The title of Hero of the Russian Federation was awarded to one of the most famous special forces soldiers of the USSR - Colonel Vladimir Kovtun. The award found the officer thirty years after his feat - Kovtun was part of the group that captured the first American Stinger MANPADS in Afghanistan. How did this happen?

Since the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, our aviation has dominated the air almost unhindered. The arrival of Mi-24 fire support helicopters at the battle site decided the outcome of the battle in the direction of Soviet units. At the beginning of 1987, the Mujahideen had only 12.7 mm DShK machine guns and 14.5 mm anti-aircraft mountain mounts based on the Vladimirov machine gun, both made in China, among their air defense systems. Both machine guns were heavy weapons that the Mujahideen installed in base areas, creating an air defense zone through the massive use of these weapons. Sometimes the DShK was placed in the back of a car. But they could only be good when operating in an ambush. In an open confrontation with the Mi-24, these mobile machine gun mounts lost.

The Americans, supplying the Mujahideen with a new generation of Stinger MANPADS, sought to deprive Soviet aviation of air supremacy. This was a unique case when the Americans agreed to supply the Mujahideen with systems in service with the US Army. As a rule, the CIA purchased for them outdated British-made Lee Enfield rifles from the First World War and AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifles, DShK machine guns and Chinese-made RPG-17 grenade launchers, the quality of which was low. This was done through third countries so that the United States itself remained in the shadows.

And the deliveries of “Stingers” really turned out to be very effective - Soviet aviation began to suffer heavy losses. Therefore, the capture of the first sample of the Stinger MANPADS solved two problems for the USSR at once. It made it possible to accuse the United States of directly supplying the Mujahideen with weapons, as well as to provide Soviet scientists with the latest American MANPADS in order to develop means of protection against it. Apparently, this is why the Minister of Defense, Marshal Sergei Sokolov, announced that for capturing the first sample of this weapon, the performers would be awarded the title of Hero Soviet Union.

Deputy commander of the 186th special forces unit, Evgeniy Sergeev, told how, after the operation to capture the first Stinger, the high ranks of our military intelligence began to process. For the country's political leadership, they presented the operation as the result of their painstaking work - supposedly it was they who discovered the fact of the deal and led the shipment of the first Stingers from the moment they were sent from the United States. The management believed this version - and, as usual, those not involved were rewarded. And those who had a real and direct connection to the matter were left without awards...

In fact, the capture of this weapon was purely an accident.

At the junction of the zones of responsibility of the 186th and 173rd special forces detachments there was the Miltanai Gorge. Due to the fact that it was too far for both the Kandahar and Sharjah detachments to fly there, the spirits felt relatively at ease there.

Major Sergeev was a very active and restless special forces officer. He constantly came up with ways to effectively combat the enemy. His comrade-in-arms in this matter was the deputy company commander, Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun - at that time the most productive officer of the detachment. That morning, January 5, 1987, the two of them decided, under the guise of another flight over the area, to choose a place for an ambush in the gorge, a place for the day and a place for landing Kovtun’s group in the coming days.

Both were in the lead helicopter and with them 2-3 more reconnaissance officers. The inspection team of Lieutenant V. Cheboksarov was in the trailing helicopter.

This is what Sergeev himself, who led the group that eventually captured the Stingers, said: “Everything happened at about nine-thirty in the morning. At this time, there is usually no movement of spirits. We were just lucky, but the spirits weren’t.”

Vladimir Kovtun recalled: “At first we flew southwest along the concrete road. Then we turned left and entered the gorge. Suddenly, three motorcyclists were found on the road. Seeing our helicopters, they quickly dismounted and opened fire with small arms, and also made two quick launches from MANPADS. But at first we mistook these launches for shots from an RPG. This was a period when the coordination of helicopter crews and groups special purpose was close to ideal. The pilots immediately made a sharp turn and sat down. Already when we left the board, the commander managed to shout to us: “They are shooting from a grenade launcher.” “Twenty-fours” covered us from the air, and we started a battle on the ground.”

Sergeev decided to land only with the leading side, since the detected enemy group was small, and he planned to deal with them with the landing forces of only the leading helicopter. On earth they were divided. “I ran along the road with one fighter. - said Sergeev. - Volodya and two scouts ran to the right. The spirits were beaten almost point blank. Motorcycles on the ground. A pipe wrapped in a blanket is attached to one of them. An inner voice calmly says: “This is a MANPADS.”

According to Kovtun, in that battle they killed 16 people. Apparently, the spirits decided to organize an air defense ambush on one of the hills, and some of them were already in place to guard the position, and trained operators with MANPADS arrived on motorcycles. Kovtun recalled: “I and two fighters chased after one of the spirits, who had some kind of pipe and a “diplomat” type case in his hands. I was interested in him, first of all, because of the “diplomat”. Even without assuming that the pipe was an empty container from the Stinger, I immediately felt that there might be interesting documents there.” However, the spirit ran very quickly, and when the distance between him and Kovtun increased, Vladimir remembered that he was a master of sports in shooting and the spirit was unlikely to be able to run faster than a bullet...

The case contained documents for the delivery of a batch of Stinger MANPADS from the USA to Pakistan. These documents were irrefutable evidence of the US supplying the Mujahideen with the latest weapons.

In order to capture the retreating enemy group of three people, Sergeev ordered the follower helicopter with the group of Lieutenant V. Cheboksarov to land. But they couldn’t take them and simply destroyed them. Therefore, from time to time the story that comes up that they forgot another participant in these events, Cheboksarov, does not correspond to the truth. He recently passed away. Evgeny Sergeev also died without receiving the promised Golden Star during his lifetime. His friends, colleagues and relatives managed to push through the award after his death in May 2012.

Thank God, Vladimir Kovtun managed to receive a well-deserved high award during his lifetime, although with a delay of three decades.

Why weren’t the heroes given the promised stars on time? Vladimir Kovtun himself answered this question: “They decided to introduce me, Sergeev, Sobol, the commander of the plane on which we were flying, and one sergeant from the inspection team to the Hero. To submit a nomination for a Hero, the candidate must be photographed. They took pictures of the four of us and... in the end, they didn’t give us anything. In my opinion, the sergeant received the “Banner”. Zhenya had a party penalty that had not been lifted, and a criminal case was opened against me (Both the party penalty and the criminal case were inspired by far-fetched circumstances by people who did not like the independent character of our heroes - approx. VIEW).

Why they didn’t give the helicopter pilot a Hero, I still don’t know. He was probably also in disgrace with his command. Although, in my opinion, we did not do anything particularly heroic then, the fact remains a fact. We took the first Stinger.”

When in 1986 the United States began supplying Stinger MANPADS to the Afghan mujahideen, the OKSV command promised the title of Hero of the Soviet Union to anyone who captured this complex in good condition. During the years of the Afghan War, Soviet special forces managed to obtain 8(!) serviceable Stinger MANPADS, but none of them became Heroes.

"Stinging" for the Mujahideen

Modern combat operations are unthinkable without aviation. Since the Second World War to the present day, gaining air supremacy has been one of the primary tasks ensuring victory on the ground. However, air supremacy is achieved not only by aviation itself, but also air defense, which neutralizes enemy air forces. In the second half of the 20th century. anti-aircraft guns appear in the air defense arsenal of the world's leading armies guided missiles. The new one was divided into several classes: long-range, medium-range, short-range anti-aircraft missiles and short-range anti-aircraft missile systems. The main short-range air defense systems, which are tasked with combating helicopters and attack aircraft at low and extremely low altitudes, have become man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems - MANPADS.

Helicopters, which became widespread after World War II, significantly increased the maneuverability of ground and military units. airborne troops to defeat enemy troops in his tactical and operational-tactical rear, to pin down the enemy in maneuver, to capture important objects etc., they became the most effective means combating tanks and other small targets. Airmobile actions of infantry units became the hallmark of armed conflicts of the second half of the 20th - early 21st centuries, where one of warring parties, as a rule, become irregular armed groups. The domestic armed forces in our new country encountered such an enemy in Afghanistan in 1979-1989, where Soviet army for the first time it was necessary to conduct a large-scale counter-guerrilla struggle. There could be no question of the effectiveness of combat operations against rebels in the mountains without the use of army and front-line aviation. It was on her shoulders that the entire burden of aviation support for the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) was placed. The Afghan rebels suffered significant losses from air strikes and airmobile actions of infantry units and OKSVA special forces, so the most serious attention was paid to the issue of combating aviation. The armed Afghan opposition constantly increased the air defense fire capabilities of its units. Already by the mid-80s. of the last century, the rebels had in their arsenal a sufficient number of short-range anti-aircraft weapons that optimally suited the tactics of guerrilla warfare. The main air defense systems of the armed formations of the Afghan opposition were 12.7-mm DShK machine guns, 14.5-mm ZGU-1 anti-aircraft mountain mounts, ZPGU-2, 20-mm and 23-mm twin anti-aircraft machine gun mounts anti-aircraft guns, as well as man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems.

MANPADS missile "Stinger"

By the beginning of the 1980s. In the USA, the company "General Dynamics" created the second generation MANPADS "Stinger". Man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems of the second generation have:
an improved IR seeker (infrared homing head), capable of operating at two separated wavelengths;
long-wave IR seeker, providing all-angle guidance of the missile to the target, including from the front hemisphere;
a microprocessor that distinguishes a real target from fired IR traps;
cooled IR homing sensor, allowing the missile to more effectively resist interference and attack low-flying targets;
a short time reactions to the target;
increased firing range at targets on a collision course;
greater missile guidance accuracy and target hit efficiency compared to first-generation MANPADS;
“friend or foe” identification equipment;
means for automating launch processes and preliminary target designation for gunner operators. The second generation MANPADS also include the Strela-3 and Igla complexes developed in the USSR. The basic version of the FIM-92A Stinger missile was equipped with a single-channel all-angle IR seeker
with a cooled receiver operating in the wavelength range of 4.1-4.4 microns, an efficient propulsion dual-mode solid propellant engine that accelerates the rocket within 6 seconds to a speed of about 700 m/s.

The “Stinger-POST” (POST - Passive Optical Seeker Technology) variant with the FIM-92B missile became the first representative of the third generation MANPADS. The seeker used in the rocket operates in the IR and UV wavelength ranges, which provides high performance for the selection of air targets in conditions of background interference.

Both versions of the Stinger missiles have been used in Afghanistan since 1986.

Of the entire listed arsenal of air defense systems, the most effective for combating low-flying targets, of course, were MANPADS. Unlike anti-aircraft machine guns and cannons, they have a greater range of effective fire and are more likely to hit high-speed targets, are mobile, easy to use and do not require lengthy crew training. Modern MANPADS are ideal for partisans and intelligence units, operating behind enemy lines, to combat helicopters and low-flying aircraft. The Chinese Hunyin-5 anti-aircraft complex (analogous to the domestic Strela-2 MANPADS) remained the most widespread MANPADS of the Afghan rebels throughout the “Afghan War”. Chinese MANPADS, as well as a small number of similar Egyptian-made SA-7 complexes (Strela-2 MANPADS in NATO terminology) began to enter service with the rebels from the early 80s. Until the mid-80s. they were used by Afghan rebels mainly to cover their targets from air strikes, and were part of the so-called object system Air defense of fortified base areas. However, in 1986, American and Pakistani military advisers and experts supervising Afghan illegal armed groups, having analyzed the dynamics of rebel losses from air strikes and systematic airmobile actions of Soviet special forces and infantry units, decided to increase the combat capabilities of the Mujahideen air defense by supplying them with American Stinger MANPADS. ("Stinging"). With the advent of the Stinger MANPADS among the rebel formations, it became the main weapon of fire when setting up anti-aircraft ambushes near the airfields of the army, front-line and military transport aviation of our Air Force in Afghanistan and the government Afghan Air Force.

MANPADS "Strela-2". USSR (“Hunyin-5”. China)

The Pentagon and the US CIA, arming Afghan rebels with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, pursued a number of goals, one of which was the opportunity to test the new MANPADS in real combat conditions. By supplying modern MANPADS to the Afghan rebels, the Americans “tried” them to supplying Soviet weapons to Vietnam, where the United States lost hundreds of helicopters and planes shot down by Soviet missiles. But the Soviet Union provided legal assistance to the government of a sovereign country fighting the aggressor, and American politicians armed anti-government armed groups of the Mujahideen (“international terrorists” - according to the current American classification).

Despite the strictest secrecy, the first media reports about the supply of several hundred Stinger MANPADS to the Afghan opposition appeared in the summer of 1986. American anti-aircraft systems were delivered from the United States by sea to the Pakistani port of Karachi, and then transported by road. Armed Forces Pakistan to Mujahideen training camps. The US CIA supplied missiles and trained Afghan rebels in the vicinity of the Pakistani city of Rualpindi. After preparing the calculations at the training center, they, together with the MANPADS, were sent to Afghanistan in pack caravans and vehicles.

Launch of the Stinger MANPADS missile

Gafar strikes

Details of the first use of Stinger MANPADS by Afghan rebels are described by the head of the Afghan department of the Pakistan Intelligence Center (1983-1987), General Mohammad Yusuf, in the book “Bear Trap”: “On September 25, 1986, about thirty-five Mujahideen secretly made their way to the foot of a small high-rise overgrown with bushes, located only one and a half kilometers northeast of the Jalalabad airfield runway... The fire crews were within shouting distance of each other, located in a triangle in the bushes, since no one knew from which direction the target might appear. We organized each crew in such a way that three people fired, and the other two held containers with rockets for fast recharge.... Each of the Mujahideen chose a helicopter through an open sight on launcher, the “friend or foe” system signaled with an intermittent signal that an enemy target had appeared in the coverage area, and the “Stinger” captured thermal radiation from the helicopter engines with its guidance head... When the leading helicopter was only 200 m above the ground, Gafar commanded: “Fire "... One of the three missiles did not work and fell without exploding, just a few meters from the shooter. The other two crashed into their targets... Two more missiles went into the air, one hit the target as successfully as the previous two, and the second passed very close, since the helicopter had already landed... In the following months, he (Gafar) shot down ten more helicopters and planes using Stingers.

Mujahideen of Ghafar to the outskirts of Jalalabad

Combat helicopter Mi-24P

In fact, two rotorcraft of the 335th separate combat helicopter regiment, returning from a combat mission, were shot down over the Jalalabad airfield. While approaching the airfield on the pre-landing straight, the Mi-8MT captain A. Giniyatulin was hit by two Stinger MANPADS missiles and exploded in the air. The crew commander and flight engineer, Lieutenant O. Shebanov, were killed; pilot-navigator Nikolai Gerner was thrown out by the blast wave and survived. The helicopter of Lieutenant E. Pogorely was sent to the Mi-8MT crash area, but at an altitude of 150 m his vehicle was hit by a MANPADS missile. The pilot managed to make a rough landing, as a result of which the helicopter was destroyed. The commander received serious injuries from which he died in the hospital. The remaining crew members survived.

The Soviet command only guessed that the rebels used Stinger MANPADS. We were able to materially prove the use of Stinger MANPADS in Afghanistan only on November 29, 1986. The same group of “Engineer Gafar” staged an anti-aircraft ambush 15 km north of Jalalabad on the slope of Mount Wachhangar (elevation 1423) and as a result of firing with five Stinger missiles The helicopter group destroyed the Mi-24 and Mi-8MT (three missile hits were recorded). The crew of the slave helicopter - Art. Lieutenant V. Ksenzov and Lieutenant A. Neunylov died when they fell under the main rotor during an emergency ejection. The crew of the second helicopter hit by the missile managed to make an emergency landing and leave the burning car. The general from the TurkVO headquarters, who was at that time in the Jalalabad garrison, did not believe the report that two helicopters were hit by anti-aircraft missiles, accusing the pilots of “the helicopters colliding in the air.” It is not known how, but the aviators nevertheless convinced the general that “spirits” were involved in the plane crash. The 2nd motorized rifle battalion of the 66th separate motorized rifle brigade and the 1st company of the 154th separate special forces detachment were alerted. The special forces and infantry were tasked with finding parts of an anti-aircraft missile or other material evidence of the use of MANPADS, otherwise all the blame for the plane crash would have been placed on the surviving crews... Only after a day had passed (the general took a long time to make a decision...) by the morning of November 30 in Search units arrived in the area of ​​the helicopter crash in armored vehicles. There could no longer be any talk of intercepting the enemy. Our company failed to find anything other than burnt fragments of the helicopters and the remains of the crew. The 6th Company of the 66th Motorized Rifle Brigade, when inspecting the probable missile launch site, quite accurately indicated by the helicopter pilots, discovered three, and then two more starting expulsion charges of the Stinger MANPADS. This was the first material evidence of the United States supplying anti-aircraft missiles to Afghan anti-government armed forces. The company commander who discovered them was presented with the Order of the Red Banner.

Mi-24, hit by fire from a Stinger MANPADS. Eastern Afghanistan, 1988

A careful study of traces of the enemy's presence (one firing position was located at the top and one in the lower third of the slope of the ridge) showed that an anti-aircraft ambush had been set up here in advance. The enemy waited for a suitable target and the moment to open fire for one or two days.

Hunt for Gafar

The OKSVA command also organized a hunt for the “Engineer Gafar” anti-aircraft group, whose area of ​​activity was the eastern Afghan provinces of Nangar-har, Laghman and Kunar. It was his group that was battered on November 9, 1986 by a reconnaissance detachment of the 3rd company of the 154 ooSpN (15 obrSpN), destroying several rebels and pack animals 6 km southwest of the village of Mangval in the province of Kunar. The intelligence officers then seized a portable American shortwave radio station, which was supplied to CIA agents. Gafar took revenge immediately. Three days later, from an anti-aircraft ambush 3 km southeast of the village of Mangval (30 km northeast of Jalalabad), a Mi-24 helicopter of the 335th “Jalalabad” helicopter regiment was shot down by fire from a Stinger MANPADS. Escorting several Mi-8MTs performing an ambulance flight from Asadabad to the hospital of the Jalalabad garrison, a pair of Mi-24s crossed the ridge at an altitude of 300 m without shooting IR traps. A helicopter shot down by a MANPADS missile fell into a gorge. The commander and pilot-operator left the plane using a parachute from a height of 100 m and were picked up by their comrades. Special forces were sent to search for the flight technician. This time, squeezing the maximum permissible speed out of infantry fighting vehicles, the scouts of 154 ooSpN arrived in the area where the helicopter crashed in less than 2 hours. The 1st company of the detachment dismounted from the “armor” and began to be drawn into the gorge in two columns (along the bottom of the gorge itself and its right ridge) simultaneously with the arriving helicopters of the 335th Airborne Regiment. The helicopters came from the northeast, but the Mujahideen managed to launch MANPADS from the ruins of a village on the northern slope of the gorge to catch up with the leading twenty-four. The “spirits” miscalculated twice: the first time - when launching towards the setting sun, the second time - without finding out that it was not the pair’s trailing helicopter flying behind the lead vehicle (as usual), but four flights of combat Mi-24s. Fortunately, the missile missed the target just slightly. Its self-destructor worked late, and the exploding rocket did not harm the helicopter. Having quickly taken stock of the situation, the pilots launched a massive air strike against the position of the anti-aircraft gunners with sixteen rotary-wing combat vehicles. The aviators did not spare ammunition... The remains of the flight equipment of the station were picked up from the site of the helicopter crash. Lieutenant V. Yakovlev.

At the crash site of the helicopter shot down by the Stinger

The special forces who captured the first Stinger. In the center is Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun.

Fragment of a Mi-24 helicopter

Parachute canopy on the ground

The first Stinger

The first portable anti-aircraft gun missile system The Stinger was captured by Soviet troops in Afghanistan on January 5, 1987. During aerial reconnaissance of the area, the reconnaissance group of Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun and Lieutenant Vasily Cheboksarov of the 186th separate special forces detachment (22 Special Forces Special Forces) under the overall command of the deputy detachment commander, Major Evgeniy Sergeev, In the vicinity of the village of Seyid Umar Kalai, three motorcyclists were spotted in the Meltakai Gorge. Vladimir Kovtun described further actions as follows: “Seeing our helicopters, they quickly dismounted and opened fire with small arms, and also made two quick launches from MANPADS, but at first we mistook these launches for shots from an RPG. The pilots immediately made a sharp turn and sat down. Already when we left the board, the commander managed to shout to us: “They are shooting from grenade launchers.” The twenty-fours covered us from the air, and we, having landed, started a battle on the ground.” Helicopters and special forces opened fire on the rebels, destroying them with NURS and small arms fire. Only the leading plane, on which there were only five special forces soldiers, landed on the ground, and the leading Mi-8 with Cheboksarov’s group provided insurance from the air. During the inspection of the destroyed enemy, Senior Lieutenant V. Kovtun seized a launch container, a hardware unit for the Stinger MANPADS and a complete set of technical documentation from the rebel he destroyed. One combat-ready complex, attached to a motorcycle, was captured by captain E. Sergeev, and another empty container and a missile were captured by the group’s reconnaissance officers, who landed from a follower helicopter. During the battle, a group of 16 rebels was destroyed and one was captured. The “spirits” did not have time to take up positions for setting up an anti-aircraft ambush.

MANPADS "Stinger" and its standard closure

Helicopter pilots with special forces on board were several minutes ahead of them. Later, everyone who wanted to become one of the heroes of the day latched on to the glory of helicopter pilots and special forces soldiers. Still, “Special forces captured the Stingers!” - the whole of Afghanistan thundered. The official version of the seizure of the American MANPADS looked like a special operation with the participation of agents who tracked the entire delivery route of the Stingers from the arsenals of the US Army to the village of Seyid Umar Kalai. Naturally, all the “sisters received earrings,” but they forgot about the true participants in the capture of the Stinger, having bought off several orders and medals, but it was promised that whoever captured the Stinger first would receive the title “Hero of the Soviet Union.”

The first two Stinger MANPADS captured by special forces of the 186th Special Forces. January 1986

National reconciliation

With the capture of the first American MANPADS, the hunt for the Stinger did not stop. The GRU special forces were tasked with preventing them from saturating the enemy’s armed formations. All winter 1986-1987. Special forces units of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan were hunting for Stingers, having the task not so much of preventing their arrival (which was unrealistic), but of preventing their rapid spread throughout Afghanistan. By this time, two special forces brigades (15th and 22nd separate special forces brigades) and the 459th separate company special forces of the 40th combined arms army. However, the special forces did not receive any preferences. January 1987 was marked by an event of “tremendous political importance,” as Soviet newspapers wrote at the time—the beginning of a policy of national reconciliation. Its consequences for OKSVA turned out to be much more destructive than the supply of American anti-aircraft missiles to the armed Afghan opposition. Unilateral reconciliation without taking into account military-political realities limited the active offensive actions of OKSVA.

The firing of two MANPADS missiles at a Mi-8MT helicopter on the first day of national reconciliation on January 16, 1987, on a passenger flight from Kabul to Jalalabad, looked like a mockery. Among the passengers on board the helicopter was the chief of staff of the 177 Special Forces (Ghazni), Major Sergei Kutsov, currently the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Internal Troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, lieutenant general. Without losing his cool, the special forces officer knocked out the flames and helped the other passengers leave the burning side. Only one passenger was unable to use the parachute because she was wearing a skirt and did not wear it...

The one-sided “national reconciliation” was immediately taken advantage of by the armed Afghan opposition, which at that moment, according to American analysts, was “on the brink of disaster.” It was the difficult situation of the rebels that was the main reason for the supply of Stinger MANPADS to them. Beginning in 1986, the airmobile operations of the Soviet special forces, whose units were assigned helicopters, so limited the rebels' ability to supply weapons and ammunition to the interior of Afghanistan that the armed opposition began to create special combat groups to fight our intelligence agencies. But, even well trained and armed, they could not significantly influence combat activities special forces The likelihood of their detection by reconnaissance groups was extremely low, but if this happened, then the clash was fierce. Sorry, activity data special groups There are no rebels against Soviet special forces in Afghanistan, but several episodes of clashes based on the same pattern of enemy actions can be attributed specifically to “anti-special forces” groups.

The Soviet special forces, which became a barrier to the movement of the “caravans of terror,” were based in the provinces of Afghanistan bordering Pakistan and Iran, but what could the special forces do, whose reconnaissance groups and detachments could block no more than one kilometer of the caravan route, or rather, the direction. The special forces perceived the “Gorbachev reconciliation” as a stab in the back, limiting their actions in the “reconciliation zones” and in the immediate vicinity of the border, when conducting raids on villages where the rebels were based and their caravans stopped for the day. But still, because active actions Soviet special forces, by the end of winter 1987, the Mujahideen were experiencing significant difficulties with food and fodder at the “overpopulated” transshipment bases. Although what awaited them in Afghanistan was not hunger, but death on mined paths and in special forces ambushes. In 1987 alone, reconnaissance groups and special forces intercepted 332 caravans with weapons and ammunition, capturing and destroying more than 290 heavy weapons (recoilless rifles, mortars, heavy machine guns), 80 MANPADS (mainly Hunyin -5 and SA- 7), 30 PC launchers, more than 15 thousand anti-tank and anti-personnel mines and about 8 million ammunition small arms. Acting on the communications of the rebels, the special forces forced the armed opposition to accumulate most of the military-technical cargo at transshipment bases in the border areas of Afghanistan, difficult for Soviet and Afghan troops. Taking advantage of this, the aircraft of the Limited Contingent and the Afghan Air Force began systematically bombing them.

Meanwhile, taking advantage of the temporary respite kindly provided to the Afghan opposition by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze (then USSR Foreign Minister), the rebels began to intensively increase firepower their formations. It was during this period that the saturation of combat detachments and groups of armed opposition with 107-mm rocket systems, recoilless rifles and mortars was observed. Not only the Stinger, but also the English Blowpipe MANPADS, the Swiss 20-mm Oerlikon anti-aircraft artillery mounts and the Spanish 120-mm mortars are beginning to enter their arsenal. An analysis of the situation in Afghanistan in 1987 indicated that the armed opposition was preparing for decisive actions, for which the Soviet “perestroika”ists, who set a course for the Soviet Union to surrender its international positions, did not have the will.

He was on fire in a helicopter hit by a Stinger missile. Head of the RUVV of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Lieutenant General S. Kutsov

Special forces on caravan routes

Limited in carrying out raids and reconnaissance and search operations (raids), Soviet special forces in Afghanistan intensified ambush operations. The rebels paid special attention to ensuring the safety of the caravans, and the scouts had to show great ingenuity when leading to the ambush area, secrecy and endurance in anticipation of the enemy, and in battle - steadfastness and courage. In most combat episodes, the enemy significantly outnumbered the special forces reconnaissance group. In Afghanistan, the effectiveness of special forces actions during ambush operations was 1: 5-6 (reconnaissance officers managed to engage the enemy in one case out of 5-6). According to data published later in the West, the armed opposition managed to deliver 80-90% of the cargo transported by pack caravans and vehicles to its destination. In special forces areas of responsibility, this figure was significantly lower. Subsequent episodes of the capture of the Stinger MANPADS by Soviet special forces occurred precisely during the actions of reconnaissance officers on caravan routes.

On the night of July 16-17, 1987, as a result of an ambush by the reconnaissance group 668 ooSpN (15 arr. SpN) of Lieutenant German Pokhvoshchev, a pack caravan of rebels in the province of Logar was scattered by fire. By the morning, the ambush area was blocked by an armored group of a detachment led by Lieutenant Sergei Klimenko. Fleeing, the rebels threw their loads off their horses and disappeared into the night. As a result of an inspection of the area, two Stinger and two Blowpipe MANPADS were discovered and captured, as well as about a ton of other weapons and ammunition. The British carefully concealed the fact of supplying MANPADS to Afghan illegal armed groups. Now the Soviet government has the opportunity to convict them of supplying anti-aircraft missiles to the Afghan armed opposition. However, what was the point in that when more than 90% of the weapons to the Afghan “Mujahideen” were supplied by China, and the Soviet press bashfully kept silent about this fact, “branding shame” on the West. You can guess why - in Afghanistan, our soldiers were killed and maimed by Soviet weapons marked “Made in China”, developed domestic designers in the 50-50s, the production technology of which was transferred by the Soviet Union to the “great neighbor”.

Landing of the Special Forces RG into a helicopter

Reconnaissance group of Lieutenant V. Matyushin (in the top row, second from left)

Now it was the rebels’ turn, and they were in no debt to the Soviet troops. In November 1987, two anti-aircraft missiles shot down a Mi-8MT helicopter of 355 obvp, on board which were scouts from 334 ooSpN (15 obrSpN). At 05:55, a pair of Mi-8MTs, under the cover of a pair of Mi-24s, took off from the Asadabad site and went to outpost No. 2 (Lahorsar, level 1864) with a gentle climb. At 06:05, at an altitude of 100 m from the ground, the Mi-8MT transport helicopter was hit by two Stinger MANPADS missiles, after which it caught fire and began to lose altitude. Flight technician Captain A. Gurtov and six passengers were killed in the crashed helicopter. The crew commander left the car in the air, but he did not have enough altitude to open the parachute. Only the pilot-navigator managed to escape, landing with a partially opened parachute canopy on a steep slope of the ridge. Among the dead was the commander of the special forces group, Senior Lieutenant Vadim Matyushin. On this day, the rebels were preparing a massive shelling of the Asadabad garrison, covering the positions of 107-mm rocket systems volley fire and mortars by crews of MANPADS anti-aircraft gunners. In the winter of 1987-1988. The rebels practically gained air superiority in the vicinity of Asadabad with portable anti-aircraft systems. Before this, the commander of the 334 Special Forces, Major Grigory Bykov, did not allow them to do this, but his replacements did not show strong will and determination... Front-line aviation still attacked rebel positions in the vicinity of Asadabad, but did not act effectively from extreme heights. Helicopters were forced to transport personnel and cargo only at night, and during the day they made only urgent ambulance flights at extremely low altitudes along the Kunar River.

Patrolling the inspection area of ​​the Spetsnaz RG by helicopters

However, reconnaissance officers from other special forces units also felt the limitations of using army aviation. The area of ​​their airmobile operations was significantly limited by the safety of army aviation flights. In the current situation, when the authorities demanded “results”, and the capabilities of the intelligence agencies were limited by the directives and instructions of the same authorities, the command of the 154th special forces found a way out of the seemingly deadlock situation. The detachment, thanks to the initiative of its commander, Major Vladimir Vorobyov, and the head of the detachment’s engineering service, Major Vladimir Gorenitsa, began to use complex mining of caravan routes. In fact, reconnaissance officers of the 154th special forces created a reconnaissance and fire complex (ROC) in Afghanistan back in 1987, the creation of which in modern Russian army there is only talk. The main elements of the system of combating rebel caravans, created by the special forces of the “Jalalabad Battalion” on the caravan route Parachnar-Shahidan-Panjshir, were:

Sensors and repeaters of the "Realiya" reconnaissance and signaling equipment (RSA) installed at the borders (seismic, acoustic and radio wave sensors), from which information was received about the composition of the caravans and the presence of ammunition and weapons in them (metal detectors);

Mining lines with radio-controlled minefields and non-contact explosive devices NVU-P “Okhota” (seismic target movement sensors);

Areas where special forces reconnaissance agencies conduct ambushes, adjacent to mining and SAR installation lines. This ensured complete closure of the caravan route, the smallest width of which in the area of ​​crossings across the Kabul River was 2-3 km;

Barrage lines and areas of concentrated artillery fire of outposts guarding the Kabul-Jalalabad highway (122-mm self-propelled howitzers 2S1 "Gvozdika", in the positions of which were the operators of the Realiya SAR, reading information from the receiving devices).

Area patrol routes accessible to helicopters with special forces inspection teams on board.

The commander of the inspection unit of the Special Forces, Lieutenant S. Lafazan (in the center), captured the Stinger MANPADS on 02/16/1988.

A combat-ready Stinger MANPADS, captured by reconnaissance officers of the 154th Special Forces in February 1988.

Such a troublesome “management” required constant monitoring and regulation, but the results showed very quickly. The rebels more and more often fell into a trap cleverly arranged by the special forces. Even having their own observers and informants from among the local population in the mountains and nearby villages, probing every stone and path, they were faced with the constant “presence” of special forces, suffering losses in controlled minefields, from artillery fire and ambushes. Inspection teams in helicopters completed the destruction of scattered pack animals and collected the “result” from caravans crushed by mines and shells. On February 16, 1988, a special-purpose inspection reconnaissance group of the 154 Special Forces Special Forces, Lieutenant Sergei Lafzan, discovered 6 km northwest of the village of Shakhidan a group of pack animals destroyed by MON-50 mines of the NVU-P “Hunting” set. During the inspection, intelligence officers seized two boxes with Stinger MANPADS. The peculiarity of NVU-P is that this electronic device identifies the movement of people by ground vibrations and issues a command to sequentially detonate five fragmentation mines OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90 or others.

A few days later, in the same area, scouts from the inspection group of the Jalalabad special forces detachment again captured two Stinger MANPADS. This episode ended the epic of the special forces hunt for the Stinger in Afghanistan. All four cases of its capture by Soviet troops were the work of special forces units and units operationally subordinate to the Main Intelligence Directorate General Staff USSR Armed Forces.

Since 1988, the withdrawal of a limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began with... the most combat-ready units that terrified the rebels throughout the “Afghan war” - individual special forces units. For some reason (?) it was the special forces that turned out to be the “weak link” for the Kremlin democrats in Afghanistan... Strange, isn’t it? Having exposed the external borders of Afghanistan, at least somehow covered by Soviet special forces, the short-sighted military-political leadership of the USSR allowed the rebels to increase the flow of military assistance from outside and handed Afghanistan over to them. In February 1989, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from this country was completed, but Najibullah's government remained in power until 1992. Since this period, chaos reigned in the country civil war, and the Stingers provided by the Americans began to spread among terrorist organizations around the world.

It’s unlikely that the Stingers played on their own decisive role in forcing the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan, as is sometimes portrayed in the West. Its reasons lie in the political miscalculations of the last leaders of the Soviet era. However, a trend towards an increase in losses of aircraft due to its destruction by fire from MANPADS missiles in Afghanistan after 1986 could be traced, despite the significantly reduced intensity of flights. But one cannot attribute the merit for this only to the “Stinger”. In addition to the same Stingers, the rebels continued to receive other MANPADS in huge quantities.

The result of the hunt of the Soviet special forces for the American “Stinger” was eight combat-ready anti-aircraft systems, for which none of the special forces received the promised Golden Star of the Hero. The highest state award was awarded to Senior Lieutenant German Pokhvoshchev (668 ooSpN), awarded the Order of Lenin, and only for the fact that he captured the only two Blowpipe MANPADS. An attempt by a number of public veteran organizations to achieve the awarding of the title of Hero of Russia to reserve Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Kovtun and posthumously to Lieutenant Colonel Evgeniy Sergeev (died in 2008) encounters a wall of indifference in the offices of the Ministry of Defense. It’s a strange position, given that currently, of the seven special forces soldiers awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union for Afghanistan, no one is left alive (five people were awarded it posthumously). Meanwhile, the first samples of Stinger MANPADS obtained by special forces and their technical documentation allowed domestic aviators to find effective methods of countering them, which saved the lives of hundreds of pilots and passengers of aircraft. It is possible that some technical solutions were used by our designers when creating domestic second- and third-generation MANPADS, which are superior to the Stinger in some combat characteristics.

MANPADS "Stinger" (above) and "Hunyin" (below) are the main anti-aircraft systems of the Afghan Mujahideen in the late 80s.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin to GRU special forces reserve colonel Vladimir Kovtun. He became one of the officers who was the first to capture the American Stinger man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) in Afghanistan. Thus, the USSR provided the world with irrefutable evidence of US participation in sponsoring Afghan militants with weapons. Life figured out the history of the unique operation of the Soviet special forces.

The Soviet Union has been at war in Afghanistan since 1979. There were various reasons for this, the essence of which does not make sense to go into in this story. One way or another, throughout the war Soviet troops acted quite successfully and could well have achieved all their goals if the United States and its other NATO allies had not come to the aid of the Afghan Mujahideen opposing them. They provided the militants not only with weapons, but also with communications equipment, money, food, and also provided training assistance. For a long time, the USSR was unable to obtain irrefutable evidence of US intervention in the conflict in Afghanistan. The turning point occurred only in 1987.

Throughout the war, one of the main advantages of the Soviet troops was aviation. For obvious reasons, the Mujahideen could not do anything to counter it in the air, and there were few means to fight it from the ground. However, in the fall of 1986, the Americans began supplying the militants with their Stinger MANPADS, which were modern at that time. This weapon was quite light and easy to operate, but at the same time unusually dangerous for Soviet pilots. The Stinger confidently hit air targets at altitudes from 180 to 3800 meters. As a result of the supply of these weapons in 1986, Soviet troops lost 23 aircraft and helicopters.

The situation reached the point where helicopter pilots had to dramatically change tactics and conduct flights at extremely low altitudes, constantly using folds in the terrain as cover. Soviet intelligence, of course, received information about the supply of American MANPADS to the Mujahideen, but there was no 100 percent evidence of this. The command issued a statement that the first soldier or officer to capture the Stinger from the militants will be nominated for the title of Hero of the USSR. However, we didn't have to wait long.

The Meltanai Gorge in the Afghan province of Kandahar was located at the junction of two Soviet units, and therefore the Mujahideen felt quite at ease there. Soviet special forces knew this and periodically ambushed the militants. On January 5, 1987, a group of reconnaissance officers from the 186th separate special forces detachment of the GRU General Staff, under the command of the deputy detachment commander, Major Evgeniy Sergeev, decided to make another raid in the gorge. Under the command of Sergeev was Vladimir Kovtun (then still with the rank of senior lieutenant).

The scouts arrived in the gorge on two Mi-8 helicopters. Approaching the intended landing site, they saw three motorcyclists on the road. At that time, only militants used this type of transport. However, the Mujahideen gave themselves away: having dismounted, they opened fire on the helicopters with automatic weapons and fired two shots from those same Stingers. As it turns out later, the militants fired from MANPADS offhand, and therefore did not hit the helicopters. But the special forces themselves initially decided that they were being fired at from hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers (RPGs).

Photo: © RIA Novosti / Alexander Grashchenkov

The “spirit” motorcyclists were partially eliminated using an onboard machine gun; in addition, the commander of one of the helicopters, Captain Sobol, fired unguided missiles at the militants. The detachment commander, Sergeev, orders the car to land, and the second helicopter asks to remain in the air to cover the special forces group. Already on the ground, the fighters divided into two detachments and began fighting the Mujahideen almost point-blank. Our soldiers had to storm the hill on which the “spirits” were strengthened. The dynamics of the battle were so high that it lasted no more than 10 minutes; the scouts literally flew up the hill.

In that battle we killed sixteen "spirits". Apparently, a group of Mujahideen, who had earlier approached from the village, was sitting on the high-rise. They couldn't all come on three motorcycles, could they? Perhaps they were trying to organize an air defense ambush with ground cover and at the same time test the recently arrived Stingers. Two soldiers and I chased after one of the “spirits,” who had some kind of pipe and a briefcase-type case in his hands. “Spirit” interested me primarily because of “diplomat.” Even without assuming that the pipe was an empty container from the Stinger, I immediately felt that the case might contain interesting documents,” Vladimir Kovtun told the Bratishka publication after many years.

Photo: © RIA Novosti / Andrey Solomonov

The senior lieutenant rushed in pursuit of the Mujahideen, but the militant broke away. Then Vladimir Kovtun, being a master of sports in shooting, decided to eliminate him. From a distance of more than 200 meters, a bullet from the AKS hit him directly in the head. Kovtun took the case and the American MANPADS. The scouts began to retreat to the helicopters, carrying valuable battle trophies. They also took one wounded Mujahideen with them, providing him with medical assistance.

They gave the order to retreat. The soldiers brought two more pipes: one empty, the other unused. The helicopter took off and took the opposite course. In the salon I opened the “diplomat”, and there was complete documentation on the “Stinger”, starting from the addresses of suppliers in the USA and ending detailed instructions for using the complex. At this point we were absolutely stunned with joy. Everyone knew what a stir our command had created around the purchase of Stingers by the Mujahideen. They also knew that the one who was the first to take at least one sample would be awarded the Hero’s Star,” Kovtun shared his memories in an interview.

Thanks to the feat of the intelligence officers, the USSR presented irrefutable evidence of US interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan at an urgent press conference at the Afghan Foreign Ministry.

However, none of the participants in this operation received the promised Star of the Hero of the USSR. The intelligence officers themselves attribute this to the fact that they had a conflict with their superiors. However, they noted that the main thing was the result; during the capture of the Stingers, no one thought about any ranks.

Photo: © Page" Afghan wind "Scorpio"/OK

There was a lot of noise around this incident. The brigade commander, Colonel Gerasimov, arrived. For the title of Hero they decided to nominate Sergeev, me, Sobol - the commander of the plane we were flying on, and one sergeant from the inspection team (Colonel Vasily Cheboksarov. - Note Life). To submit a nomination for a Hero, the candidate must be photographed. They took pictures of the four of us and... gave us nothing. In my opinion, the sergeant received the Order of the Red Banner. Zhenya Sergeev had an outstanding party penalty, and my relationship with the command was also not cloudless. Why they didn’t give the Hero to the helicopter pilot, I still don’t know. He was probably also in disgrace with his superiors. Although, in my opinion, we didn’t do anything particularly heroic then. But the fact remains: we took the first Stinger!

We had to wait more than 20 years for a well-deserved award. Thanks to the efforts of relatives and colleagues, the first title of Hero, but of Russia, was received by the commander of the detachment, Lieutenant Colonel Evgeny Sergeev, in 2012. Unfortunately, posthumously. Sergeev did not live to receive his well-deserved award for only a couple of years; he died from a serious illness, which was the result of numerous wounds during his years of service.

Now, on the day of the 30th anniversary of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, justice has also triumphed in relation to Colonel Vladimir Kovtun.