the south of the USSR, as well as communications and supply bases. Commanded - Gen.-Regiment. artillery G.S. Zashikhin.

Southern Air Defense Front It was formed on March 29, 1944 on the basis of the Eastern and Western Air Defense Fronts. It was entrusted with air defense of administrative-political, industrial-economic centers and regions of the south of the USSR, covering communications and supply bases for the army in the field, as well as building up the air defense system during the offensive operations of the Red Army in the southwestern direction. The front included 7 air defense corps and 3 divisions, 2 Istr. aviation corps and 7 Istr. aviation divisions (917 fighters, 4346 op., 866 searchlights, 296 barrage balloons). The troops of the Southern Air Defense Front took an active part in the summer-autumn campaign of 1944. On December 24, 1944, the Southern Air Defense Front was transformed into the Southwestern Air Defense Front. Commanded - Gen.-Regiment. artillery G.S. Zashikhin.

In October 1945 they were reorganized into air defense districts.

In the history of the air defense of the USSR, the most outstanding and significant event is the defense of Moscow in 1941-1942. That experience in organizing the air defense system of the capital is still of great value, because it taught us a number of important lessons that are relevant not only today, but will remain basic in the creation of Russia's aerospace defense. In addition, the study of these very interesting historical events has an invaluable cognitive and educational value, especially since many people simply do not know about these events now.

By the beginning of the war in 1941, having realized the danger of the threat of an air attack from the experience of the German conquest of European states, the Soviet Government, the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff took a number of urgent measures to strengthen the air defense of the country's territory.

At a special meeting of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks devoted to this issue, I.V. Stalin demanded: “As for the air defense forces, the primary task here is to organize a reliable cover for our industrial centers, to prevent the enemy from destroying our economic potential in case of war. On how work is being done in this direction, the People's Commissar of Defense with the Chief of the General Staff should report to me weekly. Recall that at that time all the decrees and decisions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the government, instructions of I.V. Stalin were carried out strictly.

And here is the beginning of the war. The battle for Moscow in 1941 was a severe test for the country. The air defense forces of Moscow were put in readiness to repel the raids by 18.00 on June 23, 1941.

170 divisions of the Wehrmacht, mobilized and having war experience, dealt a severe blow to the Soviet Union on a front of about 3,000 km. The enemy is attacking the Baltic States, Belarus, Ukraine, bombing the troops of the Red Army and Soviet cities almost around the clock. Minsk, Baranovichi, Bobruisk were taken. The direction of the main blow was indicated German army- to Moscow, and not to Kyiv, as the Soviet military-political leadership mistakenly believed. For this and other reasons, the border battles of the ground forces and, in general, the initial period of the war by the Red Army and, above all, the troops of the Western Front, were lost with heavy losses.

It is generally accepted that the battle for Moscow began on September 30, 1941 with the Wehrmacht's Typhoon operation. However, the capture of the capital of the USSR was initially a key political point of the entire war plan ("Barbarossa"). However, it would be more correct to consider it the beginning of an air strategic operation to destroy Moscow, which the Luftwaffe launched in the midst of the Smolensk battle. We recall that the main result of the battle, which unfolded on a front of 650 km and in depth up to 250 km, was the disruption of the calculations of the Nazi leadership for a non-stop advance towards Moscow.

Air strategic operation to destroy Moscow. The balance of forces and means

To carry out this operation, a special aviation group was created in advance as part of the German 2nd Air Fleet (more than 1600 combat aircraft), consisting of 300 bombers of the latest types: Heinkel-111, Junkers-88 and Dornier-215. The overwhelming majority of the pilots of this group repeatedly bombed the capitals and major centers of European states, many crew commanders were in the rank of "colonel", the majority had the highest awards in Germany.

Preparations for this operation were carried out literally from the first days of the war: special groups, equipped with small rotating searchlights and portable radio beacons to indicate the directions of the flight of German bombers along pre-planned routes for a raid on Moscow.

From July 1 to July 21, VNOS posts recorded flights of 89 enemy reconnaissance aircraft within the boundaries of the Moscow air defense zone, 9 of them reconnoitred approaches to Moscow and objects of the capital of the USSR from a high altitude.

The preparation by the Hitlerite Headquarters of a massive air attack on Moscow on a broad air front from the Northwestern to the Southern operational directions was not unexpected for the military leadership of the USSR and the command of the Moscow air defense zone. The nature of the reconnaissance conducted by German aviation, the relocation of bomber squadrons and groups of the 2nd Air Fleet from the deep rear to airfields close to the front line and providing a minimum flight time to strike targets, mainly without escort fighter aircraft, were too obvious.

Finally, the leadership had the testimonies of downed and captured reconnaissance pilots, as well as saboteurs sent to the rear of the Red Army to destroy the lines of communication for command and control and to designate routes for bombers to Moscow and other objects planned for destruction.

In such flights, German pilots, as a rule, did not enter into air battles, but, noticing Soviet fighters or being fired upon from the ground, they turned around abruptly and went west, considering the task completed: aerial photography and observations were made, the lines of interception of fighters and the boundaries of the zone of fire of anti-aircraft artillery defined.

However, in reality, things were not so simple. Remembering these days, the commander of the 1st Air Defense Corps D.A. Zhuravlev noted: Successful fight with enemy reconnaissance did not give the command of the enemy's 2nd Air Fleet an opportunity to learn in more detail the nature of the construction of Moscow's air defense. Destroying air scouts with small forces and, mainly, on the distant approaches to the city, outside the zone of action of anti-aircraft artillery, we did not allow the enemy to open our battle formations.

And the Nazis at that time were already specifically preparing an air attack on Moscow. On July 13, 1941, the commander of the 8th Air Corps of the Luftwaffe, General V. Richthofen, expressed his conviction that air raids on Moscow, in which more than four million people lived, would hasten the catastrophe of the Russians. The next day, July 14, Hitler formulated the goal of the upcoming bombing of Moscow: "To strike at the center of the Bolshevik resistance and prevent the organized evacuation of the Russian government apparatus."

On July 19, in Directive No. 33 "On the Further Conduct of the War in the East," he specifically demanded "... launch an air attack on Moscow ...". A date has also been set. On July 20, the commander of the 2nd Air Fleet, Field Marshal A. Kesselring, held a meeting with the commanders of bomber formations in connection with the upcoming air operation. In pursuance of Directive No. 33, the commander of the 2nd Air Corps, General B. Lerzer, was appointed responsible for organizing and conducting raids. He was promptly subordinated to all the air groups allocated for the bombing of Moscow. These were large forces: of the five air corps operating on the eastern front, only the 4th did not participate in raids on Moscow.

The strike forces of the German 2nd Air Fleet were opposed by the air defense system of the capital of the USSR as part of the 1st Air Defense Corps and the 6th Fighter Aviation Corps (IAK) Air Defense, which by June 19, 1941, two days before the start of the war, had 11 fighter aircraft regiments.

The Moscow air defense zone at that time was commanded by General M.S. Hulk. Colonel I.D. was appointed commander of the 6th IAK. Klimov. The commander of the 1st Air Defense Corps and at the same time the head of the Moscow Air Defense Point was Major General of Artillery D.A. Zhuravlev. These were wonderful and professionally trained commanders with combat experience, their merit in organizing the air defense of the capital and clear, well-coordinated combat operations of pilots and anti-aircraft gunners is enormous. The 1st Corps included six medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery regiments, 1 anti-aircraft machine-gun regiment, 2 anti-aircraft searchlight regiments, 2 barrage balloon regiments, 2 air surveillance, warning and communications regiments (VNOS), a separate VNOS radio engineering battalion and a number of others. divisions.

Anti-aircraft artillery regiments of medium caliber occupied positions in six spatial sectors relative to Moscow, covering the corresponding sectors of the airspace. Each regiment of a hundred-gun (!) Composition provided three times the fire impact on enemy aircraft with a high density of fire.

The fighter aviation regiments had the task of destroying enemy aircraft at the interception lines from 250 km to Moscow and in floodlights in the immediate vicinity of the continuous fire zones of the anti-aircraft artillery regiments of the 1st Air Defense Corps.

And today they rightfully remain at the forefront of the defense of the Fatherland

Every year on the second Sunday of April, the whole country, its Armed Forces, veterans military service celebrate the Day of the Air Defense Forces. This holiday was established by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 20, 1975 in honor of the great merits of the Air Defense Forces in the Great Patriotic War and their performance of especially important tasks in peacetime.

Domestic air defense has a long and very difficult history. Its beginning can be considered the decision taken by the military command of Russia in December 1914 to deploy anti-aircraft (then called air) defense of the capital - St. Petersburg and the imperial residence in Tsarskoye Selo. In subsequent years, the air defense of Odessa and a number of other cities was created.

At the same time, even then the basic principles of such defense were formulated, which are still relevant today: the integrated use of various means, including ground (anti-aircraft) and air (aviation); concentration of the main forces on the defense of the most important objects; circular construction of the defense of objects with its strengthening in the most dangerous directions; the creation of a reconnaissance system in the form of a network of observation points (on the defense of St. Petersburg and Odessa, these points were combined into a "radio-telegraphic air defense").

The beginning of the creation of air defense in the USSR should be considered 1924-1925, when, under the leadership of M.V. Frunze, a military reform began to be carried out in the country. In the course of the reform, a strategically completely correct understanding of the vast prospects for military aviation and the scale of its threat in future wars was developed. And most importantly, it was recognized as important and necessary to organize an active fight against enemy military aircraft.

To do this, it was proposed to create special air defense forces on the basis of anti-aircraft (anti-aircraft) weapons (since August 1924, the term "air defense" began to be used). These troops were to be used in cooperation with the Air Force fighter aircraft.

Here we should pay attention to one more important aspect: already in those years, the authors of the military reform understood that the rapidly developing military aviation would sharply increase the depth of the zone of armed struggle, cover not only the front, but also the rear of the country; accordingly, the air defense troops must solve the tasks of repelling air strikes both on the active troops and on objects and communications in the rear. Thus, for the first time, the need for the creation and development of military air defense and air defense of the country was declared.

After the sudden death of M. V. Frunze, the military reform was essentially curtailed. The development and comprehension of conceptual provisions in the field of building air defense was not completed either. At the same time, part of the developments was put into practice.

In 1925, the Red Army Headquarters developed proposals for organizing the air defense of the USSR and creating bodies to manage it in the center and in the field. In the same year, the directive of the Headquarters of the Red Army announced that the Headquarters of the Red Army was starting to organize the country's air defense. The directive formulated the tasks of the country's air defense in peacetime and wartime, their difference from the tasks in the front line.

With the radar of the P-35/37 family, the creation of the country's radar field began
Photo: Alexey MATVEEV

In 1927, a department was created at the Headquarters of the Red Army, which in 1930 was transformed into the 6th Air Defense Directorate of the Headquarters of the Red Army. Given the ever-increasing importance of air defense, in May 1932 the 6th Directorate was reorganized into the Air Defense Directorate of the Red Army, directly subordinate to the People's Commissar of Defense. At the same time, despite the official division of air defense into military air defense and air defense of the country, all air defense forces on the ground were subordinate to the commanders of the military districts.

The basis of the air defense forces were formations and units of anti-aircraft artillery. They also included units and subunits of anti-aircraft machine guns, anti-aircraft searchlights, air barrage balloons, air surveillance, warning and communications troops (VNOS). Fighter aircraft of the Air Forces of the military districts were not included in the Air Defense Forces and were involved in the fight against an air enemy on the basis of interaction.

From the beginning of the 1930s the process of a significant build-up of air defense forces and assets in the border military districts began. In 1932, the first anti-aircraft artillery divisions were formed. In 1937, for the defense of Moscow, Leningrad and Baku, air defense corps were formed, and for the defense of other large cities (Kyiv, Minsk, Odessa, Batumi, etc.) - divisions and separate air defense brigades.

In February 1941, 4 months before the start of the war, the entire border area of ​​the country was divided into air defense zones, the boundaries of responsibility of which were combined with the boundaries of military districts. In total, 13 air defense zones of the country's territory (air defense of the CU) were created. In 9 air defense zones of the CU with large spatial dimensions, brigade areas of the air defense of the CU were created. There were 36 such districts. In a number of air defense districts, air defense points were allocated - separate objects covered by units and subunits of anti-aircraft artillery.

The commanders of the air defense zones of the CU were the assistants to the commanders of the troops of the military districts. The exceptions were the Central (Moscow) and Northern (Leningrad) zones of the air defense of the CU, where the commanders of the 1st and 2nd air defense corps, respectively, were appointed commanders. The commanders of the air defense zones found themselves in dual subordination - the military districts and the Main Air Defense Directorate of the Red Army (the latter was formed in 1940 on the basis of the Air Defense Directorate of the Red Army). Practice has shown that such dual command is ineffective.

In the last pre-war years, the air defense forces were intensively equipped with new weapons and equipment. The anti-aircraft artillery unit began to receive 37-mm automatic and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, artillery anti-aircraft fire control devices - PUAZO-2 and PUAZO-3. Since 1939, the VNOS service began to receive the first domestic detection radars RUS-1 and RUS-2.

The industry mass-produced searchlights, sound collectors and air barrage balloons. From 1940, the Yak-1 and MiG-3 fighters began to enter service with fighter aviation, and from 1941 - LaGG-3.

However, there was not enough time for sufficient rearmament of the air defense forces.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, shortcomings in the organization of the country's air defense were sharply revealed, when all air defense forces were subordinated to the fronts. Already in the first months of the war, the five main air defense zones of the TS - Northern, North-Western, Western, Kiev and Southern, which, according to the plan of the military leadership, constituted the first echelon of air defense, actually ceased to exist.

Bolshoe Savino airfield (Perm). Fighter-interceptor MiG-31
Photo: Leonid YAKUTIN

German aviation, bypassing scattered groups of anti-aircraft artillery, penetrated 500-600 kilometers into the interior of the country with virtually impunity and bombarded defenseless industrial and communication facilities.

In this regard, the General Staff of the Red Army even issued a special directive dated July 9, 1941, which ordered "to release the commanders of the air defense zones - assistant commanders of the front troops in air defense from the direct leadership of the air defense of the troops of the fronts and turn them to direct duties in the air defense zones."

The directive could not change the state of affairs, since it did not change anything in the air defense organization itself. And only after the devastating German air raids on defense facilities in the city of Voronezh far beyond the front line in August 1941 did I. V. Stalin intervene in air defense.

As a result, on November 9, 1941, the Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 874 “On strengthening and strengthening the air defense of the country's territory” was issued. In this document, modest in name, for the first time, a fundamentally new organization of the air defense of the CU and its structure are outlined.

The pre-war organization of the country's air defense, subordinate to the military districts (fronts), was completely rejected. The air defense forces of the country were withdrawn from their subordination and for the first time transformed into an independent branch of the Red Army, subordinate to the people's commissar of defense and headed by the commander of the air defense forces of the Customs Union - deputy people's commissar of defense for air defense. Major General M. S. Gromadin was appointed the first commander of the Air Defense Forces of the Customs Union.

Somewhat later, the TS was transferred from the Air Force to operational subordination to the Air Defense Forces, and in January 1942, 39 fighter aviation regiments were introduced into the state, more than 1,500 aircraft in total. Now, along with the tasks of defending individual objects, the air defense forces of the CU could solve the tasks of covering the country's regions. The operational construction of a new air defense system of the TS was not tied to the borders of the fronts and military districts, but was determined by the location of the covered objects and communications.

The Moscow air defense system has become a classic example of organizing an effective air defense of a large administrative and industrial center. It included the 1st Air Defense Corps (commander - Major General of Artillery D. A. Zhuravlev) and the 6th Fighter Aviation Corps operationally subordinate to him (commander - Colonel I. D. Klimov).

By the beginning of massive air raids on Moscow (July 22, 1941), this grouping included more than 600 fighters and 1000 anti-aircraft guns, about 350 anti-aircraft machine guns, over 600 anti-aircraft searchlights, 124 air barrage balloon posts, 612 VNOS posts. The Moscow air defense system was built on the principle of all-round defense, its depth was 200–250 kilometers.

During the war years, the German Luftwaffe carried out 141 raids on Moscow, a total of about 8,600 sorties. According to official data, 234 aircraft (less than 3%) broke through to the city, almost 1,400 aircraft were shot down. These successes are largely due to the massive use of forces and means of air defense and effective organization defense: no other capital, including London and Berlin, had such a concentration of air defense forces during the Second World War.

Unfortunately history domestic air defense knows less brilliant examples. So, in the course of three massive German air raids on the automobile plant. Molotov in the city of Gorky in June 1943, the plant suffered enormous damage, despite the very strong grouping of the Gorky air defense divisional area. The most important defense enterprise was actually put out of action, and it took more than three months and almost 35,000 workers to restore it.

Later in the course of the war, the air defense troops of the Customs Union underwent organizational changes, which were objectively dictated by an increase in their combat strength and changes at the front. In April 1942, the Moscow Air Defense Front was formed, and air defense armies were formed in Leningrad and somewhat later in Baku. Thus, the first operational formations of air defense forces appeared. The transition of the Red Army to broad offensive operations significantly changed the nature of the combat use of the air defense forces. In June 1943, the Office of the Commander of the Air Defense Forces of the Customs Union was abolished, and two air defense fronts were created instead: Western and Eastern. The air defense troops on the cover of Moscow were reorganized into the Special Moscow Air Defense Army.

On-load tap-changer S-300PM and NVO at one of the sites of the Ashuluk test site
Photo: Georgy DANILOV

By the end of the war, all formations that carried out air defense in the rear of the country were consolidated into the Central Air Defense Front with headquarters in Moscow. Forward formations and units of the air defense forces formed the Western and Southwestern air defense fronts. On Far East in March 1945, on the eve of the start of hostilities against Japan, three air defense armies were created: Primorskaya, Amur and Transbaikal, which became part of the fronts.

In general, during the Great Patriotic War, the Air Defense Forces solved a number of the most important operational-strategic and operational tasks, saved many large administrative and industrial centers, hundreds of industrial enterprises and groupings of troops from destruction and destruction. Organizationally, anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft took shape as branches of the air defense forces. The VNOS Service has been greatly developed. Operational formations and operational-tactical air defense formations, formations and units of military branches were created. For merits in the performance of military duty, over 80 thousand soldiers and officers of the air defense forces were awarded orders and medals, 92 soldiers became Heroes Soviet Union.

With the end of World War II, humanity, alas, did not receive peace and tranquility. Former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition again found themselves on opposite sides of the barricades. A long-term political and military confrontation between the two world systems, called the Cold War, began. Many associate its beginning with the famous speech of W. Churchill on March 5, 1946 in the American city of Fulton (Missouri).

Then the British Prime Minister for the first time voiced the term "Iron Curtain", which divided Europe, and called for relations with the USSR to be built exclusively from a position of strength. At the same time, the United States already had nuclear weapons and the means of its delivery - strategic aviation, which created a real air threat not only to the groupings of the Soviet Armed Forces, but also to the economic potential of the country, including the strategic rear.

In this regard, despite the general reduction in the Armed Forces and the most difficult post-war economic situation in the country, the Supreme Military Council in July 1946 takes a strategic decision to deploy air defense of the TS throughout the country, even where it was not in the war. Somewhat earlier, in February 1946, the post of Commander of the Air Defense Forces of the Customs Union was re-introduced, who now reported directly to the Commander of Artillery. The command of the Air Defense Forces of the Customs Union was instructed to develop a plan for strengthening air defense in the Volga region, the Urals and Siberia, as well as its creation in Central Asia.

In terms of organizing the country's air defense, the ambitions of the branches of the Armed Forces again escalated: the air defense forces proposed to increase the number of air defense districts and create the country's air defense by analogy with the military air defense of the vehicle, Ground troops proposed to return to the pre-war organization, dividing the country's air defense forces into military districts, the Air Force proposed to include the air defense forces in their composition.

In 1948, an "intermediate option" was adopted: the country's territory was divided into a border strip and an inland territory; in the border zone, responsibility for air defense was assigned to the military districts, in the interior - to the air defense forces of the country, in which instead of the four air defense districts that existed in the first post-war years, 12 air defense districts were created.

On April 4, 1949, a military-political union of 11 states of Europe and the USA was created - the NATO bloc (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). With the creation of this structure, the general political and military tension in Europe and in the world as a whole, as well as the intensity and scale of provocative and reconnaissance flights by NATO aircraft in the airspace of the USSR, increased.

At the same time, the reorganized air defense system of the vehicle proved unable to effectively counter air intruders, which had already reached the regions of Leningrad, Minsk, and Kyiv.

A whole series of organizational transformations of the air defense troops of the Customs Union began. In an attempt to introduce an organized principle into the fragmentation of the air defense system, so-called border air defense zones (BCAA) were formed in the border districts and in the fleets. The organization and leadership of the Air Defense Forces were still assigned to the military districts and fleets. Not getting the expected result military leadership on the basis of the PPVO, it created the "air defense of the border line" (BOPL).

At the same time, the leadership of the VOPL was transferred to the commander-in-chief of the Air Force (the first deputy commander-in-chief of the Air Force was also the commander of the VOPL troops). The direct responsibility for air defense in the VOPL areas (that is, in the military districts) was shifted from the commanders of the military districts to the commanders of the air armies of the Air Force.

However, the remaining fragmentation of the air defense essentially did not change anything. Violations of air borders continued to increase, and the depth of incursions by foreign aircraft reached the Moscow region.

It soon became clear that the VOPL, headed by the Air Force, was an unnecessary and essentially useless structure. Therefore, in June 1953, the VOPL command under the Air Force Commander-in-Chief was disbanded. One part of the VOPL forces was transferred to the military districts and fleets, the other to the air defense troops of the Customs Union. At the same time, overall responsibility for the entire air defense of the country, including within the boundaries of military districts, was assigned to the commander of the air defense forces of the Customs Union.

Such a unification of all the air defense forces of the CU was of a very conditional nature, since in the border areas the forces and means were still part of the military districts and fleets. The interaction between them was weak. This was soon confirmed. On April 29, 1954, three American B-47 strategic bombers violated the state border from the Baltic Sea, penetrated as far as Novgorod, Smolensk and Kyiv, and went west with impunity. 10 days later, on the eve of Victory Day, a new daring violation of the border followed.

These outrageous pre-holiday incidents did not go unnoticed by the country's top political leadership. In the course of an urgent inspection, serious shortcomings in the organization of the entire air defense of the country were revealed, which were based on the fragmentation of the air defense forces.

On May 27, 1954, a special resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On unpunished flights of foreign aircraft over the territory of the USSR” was issued. The same resolution announced a new organization of air defense of the vehicle. Taking into account the rapid development of military aviation, a significant increase in its combat capabilities, as well as the ever-increasing scale of violations of the airspace of the USSR by NATO aircraft, it was considered expedient to deploy the Air Defense Forces of the Customs Union from the armed forces into the form of the Armed Forces - the Air Defense Forces of the country. It included all the main air defense forces and established the boundaries of responsibility along the state border of the country. In the military districts, only parts of the military air defense of land formations remained, and in the fleets - ship assets. In the Air Defense Forces of the country, the generally accepted army military structures created back in 1944 were restored: air defense formations (districts, armies) and air defense formations (corps, divisions). Fighter aviation of the military districts was promptly subordinated to the new structures of the Air Defense Forces of the country.

Simultaneously with the above-mentioned resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On providing the Air Defense Forces of the country with new equipment" was adopted. This decision proved to be very timely, as last years there has been a noticeable lag in the development of air defense weapons from the development of military aviation.

Marshal of the Soviet Union L. A. Govorov was appointed the first Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces of the country. However, soon after his death, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.S. Biryuzov became the commander-in-chief. An experienced military leader and a thoughtful organizer, he made a great contribution to the formation and development of a new kind of Armed Forces. It was under him that the foundations of the operational art and tactics of the Air Defense Forces were formed and many of the fundamental principles of the integrated organization of the fight against an air enemy, which are still relevant today, were implemented.

On the initiative of S. S. Biryuzov and under his leadership, military science in the Air Defense Forces was essentially re-created and in 1957 organizationally formalized by combining disparate scientific units of the armed forces into the first in the Armed Forces of the USSR a single integrated research institute of the type of Armed Forces Research Institute -2 air defense (subsequently - the 2nd Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, and now - the Air Defense Research Center of the 4th Central Research Institute of the Russian Federation).

In connection with the massive rearmament of troops on a fundamentally new technology the need for highly qualified personnel of commanders and military engineers has sharply increased. Therefore, on the initiative of S. S. Biryuzov in the mid-1950s. a number of new higher military air defense educational institutions were created.

Since 1956, the Air Defense Military Academy began training in Kalinin (now Tver). Today it is the Military Academy of Aerospace Defense, which has become a forge of military command and engineering personnel for the Air Defense Forces (VKO) not only of our country, but also of a number of countries near and far abroad.

1950s - truly revolutionary in terms of the development of air defense weapons, the creation of fundamentally new models. It was during this period that the formation of anti-aircraft missile troops, jet fighter aircraft, and radio engineering troops took place.

In August 1950, a decision was made to create an anti-aircraft missile defense system for Moscow. The project was named Berkut. The lead developer of the system was the specially created Design Bureau No. 1 (KB-1) - the future glorified NPO Almaz, known throughout the world for its anti-aircraft guided systems. missile weapons. A. A. Raspletin became the leader of the development. The air defense system consisted of 10 A-100 all-round radars and two rings around Moscow of stationary sectoral multi-channel air defense systems (56 in total), each consisting of a B-200 guidance radar and anti-aircraft guided missiles vertical launch B-300. The air defense system was created in a fantastically short time - less than five years. And this despite the fact that all its elements were developed practically from scratch, and the volume of capital construction was truly enormous. Already in May 1955, the Moscow S-25 air defense system was put into service and served for three decades.

In 1957, the first transportable (that is, non-stationary) S-75 medium-range air defense systems began to enter service with the country's Air Defense Forces. These complexes, like no other, were widely used in real combat operations, including in Vietnam and the Middle East. In Vietnam, in 1972 alone, the last year of the war, 421 American aircraft were destroyed by S-75 systems, including 51 B-52s. Such losses were one of the decisive factors that forced the Americans to withdraw from Vietnam. Upgraded S-75 air defense systems are still in service in a number of countries near and far abroad.

In 1961, the development of the S-125 short-range air defense system was completed, the main specialization of which is the fight against low-altitude targets. For the SAM, the V-600P solid-fuel missile was developed for the first time. The export version of the air defense system ("Pechora") was supplied to 35 countries of the world. The air defense system received its first baptism of fire in 1970 in Egypt. Then there were Syria and Libya. In March 1999, in the skies over Yugoslavia, an American F-117A stealth aircraft was shot down by an S-125 air defense system.

In June 1958, a government decree was adopted on the development of the S-200 long-range air defense system. By January 1960, its draft design was already ready. For the first time in domestic practice, the air defense system implemented the principle of homing missiles at a target. When creating the air defense system, the developers faced a number of technical difficulties, many of which had to be solved during field and state tests. The S-200 air defense system was adopted in February 1967.

Thus, within 10 years, a well-thought-out set of types of anti-aircraft missile weapons was created in the USSR, which made it possible to build effective anti-aircraft missile defense systems for various objects and regions of the country.

The development of fighter aviation proceeded at an impressive pace. The MiG-15 became the first mass domestic jet fighter of the 1st generation. The first air regiments with MiG-15 fighters were formed back in 1949. The debut of the large-scale combat use of these aircraft was the war in the skies of Korea (November 1950 - July 1953), where our MiGs were in no way inferior to the latest American F-86 Saber fighters : in total, Soviet pilots shot down about 1100 enemy aircraft, their losses amounted to 335 fighters.

To replace the 1st generation fighters MiG-15, MiG-17, Yak-25 in the late 1950s - early 1960s. fighters and aviation came missile systems interception of the 2nd generation - Su-9 (1959), Su-11-98 (1961), Su-15-98, Tu-128-S4 and Yak-28 (1965). ARCP Su-15-98 for a long time formed the basis of the fighter aviation of the Air Defense Forces of the country.

In June 1954, the formation of the air defense radio engineering troops was completed. By this time, the domestic industry had mastered the production of a fairly wide range of radar equipment. One of the first mass radars of the post-war period was the P-20 Periscope mobile two-coordinate centimeter-range radar, the P-8 Volga early warning m-range radar (1950) and the PRV-10 Konus radio altimeter.

In 1955–1956 the troops began to receive the P-15 "Tropa" meter range radar for detecting low-altitude targets and the P-12 "Yenisei" radar. The P-12 radar was the first to use the SDC coherent-compensation equipment. This radar gradually replaced almost all previously created meter range radars.

A little later, in 1959, the Oborona-14 mobile early warning radar was put into service, and in 1961, the Altai radar, consisting of four radio altimeters and two range finders. In the same year, the PRV-11 "Vershina" radio altimeter of the centimeter range began to enter the troops. The latest modifications of this radio altimeter are still in service with the RTV of the Russian Air Force and a number of CIS countries.

Gradually, automation tools began to be used for combat command and control of troops. The first adopted control automation system (ACS) was the warning, control and guidance system for fighter aircraft Vozdukh-1. The command posts of the operational level began to be equipped with a complex of automation equipment (KSA) "Almaz-2".

Under the conditions of the new organizational structure of the country's Air Defense Forces and equipping them with new weapons with sharply increased combat capabilities, the ideology and principles of organizing air defense have changed. It was considered expedient in a number of regions of the country to switch from the object-based to the zonal (zonal-objective) principle of organizing defense. In the border (coastal) areas, anti-aircraft missile defense zones were advanced to the 1st echelon of defense with the creation of anti-aircraft missile defense lanes. Fighter aviation formed the basis of the 2nd echelon, but with the ability, if necessary, to operate in the ZRV zones.

Created in the 1960s. the air defense system was mainly focused on the Western, Southwestern and Southern strategic directions, where the main US and NATO air attack forces were concentrated. In the future, with the growth of the capabilities of US strategic aviation and equipping it with strategic cruise missiles, the North direction became potentially dangerous. In this regard, work began on the organization of air defense in this area (the "Shield" system) on the basis of the long-range interception ARCP.

The organizational structure of the Air Defense Forces of the country itself was changing. By 1960, the operational link was enlarged. Instead of 20 air defense formations and formations, 13 were left: two air defense districts, five air defense armies and six air defense corps, whose areas of responsibility covered the entire country. Soon, changes were made at the operational-tactical and tactical level. Instead of corps and divisions of the military branches, air defense formations (corps, divisions) of mixed composition were created, in which the types of troops (ZRV, IA, RTV) were represented by regimental structures.

The relatively calm and very productive development of the Air Defense Forces of the country under the leadership of Marshal S. S. Biryuzov, and then Marshal P. F. Batitsky ended in 1978. Head General Staff The USSR Armed Forces N.V. Ogarkov put forward the idea of ​​creating the so-called Unified Air Defense System of the country and the Armed Forces. The commander-in-chief of the Air Defense Forces of the country, P.F. Batitsky, sharply opposed, but the top political and military leadership (L.I. Brezhnev and D.F. Ustinov) supported N.V. Ogarkov. As a result, Batitsky resigned as commander-in-chief, and in December 1979 a decision was made by the Defense Council, according to which the air defense system essentially returned to the pre-war organization.

The territory of the country was again divided into border and inland regions. In the border areas, the Baku Air Defense District and five separate air defense armies (Minsk, Leningrad, Kyiv, Arkhangelsk, Khabarovsk) were disbanded. The air defense corps and divisions included in them were again subordinated to the military districts. Fighter aviation regiments from these formations were seized and transferred to the Air Force of the military districts. As a result, the unity of command and control of air defense forces and means was disrupted and the unified air defense system of the country actually ceased to exist.

At the end of 1982, after the death of L. I. Brezhnev, P. F. Batitsky managed to draw the attention of the new Secretary General Yu. V. Andropov to the so-called reform of the country's Air Defense Forces. As a result, a commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU was created, which, after two years of work, concluded that the reorganization of N.V. Ogarkov was wrong and "The air defense forces of the country should be returned to their previous state."

The corresponding resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR was adopted on January 24, 1986. In the border areas, five former air defense formations were restored, returning them to direct subordination to the commander-in-chief of the Air Defense Forces. Instead of the Baku Air Defense District, a separate air defense army was formed with headquarters in Tbilisi.

At the same time, the dual command over the Air Defense Forces remained: they were operationally subordinate to the commanders-in-chief of the troops of the directions (soon abolished), and in fact - to the military districts.

Despite organizational fluctuations, in the 1970s and 1980s. there was a dynamic process of equipping the Air Defense Forces with new weapons and military equipment.

Since 1979, the Air Defense Forces began to receive fundamentally new S-300P air defense systems (the lead developer was NPO Almaz). At present, modifications of this system (S-300PS, S-300PM) form the basis of the armament of the anti-aircraft missile system. On the basis of this air defense system, the Moscow S-50 air defense system was created, which replaced the previously existing S-25 system.

Fighter aviation continued to develop. In the 1970s the industry has mastered the mass production of 3rd generation fighter-interceptors - MiG-23P and MiG-25PD, and in the early 80s 4th generation fighters - MiG-31 (1981), MiG-29 (1983) and Su-27 (1984).

The MiG-31 long-range fighter was for the first time equipped with a phased array radar and had high capabilities for detecting and destroying cruise missiles. It was considered as the main element of the above-mentioned air defense system in the Northern direction "Shield". Aircraft of the 4th generation currently form the basis of the weapons of the Air Force IA.

The radio engineering troops have almost completely updated their fleet of radar equipment. During the period under review, the RTV received radars and radars ST-68U (UM), Casta 2-1 and Casta 2-2, Periscope-VM, Oborona-14S, P-18, P-37 , "Sky" and "Sky-U", "Desna-M", "Opponent-G", "Gamma-S1", K-66 (M).

EW units and subunits were equipped with new equipment.

Taking into account the high dynamics of the combat operations of the air defense forces, the military leadership paid great attention to the development of means of automation of combat control and equipping the troops with them. At the same time, the process of complex equipment of the KSA of the control points of the operational, operational-tactical and tactical levels of control was underway. The command posts of the operational control level were equipped with Almaz-type KSA. ACS "Luch-1", "Luch-2" were introduced into the operational-tactical level of command. The command posts of formations and units of the military branches were equipped with KSA of the Senezh, Vector-2, Baikal, Rubezh-1, Niva, AKUP-1 types.

In the 1970s the Air Defense Forces of the country included the forces and means of rocket and space defense (RKO). The RKO system combined the missile attack warning system (SPRN), the outer space control system (SKKP), the anti-missile (ABM) and anti-space (PKO) defense systems.

The early warning system officially took up combat duty in 1976 as part of a command post, six early detection nodes (Dnepr radar) and the US-K space echelon. In 1978, the modernized Moscow A-135M missile defense system was adopted as part of the Don-2N radar, a command and computer center and two types of anti-missiles. In November 1978, the PKO IS-M complex was put into service. A few years earlier, a space control center began to function.

The further history of the Air Defense Forces of the country is inextricably linked with the history of the formation and development of the Armed Forces Russian Federation. Unfortunately, its beginning was far from joyful. Already in 1992, they announced the reform of the Armed Forces.

The reform was carried out in the absence of a coherent military ideology for ensuring the military security of the state as a whole and a clear understanding of the rational image of the RF Armed Forces (“The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation” and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation were adopted only at the beginning of 2000).

As a result, the main result of the reform of the Air Defense Forces was a sharp reduction in the combat strength and funding for their maintenance. The troops have practically ceased to receive new weapons, the level of combat training has dropped to a dangerous limit.

In July 1997, a large-scale reorganization of the country's air defense took place. In accordance with the decree of the President of the Russian Federation, the Air Defense Forces were liquidated as a branch of the Armed Forces. The air defense forces from their composition were transferred to the Air Force, and the RKO forces - to the Strategic Missile Forces (later - to the newly formed Space Forces). Among military specialists, disputes about the benefits and harms of these transformations still do not subside.

However, life does not stand still. As Russia's economic position strengthened, so did its Armed Forces. Considerable attention was paid to the air defense of the country.

Military science played a significant role in the development and strengthening of air defense. With her active participation in the early 2000s. a draft "Concept of Aerospace Defense of the Russian Federation" was developed, which in November 2002 was approved by the collegium of the Ministry of Defense. Subsequently, the concept was approved by the President of the Russian Federation and became one of the fundamental documents regarding the development of the country's aerospace defense. At the same time, a system project for the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation was developed, and a little later, a draft design for an integrated system of the aerospace defense of Moscow and the Central Industrial Region.

A large amount of research has been carried out to identify and streamline the most important objects of the Armed Forces, the economy and infrastructure in the interests of improving the organization of their air defense. Active scientific research was carried out in the field of development of the unified air defense system of the CIS, formed in 1996.

In 2010–2011 there have been significant changes in the organization of air defense (VKO) of the country. To date, air defense forces and assets in the Air Force are concentrated in four Air Force and Air Defense Commands, each of which is operationally subordinate to the corresponding military district (in accordance with the new military-administrative division of the country, since December 1, 2010, four military districts have been operating in the Russian Federation - Western , Southern, Central and Eastern). The air defense corps and divisions that existed earlier were transformed into aerospace defense brigades. Fighter aviation has been reduced to air bases.

On the basis of the Space Forces, the Aerospace Defense Troops were formed. They include the Space Command (PRN systems and reconnaissance of the space situation) and the Air Defense-ABM Command, which provides aerospace defense of Moscow and the Central Industrial Region. It includes the Moscow missile defense system and three air defense brigades. On December 1, 2011, the troops of the East Kazakhstan region took up combat duty.

In recent years, the process of re-equipping the Air Defense Forces (VKO) with new equipment has significantly revived. The troops began to receive the latest S-400 air defense systems, Pantsir air defense systems, and 4+ generation fighters. The latest radar equipment is supplied to the radio engineering troops. Control systems are equipped with ever more intelligent and fast automation systems. The country's leadership announced impressive amounts of funding for the Armed Forces, planned for the period up to 2020. The implementation of these plans will significantly increase the rate of rearmament of the troops and ensure a significant increase in their combat capabilities.

The experience of local wars and armed conflicts in recent decades convincingly testifies to the steady growth of the role of aviation in modern warfare. becomes more potentially dangerous space. Under these conditions, the issues of improving the means and methods of countering potential threats from the air and space are becoming increasingly important.

The modern system of aerospace defense of the Russian Federation is designed to provide a solution to the entire set of tasks of combat in aerospace:

• warning of air, missile and space attacks, reconnaissance of the air and space situation and notification of troops about it;
• protection of the state border of the Russian Federation in the airspace and control of the procedure for using the airspace;
• reflection of aggression in the aerospace sphere, air and missile defense of the most important objects of state and military administration, key objects of the Armed Forces, economy and infrastructure.

The Air Defense Forces have traveled a glorious and difficult path. There were ups and downs, moments of glory and years of disappointments, high achievements and failures. And today they rightfully remain at the forefront of the defense of the Fatherland, strengthening and increasing the military glory of our grandfathers and fathers.

Boris Leonidovich ZARETSKY
Candidate of Military Sciences, Corresponding Member of the AVN, Senior Researcher at the Air Defense Research Center (Tver)

Yuri Timofeevich ALEKHIN
candidate of technical sciences, professor of AVN, senior researcher at the Air Defense Research Center (Tver)

Sergei Glebovich KUTSENKO
senior researcher at the Air Defense Research Center (Tver)

The heroic defense of Leningrad is one of the brightest pages of the Great Patriotic War. The defense was carried out not only from the ground, but also from the air. leningrad war aviation combat

The 2nd Air Defense Corps provided direct cover for Leningrad from air strikes. The corps was commanded by Major General M. M. Protsvetkin, his deputy was Major General of Artillery S. A. Krasnopevtsev, Brigade Commissar Chumakov was deputy for political affairs, Colonel V. M. Dobryansky was the chief of staff, Colonel S. K. Grokhochinsky was the chief of artillery of the corps.

After the deployment of the corps with the beginning of the war, it consisted of: six medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery regiments, one separate medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery battalion, one anti-aircraft machine-gun regiment, two anti-aircraft searchlight regiments, three barrage balloon regiments, one VNOS regiment and a separate VNOS radio battalion.

In addition to the ground air defense units for the air defense of Leningrad, two fighter aviation divisions were allocated from the Air Force of the Leningrad Military District. With the outbreak of hostilities, five additional fighter aviation regiments were included in these divisions.

Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel S.P. Danilov was appointed commander of the corps, Brigadier Commissar F.F. Verov was appointed military commissar, and Colonel N.P. Abramov was appointed chief of staff.

The 7th Fighter Aviation Corps was transferred to the operational subordination of the commander of the 2nd Air Defense Corps, which was extremely important for ensuring the purposeful use of fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery in the Leningrad air defense system.

To carry out the assigned tasks, air defense fighter aviation was based at 10 airfields located around Leningrad, 20-60 km from it. In addition, in the first months of the war, if necessary, another 15 other airfields could be used. Most of the airfields were located in the south and southwest of the city. But by September 1941, when the city was besieged by the enemy, the airfield network of the 7th Fighter Air Corps was sharply reduced. Only four airfields located to the north remained at his disposal. Air defense fighters were based on them during the entire period of the blockade of Leningrad.

From the first day of the war, air defense fighter aviation established round-the-clock patrols in the air on the approaches to Leningrad and over the city itself, and duty groups of fighters were on alert at the airfields. But as the reliability of detecting an air enemy by the Redut radar stations increased, it also became possible to more or less timely raise duty groups of fighters into the air. This made it possible, from September 1941, to reduce fighter patrols near Leningrad.

The grouping of medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery was based on the principle of all-round defense with the strengthening of the north-western, western and south-western directions, which before the war the command of the 2nd Air Defense Corps considered the most dangerous. In the first weeks of the war, some changes were made to the grouping of medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery. In particular, they strengthened the western direction by placing eight batteries on barges in the Gulf of Finland and somewhat expanded the zone of fire in the northern part of the city in order to cover the most important airfields.

After the main directions of the approach of enemy aircraft to Leningrad from the south and south-west were identified during the hostilities and our southern airfields of air defense fighter aircraft began to be subjected to assault and bomber raids, in August 1941 it was necessary to make a more significant regrouping of medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery batteries . An additional external line of 15 medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery batteries was created, which were removed from the northern and eastern sectors and installed along the Nizino, Ropsha, Kolomenskaya, Pokrovskaya, Glinka settlement lines. For maneuvering operations on enemy aircraft approach routes from the southwest and south, a separate medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery division was formed, consisting of three batteries at the expense of supernumerary materiel. In addition, from August 1941, 6 separate railway anti-aircraft batteries were created to cover the lines of communication.

With the approach of German ground troops to Leningrad, a number of anti-aircraft batteries of the southern and south-western sectors had to be moved to new positions, as well as to remove anti-aircraft batteries that were on barges in the Gulf of Finland, as they were under the influence of enemy artillery fire. As a result, by October 1941, the zone of anti-aircraft fire for the defense of Leningrad in the south and south-west was significantly reduced.

In the western and southwestern directions, the depth of the fire zone was only 17-18 km from the city, in the south - 27 km, and in other directions - 26-28 km.

Anti-aircraft artillery of small caliber covered the most important objects inside the city. Its guns were mounted on the roofs of buildings on specially equipped platforms. Due to the fact that small-caliber anti-aircraft batteries were located throughout the city, separated from the battle formations of their regiments, their control was difficult. Therefore, in September 1941 they were promptly subordinated to the commander of an anti-aircraft machine-gun regiment, and in February 1942 they were reduced to a separate small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery regiment, which made it possible to more correctly organize battery management and their combat training.

Most of the anti-aircraft machine guns were to cover the firing positions of medium-caliber anti-aircraft batteries from low-flying aircraft. The rest of the machine guns, mainly the DShK systems, were part of the anti-aircraft machine gun regiment and carried out combat missions to defend the industrial facilities of the city. They, like small-caliber anti-aircraft guns, stood on the roofs of buildings.

Due to the large understaffing of units of the 2nd Air Defense Corps with searchlight stations, with the beginning of the war, all anti-aircraft searchlights were used to create only a light zone to ensure night firing of anti-aircraft artillery. But the combat situation in the very first months of the war required the creation of light searchlight fields for the night battle of fighters. At the end of July 1941, searchlight regiments on one of the main enemy aviation routes in the southwestern direction, in the area of ​​Gatchina, Sivertsy, Vitino, Ropsha, created a light searchlight field with an area of ​​40X25 km.

At the end of July 1941, to strengthen the western direction in the Gulf of Finland, 8 searcher stations with sound pickups and 12 accompanying stations were installed on barges. In this way, the connection between the light zone of Leningrad and the light zone of the air defense of Kronstadt was achieved.

The advance of the enemy to Leningrad forced at the end of August 1941 to remove the light searchlight field for the night battle of fighters in the south-west direction, and also to withdraw the barges with searchlights from the Gulf of Finland to the mouth of the Neva, as they were subjected to artillery fire from the Nazis. In addition, 86 searchlights were directed from the southern and southwestern directions.

As a result, during the period of the blockade, the main area of ​​​​the light zone of anti-aircraft searchlights was significantly reduced and the searchlights could only partially provide night fire for anti-aircraft artillery. On the southern and western directions, the border of the light zone was behind the border of the anti-aircraft artillery fire zone.

Three regiments of barrage balloons built their battle formation on the principle of all-round defense with increased cover for the most important objects inside the city and with the consolidation of the grouping in the most probable directions of enemy aircraft flights. On the outskirts of the city, a front line of barrage balloons was created, remote from the city borders by 12-15 km from the south and 8-10 km from the north. Here, barrage balloons were located in a checkerboard pattern with intervals between posts of 800 - 1200 m. At the beginning of the war, there were 150 balloon posts in the city, and 147 on the approaches to it. 31 balloons.

During the blockade, the area of ​​the balloon barrage was sharply reduced. Due to the loss of balloons and the lack of hydrogen for balloon units, only 114 posts remained on the defense of Leningrad, they were clearly not enough to create an appropriate barrage density.

Barrage balloons, which were in service with the air defense of Leningrad, made it possible to barrage at altitudes of 2000 - 4500 m with a maximum wind speed of up to 12 - 15 m per second.

By June 24, 1941, the 2nd regiment and the 72nd separate VNOS radio battalion deployed the main VNOS post of the 2nd Air Defense Corps, 16 company posts, 263 observation posts, 23 VNOS posts for directing fighter aircraft to an air enemy and 8 sets of RUS radio installations -1 ("Rhubarb").

The basis of the VNOS service in the first months of the war was ground-based visual observation posts. Of these, a warning strip and a continuous field of observation were created. The VNOS warning zone was located 120-140 km from Leningrad and ran from the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ladoga along the line of Narva, Luga, Chudovo, Volkhov and further along the eastern shore of Lake Ladoga. In the north and northwest, warning line posts were located along the state border with Finland. A continuous field of observation was created around Leningrad and consisted of four or five concentric rings of VNOS posts. The outer contour of the continuous field of observation took place at a distance of 60 - 70 km from the city, and the inner contour - at a distance of 25 - 30 km. The warning strip and the continuous field of observation were connected by nine radial compartments from observation posts. The airspace over the Gulf of Finland near Leningrad and over Lake Ladoga was not monitored by VNOS posts of the 2nd Air Defense Corps. Here, the observation of the air enemy was carried out by the forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, which interacted with the air defense corps.

Eight RUS-1 radar installations were deployed a month before the war and formed three lines of radio detection of an air enemy.

The enemy offensive led to a significant curtailment of the network of VNOS observation posts. So, from July 3, 1941, the withdrawal of VNOS posts on the Karelian Isthmus began, from July 19 - from the Gdov-Luga line, and in early August - along the entire front. By mid-September, the former VNOS service system in Leningrad ceased to exist. The front line moved almost close to the city. Only 62 active VNOS posts remained on the supply of Leningrad, which formed a continuous field of observation in the blocked territory. The forward line of VNOS posts ran in the north along the line of N. Nikuoyasy, Lembalovo, Sestroretsk, and in the south - the Trade Port, Pulkovo, Ust-Izhora and further along the Neva. Posts remained on these lines throughout the blockade.

Under the conditions of the blockade, the RUS-2 radar installations played an exceptional role. Since the second half of August 1941, they have become the main means of monitoring the air situation. By the end of the first year of the war, Leningrad's air defense was already provided by 10 RUS-2 radar stations, of which 2 were of the Pegmatit type, and the rest of the Redut type. Directly Leningrad was provided by 5 RUS-2 stations. All these stations worked quite reliably, ensuring the detection of enemy aircraft at a distance of 100-140 km.

Thus, from September 1941, the old VNOS air defense system of Leningrad, based on visual observation of VNOS posts, ceased to exist and its place was taken by the VNOS system, in which the RUS-2 radar stations played the main role. VNOS observation posts have become a means of clarifying radar data on the nearest approaches to the city (176).

The air defense forces of Leningrad entered into battle with an air enemy in the very first days of the war. On the night of June 23, 1941, two groups of bombers, seven to nine aircraft each, tried to raid Leningrad from the Karelian Isthmus (177). The bombers flew at low altitude. Met by anti-aircraft gunners in the Gorskaya, Sestroretsk area, they split up: one group went to Kronstadt, where anti-aircraft gunners of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet shot down 4 aircraft, and the rest, hastily turning around, left. The second group bombarded the military camp and the anti-aircraft gunners' command posts. The raid of this group was repulsed by the batteries of the 115th and 194th anti-aircraft artillery regiments. Anti-aircraft gunners of the 2nd Air Defense Corps shot down one enemy aircraft from this group.

In the first months of the war, the efforts of enemy aviation were mainly concentrated on conducting aerial reconnaissance. Scouts usually operated from high altitudes - 6000 - 7000 m. Along with reconnaissance, fascist aviation bombed Leningrad objects.

In the first half of July 1941, the group of German fascist armies "North", using its numerical superiority and a large superiority in equipment, reached the distant approaches to Leningrad. There was an immediate threat to the city of Lenin. To reinforce and support our ground troops, the 2nd Air Defense Corps on July 5 allocated 100 anti-aircraft guns with the best crews and sent them to anti-tank defense. On August 22, by order of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, the 115th, 189th, 194th and 351st anti-aircraft artillery regiments additionally formed four anti-tank divisions and sent them to anti-tank defense in the Southern Fortified Region.

The exit of German troops to the distant approaches to Leningrad allowed them to pull up their aircraft to the airfields closest to the city and from the second half of July 1941 to intensify bombing raids on the city.

On July 20, a group of 9 Yu-88 bombers under the cover of 11 Me-110 fighters at an altitude of 3000 m tried to break through to Leningrad from the south. In the Krasnogvardeysk area, she was met by 25 fighters of the 7th Fighter Aviation Corps. In an air battle, our pilots shot down 8 enemy aircraft, forcing the rest to turn around and go back.

The enemy repeated an attempt to break through to Leningrad the next day, when 25 Yu-88, Me-110 and Me-109 aircraft at an altitude of 4000 m approached the city from the south, but, having met intense fire from anti-aircraft batteries, turned around and left, dropping bombs on Gorelovsky aerodrome.

On July 22, the raid was repeated. This time, five groups of up to 70 aircraft rushed to Leningrad. 75 of our fighters were raised to meet them, which shot down 13 aircraft in air battles and forced the rest to abandon the raid.

Having received during these three days a crushing rebuff from the air defense of Leningrad, especially from the air defense fighters, the Nazis launched their raids on the airfields of fighter aircraft, trying to suppress it. Along with this, they continued to try to break through to Leningrad. In total, in July and August, the Nazis carried out 17 group raids on Leningrad, of which 8 were daytime and 9 night.

The air defense forces of Leningrad, successfully repulsing all these raids, shot down 232 enemy aircraft by September 1, including 192 fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery 40 aircraft. Of the 1614 enemy aircraft sent to Leningrad, only 28 enemy bombers managed to break through to the city.

When repulsing enemy air raids, pilots and anti-aircraft gunners, Vnosovtsy and projectorists showed courage and courage.

On August 10, 1941, 6 fighters of the 192nd Fighter Aviation Regiment, led by squadron commander Captain I. A. Shapovalov, stormed enemy ground forces near the village of Ustye. At this time, an enemy group of 40-50 bomber aircraft appeared in the air. Our six fighters, having dropped bombs on enemy positions, decided to thwart the plan of the Nazis and resolutely attacked them. Captain I. A. Shapovalov set fire to the Me-110 with a successful burst, however, his plane also caught fire from enemy shots. But the captain continued the fight and rammed the second fascist plane with his burning car. With bold attacks, six brave fighters prevented the enemy group from completing their task.

But not only in the air, Leningrad fighters destroyed enemy aircraft during this period. They made daring crushing raids on enemy airfields. So, on August 25, reconnaissance established a concentration of over 70 German aircraft at the airfield in the Spasskaya Polest area. Four groups of fighters consisting of 41 aircraft took off to attack this airfield. On the first approach, they bombed the airfield, and then began to storm the parking lots, making three or four attacks. The Nazis tried to lift their aircraft into the air, but our pilots destroyed 14 aircraft during takeoff, and in total 40 aircraft were destroyed at the airfield. To the rescue, the Germans raised 12 of their fighters from a nearby airfield. Our aviators entered into an air battle with them and shot down 6 aircraft.

Anti-aircraft gunners, with their fire, forced enemy bombers to operate from high altitudes and drop bombs, often without aiming anywhere. Many anti-aircraft units and subunits, courageously repelling Nazi air raids, successfully replenished the account of downed enemy aircraft. Thus, the division of the 351st anti-aircraft artillery regiment under the command of Captain A.I. Sumenkov shot down 14 enemy aircraft during one battle.

In the battles on the outskirts of Leningrad, the 8th battery of the 351st anti-aircraft artillery regiment under the command of Lieutenant P. N. Petrunin distinguished himself. On August 30, 1941, the advanced units of the Nazi troops reached the Neva near the village of Ivanovskoye and tried to force it. In this sector, there was only one 8th anti-aircraft battery, located on the opposite bank. Our infantry units have not yet arrived here. Lieutenant P. N. Petrunin immediately organized the defense. The commander of the control platoon, Lieutenant E. A. Miloslavsky, with scouts, junior sergeant D. A. Krayukhin and Red Army soldier A. D. Panfilov, established continuous surveillance of the enemy. As soon as the Nazis accumulated and headed for the shore for the crossing, the battery opened fire. According to the exact adjustment of Lieutenant E. A. Miloslavsky, the gaps covered the Nazis and dispersed them, preventing them from crossing.

Then the enemy decided to destroy the battery with an air strike. On the morning of September 2, several Yu-88 bombers appeared over the firing position. However, the battery detected the danger in time and met them with well-aimed volleys. Three planes, enveloped in flames, crashed into the ground, and the rest, hastily dropping bombs, fled.

In the evening, the enemy again sent a large group of Yu-88 bombers to suppress the battery. A hot fight broke out. But this time, the anti-aircraft gunners won, shooting down three more aircraft. It was clear that the Nazis would try to take revenge on the gunners. The commander changed his firing position. The enemy discovered the battery and again threw a large group of aircraft at it, now Yu-87, which flew in from different directions and dived. The fire had to be carried out by direct fire to each gun independently. In a fierce battle, the battery suffered losses, but the fire did not stop until the last enemy aircraft was driven off.

In difficult conditions, the advanced posts of the VNOS also had to operate. With the advance of the enemy, the command of the 2nd Air Defense Corps was forced to withdraw these posts closer to the city. And, retreating together with our troops, they often had to fight with a ground enemy. For example, on July 14, 1941, a column of fascist tanks broke through in the area of ​​VNOS post No. 0114 near the village of Ivanovskoye. The head of the post, Sergeant N. I. Zornikov, having reported this, together with the Red Army observers I. A. Zaitsev, P. A. Zhulyev and P. P. Yakovlev entered into an unequal battle. And even when the Nazis opened artillery fire on the post, the brave soldiers continued to fight the enemy. Vnosovites destroyed four tanks and several dozen Nazi soldiers. The entire personnel of the VNOS post died in an unequal battle, but the tanks were detained, and in the meantime our units arrived in time and drove the enemy back. Since then, the Zornikovites have become a symbol of courage and patriotism in the air defense units of Leningrad.

The very first battles with a strong and experienced air enemy forced the pilots of the 7th Fighter Aviation Corps to seek and master new tactics, to master the skill of air combat. At the beginning of the war, when patrolling and repelling raids, our pilots usually used the combat formations of the "ceremonial" formation of the link and nine. This strongly tied the maneuverability of the group, diverted the attention of the pilots to maintaining the battle formation and interfered with the timely detection of the enemy. The entire composition of the group usually entered the battle, without providing cover for their attacking crews. The enemy took advantage of this and made unexpected attacks from above, from the direction of the sun, from behind the clouds, as a result, our pilots suffered unnecessary losses. They carried out attacks in the same way, as a rule, from the rear hemisphere, and especially from behind from below, and fire was opened from long distances and long bursts. Masking with the use of clouds and the sun was also insufficiently applied. The exit from the attack was most often carried out by diving without the use of horizontal maneuver, which allowed enemy fighters to use their advantages in vertical maneuver.

Eliminating these shortcomings became the most important task of fighter pilots in the first months of the war. "Ceremonial" constructions were no longer used. In combat formations, a strike group and a cover group began to be distinguished, and a pair of fighters became the smallest combat unit. Particular attention was now paid to covering attacks and getting out of them. Such techniques as covert approach to the enemy, opening fire from short distances, forcing enemy fighters into battle on horizontal lines and at the most favorable altitudes, began to bring significant success to our pilots in air battles. If the results of air battles with the enemy in July - August 1941 amounted to a ratio of approximately 2: 1 in favor of the pilots of the 7th Fighter Air Corps, then in May - June 1942 this ratio increased to 4: 1.

In some parts of the anti-aircraft artillery in the first months of the war, the crews were late with the opening of fire, the batteries were poorly prepared for firing and uncoordinatedly fired volley fire. To eliminate these shortcomings, much attention was paid to the organization of observation of the air situation and target designation on batteries, to the training of rangefinder and instrument calculations, and to the preparation of materiel for firing. In turn, the VNOS radio battalion had to hastily master the new RUS-2 radar installations that were coming into service, which, in the face of a reduced network of VNOS observation posts, were the only means of timely detection of an air enemy on the outskirts of the city.

In early September 1941, enemy ground troops came close to Leningrad and began to prepare to storm the city. Before proceeding to storm the defensive lines of Leningrad, the enemy subjected the city to heavy artillery fire and aerial bombardment. On September 8, 1941, fascist aviation made a daytime raid on the city by two groups of Yu-88 bombers, consisting of 23 aircraft flying at an altitude of 4000 m. Some of them managed to break through to the target and drop high-explosive and incendiary bombs in the southern part of the city, causing a number of fires . With the onset of darkness, the raid was repeated. Up to 20 planes, approaching one by one from the south-western direction at an altitude of 6000 m, bombed the city. And in the morning the enemy went on the offensive, hoping to take Leningrad by storm, but failed.

On the night of September 9, German aviation repeated an air raid on Leningrad, dropping 48 high-explosive bombs weighing from 250 to 500 kg.

During September 1941, the enemy made 23 group raids on Leningrad, 11 of them during the day, and the rest at night. During the day, he delivered the main bombing strikes, and at night the raids were designed to wear down the air defense and demoralize the population. The most intensive raids on Leningrad were carried out on 19 and 27 September. On September 19, the enemy made four daytime and two night raids involving about 280 aircraft, and on September 27, groups of up to 200 aircraft attacked the city and airfields three times in the afternoon.

Simultaneously with the bombardment of the city in September, fascist German aviation tried to destroy the main forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in Kronstadt with air strikes. To this end, for three days in a row - September 21, 22 and 23 - up to 400 aircraft carried out massive bombing raids on Kronstadt.

The main burden of repulsing the raids fell on the anti-aircraft artillery of Kronstadt and Leningrad. On September 21, 22 anti-aircraft batteries fired, which shot down 7 aircraft. Under the fire of anti-aircraft artillery, the Nazis could not conduct aimed bombing and did not cause significant damage to the ships of the fleet. The next day, September 22, the Nazi raid on Kronstadt failed. Fighters and anti-aircraft gunners, having destroyed 6 aircraft, did not allow the bombers to reach the object. Having suffered losses and not having achieved success in the first two days, on September 23, enemy aircraft increased their flight altitude to 4000 - 6000 m. But even on that day, five raids on Kronstadt did not bring success to the Germans. Only one of our battleships was damaged and several objects in Kronstadt were damaged. The enemy lost 12 planes that day.

In general, the enemy was unable to achieve the fulfillment of his plans to destroy the ships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Having made several more small raids, which were also successfully repelled by air defense forces, until April 1942 he stopped strikes on the ships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.

More than 2,700 enemy planes took part in the September raids on Leningrad, but as a result active action only 480 German aircraft were able to break through the air defense systems to the city. At the same time, fascist aviation suffered significant losses. Only the Air Defense Forces of the country, defending Leningrad, shot down 272 aircraft, of which pilots of the 7th Fighter Aviation Corps - 120 and anti-aircraft artillery of the 2nd Air Defense Corps - 152 aircraft.

The fascist German command, having not achieved decisive results in the September battles, was forced to abandon further attempts to take Leningrad by storm. It decided to break the heroic resistance of the defenders of the city by a long blockade, systematic artillery shelling and aerial bombardment.

And indeed, the fascist German troops went over to the realization of their barbaric plan. But huge losses, suffered by enemy aircraft during massive daytime raids, forced him to switch almost exclusively to night operations. From October 1 to November 24, 1941, the Nazis carried out 37 bombing raids on Leningrad, of which 32 were carried out at night and only 5 during the day, and then in conditions of continuous cloud cover. About 840 aircraft participated in these raids. Night raids, as a rule, were carried out on clear moonlit nights at altitudes of 5000-6000 m. Bombers approached the city from different directions. The time intervals between the planes reached up to 20 minutes, and the raids stretched out all night, exhausting the personnel of the air defense forces and the population. So, on the night of November 14, the raid lasted 14 hours, and only about 36 aircraft participated in it.

During the period of the blockade, significant changes took place in the air defense control system of Leningrad, aimed at strengthening it.

In accordance with the decision of the State Defense Committee, the 2nd Air Defense Corps was reorganized into the Leningrad Air Defense Corps District. Major General of the Coastal Service G.S. Zashikhin was appointed commander of the troops of the Leningrad Corps Air Defense District, Regimental Commissar A.A. Ikonnikov was appointed military commissar, and Lieutenant Colonel P.F. Rozhkov was appointed chief of staff.

The Svirsky and Ladoga air defense brigade areas, which performed the tasks of defending the communications lines of Leningrad, remained unchanged. The State Defense Committee provided for the direct subordination of the Leningrad corps, Ladoga and Svir air defense brigade regions to the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, and not to the commander of the Air Defense Forces of the country, as was done for all other air defense units of the country. Such an exception was dictated by the specific conditions of the air defense of the blockaded city, in which the troops of the front and the Air Defense Forces of the country carried out one common task - the defense of the city. In this situation, it was expedient to concentrate the leadership of all the troops defending Leningrad in one center.

During the period of the blockade, changes were made in the leadership of the 7th Fighter Aviation Corps, which was operationally subordinate to the commander of the corps area. Colonel E.E. Yerlykin was appointed commander of the corps, brigade commissar G.Yu. Pevzner was appointed military commissar, and lieutenant colonel N.P. Zhiltsov was appointed chief of staff.

During the difficult time of the blockade, the main attention of the command of the 7th Fighter Aviation Corps was focused on covering the Ladoga waterway from enemy air strikes, on patrolling and repelling raids on the Ladoga waterway. For three months, starting from October 1941, the corps made 1836 sorties, which amounted to about 42 percent. the total number of corps sorties. At the same time, pilots over Lake Ladoga shot down 37 enemy aircraft. The corps also continued to conduct combat operations in support of ground troops. To fulfill these tasks, 1460 sorties were made.

Anti-aircraft artillery played a decisive role in repelling raids on Leningrad in October-December. But during this period there was a critical situation with ammunition. The receipt of shells during the hostilities did not cover the cost. So, in September 1941, anti-aircraft gunners used up about 69,000 shells, and received 14,530 shells. The workers of Leningrad provided great assistance to the anti-aircraft gunners, who set up the production of anti-aircraft shells at factories besieged city. However, an acute shortage of shells for 85-mm anti-aircraft guns felt throughout the blockade.

The command was forced to take emergency measures to save ammunition. Fire on enemy aircraft was opened only with the permission of the regiment commander and, in some extreme cases, with the permission of the division commander. When repelling night raids, barrage fire was fired only by two guns of each battery, and the number of series of shots in the curtain was also reduced. In addition, the command of the 2nd Air Defense Corps made a mistake by widely practicing anti-aircraft artillery firing according to sound pickups. This method of shooting proved to be extremely inefficient. During the period from June to December 1941, 69220 shells were used up when firing in this way, and only 1 enemy aircraft was shot down. Therefore, at the beginning of 1942, the air defense of Leningrad abandoned the method of firing with sound pickups and switched to barrage fire.

At the end of November 1941, the Germans again changed their tactics of attacking Leningrad and switched mainly to daylight raids. But now these raids were carried out exclusively in overcast, with bombing from behind the clouds. Usually the raid began in the afternoon and continued until dark. Bombers approached the city singly or in groups of 2-3 aircraft, at intervals of 20-40 minutes, at an altitude of 4000-4500 m. 12-15 aircraft participated in each such raid. At the same time, the enemy carried out artillery shelling of the city.

The reflection of these raids was extremely difficult. Fighter aircraft could not operate successfully in conditions of continuous low cloud cover, and anti-aircraft artillery did not have devices for conducting aimed fire at targets invisible to optical instruments. She fired only low-density barrage fire due to lack of ammunition.

On April 4, 1942, fascist German aviation once again tried to destroy the ships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, which were now stationed at the mouth of the Neva near Vasilyevsky Island. For this purpose, the Nazis sent 100 bombers under the guise of fighters. At the same time, they attacked the airfields of our fighter aviation and fired artillery fire at anti-aircraft batteries stationed in the raid zone.

But this time, too, the enemy miscalculated. Considering the nature of its aerial reconnaissance, the Leningrad Air Defense Command strengthened the defense of the ship parking in advance. The grouping of anti-aircraft batteries at the approaches to the ships was compacted, and medium and small-caliber anti-aircraft batteries and part of anti-aircraft machine guns were concentrated directly at the parking lot to fight diving aircraft. Enemy aircraft were met by our fighters and powerful anti-aircraft fire. 58 bombers managed to break through to the city, dropping up to 230 high-explosive bombs. But under the fire of anti-aircraft artillery, the accuracy of bombing was low, and the ships of the fleet did not suffer significant damage. The Nazis also lost 25 aircraft.

After this unsuccessful raid, the Nazis conducted intensive additional reconnaissance of air defense and the location of ships in the parking lot for twenty days. And then for four days - April 24, 25, 27 and 30 - they made a number of large raids on the parking of ships. They involved up to 200 bombers under the guise of fighters. But this time, too, our aviators and anti-aircraft gunners successfully repulsed all the raids, destroying 38 enemy aircraft. A small number of bombers broke through to the city and the parking lot, which caused almost no damage.

After the April raids on ships at the mouth of the Neva, the Germans did not launch bombing raids on Leningrad until the end of October 1942.

In April, the Leningrad Air Defense Army was created, which included ground air defense units of the Leningrad Corps District and the 7th Fighter Aviation Corps. Major General of the Coastal Service G.S. Zashikhin was appointed Commander of the Leningrad Air Defense Army, Brigadier Commissar A.A. Ikonnikov, Brigadier Commissar F.F. Verov and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Leningrad City Council of Workers’ Deputies P.S. Popkov were appointed members of the Military Council.

This event played a positive role in strengthening the air defense of Leningrad, since it completed the operational and organizational unification of all the troops defending Leningrad from the air, in single system, and a significant strengthening of the controls made it possible to improve the quality of management of their combat operations.

Under the conditions of a long blockade of the city, the importance of reliable interaction between the troops of the Leningrad Air Defense Army, the Air Force of the Leningrad Front and the Air Defense Forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet has increased significantly. To this end, their headquarters developed documents that are uniform for all: a planned table for the interaction of anti-aircraft defense assets; instructions for fighter aircraft of the Leningrad Air Defense Army, the Air Force of the Leningrad Front and the Air Force of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet to repel enemy air raids on Leningrad, on the Kronstadt naval base and on the port of Osinovets; a single coded map for directing fighter aircraft to an air enemy and a single scheme of fighter aircraft combat zones.

By a special resolution of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, the Commander of the Air Defense Fighter Aviation of Leningrad was given the right to use the fighter aviation of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet to repel massive raids on the city.

The system of posts for pointing fighters at the enemy was one for the entire air defense fighter aviation, the Air Force of the Leningrad Front and the Air Force of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. The VNOS services of the Leningrad Air Defense Army, the Leningrad Front and the Air Defense of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet had direct telephone and radio communications between themselves and exchanged data on the air situation.

The anti-aircraft artillery regiments of the KBF had fire communication with the anti-aircraft artillery regiments of the Leningrad Air Defense Army and exchanged mutual information by direct telephone.

Interaction with the military air defense system was organized by the headquarters of the Leningrad Front.

For 1941-1942 pilots of the 7th Air Defense Fighter Aviation Corps destroyed 653 German aircraft, 534 of them in air battles and 119 during airfield attacks. Besides, in. fighting a ground enemy, they destroyed 23 tanks, 228 vehicles, about 34 artillery batteries and suppressed about 86 batteries. During the same period, anti-aircraft artillery units shot down 339 enemy aircraft. In the fight against the ground enemy, anti-aircraft gunners destroyed 61 enemy tanks, 29 vehicles, defeated about 37 and suppressed 59 artillery and mortar batteries, 35 bunkers and 16 observation posts.

Defending the besieged Leningrad, the air defense soldiers accomplished many glorious military deeds and heroic deeds.

Despite the extremely difficult conditions of the fight against fascist aviation, the air defense forces of Leningrad in the first period of the Great Patriotic War did not allow the fascist barbarians to destroy the city with air strikes. The city of Lenin lived and continued to fight heroically.