Here's a small illustration:

Let’s say I read in a 12-volume book (which usually exaggerates the strength of the Germans and satellites opposing us) that by the beginning of 1944 on the Soviet-German front the ratio of forces in artillery guns and mortars was 1.7: 1 (95,604 Soviet versus 54,570 enemy). More than one and a half overall superiority. That is, in active areas it could be up to three times (for example, in the Belarusian operation, 29,000 Soviets against 10,000 enemy). Does this mean that the enemy could not raise his head under hurricane fire Soviet artillery? No, artillery piece it's just a tool for expending shells. There are no shells - and the gun is a useless toy. And providing shells is precisely a logistics task.

In 2009, on VIF, Isaev posted a comparison of ammunition consumption of Soviet and German artillery (1942: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/1718/1718985.htm, 1943: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/ forum/0/archive/1706/1706490.htm, 1944: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/1733/1733134.htm, 1945: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/ 0/archive/1733/1733171.htm). I collected everything in a table, supplemented it with rocket artillery, for the Germans I added from Hanna the consumption of captured calibers (often it gives a non-negligible addition) and the consumption of tank calibers for comparability - in Soviet figures, tank calibers (20-mm ShVAK and 85-mm non-aircraft) are present. Posted it. Well, I grouped it a little differently. It turns out to be quite interesting. Despite the superiority of Soviet artillery in the number of barrels, the Germans fired more shells in pieces, if we take artillery calibers (i.e. guns 75 mm and above, without anti-aircraft):
USSR Germany 1942 37,983,800 45,261,822 1943 82,125,480 69,928,496 1944 98,564,568 113,663,900
If we convert into tons, the superiority is even more noticeable:
USSR Germany 1942 446,113 709,957 1943 828,193 1,121,545 1944 1,000,962 1,540,933
Tons here are taken by the weight of the projectile, not the shot. That is, the weight of metal and explosives falling directly on the head of the opposing party. Let me note that I did not count armor-piercing shells from tanks and tanks as Germans. anti-tank guns(I hope it's clear why). It is not possible to exclude them on the Soviet side, but judging by the Germans, the amendment will be insignificant. In Germany, consumption is given on all fronts, which begins to play a role in 1944.

In the Soviet army, on average, 3.6-3.8 shells were fired per day on a gun barrel from 76.2 mm and above in the active army (without RGK). The figure is quite stable both by year and by caliber: in 1944 the average daily round for all calibers was 3.6 per barrel, for a 122 mm howitzer - 3.0, for 76.2 mm barrels (regimental, divisional, tank) - 3.7. On the contrary, the average daily fire per mortar barrel increases year by year: from 2.0 in 1942 to 4.1 in 1944.

Regarding the Germans, I do not have any guns in the active army. But if we take the general availability of guns, then the average daily round per barrel of 75 mm caliber and higher in 1944 will be about 8.5. At the same time, the main workhorse of divisional artillery (105-mm howitzers - almost a third of the total tonnage of shells) fired an average of 14.5 shells per barrel per day, and the second main caliber (150-mm divisional howitzers - 20% of the total tonnage) fired approximately 10. 7. Mortars were used much less intensively - 81 mm mortars fired 4.4 rounds per barrel per day, and 120 mm only 2.3. The regimental artillery guns gave a consumption closer to average (75 mm infantry gun 7 shells per barrel, 150 mm infantry gun - 8.3).

Another instructive metric is the consumption of shells per division.

The division was the main organizational building block, but typically divisions achieved reinforcement in units. It would be interesting to see how the middle division was supported in terms of firepower. In 1942-44, the USSR had approximately 500 estimated divisions in the active army (without RGK) (weighted average number: 1942 - 425 divisions, 1943 - 494 divisions, 1944 - 510 divisions). IN ground forces The active army was approximately 5.5 million, that is, there were approximately 11 thousand people per division. This “had to” naturally, taking into account both the composition of the division itself and all the reinforcement and support units that worked for it both directly and in the rear.

For the Germans, the average number of troops per division of the Eastern Front, calculated in the same way, decreased from 16,000 in 1943 to 13,800 in 1944, approximately 1.45-1.25 times “thicker” than the Soviet one. Moreover, the average daily fire for a Soviet division in 1944 was about 5.4 tons (1942 - 2.9; 1943 - 4.6), and for a German division it was three times more (16.2 tons). If we count 10,000 people in the active army, then on the Soviet side, 5 tons of ammunition were spent per day to support their actions in 1944, and 13.8 tons on the German side.

The American division in the European theater of operations stands out even more in this sense. It had three times more people than the Soviet one: 34,000 (this does not include Supply Command troops), and the daily ammunition consumption was almost ten times more (52.3 tons). Or 15.4 tons per day for 10,000 people, that is, more than three times more than in the Red Army.

In this sense, it was the Americans who implemented Joseph Vissarionovich’s recommendation to “fight with little blood but with a lot of shells.” You can compare - in June 1944, the distance to the Elbe was approximately the same from Omaha Beach and from Vitebsk. The Russians and Americans also reached the Elbe at about the same time. That is, they provided themselves with the same speed of advancement. However, the Americans along this route spent 15 tons per day per 10,000 personnel and lost an average of 3.8% of troops per month killed, wounded, captured and missing. Soviet troops, advancing at the same speed, spent (specifically) three times less shells, but they also lost 8.5% per month. Those. speed was ensured by the expenditure of manpower.

It is also interesting to look at the distribution of weight consumption of ammunition by type of gun:

Let me remind you that all the figures here are for artillery 75 mm and above, that is, without anti-aircraft guns, without 50 mm mortars, without battalion/anti-tank guns with a caliber from 28 to 57 mm. Infantry guns include German guns with this name, Soviet 76 mm regiments and an American 75 mm howitzer. Other guns weighing less than 8 tons in firing position are counted as field guns. At the upper limit this includes systems such as the Soviet 152 mm howitzer-cannon ML-20 and the German s.FH 18. Heavier guns such as the Soviet 203 mm howitzer B-4, the American 203 mm howitzer M1 or the German 210- mm mortar, as well as the 152-155-170 mm long-range guns on their carriages fall into the next class - heavy and long-range artillery.

It can be seen that in the Red Army the lion's share of fire falls on mortars and regimental guns, i.e. to fire in the near tactical zone. Heavy artillery plays a very minor role (more in 1945, but not much). In field artillery, the effort (based on the weight of the shells fired) is approximately evenly distributed between the 76 mm gun, 122 mm howitzer and 152 mm howitzer/howitzer-gun. Which leads to the fact that the average weight of a Soviet projectile is one and a half times less than a German one.

In addition, it should be noted that the further away the target, the less covered (on average) it is. In the near tactical zone, most targets are dug in/covered in one way or another, while in the depths such unsheltered targets appear as moving reserves, enemy troops in gathering places, headquarters locations, etc. In other words, a projectile hitting a target in depth on average causes more damage than a projectile fired along the front edge (on the other hand, the dispersion of projectiles at long distances is higher).

Then, if the enemy has parity in the weight of the fired shells, but at the same time holds twice as much at the front less people, thereby giving us half as many targets for our artillery.

All this works for the observed loss ratio.

(Like an extended commentary on

In the first weeks of the war, the fronts suffered significant losses and losses accumulated in the troops of the border military districts in the pre-war years. Most of the artillery and ammunition factories were evacuated from the threatened areas to the east.

The supply of weapons and ammunition to military factories in the south of the country stopped. All this significantly complicated the production of weapons and ammunition and the provision of them to the active army and new military formations. Shortcomings in the work of the Main Artillery Directorate also had a negative impact on the supply of troops with weapons and ammunition. The GAU did not always know exactly the state of the supply of troops at the fronts, since strict reporting on this service was not established before the war. The urgent report card for ammunition was introduced at the end of ., and for weapons - in April

Soon changes were made to the organization of the Main Artillery Directorate. In July 1941, the Ground Artillery Supply Directorate was formed, and on September 20 of the same year the position of chief of artillery was restored Soviet army with the GAU subordinate to him. The head of the GAU became the first deputy chief of artillery of the Soviet Army. The adopted structure of the GAU did not change throughout the war and fully justified itself. With the introduction of the post of Chief of Logistics of the Soviet Army, close interaction was established between the GAU, the headquarters of the Chief of Logistics of the Soviet Army and the Central Directorate of Military Transport.

The heroic work of the working class, scientists, engineers and technicians at military enterprises in the central and eastern regions of the country, firm and skillful leadership Communist Party and its Central Committee, local party organizations, the restructuring of the entire national economy on a war footing allowed the Soviet military industry to produce 30.2 thousand guns in the second half of 1941, including 9.9 thousand 76-mm and larger calibers, 42, 3 thousand mortars (of which 19.1 thousand with a caliber of 82 mm and larger), 106.2 thousand machine guns, 89.7 thousand machine guns, 1.6 million rifles and carbines and 62.9 million shells and bombs and mines 215. But since these supplies of weapons and ammunition only partially covered the losses of 1941, the situation with the provision of weapons and ammunition to the troops of the active army continued to remain tense. It took enormous effort from the military industry, the work of the central logistics agencies, and the artillery supply service of the GAU in order to satisfy the needs of the fronts for weapons, and especially for ammunition.

During the defensive battle near Moscow, due to the current production, which was constantly growing in the eastern regions of the country, weapons were primarily provided by the reserve association of the Supreme High Command Headquarters - the 1st shock, 20th and 10th armies, formed in the depths of the country and transferred to the beginning of the counteroffensive near Moscow as part of the Western Front. Due to the current production of weapons, the needs of the troops and other fronts participating in the defensive battle and counter-offensive near Moscow were also met.

A lot of work to make various types weapons during this difficult period for our country were manufactured by Moscow factories. As a result, the number of weapons on the Western Front by December 1941 for its individual types increased from 50-80 to 370-640 percent. There was also a significant increase in armament among the troops of other fronts.

During the counteroffensive near Moscow, massive repairs of failed weapons and military equipment were organized in military repair shops and at enterprises in Moscow and the Moscow region. And yet, the situation with the supply of troops during this period was so difficult that Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin personally distributed anti-tank rifles, machine guns, anti-tank 76-mm regimental and divisional guns between the fronts.

As military factories came into operation, especially in the Urals, Western and Eastern Siberia, and Kazakhstan, already in the second quarter of 1942, the supply of troops with weapons and ammunition began to noticeably improve. In 1942, the military industry supplied the front with tens of thousands of guns of 76 mm caliber and larger, over 100 thousand mortars (82-120 mm), and many millions of shells and mines.

In 1942, the main and most difficult task was to provide support for the troops of the fronts operating in the Stalingrad area, in the great bend of the Don and in the Caucasus.

The consumption of ammunition in the defensive battle of Stalingrad was very high. So, for example, from July 12 to November 18, 1942, the troops of the Don, Stalingrad and Southwestern Fronts expended: 7,610 thousand shells and mines, including about 5 million shells and mines by the troops of the Stalingrad Front 216.

Due to the huge workload railways With operational transportation, transports with ammunition moved slowly and were unloaded at the stations of the front-line railway section (Elton, Dzhanybek, Kaysatskaya, Krasny Kut). In order to quickly deliver ammunition to the troops, the artillery supply department of the Stalingrad Front was allocated two automobile battalions, which in an extremely limited time managed to transport over 500 wagons of ammunition.

The provision of weapons and ammunition to the troops of the Stalingrad Front was complicated by the continuous enemy bombing of crossings across the Volga. Due to enemy air raids and shelling, artillery depots of the front and armies were forced to frequently change locations. The trains were unloaded only at night. In order to disperse the supply trains, ammunition was sent to army warehouses and their departments located near the railway, in batches, 5-10 cars each, and then to the troops in small automobile convoys (10-12 cars each), which usually followed different routes. This method of delivery ensured the safety of ammunition, but at the same time lengthened the time it took to deliver it to the troops.

The supply of weapons and ammunition to troops of other fronts operating in the Volga and Don region during this period was less complex and labor-intensive. During the defensive battle of Stalingrad, all three fronts received 5,388 wagons of ammunition, 123 thousand rifles and machine guns, 53 thousand machine guns and 8 thousand 217 guns.

Along with the current supply of troops, the rear services of the center, fronts and armies during the defensive battle of Stalingrad accumulated weapons and ammunition. As a result of the work done, by the beginning of the counteroffensive the troops were mainly provided with ammunition (Table 19).

Table 19

Supply of troops of three fronts with ammunition (in ammunition) as of November 19, 1942 218

Ammunition	Front
	Stalingrad	Donskoy	Southwestern
Rifle cartridges	3,0	1,8	3,2
Pistol cartridges	2,4	2,5	1,3
Cartridges for anti-tank rifles	1,2	1,5	1,6
Hand and anti-tank grenades	1,0	1,5	2,9
50 mm mines	1,3	1,4	2,4
82 mm mines	1,5	0,7	2,4
120 mm mines	1,2	1,3	2,7
Shots:
45 mm cannon	2,9	2,9	4,9
76 mm cannon regimental artillery	2,1	1,4	3,3
76-mm cannon divisional artillery	1,8	2,8	4,0
122 mm howitzer	1,7	0,9	3,3
122 mm cannon	0,4	2,2	—
152 mm howitzer	1,2	7,2	5,7
152 mm howitzer-cannon	1,1	3,5	3,6
203 mm howitzer	—	—	—
37 mm anti-aircraft	2,4	3,2	5,1
76 mm anti-aircraft	—	5,1	4,5
85 mm anti-aircraft	—	3,0	4,2

Much work was done to provide the troops with ammunition during this period by the heads of the artillery supply services of the fronts: Stalingrad - Colonel A. I. Markov, Don - Colonel N. M. Bocharov, South-Western - Colonel S. G. Algasov, as well as special group GAU, headed by the deputy head of the GAU, Lieutenant General of Artillery K. R. Myshkov, who died on August 10, 1942 during an enemy air raid on Stalingrad.

Simultaneously with the battles that unfolded on the banks of the Volga and in the steppes of the Don, the battle for the Caucasus began in the vast area from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. Supplying the troops of the Transcaucasian Front (Northern and Black Sea groups) with weapons and ammunition was an even more difficult problem than at Stalingrad. The supply of weapons and ammunition was carried out in a roundabout way, that is, from the Urals and from Siberia through Tashkent, Krasnovodsk, and Baku. Some transports went through Astrakhan, Baku or Makhachkala. The long distance for transport with ammunition (5170-5370 km) and the need for repeated transshipment of cargo with railway transport to water and back, or from railway to road and mountain-pack, greatly increased the time of their delivery to front-line and army warehouses. For example, transport No. 83/0418, sent on September 1, 1942 from the Urals to the Transcaucasian Front, arrived at its destination only on December 1. Transport No. 83/0334 traveled from Eastern Siberia to Transcaucasia, equal to 7027 km. But, despite such enormous distances, transports with ammunition regularly went to the Caucasus. During six months of hostilities, the Transcaucasian (North Caucasian) Front received about 2 thousand wagons of ammunition 219.

The delivery of ammunition from front-line and army warehouses to the troops defending the mountain passes and passes of the Caucasus Range was very difficult. The main means of transportation here were army and military pack companies. The 20th Guards Rifle Division, defending the Belorechensk direction, received shells from Sukhumi to Sochi by sea, then to the divisional warehouse by road, and to the regimental combat supply points by pack transport. For the 394th Rifle Division, ammunition was delivered by U-2 aircraft from the Sukhumi airfield. In a similar way, ammunition was delivered to almost all divisions of the 46th Army.

The working people of Transcaucasia provided great assistance to the front. Up to 30 mechanical factories and workshops in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia were involved in the production of shells for hand grenades, mines and medium-caliber shells. From October 1, 1942 to March 1, 1943, they produced 1.3 million hand grenade casings, 1 million mines and 226 thousand shell casings. The local industry of Transcaucasia produced 4,294 50-mm mortars, 688 82-mm mortars, and 46,492 220 machine guns in 1942.

The working class of besieged Leningrad worked heroically. Delivery of weapons and ammunition to a besieged city was extremely difficult, so producing them on site was often crucial. From September until the end of 1941 alone, the city’s industry supplied the front with 12,085 machine guns and signal pistols, 7,682 mortars, 2,298 artillery pieces and 41 rocket launchers. In addition, Leningraders produced 3.2 million shells and mines, over 5 million hand grenades.

Leningrad also supplied weapons to other fronts. In the difficult days of November 1941, when the enemy was rushing to Moscow, by decision of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, 926 mortars and 431 76-mm regimental guns were sent to Moscow. The disassembled guns were loaded onto planes and sent to the Cherepovets station, where an artillery workshop was equipped for their assembly. Then the assembled weapons were loaded onto platforms and delivered by rail to Moscow. During the same period, Leningrad sent 39,700 76-mm armor-piercing shells to Moscow by air.

Despite the difficulties of the first period of the war, our industry steadily increased its output from month to month. In 1942, the GAU received from military factories 125.6 thousand mortars (82-120 mm), 33.1 thousand guns of 76 mm caliber and larger without tanks, 127.4 million shells without aircraft and mines 221, 2,069 222 thousand rockets. This made it possible to completely compensate for combat losses of weapons and ammunition consumption.

Providing the troops of the active army with weapons and ammunition remained difficult in the second period of the war, which was marked by the beginning of a powerful counter-offensive Soviet troops near Stalingrad. By the beginning of the counteroffensive, the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts had 30.4 thousand guns and mortars, including 16,755 units of 76 mm and above 223 caliber, about 6 million shells and mines, 380 million cartridges for small arms and 1.2 million hand grenades. The supply of ammunition from the central bases and warehouses of the GAU during the entire time of the counteroffensive and the liquidation of the encircled enemy group was carried out continuously. From November 19, 1942 to January 1, 1943, 1095 wagons of ammunition were supplied to the Stalingrad Front, 1460 wagons to the Don Front (from November 16, 1942 to February 2, 1943), and to the South-Western Front (from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943). January 1, 1942) - 1090 cars and Voronezh Front (from December 15, 1942 to January 1, 1943) - 278 cars. In total, 3,923 wagons of ammunition were supplied to four fronts during the period November 1942 - January 1943.

The total consumption of ammunition in the Battle of Stalingrad, starting on July 12, 1942, reached 9539 wagons 224 and was unmatched in the history of previous wars. It amounted to a third of the ammunition consumption of the entire Russian army during the four years of the First World War and was twice as high as the ammunition consumption of both belligerents at Verdun.

A huge amount of weapons and ammunition had to be supplied in the second period of the war to the Transcaucasian and North Caucasian fronts, which liberated the North Caucasus from Nazi troops.

Thanks to the effective measures of the Communist Party, the Soviet government, the State Defense Committee, local party and Soviet bodies, and the heroic work of the working class, the production of weapons and ammunition increased significantly in 1942. This made it possible to increase their supply to the troops. The increase in the number of weapons in the troops of the fronts at the beginning of 1943 compared to 1942 is shown in table. 20,225.

Table 20

The hostilities that unfolded in 1943 posed new, even more complex tasks for the artillery supply service of the Soviet Army in the timely accumulation and ongoing supply of front-line troops with weapons and ammunition.

The volume of supplies of weapons and ammunition especially increased during the preparation for the Battle of Kursk. In the period March - July 1943, over half a million rifles and machine guns, 31.6 thousand light and heavy machine guns, 520 heavy machine guns, 21.8 thousand anti-tank rifles, 12,326 guns and mortars were sent to the fronts from the central bases and warehouses of the GAU , or a total of 3100 wagons of weapons 226.

In preparation for the Battle of Kursk, the artillery supply authorities of the center, fronts and armies already had some experience in planning the provision of weapons and ammunition to the troops of the active army. It was carried out as follows. Every month the General Staff issued a directive, which indicated which front, in which order, how much ammunition (in ammunition) and by what time it should be sent. Based on these instructions, time sheets of urgent reports from the fronts and their requests, the GAU planned to send ammunition to the troops of the active army, based on their availability at NPO bases and warehouses, production capabilities during the month, supply and needs of the fronts. When the GAU did not have the necessary resources, it, in agreement with General Staff made adjustments to the established volume of ammunition supply. The plan was reviewed and signed by the commander of the artillery of the Soviet Army, Colonel General, then the chief marshal of artillery N. N. Voronov, his deputy - the head of the GAU, General N. D. Yakovlev, and was presented to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for approval.

Based on this plan, the organizational planning department of the GAU (chief General P.P. Volkotrubenko) reported data on the release and dispatch of ammunition to the fronts and gave orders to the Ammunition Supply Directorate. The latter, together with TsUPVOSO, planned the dispatch of transports within a period of five days and informed the fronts of the numbers of transports, places and dates of their departure. As a rule, the dispatch of transports with ammunition to the fronts began on the 5th and ended on the 25th of each month. This method of planning and sending ammunition to the fronts from central bases and NPO warehouses remained until the end of the war.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk (on July 1, 1943), the Central and Voronezh fronts had 21,686 guns and mortars (without 50-mm mortars), 518 rocket artillery installations, 3,489 tanks and self-propelled guns 227.

The large number of weapons in the troops of the fronts operating on the Kursk Bulge and the intensity of combat operations in the planned offensive operations required an increase in the supply of ammunition to them. During April - June 1943, the Central, Voronezh and Bryansk fronts received over 4.2 million shells and mines, about 300 million small arms ammunition and almost 2 million hand grenades (over 4 thousand wagons). By the beginning of the defensive battle, the fronts were provided with: 76 mm rounds - 2.7-4.3 rounds of ammunition; 122-mm howitzer rounds - 2.4-3.4; 120 mm mines - 2.4-4; large-caliber ammunition - 3-5 ammunition sets 228. In addition, during the Battle of Kursk, the named fronts were supplied with 4,781 cars (over 119 full-fledged trains) of various types of ammunition from central bases and warehouses. The average daily supply to the Central Front was 51 cars, to Voronezh - 72 cars and to Bryansk - 31 cars 229.

The consumption of ammunition in the Battle of Kursk was especially high. During the period July 5–12, 1943 alone, the troops of the Central Front, repelling fierce enemy tank attacks, used up 1,083 wagons of ammunition (135 wagons per day). The bulk falls on the 13th Army, which in eight days consumed 817 wagons of ammunition, or 100 wagons per day. In just 50 days of the Battle of Kursk, three fronts consumed about 10,640 wagons of ammunition (not counting rockets), including 733 wagons of small arms ammunition, 70 wagons of anti-tank rifle ammunition, 234 wagons of hand grenades, 3369 wagons of mines, 276 wagons anti-aircraft artillery rounds and 5950 wagons of ground artillery rounds 230.

Artillery supply in the Battle of Kursk was led by the heads of the artillery supply service of the fronts: Central - engineer-colonel V. I. Shebanin, Voronezh - Colonel T. M. Moskalenko, Bryansk - Colonel M. V. Kuznetsov.

In the third period of the war, the provision of front-line troops with weapons and ammunition improved significantly. Already by the beginning of this period, the Soviet military industry could uninterruptedly supply them to the troops of the active army and new ones. military formations Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. At the bases and warehouses of the GAU, significant reserves of guns, mortars and especially small arms. In this regard, in 1944, the production of small arms and ground artillery guns decreased slightly. If in 1943 the military industry supplied the Soviet Army with 130.3 thousand guns, then in 1944 - 122.5 thousand. The supply of rocket launchers also decreased (from 3330 in 1943 to 2564 in 1944). Due to this, the production of tanks and self-propelled guns(29 thousand in 1944 versus 24 thousand in 1943).

At the same time, the supply of ammunition to the troops of the active army continued to remain strained, especially with shells of 122 mm caliber and higher, due to their high consumption. The total stocks of these ammunition decreased: for 122 mm rounds - by 670 thousand, for 152 mm shells - by 1.2 million and for 203 mm shells - by 172 thousand 231

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee, having considered the situation with the production of acutely scarce ammunition on the eve of decisive offensive operations, set the military industry the task of radically revising production programs for 1944 in the direction of a sharp increase in the production of all types of ammunition, and especially those in short supply.

By decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee, the production of ammunition in 1944 was significantly increased compared to 1943: especially 122-mm and 152-mm shells, 76-mm - by 3,064 thousand (9 percent), M-13 - by 385.5 thousand (19 percent) and M-31 shells - by 15.2 thousand (4 percent) 232. This made it possible to provide front troops with all types of ammunition in offensive operations of the third period of the war.

On the eve of the Korsun-Shevchenko offensive operation, the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts had about 50 thousand guns and mortars, 2 million rifles and machine guns, 10 thousand 233 machine guns, 12.2 million shells and mines, 700 million ammunition for small arms and 5 million hand grenades, which amounted to 1-2 front-line ammunition. During the operation, more than 1,300 wagons of all types of ammunition were supplied to these fronts 234. There were no interruptions in the supply. However, due to the early spring thaw on military roads and military supply routes, the movement of road transport became impossible, and the fronts began to experience great difficulties in transporting ammunition to troops and to artillery firing positions. It was necessary to use tractors, and in some cases involve soldiers and local residents on impassable sections of roads to bring shells, cartridges, and grenades. Transport aircraft were also used to deliver ammunition to the front line.

Po-2 aircraft were used to provide ammunition to tank formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front advancing in the operational depths of enemy defenses. On February 7 and 8, 1944, they were delivered from Fursy airfield to settlements Baranye Pole and Druzhintsy 4.5 million rounds of ammunition, 5.5 thousand hand grenades, 15 thousand 82- and 120-mm mines and 10 thousand 76- and 122-mm shells. Every day, 80-85 aircraft delivered ammunition to tank units, making three to four flights per day. In total, over 400 tons of ammunition were delivered by plane to the advancing troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

Despite great difficulties with supply, the units, units and formations participating in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation were fully provided with ammunition. In addition, their consumption in this operation was relatively small. In total, the troops of the two fronts spent only about 5.6 million rounds, including 400 thousand anti-aircraft artillery shells, 2.6 million ground artillery shells and 2.56 million mines.

The supply of troops with ammunition and weapons was led by the chiefs of artillery supply of the fronts: the 1st Ukrainian - Major General of Artillery N. E. Manzhurin, the 2nd Ukrainian - Major General of Artillery P. A. Rozhkov.

A huge amount of weapons and ammunition was required during the preparation and conduct of the Belarusian offensive operation, one of the largest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War. To fully equip the troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts that took part in it, in May - July 1944, the following were supplied: 6370 guns and mortars, over 10 thousand machine guns and 260 thousand rifles and 236 machine guns. By the beginning of the operation, the fronts had 2-2.5 ammunition for small arms, 2.5-5 ammunition for mines, 2.5-4 ammunition for anti-aircraft rounds, 3-4 ammunition for 76-mm shells, 2.5-5 ,3 ammunition loads of 122-mm howitzer shells, 3.0-8.3 ammunition loads of 152-mm shells.

Such a high supply of ammunition to front troops has never been seen in any of the previously conducted offensive operations of a strategic scale. To ship weapons and ammunition to the fronts, NPO bases, warehouses and arsenals worked at maximum capacity. Personnel at all levels of the rear and railway workers did everything in their power to deliver weapons and ammunition to the troops in a timely manner.

However, during the Belarusian operation, due to the rapid separation of troops from their bases, as well as due to the insufficiently high pace of restoration of railway communications severely destroyed by the enemy, the supply of ammunition to the fronts was often complicated. Road transport worked with great stress, but could not alone cope with the huge volume of supplies in the operational and military rear.

Even the relatively frequent advance of the head sections of front-line and army artillery depots did not solve the problem of timely delivery of ammunition to the troops advancing in wooded and swampy areas, in off-road conditions. The scattering of ammunition reserves along the front line and in depth also had a negative effect. For example, two warehouses of the 5th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front on August 1, 1944 were located at six points at a distance of 60 to 650 km from the front line. A similar situation existed in a number of armies of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian Fronts. The advancing units and formations could not lift all the ammunition reserves accumulated in them during the preparation of the operation. Military councils of fronts and armies were forced to allocate a large number of motor transport for collecting and delivering ammunition remaining in the rear to the troops. For example, the Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front allocated 150 vehicles for this purpose, and the chief of logistics of the 50th Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front allocated 60 vehicles and a working company of 120 people. On the 2nd Belorussian Front in the areas of Krichev and Mogilev, by the end of July 1944, ammunition reserves were at 85 points, and at the initial positions of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front - at 100. The command was forced to transfer them by plane 237. Leaving ammunition at the initial positions lines, artillery firing positions and along the route of advance of units and formations led to the fact that the troops began to experience a shortage of them, although there was a sufficient amount of ammunition registered with the fronts and armies.

The total consumption of ammunition of all calibers during the Belarusian strategic offensive operation was significant. But based on the large availability of weapons, it was generally relatively small. During the operation, 270 million (460 wagons) of small arms ammunition, 2,832 thousand (1,700 wagons) of mines, 478 thousand (115 wagons) of anti-aircraft artillery rounds, about 3,434.6 thousand (3656 wagons) of ground artillery rounds were consumed. artillery 238.

The supply of troops with ammunition during the Belarusian offensive operation was led by the chiefs of artillery supply of the fronts: 1st Baltic - Major General of Artillery A.P. Baykov, 3rd Belorussian - Major General of Engineering and Technical Service A.S. Volkov, 2nd Belorussky - engineer-colonel E. N. Ivanov and 1st Belorussky - major general of the engineering and technical service V. I. Shebanin.

The consumption of ammunition in the Lvov-Sandomierz and Brest-Lublin offensive operations was also significant. During July and August, the 1st Ukrainian Front consumed 4,706 wagons, and the 1st Belorussian Front - 2,372 wagons of ammunition. As in the Belarusian operation, the supply of ammunition was fraught with serious difficulties due to the high rate of advance of troops and their large separation from the artillery depots of the fronts and armies, poor road conditions and the large volume of supply, which fell on the shoulders of road transport.

A similar situation developed in the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts that participated in the Iasi-Kishinev operation. Before the start of the offensive, two to three rounds of ammunition were concentrated directly among the troops. But during the breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses, they were not completely used up. The troops quickly advanced and took with them only the ammunition that their vehicles could carry. A significant amount of ammunition remained in divisional warehouses on the right and left banks of the Dniester. Due to the great extent of military routes, their supply stopped after two days, and five to six days after the start of the offensive, the troops began to experience a great need for ammunition, despite their low consumption. After the decisive intervention of the military councils and front rear services, all vehicles were mobilized, and the situation was soon rectified. This made it possible to successfully complete the Iasi-Kishinev operation.

During the offensive operations of 1945, there were no particular difficulties in providing troops with weapons and ammunition. The total reserves of ammunition on January 1, 1945 compared to 1944 increased: for mines - by 54 percent, for anti-aircraft artillery rounds - by 35, for ground artillery rounds - by 11 percent 239. Thus, in the final period of the war Soviet Union With Nazi Germany, not only were the needs of the active army troops fully met, but they also managed to create additional reserves of ammunition at the front and army warehouses of the 1st and 2nd Far Eastern and Transbaikal fronts.

The beginning of 1945 was marked by two major offensive operations - East Prussian and Vistula-Oder. During their preparation, the troops were fully provided with weapons and ammunition. There were no serious difficulties in transporting them during operations due to the presence of a well-developed network of railways and highways.

The East Prussian operation, which lasted about three months, was distinguished by the highest consumption of ammunition during the entire Great Patriotic War. During its course, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts used up 15,038 wagons of ammunition (5,382 wagons in the Vistula-Oder operation).

After the successful completion of the Vistula-Oder offensive operation, our troops reached the river line. Oder (Odra) and began to prepare for the assault on the main citadel of Nazism - Berlin. In terms of the level of equipment of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts with military equipment and weapons, the Berlin offensive operation surpasses all offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet rear and the rear of the Armed Forces themselves well provided the troops with everything necessary to deliver the final crushing blow to fascist Germany. In preparation for the operation, the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts Over 2 thousand guns and mortars, almost 11 million shells and mines, over 292.3 million rounds of ammunition and about 1.5 million hand grenades were sent. By the beginning of the operation, they had over 2 million rifles and machine guns, over 76 thousand machine guns and 48 thousand guns and mortars 240. During the Berlin operation (from April 16 to May 8), 1945, 7.2 million were supplied to the fronts. (5924 wagons) of shells and mines, which (taking into account reserves) fully covered the consumption and made it possible to create the necessary reserve by the end of the operation.

In the final operation of the Great Patriotic War, over 10 million shells and mines, 392 million rounds of ammunition and almost 3 million hand grenades were used - a total of 9,715 wagons of ammunition. In addition, 241.7 thousand (1920 wagons) of 241 rockets were expended. During preparation and during the operation, ammunition was transported via Allied and Western European gauge railways, and from here to the troops - by front-line and army vehicles. At the junctions of the Union and Western European gauge railways, the transshipment of ammunition in the areas of specially created transshipment bases was widely practiced. It was quite labor-intensive and complex work.

In general, the supply of ammunition to front-line troops in 1945 significantly exceeded the level of previous years of the Great Patriotic War. If in the fourth quarter of 1944 31,736 wagons of ammunition (793 trains) arrived at the fronts, then in the four months of 1945 - 44,041 wagons (1101 trains). To this figure we must add the supply of ammunition to the country’s air defense forces, as well as to marine units. Taking this into account, the total amount of ammunition sent from central bases and warehouses to the troops of the active army for four months of 1945 amounted to 1327 trains 242.

The domestic military industry and the rear services of the Soviet Army successfully coped with the task of supplying front-line troops and new formations with weapons and ammunition in the last war.

The active army spent over 10 million tons of ammunition during the war. As is known, the military industry supplied individual elements of shots to artillery bases. In total, about 500 thousand wagons of these elements were delivered during the war, which were assembled into ready-made shells and sent to the fronts. This colossal and complex work was carried out at the GAU artillery bases mainly by women, old people and teenagers. They stood at the conveyors for 16-18 hours a day, did not leave the workshops for several days, ate food and rested right there, at the machines. Their heroic, selfless work during the war years will never be forgotten by the grateful socialist Fatherland.

Summing up the work of the artillery supply service of the Soviet Army during the years of the last war, it should be emphasized once again that the basis of this type material support The Armed Forces was an industry that during the war years supplied the active army with several million small arms, hundreds of thousands of guns and mortars, hundreds of millions of shells and mines, tens of billions of cartridges. Along with the steady growth in mass production of weapons and ammunition, a number of qualitatively new models of ground and anti-aircraft artillery were created, new models of small arms, as well as sub-caliber and cumulative projectiles were developed. All these weapons were successfully used by Soviet troops in the operations of the Great Patriotic War.

As for the import of weapons, it was very insignificant and, in essence, did not have a big impact on the equipment of the Soviet troops. In addition, imported weapons were inferior in tactical and technical characteristics to Soviet weapons. Several anti-aircraft artillery systems received as imports in the third period of the war were only partially used by the air defense forces, and the 40-mm anti-aircraft guns they remained at GAU bases until the end of the war.

The good quality of weapons and ammunition supplied by the domestic military industry to the Soviet Army during the war was largely ensured by the wide network of military representatives (military acceptance) of the GAU. Of no small importance in the timely supply of troops in the field army with weapons and ammunition was the fact that it was based on strictly planned production and support. Since 1942, establishing a system for recording and reporting weapons and ammunition in the troops, armies and fronts, as well as planning their supply to the fronts, the artillery supply service has continuously improved and improved the organizational forms, methods and methods of working to supply the troops of the army. Strict centralization of leadership from top to bottom, close and continuous interaction of the artillery supply service of the center, fronts and armies, formations and units with other rear services, and especially with rear headquarters and the military communications service, hard work of all types of transport made it possible to provide troops of the fronts and new formations of Headquarters Supreme High Command of Armaments and Ammunition. In the Main Artillery Directorate, which worked under the direct supervision of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, a coherent system of systematic and targeted provision of troops with weapons and ammunition was developed, corresponding to the nature of the war, its scope and methods of conducting combat operations. This system completely justified itself throughout the war. The uninterrupted supply of weapons and ammunition to the active army was achieved thanks to the enormous organizational and creative activity of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, the Soviet government, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the efficient work of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, workers of the defense people's commissariats and all levels of the rear of the Soviet Army, the selfless and heroic work of the working class .

I I - period before 1941

In December 1917, the Council of People's Commissars announced the demobilization of military factories, but by this time the production of ammunition in the country had practically ceased. By 1918, all the main stocks of weapons and ammunition remaining from the World War had already been exhausted. However, by the beginning of 1919, only the Tula Cartridge Plant remained operational. Lugansk cartridge in 1918 was initially captured by the Germans, then it was occupied by Krasnov’s White Guard army.

For the newly created plant in Taganrog, the White Guards took from the Lugansk plant 4 machines from each development, 500 pounds of gunpowder, non-ferrous metals, as well as some finished cartridges.
So Ataman Krasnov resumed production at RUSSIAN - BALTIC Rus.-Balt plant acc. association of shipbuilding and mechanical plants. (Founded in 1913 in Reval, in 1915 evacuated to Taganrog, in Soviet time Taganrog Combine Plant.) and by November 1918, the productivity of this plant had increased to 300,000 rifle cartridges per day (Kakurin N. E. “How the Revolution Fought”)

“On January 3 (1919), the allies saw the Russian-Baltic plant in Taganrog already revived and put into operation, where they made cartridges, cast bullets, inserted them into a cupronickel silver shell, filled cartridges with gunpowder - in a word, the plant was already in full operation. (Peter Nikolaevich Krasnov “The Great Don Army”) In Krasnodar region and in the Urals they find cartridges marked D.Z.
Most likely this marking means “Donskoy Plant” in Taganrog

Simbirsk, which was under construction, was under threat of capture. In the spring of 1918 The evacuation of the St. Petersburg Cartridge Plant to Simbirsk began. To establish the production of cartridges, about 1,500 workers from Petrograd arrived in Simbirsk in July 1919.
In 1919, the plant began production, and in 1922, the Ulyanovsk plant was renamed “Plant named after Volodarsky.”

In addition, the Soviet government is building a new cartridge factory in Podolsk. A part of the shell plant, located in the premises of the former Singer plant, was allocated for it. The remains of equipment from Petrograd were sent there. Since the fall of 1919, the Podolsk plant began to remake foreign cartridges, and in November 1920 the first batch of rifle cartridges was produced.

Since 1924 The production of cartridges is carried out by the State Association “Main Directorate of Military Industry of the USSR”, which includes Tula, Lugansk, Podolsk, Ulyanovsk factories.

Since 1928, cartridge factories, except Tula, received numbers: Ulyanovsk - 3, Podolsk - 17, Lugansk - 60. (But Ulyanovsk retained its ZV marking until 1941)
Since 1934, new workshops were built south of Podolsk. Soon they began to be called the Novopodolsk plant, and from 1940 the Klimovsky plant No. 188.
In 1939 cartridge factories were reassigned to the 3rd Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Armaments. It included the following plants: Ulyanovsk No. 3, Podolsk No. 17, Tula No. 38, Experienced Patr. plant (Maryina Roshcha, Moscow) No. 44, Kuntsevsky (Red Equipment) No. 46, Lugansky No. 60 and Klimovsky No. 188.

Cartridge markings Soviet made remains mainly with a protruding impression.

At the top is the number or name of the plant, at the bottom is the year of manufacture.

Cartridges from the Tula plant in 1919-20. the quarter is indicated, possibly in 1923-24. only the last digit of the year of manufacture is indicated, and the Lugansk plant in 1920-1927. indicates the period (1,2,3) in which they were manufactured. The Ulyanovsk plant in 1919 -30 puts the name of the plant (S, U, ZV) below.

In 1930, the spherical bottom of the sleeve was replaced with a flat one with a chamfer. The replacement was caused by problems that arose when firing the Maxim machine gun. The protruding marking is located along the edge of the bottom of the cartridge case. It was only in the 1970s that cartridges began to be marked with an embossed imprint on a flat surface closer to the center.

	Marking		Start of marking	End of marking
Klimovsky plant
Kuntsevo plant "Red Equipment" Moscow		Produced cartridges for ShKAS and with special bullets T-46, ZB-46 Apparently, experimental parties

*Note. The table is not complete, there may be other options

It is very rare to find shells from the Lugansk plant with the additional designation +. Most likely, these are technological designations and the cartridges were intended only for test firing.

There is an opinion that in 1928-1936 the Penza plant produced cartridges marked No. 50, but it is more likely that this is a vague mark No. 60

Perhaps, at the end of the thirties, cartridges or cartridges were produced at the Moscow Shot Foundry No. 58, which then produced tail cartridges for mortar mines.

In 1940-41 in Novosibirsk, plant No. 179 NKB (People's Commissariat of Ammunition) produced rifle cartridges.

The case for the ShKAS machine gun, unlike an ordinary rifle case, has, in addition to the factory number and year of manufacture, an additional stamp - the letter "Ш".
Cartridges with a ShKAS case and a red primer were used for firing only from synchronized aircraft machine guns.

R. Chumak K. Soloviev Cartridges for a supermachine gun Kalashnikov Magazine No. 1 2001

Notes:
Finland, which used the Mosin rifle, produced and also purchased from the USA and other countries 7.62x54 cartridges, which are found on the battlefields of the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939 and the Second World War. It is likely that pre-revolutionary Russian-made cartridges were also used.

	Suomen Ampuma Tarvetehdas OY (SAT) , Riihimaki, Finland(1922-26)

In the 1920-30s, the United States used Mosin rifles left over from the Russian order for training purposes and sold them for private use, producing cartridges for this. Deliveries were made to Finland in 1940

	(UMC- Union Metallic Cartridge Co. affiliatedToRemington Co.)
	WinchesterRepeating Arms Co., Bridgeport, CT Middle picture – factoryEastAlton Right picture - factoryNewHaven

During World War I, Germany used a captured Mosin rifle to arm auxiliary and rear units.

	It is possible that, initially, German cartridges were produced without markings, but there will probably no longer be reliable information about this.
	Deutsche Waffen-u. Munitionsfabriken A.-G., Fruher Lorenz, Karlsruhe, Germany

Spain during the period civil war received a large number of various, mostly outdated, weapons from the USSR. Including the Mosin rifle. The production of cartridges was established. It is possible that at first Soviet-made cartridges were used, which were reloaded and new markings were applied to them.

Fabrica Nacional de Toledo. Spain

The English company Kynoch supplied cartridges to Finland and Estonia. According to the data providedGOST from "P.Labbett &F.A.Brown.Foreignrifle-caliberammunition manufactured in Britain.London, 1994." Kynoch signed contracts for the supply of 7.62x54 cartridges:

1929 Estonia (with tracer bullet)
1932 Estonia (with a heavy bullet weighing 12.12g.)
1938 Estonia (with tracer bullet)
1929 Finland (with tracer bullet, armor-piercing bullet)
1939 Finland (with tracer bullet)

The 7.62x54 cartridge was produced in the 20-40s in other countries for commercial purposes:

	A.R.S.it's unlikely that this isA. R.S.AtelierdeConstitutiondeRennes, Rennes, France, since this company uses cartridgesRS, most likely equipped in Estonia with participation of Finland
	FNC- (Fabrica Nacional de Cartuchos, Santa Fe), Mexico
	FN-(Fabrique Nationale d'Armes de Guerre, Herstal) Belgium,
	Pumitra Voina Anonima, Romania Probably for the remaining captured rifles after World War 1, but there is no exact information about the manufacturer

It is possible that some of the foreign ammunition listed above could have ended up in Soviet warehouses in small quantities as a result of the annexation of the western territories and the Finnish War, and were most likely used by parts of the “people's militia” in the initial period of the Second World War. Also now often found during archaeological research of WWII battle sites in Soviet positions are casings and cartridges produced in the USA and England, ordered by Russia for World War I. The order was not completed on time and was already supplied to the White Army during the Civil War. After the end of the civil war, the remains of this ammunition ended up in warehouses, probably used by security units and OSOAVIAKHIM, but they turned out to be in demand with the beginning of the Second World War.
Sometimes, at battlefields, cartridge cases of a 7.7mm English rifle cartridge (.303 British) are found, which are mistaken for 7.62x54R ammunition. These cartridges were used, in particular, by the armies of the Baltic states and in 1940 were used for the Red Army. Near Leningrad there are such cartridges marked V - Riga plant "Vairogs" (VAIROGS, formerly Sellier & Bellot)
.
Later, such cartridges of English and Canadian production were supplied under Lend-Lease.

I I I - period 1942-1945

In 1941, all factories, except Ulyanovsk, were partially or completely evacuated, and the old factory numbers were retained in the new location. For example, the Barnaul plant, transported from Podolsk, produced its first products on November 24, 1941. Some plants were re-established. The numbering of all cartridge production is given, since there is no accurate data on the range of products they produce.

Marking with 1941-42	Plant location	Marking with 1941-42	Plant location
			New Lyalya
	Sverdlovsk		Chelyabinsk
	Novosibirsk

According to B. Davydov, during the war, rifle cartridges were produced in factories 17 ,38 (1943), 44 (1941-42),46 ,60 ,179 (1940-41),188 ,304 (1942),529 ,539 (1942-43),540 ,541 (1942-43), 543 ,544 ,545 ,710 (1942-43),711 (1942).

When restored in 1942-1944, the factories received new designations.

This mark is probably a product produced by the Podolsk plant during the period of its resumption of work.
There may be other designations. For example, No. 10 in 1944 (found on TT cartridges), but the location of production is unknown, perhaps it is the Perm plant or the poorly readable mark of the Podolsk plant.

Since 1944, it has been possible to designate the month of manufacture of the cartridge.
For example, a 1946 training cartridge has this marking.

IV - Post-war period

In the post-war years in the USSR, the factories in cartridge production remained in Klimovsk-No. 711, Tula-No. 539, Voroshilovgrad (Lugansk)-No. 270, Ulyanovsk-No. 3, Yuryuzan-No. 38, Novosibirsk-No. 188, Barnaul-No. 17 and Frunze -No. 60.

The markings of rifle cartridges from this period of production remain primarily with a raised imprint. At the top is the plant number, at the bottom is the year of manufacture.

In 1952-1956, the following designations are used to indicate the year of manufacture:

G = 1952, D = 1953, E = 1954, I = 1955, K = 1956.

After WWII, the 7.62 caliber cartridge was also produced in the Warsaw Pact countries, China, Iraq and Egypt, and other countries. Designation options are possible

Czechoslovakia	aymbxnzv
Bulgaria
Hungary
Poland
Yugoslavia	P P U
	31 51 61 71 321 671 (usually the code is placed at the top, but code 31 can also be at the bottom)

This cartridge is still produced at Russian factories in combat and hunting versions.

Modern names and some of the commercial markings on Russian cartridges since 1990

The designs and characteristics of various bullets for 7.62 caliber cartridges are quite well presented in modern literature on weapons and therefore only the color designations of bullets are given according to the “Handbook of Cartridges...” of 1946.

	Light bullet L model 1908
	Heavy bullet D model 1930, the tip is painted yellow for a length of 5 mm Since 1953 it was replaced by an LPS bullet, painted on the tip until 1978 in silver color
	Armor-piercing bullet B-30 mod. 1930 the tip is painted black to a length of 5 mm
	Armor-piercing incendiary bullet B-32 mod. 1932, the tip is painted black for a length of 5 mm with a red border stripe Bullet BS-40 mod. 1940 a length of 5 mm was painted black, and the rest of the bullet protruding from the cartridge case was painted red.
	Sighting and incendiary bullet PZ model 1935. the tip is painted red to a length of 5 mm
	Tracer bullet T-30 mod. 1930 and T-46 arr. 1938 the tip is painted green for a length of 5 mm. The T-46 bullet was developed at the Kuntsevo plant (Krasny sniruzhatel) No. 46 and hence got its number in the name.

Most of the above information was provided by the director of the local history museum of the Lomonosov district of the Leningrad region
Vladimir Andreevich Golovatyuk , who has been studying the history of small arms and ammunition for many years.
The museum contains a lot of materials and exhibits on the history of the area, military operations in the area during the Second World War. Excursions are regularly held for schoolchildren and anyone interested. T museum phone 8 812 423 05 66

In addition, I provide the information I have on rifle cartridges of an earlier period:
Cartridge for the Krnka, Baranova rifle
Produced at the St. Petersburg plant (and some workshops without designations)

Probably L is the name of the St. Petersburg Foundry.

Probably VGO - Vasileostrovsky cartridge case department of the St. Petersburg cartridge plant.

The designation of the third year of manufacture appears

Petersburg plant

Unfortunately, I have no information on the designations before 1880, most likely the letter B denotes the Vasileostrovsky cartridge case department of the St. Petersburg cartridge plant, and the upper sign is the name of the brass manufacturer.

Made by Keller & Co., Hirtenberg Austria, probably commissioned by Bulgaria for the Serbo-Bulgarian War.

Thanks to Soviet films about the war, most people have a strong opinion that the mass-produced small arms (photo below) of the German infantry during the Second World War is a machine gun (submachine gun) of the Schmeisser system, which is named after the name of its designer. This myth is still actively supported by domestic cinema. However, in fact, this popular machine gun was never a mass weapon of the Wehrmacht, and it was not created by Hugo Schmeisser. However, first things first.

How myths are created

Everyone should remember the footage from domestic films dedicated to the attacks of German infantry on our positions. Brave blond guys walk without bending down, while firing from machine guns “from the hip.” And the most interesting thing is that this fact does not surprise anyone except those who were in the war. According to movies, the “Schmeissers” could conduct aimed fire at the same distance as the rifles of our soldiers. In addition, when watching these films, the viewer got the impression that all the personnel of the German infantry during the Second World War were armed with machine guns. In fact, everything was different, and the submachine gun is not a mass-produced small arms weapon of the Wehrmacht, and it is impossible to shoot from the hip, and it is not called “Schmeisser” at all. In addition, carrying out an attack on a trench by a submachine gunner unit, in which there are soldiers armed with repeating rifles, is clearly suicide, since simply no one would reach the trenches.

Dispelling the myth: MP-40 automatic pistol

This Wehrmacht small weapon in WWII is officially called the submachine gun (Maschinenpistole) MP-40. In fact, this is a modification of the MP-36 assault rifle. The designer of this model, contrary to popular belief, was not the gunsmith H. Schmeisser, but the less famous and talented craftsman Heinrich Volmer. Why is the nickname “Schmeisser” so firmly attached to him? The thing is that Schmeisser owned the patent for the magazine that is used in this submachine gun. And in order not to violate his copyright, in the first batches of the MP-40, the inscription PATENT SCHMEISSER was stamped on the magazine receiver. When these machine guns ended up as trophies among the soldiers of the Allied armies, they mistakenly believed that the author of this model of small arms was, naturally, Schmeisser. This is how this nickname stuck to the MP-40.

Initially, the German command armed only command staff with machine guns. Thus, in infantry units, only battalion, company and squad commanders were supposed to have MP-40s. Later, automatic pistols were supplied to drivers of armored vehicles, tank crews and paratroopers. Nobody armed the infantry with them en masse, either in 1941 or after. According to archives, in 1941 the troops had only 250 thousand MP-40 assault rifles, and this was for 7,234,000 people. As you can see, a submachine gun is not a mass-produced weapon of World War II. In general, during the entire period - from 1939 to 1945 - only 1.2 million of these machine guns were produced, while over 21 million people were conscripted into the Wehrmacht units.

Why weren't the infantry armed with MP-40s?

Despite the fact that experts subsequently recognized that the MP-40 was the best small arms of World War II, very few of the Wehrmacht infantry units had it. This is explained simply: the sighting range of this machine gun for group targets is only 150 m, and for single targets - 70 m. This is despite the fact that Soviet soldiers were armed with Mosin and Tokarev rifles (SVT), the sighting range of which was 800 m for group targets. targets and 400 m for singles. If the Germans had fought with such weapons as they showed in Russian films, they would never have been able to reach the enemy trenches, they would have simply been shot, as if in a shooting gallery.

Shooting on the move "from the hip"

The MP-40 submachine gun vibrates strongly when firing, and if you use it, as shown in the films, the bullets always fly past the target. Therefore, for effective shooting, it must be pressed tightly to the shoulder, having first unfolded the butt. In addition, long bursts were never fired from this machine gun, since it quickly heated up. Most often they fired in a short burst of 3-4 rounds or fired single fire. Despite the fact that in tactical and technical characteristics it is indicated that the rate of fire is 450-500 rounds per minute; in practice, such a result has never been achieved.

Advantages of MP-40

This cannot be said that this small arms weapon was bad; on the contrary, it is very, very dangerous, but it must be used in close combat. That is why sabotage units were armed with it in the first place. They were also often used by scouts in our army, and the partisans respected this machine gun. The use of light, rapid-fire small arms in close combat provided tangible advantages. Even now, the MP-40 is very popular among criminals, and the price of such a machine gun is very high. And they are supplied there by “black archaeologists” who carry out excavations in places of military glory and very often find and restore weapons from the Second World War.

Mauser 98k

What can you say about this carbine? The most common small arms in Germany is the Mauser rifle. Its target range is up to 2000 m when firing. As you can see, this parameter is very close to the Mosin and SVT rifles. This carbine was developed back in 1888. During the war, this design was significantly modernized, mainly to reduce costs, as well as to rationalize production. In addition, these Wehrmacht small arms were equipped with optical sights, and sniper units were equipped with them. The Mauser rifle at that time was in service with many armies, for example, Belgium, Spain, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Sweden.

Self-loading rifles

At the end of 1941, the Wehrmacht infantry units received the first automatic self-loading rifles of the Walter G-41 and Mauser G-41 systems for military testing. Their appearance was due to the fact that the Red Army had more than one and a half million similar systems in service: SVT-38, SVT-40 and ABC-36. In order not to be inferior to Soviet soldiers, German gunsmiths urgently had to develop their own versions of such rifles. As a result of the tests, the G-41 system (Walter system) was recognized as the best and adopted. The rifle is equipped with a hammer-type impact mechanism. Designed to fire only single shots. Equipped with a magazine with a capacity of ten rounds. This automatic self-loading rifle is designed for targeted shooting at a distance of up to 1200 m. However, due to the large weight of this weapon, as well as low reliability and sensitivity to contamination, it was produced in a small series. In 1943, the designers, having eliminated these shortcomings, proposed a modernized version of the G-43 (Walter system), which was produced in quantities of several hundred thousand units. Before its appearance, Wehrmacht soldiers preferred to use captured Soviet (!) SVT-40 rifles.

Now let's return to the German gunsmith Hugo Schmeisser. He developed two systems, without which the Second World War could not have happened. World War.

Small arms - MP-41

This model was developed simultaneously with the MP-40. This machine gun was significantly different from the “Schmeisser” familiar to everyone from the movies: it had a forend trimmed with wood, which protected the fighter from burns, it was heavier and had a long barrel. However, these Wehrmacht small arms were not widely used and were not produced for long. In total, about 26 thousand units were produced. It is believed that the German army abandoned this machine gun due to a lawsuit from ERMA, which claimed illegal copying of its patented design. The MP-41 small arms were used by Waffen SS units. It was also successfully used by Gestapo units and mountain rangers.

MP-43, or StG-44

Schmeisser developed the next Wehrmacht weapon (photo below) in 1943. At first it was called MP-43, and later - StG-44, which means “assault rifle” (sturmgewehr). This automatic rifle is appearance, and for some technical specifications, resembles (which appeared later), and differs significantly from the MP-40. Its aimed fire range was up to 800 m. The StG-44 even had the ability to mount a 30 mm grenade launcher. To fire from cover, the designer developed a special attachment that was placed on the muzzle and changed the trajectory of the bullet by 32 degrees. This weapon went into mass production only in the fall of 1944. During the war years, about 450 thousand of these rifles were produced. So few of the German soldiers managed to use such a machine gun. StG-44s were supplied to elite units of the Wehrmacht and to Waffen SS units. Subsequently, these Wehrmacht weapons were used in

Automatic rifles FG-42

These copies were intended for paratroopers. They combined fighting qualities light machine gun and an automatic rifle. The development of weapons was undertaken by the Rheinmetall company already during the war, when, after assessing the results of airborne operations carried out by the Wehrmacht, it became clear that the MP-38 submachine guns did not fully meet the combat requirements of this type of troops. The first tests of this rifle were carried out in 1942, and then it was put into service. In the process of using the mentioned weapon, disadvantages associated with low strength and stability during automatic shooting also emerged. In 1944, a modernized FG-42 rifle (model 2) was released, and model 1 was discontinued. The trigger mechanism of this weapon allows automatic or single fire. The rifle is designed for the standard 7.92 mm Mauser cartridge. The magazine capacity is 10 or 20 rounds. In addition, the rifle can be used to fire special rifle grenades. In order to increase stability when shooting, a bipod is attached under the barrel. The FG-42 rifle is designed to fire at a range of 1200 m. Due to the high cost, it was produced in limited quantities: only 12 thousand units of both models.

Luger P08 and Walter P38

Now let's look at what types of pistols were in service with the German army. “Luger”, its second name “Parabellum”, had a caliber of 7.65 mm. By the beginning of the war, units of the German army had more than half a million of these pistols. This Wehrmacht small arms were produced until 1942, and then they were replaced by the more reliable Walter.

This pistol was put into service in 1940. It was intended for firing 9-mm cartridges; the magazine capacity is 8 rounds. The target range of the "Walter" is 50 meters. It was produced until 1945. Total number P38 pistols produced amounted to approximately 1 million units.

Weapons of World War II: MG-34, MG-42 and MG-45

In the early 30s, the German military decided to create a machine gun that could be used both as an easel and as a manual one. They were supposed to fire at enemy aircraft and arm tanks. The MG-34, designed by Rheinmetall and put into service in 1934, became such a machine gun. By the beginning of hostilities, there were about 80 thousand units of this weapon in the Wehrmacht. The machine gun allows you to fire both single shots and continuous fire. To do this, he had a trigger with two notches. When you press the top one, the shooting was carried out in single shots, and when you press the bottom one - in bursts. It was intended for 7.92x57 mm Mauser rifle cartridges, with light or heavy bullets. And in the 40s, armor-piercing, armor-piercing tracer, armor-piercing incendiary and other types of cartridges were developed and used. This suggests that the impetus for changes in weapons systems and the tactics of their use was the Second World War.

The small arms that were used in this company were replenished with a new type of machine gun - MG-42. It was developed and put into service in 1942. The designers have significantly simplified and reduced the cost of production of these weapons. Thus, in its production, spot welding and stamping were widely used, and the number of parts was reduced to 200. The trigger mechanism of the machine gun in question allowed only automatic firing - 1200-1300 rounds per minute. Such significant changes had a negative impact on the stability of the unit when firing. Therefore, to ensure accuracy, it was recommended to fire in short bursts. The ammunition for the new machine gun remained the same as for the MG-34. The aimed fire range was two kilometers. Work to improve this design continued until the end of 1943, which led to the creation of a new modification known as the MG-45.

This machine gun weighed only 6.5 kg, and the rate of fire was 2400 rounds per minute. By the way, no infantry machine gun of that time could boast of such a rate of fire. However, this modification appeared too late and was not in service with the Wehrmacht.

PzB-39 and Panzerschrek

PzB-39 was developed in 1938. These weapons of the Second World War were used with relative success at the initial stage to combat wedges, tanks and armored vehicles with bulletproof armor. Against the heavily armored B-1s, English Matildas and Churchills, Soviet T-34s and KVs), this gun was either ineffective or completely useless. As a result, it was soon replaced by anti-tank grenade launchers and rocket-propelled anti-tank rifles “Panzerschrek”, “Ofenror”, as well as the famous “Faustpatrons”. The PzB-39 used a 7.92 mm cartridge. The firing range was 100 meters, the penetration ability made it possible to “pierce” 35 mm armor.

"Panzerschrek". This German light anti-tank weapon is a modified copy of the American Bazooka rocket gun. German designers equipped it with a shield that protected the shooter from the hot gases escaping from the grenade nozzle. Anti-tank companies of motorized rifle regiments of tank divisions were supplied with these weapons as a matter of priority. Rocket guns were extremely powerful weapons. “Panzerschreks” were weapons for group use and had a maintenance crew consisting of three people. Since they were very complex, their use required special education calculations. In total, 314 thousand units of such guns and more than two million rocket-propelled grenades for them were produced in 1943-1944.

Grenade launchers: “Faustpatron” and “Panzerfaust”

The first years of World War II showed that anti-tank rifles could not cope with the assigned tasks, so the German military demanded anti-tank weapons that could be used to equip infantrymen, operating on the “fire and throw” principle. Development of a hand grenade launcher disposable started by HASAG in 1942 ( chief designer Langweiler). And in 1943 mass production was launched. The first 500 Faustpatrons entered service in August of the same year. All models of this anti-tank grenade launcher had a similar design: they consisted of a barrel (a smooth-bore seamless tube) and an over-caliber grenade. The impact mechanism and sighting device were welded to the outer surface of the barrel.

The Panzerfaust is one of the most powerful modifications of the Faustpatron, which was developed at the end of the war. Its firing range was 150 m, and its armor penetration was 280-320 mm. The Panzerfaust was a reusable weapon. The barrel of the grenade launcher is equipped with a pistol grip, which houses the trigger mechanism; the propellant charge was placed in the barrel. In addition, the designers were able to increase the grenade's flight speed. In total, more than eight million grenade launchers of all modifications were manufactured during the war years. This type of weapon caused significant losses to Soviet tanks. Thus, in the battles on the outskirts of Berlin, they knocked out about 30 percent of armored vehicles, and during street battles in the German capital - 70%.

Conclusion

The Second World War had a significant impact on small arms, including the world, its development and tactics of use. Based on its results, we can conclude that, despite the creation of the most modern weapons, the role of small arms units is not diminishing. The accumulated experience in using weapons in those years is still relevant today. In fact, it became the basis for the development and improvement of small arms.

Many letters

The female name Katyusha entered the history of Russia and world history as the name of one of the most terrible types of weapons of the Second World War.
At the same time, not a single type of weapon was surrounded by such a veil of secrecy and misinformation...

PAGES OF HISTORY

No matter how much our father-commanders kept the Katyusha materiel secret, just a few weeks after its first combat use it fell into the hands of the Germans and ceased to be a secret. And here is the history of the creation of "Katyusha" long years was kept “closed sealed” both because of ideological principles and because of the ambitions of the designers.

Question one: why was rocket artillery used only in 1941? After all, gunpowder rockets were used by the Chinese a thousand years ago. In the first half of the 19th century, missiles were used quite widely in European armies (missiles by V. Kongrev, A. Zasyadko, K. Konstantinov and others).

Rocket launchers early XIX V. V. Kongrev (a) and I. Kosinsky (b)

Alas, the combat use of missiles was limited by their enormous dispersion. At first, long poles made of wood or iron – “tails” – were used to stabilize them. But such missiles were effective only for hitting area targets. So, for example, in 1854, the Anglo-French fired missiles at Odessa from rowing barges, and the Russians fired missiles at Central Asian cities in the 50s–70s of the 19th century.

But with the introduction of rifled guns, gunpowder rockets became an anachronism, and between 1860–1880 they were removed from service in all European armies (in Austria in 1866, in England in 1885, in Russia in 1879). In 1914, only signal flares remained in the armies and navies of all countries. Nevertheless, Russian inventors constantly turned to the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) with projects for military missiles. So, in September 1905, the Artillery Committee rejected the high-explosive rocket project. The warhead of this rocket was stuffed with pyroxylin, and smokeless gunpowder rather than black gunpowder was used as fuel. Moreover, the fellows from the State Agrarian University did not even try to work out an interesting project, but dismissed it out of the blue. It is curious that the designer was... Hieromonk Kirik.

It was only during the First World War that interest in rockets was revived. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, slow-burning gunpowder was created, which made it possible to dramatically increase flight speed and firing range. Accordingly, with an increase in flight speed, it became possible to effectively use wing stabilizers and improve the accuracy of fire.

Second reason: the need to create powerful weapons for airplanes of the First World War - “flying whatnots”.

And finally, the most main reason– the rocket was best suited as a means of delivering chemical weapons.


CHEMICAL PROJECTILE

Back on June 15, 1936, the head of the chemical department of the Red Army, corps engineer Y. Fishman, was presented with a report from the director of the RNII, military engineer 1st rank I. Kleimenov, and the head of the 1st department, military engineer 2nd rank K. Glukharev, on preliminary tests of 132/82-mm short-range chemical rocket mines . This ammunition complemented the 250/132 mm short-range chemical mine, testing of which was completed by May 1936.

M-13 rocket.
The M-13 projectile consists of a head and a body. The head has a shell and a combat charge. A fuse is attached to the front of the head. The body ensures the flight of a rocket projectile and consists of a casing, a combustion chamber, a nozzle and stabilizers. In front of the combustion chamber there are two electric powder igniters. On the outer surface of the combustion chamber shell there are two threaded guide pins, which serve to hold the missile projectile in the guide mounts. 1 - fuse retaining ring, 2 - GVMZ fuse, 3 - detonator block, 4 - explosive charge, 5 - warhead, 6 - igniter, 7 - chamber bottom, 8 - guide pin, 9 - powder rocket charge, 10 - rocket part, 11 - grate, 12 - critical section of the nozzle, 13 - nozzle, 14 - stabilizer, 15 - remote fuse pin, 16 - AGDT remote fuse, 17 - igniter.

Thus, “RNII has completed all preliminary development of the issue of creating a powerful means of short-range chemical attack, and expects from you a general conclusion on the tests and instructions on the need for further work in this direction. For its part, RNII considers it necessary to now issue a pilot order for the production of RKhM-250 (300 pieces) and RKhM-132 (300 pieces) for the purpose of conducting field and military tests. The five pieces of RKhM-250 remaining from the preliminary tests, of which three are at the Central Chemical Test Site (Prichernavskaya station) and three RKhM-132 can be used for additional tests according to your instructions.”

Experimental installation of M-8 on a tank

According to the RNII report on the main activities for 1936 on topic No. 1, samples of 132-mm and 250-mm chemical rockets with a warhead capacity of 6 and 30 liters of chemical agent were manufactured and tested. The tests, carried out in the presence of the head of the VOKHIMU RKKA, gave satisfactory results and received a positive assessment. But VOKHIMU did nothing to introduce these shells into the Red Army and gave RNII new assignments for shells with a longer range.

The Katyusha prototype (BM-13) was first mentioned on January 3, 1939 in a letter from the People's Commissar of Defense Industry Mikhail Kaganovich to his brother, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Lazar Kaganovich: “In October 1938, a mechanized automobile rocket launcher to organize a surprise chemical attack on the enemy, it basically passed factory tests by shooting at the Sofrinsky control and testing artillery range and is currently undergoing field tests at the Central Military Chemical Test Site in Prichernavskaya.”

Experimental installation of M-13 on a trailer

Please note that the customers of the future Katyusha are military chemists. The work was also financed through the Chemical Administration and, finally, the missile warheads were exclusively chemical.

132-mm chemical shells RHS-132 were tested by firing at the Pavlograd artillery range on August 1, 1938. The fire was carried out with single shells and series of 6 and 12 shells. The duration of firing in a series with full ammunition did not exceed 4 seconds. During this time, the target area reached 156 liters of explosive agent, which, in terms of an artillery caliber of 152 mm, was equivalent to 63 artillery shells when firing in a salvo from 21 three-gun batteries or 1.3 artillery regiments, provided that the fire was carried out with unstable explosive agents. The tests focused on the fact that the metal consumption per 156 liters of explosive agent when firing rocket projectiles was 550 kg, while when firing 152-mm chemical projectiles, the weight of the metal was 2370 kg, that is, 4.3 times more.

The test report stated: “The vehicle-mounted mechanized chemical attack missile launcher was tested to show significant advantages over artillery systems. The three-ton vehicle is equipped with a system capable of firing both a single fire and a series of 24 shots within 3 seconds. Travel speed is normal for a truck. Transferring from traveling to combat position takes 3–4 minutes. Firing - from the driver's cabin or from cover.

The first experimental installation of M-13 on a car chassis

The warhead of one RCS (reactive chemical projectile - “NVO”) holds 8 liters of agent, and in artillery shells of a similar caliber - only 2 liters. To create a dead zone on an area of ​​12 hectares, one salvo from three trucks is enough, which replaces 150 howitzers or 3 artillery regiments. At a distance of 6 km, the area of ​​contamination with chemical agents in one salvo is 6–8 hectares.”

I note that the Germans also have their own attitudes volley fire They were also prepared exclusively for chemical warfare. Thus, in the late 1930s, the German engineer Nebel designed a 15-cm rocket and a six-barrel tubular installation, which the Germans called a six-barrel mortar. Testing of the mortar began in 1937. The system was named “15-cm smoke mortar type “D”. In 1941, it was renamed 15 cm Nb.W 41 (Nebelwerfer), that is, a 15-cm smoke mortar mod. 41. Naturally, their main purpose was not to set up smoke screens, but to fire rockets filled with toxic substances. Interestingly, Soviet soldiers called the 15 cm Nb.W 41 “Vanyusha”, by analogy with the M-13, called “Katyusha”.

Nb.W 41

The first launch of the Katyusha prototype (designed by Tikhomirov and Artemyev) took place in the USSR on March 3, 1928. The flight range of the 22.7 kg rocket was 1300 m, and a Van Deren system mortar was used as a launcher.

The caliber of our missiles during the Great Patriotic War - 82 mm and 132 mm - was determined by nothing more than the diameter of the engine's powder bombs. Seven 24-mm powder bombs, tightly packed into the combustion chamber, give a diameter of 72 mm, the thickness of the chamber walls is 5 mm, hence the diameter (caliber) of the rocket is 82 mm. Seven thicker (40 mm) pieces in the same way give a caliber of 132 mm.

The most important issue in the design of rockets was the method of stabilization. Soviet designers preferred finned rockets and adhered to this principle until the end of the war.

In the 1930s, rockets with a ring stabilizer that did not exceed the dimensions of the projectile were tested. Such projectiles could be fired from tubular guides. But tests have shown that it is impossible to achieve stable flight using a ring stabilizer.

Then they fired 82-mm rockets with a four-blade tail span of 200, 180, 160, 140 and 120 mm. The results were quite definite - with a decrease in the span of the tail, flight stability and accuracy decreased. The tail, with a span of more than 200 mm, shifted the center of gravity of the projectile back, which also worsened flight stability. Lightening the tail by reducing the thickness of the stabilizer blades caused strong vibrations of the blades until they were destroyed.

Grooved guides were adopted as launchers for finned missiles. Experiments have shown that the longer they are, the higher the accuracy of the projectiles. The length of 5 m for the RS-132 became the maximum due to restrictions on railway dimensions.

I note that the Germans stabilized their rockets until 1942 exclusively by rotation. The USSR also tested turbojet missiles, but they did not go into mass production. As often happens with us, the reason for failures during testing was explained not by poor execution, but by the irrationality of the concept.

FIRST SALLOS

Whether we like it or not, the Germans used multiple launch rocket systems for the first time in the Great Patriotic War on June 22, 1941 near Brest. “And then the arrows showed 03.15, the command “Fire!” was sounded, and the devil’s dance began. The earth began to shake. Nine batteries of the 4th Mortar Regiment special purpose also contributed to the infernal symphony. In half an hour, 2880 shells whistled over the Bug and fell on the city and fortress on the eastern bank of the river. Heavy 600-mm mortars and 210-mm guns of the 98th artillery regiment rained down their volleys on the fortifications of the citadel and hit point targets - Soviet artillery positions. It seemed that the strength of the fortress would not leave one stone unturned.”

This is how historian Paul Karel described the first use of 15-cm rocket launchers. In addition, the Germans in 1941 used heavy 28 cm high-explosive and 32 cm incendiary turbojet shells. The projectiles were over-caliber and had one powder engine (the diameter of the engine part was 140 mm).

A 28-cm high-explosive mine, with a direct hit on a stone house, completely destroyed it. The mine successfully destroyed field-type shelters. Living targets within a radius of several tens of meters were hit by the blast wave. Mine fragments flew at a distance of up to 800 m. The warhead contained 50 kg of liquid TNT or ammatol grade 40/60. It is curious that both 28 cm and 32 cm German mines (missiles) were transported and launched from a simple wooden closure such as a box.

The first use of Katyushas took place on July 14, 1941. The battery of captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov fired two salvos from seven launchers at the Orsha railway station. The appearance of the Katyusha came as a complete surprise to the leadership of the Abwehr and the Wehrmacht. On August 14, the High Command of the German Ground Forces notified its troops: “The Russians have an automatic multi-barrel flamethrower cannon... The shot is fired by electricity. When fired, smoke is generated... If such guns are captured, report immediately.” Two weeks later, a directive appeared entitled “Russian gun throwing rocket-like projectiles.” It said: “...The troops are reporting that the Russians are using a new type of weapon that fires rockets. A large number of shots can be fired from one installation within 3-5 seconds... Each appearance of these guns must be reported to the general commander of the chemical forces at the high command on the same day.”

Where the name “Katyusha” came from is not known for certain. Pyotr Guk’s version is interesting: “Both at the front and then, after the war, when I got acquainted with the archives, talked with veterans, read their speeches in the press, I came across a variety of explanations for how the formidable weapon received a maiden name. Some believed that the beginning was made by the letter “K”, which the Voronezh Comintern members put on their products. There was a legend among the troops that the Guards mortars were named after the dashing partisan girl who destroyed many Nazis.”

When, at a firing range, soldiers and commanders asked a GAU representative to name the “true” name of the combat installation, he advised: “Call the installation as an ordinary artillery piece. This is important for maintaining secrecy."

Soon, Katyusha had a younger brother named Luka. In May 1942, a group of officers from the Main Directorate of Armaments developed the M-30 projectile, in which a powerful over-caliber warhead, made in the shape of an ellipsoid, with a maximum diameter of 300 mm, was attached to the rocket engine from the M-13.

Installation of M-30 "Luka"

After successful field tests, on June 8, 1942, the State Defense Committee (GKO) issued a decree on the adoption of the M-30 and the start of its mass production. In Stalin's times, all important problems were resolved quickly, and by July 10, 1942, the first 20 M-30 guards mortar divisions were created. Each of them had a three-battery composition, the battery consisted of 32 four-charged single-tier launchers. The divisional salvo accordingly amounted to 384 shells.

The first combat use of the M-30 took place in the 61st Army of the Western Front near the city of Beleva. On the afternoon of June 5, two regimental salvoes fell on German positions in Annino and Upper Doltsy with a thunderous roar. Both villages were razed to the ground, after which the infantry occupied them without loss.

The power of the Luka shells (M-30 and its modification M-31) made a great impression on both the enemy and our soldiers. There were many different assumptions and fabrications about “Luka” at the front. One of the legends was that combat unit The rocket is filled with some kind of special, especially powerful explosive, capable of burning everything in the area of ​​the explosion. In fact, the warheads used conventional explosives. The exceptional effect of the Luka shells was achieved through salvo firing. With the simultaneous or almost simultaneous explosion of an entire group of shells, the law of addition of impulses from shock waves came into force.

Installation of the M-30 Luka on the Studebaker chassis

M-30 shells had high-explosive, chemical and incendiary warheads. However, the high-explosive warhead was mainly used. For the characteristic shape of the M-30's head section, front-line soldiers called it “Luka Mudishchev” (the hero of Barkov’s poem of the same name). Naturally, the official press preferred not to mention this nickname, unlike the widely circulated “Katyusha”. The Luka, like the German 28 cm and 30 cm shells, was launched from the wooden sealed box in which it was delivered from the factory. Four, and later eight, of these boxes were placed on a special frame, resulting in a simple launcher.

Needless to say, after the war the journalistic and literary fraternity appropriately and inappropriately remembered “Katyusha”, but chose to forget her much more formidable brother “Luka”. In the 1970s–1980s, at the first mention of “Luka,” veterans asked me in surprise: “How do you know? You didn’t fight.”

ANTI-TANK MYTH

"Katyusha" was a first-class weapon. As often happens, the father-commanders wanted it to become a universal weapon, including an anti-tank weapon.

An order is an order, and reports of victory rushed to headquarters. If you believe the secret publication “Field Rocket Artillery in the Great Patriotic War” (Moscow, 1955), then on the Kursk Bulge in two days in three episodes, 95 enemy tanks were destroyed by Katyushas! If this were true, it should have been disbanded anti-tank artillery and replace it with multiple rocket launchers.

In some ways, the huge numbers of destroyed tanks were influenced by the fact that for each damaged tank the crew of the combat vehicle received 2,000 rubles, of which 500 rubles. - commander, 500 rubles. - to the gunner, the rest - to the rest.

Unfortunately, due to the huge dispersion, shooting at tanks is ineffective. Here I am picking up the most boring brochure “Tables for firing M-13 rocket projectiles,” published in 1942. It follows from it that with a firing range of 3000 m, the range deviation was 257 m, and the lateral deviation was 51 m. For shorter distances, the range deviation was not given at all, since the dispersion of projectiles could not be calculated. It is not difficult to imagine the likelihood of a missile hitting a tank at such a distance. If we theoretically imagine that a combat vehicle somehow managed to shoot at a tank at point-blank range, then even here the muzzle velocity of a 132-mm projectile was only 70 m/s, which is clearly not enough to penetrate the armor of a Tiger or Panther.

It is not for nothing that the year of publication of the shooting tables is specified here. According to the TS-13 firing tables of the same M-13 missile, the average deviation in range in 1944 is 105 m, and in 1957 - 135 m, and the lateral deviation is 200 and 300 m, respectively. Obviously, the 1957 table is more correct, in which the dispersion increased by almost 1.5 times, so that in the 1944 tables there are errors in calculations or, most likely, deliberate falsification to increase the morale of personnel.

There is no doubt that if an M-13 shell hits a medium or light tank, it will be disabled. The M-13 shell is not able to penetrate the frontal armor of the Tiger. But in order to be guaranteed to hit a single tank from a distance of the same 3 thousand m, it is necessary to fire from 300 to 900 M-13 shells due to their enormous dispersion; at shorter distances an even larger number of missiles will be required.

Here is another example told by veteran Dmitry Loza. During the Uman-Botoshan offensive operation on March 15, 1944, two Shermans from the 45th mechanized brigade of the 5th mechanized corps got stuck in the mud. The landing party from the tanks jumped off and retreated. German soldiers surrounded the stuck tanks, “covered the viewing slots with mud, covered the sighting holes in the turret with black soil, completely blinding the crew. They knocked on the hatches and tried to open them with rifle bayonets. And everyone shouted: “Rus, kaput! Give up!” But then two left combat vehicles BM-13. The Katyushas quickly descended into the ditch with their front wheels and fired a direct fire salvo. Bright fiery arrows, hissing and whistling, rushed into the ravine. A moment later, blinding flames danced around. When the smoke from the rocket explosions cleared, the tanks stood seemingly unharmed, only the hulls and turrets were covered with thick soot...

Having repaired the damage to the tracks and throwing out the burnt tarpaulins, the Emcha left for Mogilev-Podolsky.” So, thirty-two 132-mm M-13 shells were fired at two Shermans at point-blank range, and they... only had their tarpaulin burnt.

WAR STATISTICS

The first installations for firing the M-13 had the index BM-13-16 and were mounted on the chassis of a ZIS-6 vehicle. The 82-mm BM-8-36 launcher was also mounted on the same chassis. There were only a few hundred ZIS-6 cars, and at the beginning of 1942 their production was stopped.

Launchers for M-8 and M-13 missiles in 1941–1942 were mounted on anything. Thus, six M-8 guide shells were installed on machines from the Maxim machine gun, 12 M-8 guide shells were installed on a motorcycle, sled and snowmobile (M-8 and M-13), T-40 and T-60 tanks, armored railway vehicles platforms (BM-8-48, BM-8-72, BM-13-16), river and sea boats, etc. But basically, launchers in 1942–1944 were mounted on cars received under Lend-Lease: Austin, Dodge, Ford Marmont, Bedford, etc.

Over the 5 years of the war, out of 3374 chassis used for combat vehicles, the ZIS-6 accounted for 372 (11%), Studebaker - 1845 (54.7%), the remaining 17 types of chassis (except for the Willys with mountain launchers) – 1157 (34.3%). Finally, it was decided to standardize combat vehicles based on the Studebaker car. In April 1943, such a system was put into service under the designation BM-13N (normalized). In March 1944, a self-propelled launcher for the M-13 was adopted on the Studebaker BM-31-12 chassis.

But in the post-war years, Studebakers were ordered to be forgotten, although combat vehicles on its chassis were in service until the early 1960s. In secret instructions, the Studebaker was called an “all-terrain vehicle.” Mutant Katyushas on the ZIS-5 chassis or post-war types of vehicles, which are stubbornly passed off as genuine military relics, were erected on numerous pedestals, but the genuine BM-13-16 on the ZIS-6 chassis was preserved only in the Artillery Museum in St. Petersburg.

As already mentioned, the Germans captured several launchers and hundreds of 132 mm M-13 and 82 mm M-8 shells back in 1941. The Wehrmacht command believed that their turbojet shells and tubular launchers with revolver-type guides were better than Soviet wing-stabilized shells. But the SS took up the M-8 and M-13 and ordered the Skoda company to copy them.

In 1942, based on the 82-mm Soviet M-8 projectile, 8 cm R.Sprgr rockets were created in Zbroevka. In fact, it was a new projectile, and not a copy of the M-8, although externally the German projectile was very similar to the M-8.

Unlike the Soviet projectile, the stabilizer feathers were set obliquely at an angle of 1.5 degrees to the longitudinal axis. Due to this, the projectile rotated in flight. The rotation speed was many times less than that of a turbojet projectile, and did not play any role in stabilizing the projectile, but it eliminated the eccentricity of the thrust of a single-nozzle rocket engine. But eccentricity, that is, a displacement of the engine thrust vector due to uneven burning of gunpowder in the bombs, was the main reason for the low accuracy of Soviet missiles of the M-8 and M-13 types.

German installation for firing prototypes of Soviet missiles

Based on the Soviet M-13, the Skoda company created a whole series of 15-cm missiles with oblique wings for the SS and Luftwaffe, but they were produced in small series. Our troops captured several samples of German 8-cm shells, and our designers made their own samples based on them. The M-13 and M-31 missiles with oblique tails were adopted by the Red Army in 1944, they were assigned special ballistic indices - TS-46 and TS-47.

R.Sprgr projectile

The apotheosis of the combat use of “Katyusha” and “Luka” was the storming of Berlin. In total, more than 44 thousand guns and mortars, as well as 1,785 M-30 and M-31 launchers, 1,620 rocket artillery combat vehicles (219 divisions) were involved in the Berlin operation. In the battles for Berlin, rocket artillery units used the wealth of experience they acquired in the battles for Poznan, which consisted of direct fire with single M-31, M-20 and even M-13 projectiles.

At first glance, this method of firing may seem primitive, but its results turned out to be very significant. Firing single rockets during battles in such a huge city as Berlin has found the widest application.

To conduct such fire, assault groups of approximately the following composition were created in the guards mortar units: an officer - group commander, an electrical engineer, 25 sergeants and soldiers for the M-31 assault group and 8-10 for the M-13 assault group.

The intensity of the battles and the fire missions performed by rocket artillery in the battles for Berlin can be judged by the number of rockets expended in these battles. In the offensive zone of the 3rd Shock Army the following were expended: M-13 shells - 6270; M-31 shells – 3674; M-20 shells – 600; M-8 shells - 1878.

Of this amount, the rocket artillery assault groups expended: M-8 shells - 1638; M-13 shells – 3353; M-20 shells – 191; M-31 shells – 479.

These groups in Berlin destroyed 120 buildings that were strong centers of enemy resistance, destroyed three 75-mm guns, suppressed dozens of firing points, and killed over 1,000 enemy soldiers and officers.

So, our glorious “Katyusha” and her unjustly offended brother “Luka” became a weapon of victory in the full sense of the word!

The information used in writing this material is, in principle, generally known. But maybe at least someone will learn something new for themselves