An irreconcilable fighter against the communist regime, writer, neurophysiologist, one of the founders of the dissident movement in the USSR, Vladimir Bukovsky was arrested four times. For anti-Soviet activities. Bukovsky spent a total of 12 years in prisons and in compulsory treatment, until in 1976 Soviet authorities did not exchange him for the General Secretary of the Chilean Communist Party, Luis Corvalan.

For almost 40 years, the dissident has been living in the UK in a small house in Cambridge. Back in the early 2000s, when both Russians and western world admired the new leader of the Russian Federation, Bukovsky called on politicians to stand in radical opposition to Vladimir Putin. “The only chance today to save Russia from emerging totalitarianism is the creation of a strong, powerful democratic opposition to the current regime ... otherwise Russia is simply doomed,” Bukovsky wrote back in 2002.

In an exclusive interview with GORDON, Vladimir Konstantinovich spoke about why Ukraine should not rely on the West and that in a few years, Russian jingoistic patriots will themselves sweep away the Putin regime.

- After the Boeing 777 shot down by terrorists in the Donbass, Western leaders made harsh statements against Russia. Is Europe really ready for tough action?

- European politicians will do everything to hush up the subject of the downed Boeing, because they are not ready to go for a complete break with Russia, the war with the Russian Federation does not suit anyone. I know from my own experience that in extreme situations, Western politicians try to cover up, hush up, do everything to maintain relations with Russia. So there is nothing to expect from Europe, there has long been no unity, one name. Moreover, in each specific country of the European Union, the reaction to the actions of the Putin regime is not as unambiguous as it seems to us.

As for the reaction of the public, after the tragedy with the passenger airliner, it is very strong. You can't imagine stronger. But, unfortunately, the connection between society and power in the West has been very weakened. I moved to England almost 40 years ago, then this connection was still there, public opinion really forced politicians to act differently. But not today…

- How can the death of 298 people, including 83 children, be hushed up?

“Very simple, I assure you. In 1983 Soviet Union shot down a South Korean passenger airliner over Sakhalin. 269 ​​people died. A year later, no one remembered it.

– Didn’t US President Reagan start the mechanism for the collapse of the USSR after that tragedy when he entered into negotiations with Saudi Arabia and brought down world oil prices?

- The collapse of the Union was the general strategy of the United States, developed in the early years of Reagan's coming to power. The tragedy with the South Korean airliner added nothing to this. The downed plane provoked a strong reaction among ordinary people West is true. For example, in the United States, all bottles of vodka were broken in bars, although it was not Soviet, but American-made. I was amazed then: why not destroy the Soviet embassy in the USA, why take out your anger on vodka? This is an inappropriate response.

I can imagine what an emotional state is now in the Netherlands, 193 citizens of which died in the sky over Ukraine. But there is no way for the public to act out their outrage. It will subside, it will pass, as everything passes. There will be other events, somewhere else something will be blown up. July 17 will also gradually fade into a foggy past ...

- That is, the West will not even introduce a third package of sanctions against Russia?

- Sanctions are disadvantageous, first of all, to Western countries, which will suffer from them more than Russia. A country under sanctions can easily circumvent them, especially when there is no consensus within the EU. Saddam Hussein was also under sanctions for many years, but his regime practically did not suffer from this: bypassing the restrictions, everything was bought and sold.

The West has already frozen the bank accounts of Putin's mosquito, but the inner circle of the President of the Russian Federation prepared for this in advance and took their capital from Western banks. Of course, part of the Kremlin elite has been punished, now it is difficult for them to keep money. But this is not the same as if their capital was taken away. This is how life works: it is impossible to do anything immediate and effective, you have to put up with it.

Well, let's say the European Union introduces some regular restrictions for Russia. But all sanctions have a certain blind period of operation, the consequences will become tangible in two years.

– What should Ukraine do in the current realities?

- You are already at war, but you should have started much earlier, with the Crimean events, then 90% of the current disaster in Ukraine would not have happened. However, I read on your site: six tanks passed through the border, two "Grad" crossed the border ... How is this possible? Where are the Ukrainian border guards, combat aircraft?! If the Russian military equipment moving across the steppe, it can be seen for tens of kilometers! With current technology, it can be destroyed over the horizon. But nothing of the kind happens: the convoy continues to move around Ukraine, and it goes to kill.

– We also have a lot of questions for the military leadership. Afraid, Ukrainian army rests solely on volunteers who carry everything to the front line: from shorts and socks to bulletproof vests and thermal imagers.

- Not everything is clear with the fighters either. A friend wrote to me: they say, it's a disgrace, we found a convoy of KamAZ trucks that arrived from Russia, we raised the planes, asked Kyiv, and in response to us: "Don't shoot." Why ask all these parquet generals? If there is no sensible bosses, we must fight ourselves: first defeat, and then “request” Kyiv. In all the armies of the world, they report backdating: they say, sorry, they wanted to know your team, but there was no connection, so they decided - it’s better to defeat than let the enemy through. No need to ask, take responsibility!

– Why do young Russians who were born after the collapse of the USSR, traveling around Europe and the USA, having access to alternative information - the Internet, still believe Russian propaganda?

- In the current Russian climate, it is still necessary to find out whether people really believe or pretend. Fear has returned to Russia, I feel it when I call my friends on the phone. In a conversation, they avoid a number of topics, because they assume that the phone can be tapped, which means that there will be corresponding consequences. In today's Russia, people are afraid to say what they think, because they know that they will have to answer to the Putin regime.

- This is just a short burst, a reaction to the slogan "Crimea is ours!". I had already seen a similar explosion of joy in 1961 when Yuri Gagarin flew into space. I was then 18 years old, together with geologists I came to Krasnoyarsk. There was nothing in the stores. At all. Even cans. Women stood at the crossroads and sold wild garlic in bags, which they had collected in the taiga. Nearby there was a kilometer-long line for shag. And at the same time, toothless grandmothers shouted: “Gagarin!”. This is 1961, the millionth city of Krasnoyarsk.

What were they happy about? The country, as it was hungry, remained, except wild garlic, there is nothing to eat! Grandmas did not understand: they were hungry and toothless because the country launched Gagarin into space. It's worth all the billions. But the people rejoiced: they say, even if we are beggars, we were the first to master space. At the age of 18 I did not understand this, and now, at 71, I do not understand.

– Ukraine was part of the USSR for almost 70 years. Do you think we also have the imperial gene “Let us be poor, but great”?

– Once upon a time there was something similar in Ukraine, but Maidan-2014 became a revolution against Sovietness. Not so much against Yanukovych - a crook and a thief - but against the Soviet mentality, which gave birth to such Yanukovychs. Of course, some part of the citizens still remained Soviet. In fact, the inhabitants of the east of Ukraine did not want to become part of Russia, but to return to the USSR.

I think that all these myths are in the minds not only because of TV propaganda, but also because after the collapse of the USSR there was no public remorse for the Soviet past. As early as 1991, dissidents called for a new Nuremberg Trial. Our appeals fell on dead ground, the people did not show any enthusiasm, the authorities did not want to.

How will the Ukrainian-Russian conflict end?

- The collapse of the Putin system.

- God bless you, Vladimir Konstantinovich!

“I am not saying this because I want to please you. As a scientist by profession, I am accustomed to analyze absolutely impartially.

The collapse of the Putin regime will begin within Russia itself. Those who with such enthusiasm shouted "Crimea is ours!" very soon they will hate Putin much more than you and me. Because he betrayed them, merged and abandoned the Russkiy Mir, did not send troops to the east of Ukraine. Ideological patriots will hate Putin fiercely and, in the end, they will sweep him away.

In Russia, instead of searching for the truth, myths began that wildly confused people's consciousness. The current Russian generation is a non-reader, they believe what they see on TV. In 2008, at the height of the Russian-Georgian conflict, I was talking to my distant relatives. They told me: they say, it was the Georgians who attacked Russia, they wanted to reach Moscow and occupy it. Adults don't think logically! Why would four million Georgia attack Russia, which has over 143 million people? But Russians are more comfortable thinking “we are great, the rest are rubbish” than looking for the truth. Moreover, rethinking one's participation in the criminal system is a painful process that requires great effort.

“But propaganda can launch a message: “Putin the peacemaker sacrificed the idea of ​​uniting Russian lands so that blood would not be shed, even if fools, but still Ukrainian brothers.”

- This message has already gone, his mouthpiece of the Kremlin Nikita Mikhalkov voiced: they say that the Americans are deliberately escalating the Ukrainian conflict in order to provoke Russia into a war, but we are not ready for this. And most Russians will believe this again. Here are just hot heads, ready to knock down Malaysian liners, this explanation will not be accepted.

It is the contingent that is now enthusiastic about “Crimea is ours!” and trample against the Putin regime. In the meantime, the effect, albeit delayed, of the sanctions will begin to be felt. Russia will lose European oil and gas markets, world oil prices will fall and the country will face an economic collapse. In Russia, literally pieces of territories will begin to separate. For example, some Far East will declare that it will no longer deal with Moscow, but will become an independent republic.

It is bad that the building of the “Russian empire” will collapse on the heads of ordinary citizens, but the Putin regime will fall. And not least because he unleashed a war in Ukraine. It accelerated everything.

- How much faster?

“A few more years, that's all. In the meantime, I want to tell Ukraine only one thing: never expect any outside help from either Europe or the United States. Always rely only on yourself.

Russian President Vladimir Putin used to seem invulnerable. Today, he and his regime look exhausted, baffled and desperate. Both Russian and Western commentators are increasingly making it clear that Russia may be on the brink of deep instability, and perhaps even destruction.

This change in perception is not surprising. Last year, Russia reveled in the glare of Crimean annexation and aggression in the Donbass. The economy, though stagnant, seemed stable. Putin has left high-ranking Western politicians and domestic critics far behind. His popularity was very high. Now only his popularity remained; everything else has changed for the worse. Crimea and Donbass are economic holes and a huge waste for Russian resources. The war with Ukraine is in a stalemate. Energy prices are collapsing and the Russian economy is in crisis. Putin's economic punitive measures against Ukraine, Turkey and the West have only done more damage to the Russian economy. Meanwhile, the country's intervention in Syria is poised to turn into a quagmire.

The situation is perhaps much worse for Russia than this cursory survey of negative trends shows. The country is coping with three crises caused by Putin's rule - and Russia's foreign policy adventures in Ukraine and Syria are only exacerbating them.

First, the Russian economy is in free fall. That oil and gas prices are unlikely to rise anytime soon is bad enough. But much worse is that Russia's energy-dependent economy is not reformed, uncompetitive and modernized, and will remain so as long as it serves to generate wealth for Russia's political elite. Second, Putin's political system is disintegrating. His brand of authoritarian centralization was to create a strong "power vertical" that would bring order to the administrative apparatus, cleanse it of corruption, and subdue regional Russian and non-Russian elites to Moscow's will. Instead, over-centralization has had the opposite effect, dispersing bureaucracy, encouraging bureaucrats to pursue their own interests, and allowing regional elites to become increasingly rebellious - and Ramzan Kadyrov, Chechnya's domineering leader, is a prime example here. Third, best years Putin himself as the main element Russian system clearly behind. Since his disastrous decision to prevent Ukraine from signing an Association Agreement with the European Union in 2013, he has made one strategic mistake after another. His previously attractive brutal image is drying up, and his recent attempts to promote his cult of personality through the publication of a book of his sayings and a calendar with Putin look ridiculous and bordering on despair.

The problem for Putin - and for Russia - is that the politico-economic system is resistant to change. Such an inefficient economy is sustainable only if it is controlled by a self-serving bureaucratic caste that puts its own interests above those of the country. In turn, a deeply corrupt authoritarian system needs a dictator at its center who coordinates and balances the interests and appetites of the elite. Putin's innovation is that he has turned himself into a cult figure whose legitimacy depends on his outwardly boundless youth and vigor. However, such leaders eventually become victims of their own cult of personality and, like Stalin, Hitler, Mao, and Mussolini, do not leave office voluntarily. Russia is thus trapped between the Scylla of systemic decline and the Charybdis of systemic stagnation. Under such conditions, Putin will increasingly turn to Russian chauvinism, imperialism and ethnocentrism for legitimacy.

Since this whole mess won't be resolved anytime soon, Russia is likely to enter a long period of "time of trouble" that can range from social unrest to regime change and state collapse. It might be rash to predict Russia's future, but it is clear that the longer Putin stays in power, the worse it will be for the country. Putin, who claimed to be saving Russia, has become her worst enemy. At this stage, the United States, Europe, and Russia's neighbors must prepare for the worst.

Drivers of instability

Some analysts dismiss the possibility of huge instability in Russia on the grounds that the opposition is weak, its leaders lack charisma, and Putin's popularity is high. These factors are not as important as it is believed. Most revolutions have resulted from deep structural crises; some were created by self-proclaimed revolutionaries. Charismatic leaders appear just as often during systemic instability as before. And nationwide popularity is never as important to a movement or leader as power in the capital and among key political and economic elites.

Imagine that the three crises noted above continue to deepen, as they most likely will. In this case, almost every sector of Russian society will be close to rebellion. As inflation and unemployment rise and living standards fall, discontent among workers will grow and social unrest will intensify. Political and economic elites will also become increasingly dissatisfied as all three crises deepen in Russia. Their status and wealth will become increasingly vulnerable, and their willingness to support alternatives to Putin and his system will increase. Urban intellectuals, students and skilled professionals will again find their voice and provide intellectual guidance to the forces of instability.

With more systemic chaos and elite stagnation, patriotic elements in the armed forces (army, militia and secret police) will seek alternatives to Putin and his ruinous system of government. And the soldiers and mercenaries now fighting in Ukraine and Syria can return home and start popularizing radical views throughout the country. Outside of Russia 21 non-Russian republics Russian Federation proclaim their full power.

For 18 years, Putin has been able to smooth over dissatisfaction through three means that all elites use to stay in power. He bought popular support with a golden shower from rising energy prices. He strengthened the power structures and suppressed the dissatisfied. And by demonstrating masculinity and energy and promising to transform Russia in his own image and likeness, he created ideological incentives to support himself and his regime. Thanks to his mistakes and the system's demise, however, Putin no longer has the material resources he once had, and his image has been greatly tarnished. And with Russia turning into a pariah, unable to defeat Ukraine and increasingly bogged down in the Middle East, the vision of a resurgent Russian greatness is losing its appeal. As a result, Putin now relies almost exclusively on the security forces to stay in power and maintain his regime. Thus, he depends on their willingness to accept his rule. And Putin, whose regime recently passed a bill allowing secret police to fire on protesters, knows this.

The end of the Putin regime. The coming Russian collapse

Pressing the security forces

Dependence on the military can be dangerous. First, they may be reluctant to use force if faced with large numbers of protesters from all walks of life. This is true of all repressive regimes that tend to emphasize the elite nature of policing and use officers far away from their homes. Given Putin's popularity and the relatively greater difficulty in organizing mass protests in the Russian provinces, this scenario is most likely to play out in Moscow, which had massive demonstrations in 2011-12, and in non-Russian regions such as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Yakutia, Dagestan and Ingushetia, where ethnic solidarity can take precedence over orders to use force. If women and workers participate in such riots, then enforcement forces will be the least disposed to follow orders and shoot.

At the moment, such a revolution looks almost impossible; but in the middle of 2004 and in the middle of 2013 no one predicted an "Orange Revolution" or a Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine. Revolutions such as Putin may understand are inherently unpredictable because they are the result of rudimentary forces of discontent, dissatisfaction, anger, radicalization and hope. And yet, given the inefficiency of the politico-economic system and its inability to change, the chances of such unrest will increase every year. Protests are likely to be triggered by an unexpected, sudden event that will anger people and take them to the streets. This shock can be anything from Putin's outrageous television blunder to police brutality or a tragic fire. No one ever predicts such shocks, but as the system declines, they become more and more likely.

Another scenario would be where the military fails to prevent elite anti-regime forces from plotting a palace coup or promoting independence in non-Russian regions. Although Putin has created a type of authoritarianism that is reminiscent of the regimes of Nazi Germany and Mussolini's Italy, the Russian security forces are not yet, as they were in Stalin's time, a state within a state capable of monitoring the behavior of the entire elite. Therefore, the loyalty or neutrality of the Russian elites cannot be fully guaranteed. Russian elites they know this, and like Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the Russian businessman-turned-oppositionist who incurred Putin's fury and several years in prison for fraud, could be punished for going overboard, but they also know that the Kremlin needs them in troubled times. as much as they need the Kremlin, if not more.

How likely is a palace coup or regional separatism? Soviet and Russian history is full of examples. After Stalin's death, his successors assassinated the head of his secret police, Lavrenty Beria, in 1953. In 1964, Nikita Khrushchev was ousted in a coup. In 1998-99 Putin came to power in a coup-like deal with the elites and then-president Boris Yeltsin. As for the non-Russians, they declared statehood every time the state was in crisis - during the revolution of 1917-21, during the German occupation of 1941-43. and during Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika in 1987-91. The loyalty of the elite depends on Putin's ability to pay them back. Just as the political and economic elites flocked to Putin during the years of plenty, from 1998 to 2013, they will also be tempted to abandon him in the coming years of scarcity. In the meantime, non-Russian elites - and especially in oil-rich Tatarstan and diamond-rich Yakutia - may be the first to weaken their ties to Moscow, because they may have nationalist aspirations and be further from the center and thus less sensitive to threats. Once the elites see that they can criticize the regime with impunity, the situation will reach a tipping point - and an anti-Putin copycat effect may occur. Some may even conspire against Putin and try to forcefully remove him or kill him.

A third scenario is that coercion may not be enough to quell discontent if the opposition resorts to violence and the military is too weak to respond. Armies that have lost wars or experienced humiliation on the battlefield are prone to such weakness. The Russian army is currently involved in two wars - in Ukraine and in Syria. Additional interventions in the Baltic states or Central Asia may also be on the horizon as Putin tries to sow discord within NATO and protect Russia from the Islamic State (also known as ISIS). Despite Russia's huge advantages, Russia's war against Ukraine has ended so far with the annexation of two economically poor regions, Crimea and eastern Donbass, with little hope of a quick recovery. More importantly, Moscow's Novorossiya project, which aimed to annex all of southeastern Ukraine, has failed. To sum up, despite several tactical victories, the Russian armed forces were defeated.

Victory in Syria looks equally far off, even as the possibility of additional engagement increases. Sooner or later, humiliated and defeated Russian soldiers and mercenaries will return home, and their anger will most likely be directed against the regime that sent them into battles doomed to fail. Internal police and military forces are unlikely to crack down on disgruntled soldiers.

Complicating the situation is the growing likelihood of a resurgence of terrorism in Russia. Chechnya could easily explode if Kadyrov is replaced in a local palace coup or killed by Russia's secret services, who by all accounts can't stand him. Most of North Caucasus already in a state of semi-open rebellion. The Russian Syrian adventure and its open alliance against the Sunnis may not only exacerbate tensions with the Sunni population of Russia, but also provoke ISIS to launch terror in Russia itself.

How likely is it that the armed forces may not be sufficient to quell the discontent? First Chechen War 1994-96 demonstrates that the Russian armed forces can be defeated. The Ukrainian war shows that the Russian army and mercenaries can be held back from the offensive by much weaker forces. A series of terrorist attacks that took place in the early years of Putin's rule show that Russia is vulnerable to violent attacks. It is impossible to say exactly when violence against the regime will erupt, but it is likely that it will increase as the politico-economic system declines and riots and elite discontent intensify.

After the storm

Russia is on the cusp of the perfect storm as destabilizing forces converge on one point. Under such conditions, mass unrest is highly probable. Revolutions palace coups and violence will become more and more likely. The result may be the collapse of the regime or the collapse of the state. Whatever the scenario, Putin is unlikely to survive.

Putin and his entourage are not going to imitate Gorbachev and leave without a fight. Instead, they will defend their kleptocracy by force.

To paraphrase the famous phrase of Pravda, Putin is Stalin today. Since the death of Stalin, no one has been able to achieve such a lasting and undeniable power over Russia. Nobody but Putin. However, tomorrow he may be remembered as a modern-day Brezhnev due to the rapid decline of the economy and public morality during his years in power. At the same time, like many previous Russian leaders - including Brezhnev, Stalin and Nicholas I - he seeks to force Russia into a straitjacket of repression and the imposition of an official line of thought that glorifies autocracy and Russian state nationalism.

Under Nicholas I, this system was called "official nationality", in last years his reign, this system drove Russia into an ice age. Despots such as Alexander III, Stalin, and Brezhnev experienced extreme stagnation as these rulers refused to make any reforms that could weaken their leadership. The results of such a policy are well known to Russian historians and observers, and they are of particular importance on this centennial anniversary of the 1917 revolution. Absolutely the same phenomena are observed today under Putin.

However, recent trends show that pressure within the Putin regime is steadily rising. The potential and geographic scope of the anti-government demonstrations on June 12, as well as Putin's direct line, testify to the huge disillusionment with the Kremlin regime among the most unpredictable category of citizens - the youth. This is always and everywhere considered a dangerous sign for despots. As well as the dissatisfaction of the intelligentsia and the middle class, the increase in the number of strikes over the past few years, including the ongoing truckers' strike, as well as the increase in emigration and the increase in demographic, medical and economic risks.

Putin is ready to wage war not only against Russia's neighbors

There is every reason to suspect that the situation will continue to deteriorate. This has the potential to lead to a sudden upheaval triggered by an unexpected incident or crisis. This coup may not turn into a revolution, but it will be a real shock to the system and will refute the government's attempts to assure everyone that Russia's internal affairs are in perfect order.

Many analysts in the West and in Russia dispute this formulation, even acknowledging the overall scale of the crisis. They usually cite opinion polls, Russians' capacity for endurance and suffering, the lack of alternative leadership, the strength of repression, and the weakness of the opposition. All these factors, of course, must be taken into account. However, none of them seem to have succeeded in convincing key audiences that the regime can afford to simply ignore the mounting protests.

That key audience is, of course, Vladimir Putin. The increasing intensity, ubiquity, and coercivity of repressive activity strongly suggests that he feels the ground tremble under his feet. Perhaps one of the clearest examples of the regime's fear can be found in the latest subjugation ordinances. Russian army troops of the National Guard, since this organization is entrusted with the mission of violent suppression of riots. The National Guard, which numbers about 400,000 people, resembles the Praetorian Guard. ancient rome whose mission was to protect the Emperor. The function of the National Guard is to protect Putin and his regime. This service exists along with the regular forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB, the border, railway, regular army and hundreds of thousands of other paramilitary formations.

The potential subordination of the regular army to the National Guard, observers say, is unprecedented in Russian history. It clearly underlines how this regime is afraid of its own people and how ready it is to drown any protest in blood. In other words, Putin is ready to wage war not only against Russia's neighbors and potential NATO members, he is also preparing to wage war against his own people. Putin and his entourage are not going to imitate Gorbachev and leave without a fight. Instead, they will defend their kleptocracy by force. The emphasis on militarization inherent in these new decrees, other forms of repression, the prioritization of defense spending, the unwillingness to abandon the current economic structure that provides the maximum rent for the elites - all this is strong evidence that the regime does not believe its own legend of prospects and stability.

In this respect, Putin's determination to continue to impose his regime on Russia, no matter what, surpasses even the ideas of Brezhnev and his tsarist predecessors. Stalin, of course, continues to stand apart, making the analogy at the beginning of this article all the more relevant. Historians write that the regime of Nicholas I was a mistake, that Stalin's rule was a disaster for the Soviet people. What verdict would historians give to a would-be king who showed he was willing to take extreme measures against his citizens? If the collapse of the USSR was the major catastrophe of the twentieth century, how would one describe what looks today as the increasingly inevitable collapse of Putinism?

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It can survive only with growing chaos not only in Russia, but throughout the world, says Russian oppositionist Garry Kasparov.

But why is the end of Putin's power dangerous not only for Russia, but for the whole world. We have collected the best abstracts of the politician's speech at the Free Russia forum.

What is the Putin regime and why Russians support it

The Putin regime is not a classic dictatorship of the 20th century, because there is no ideology as such. The regime is described in terms of mafia terms. The mafia state, in this case, the boss as the leader of the mafia, exists under the conditions of income distribution, extra income, rents for justice and the concepts that are accepted in this community.

The growth of Putin's popularity was once associated with the fact that after the 90s, which was quite difficult for our compatriots, an era of first relative, then quite decent prosperity began. Yes, there were recessions due to the global crisis in 2008, but in general the situation has stabilized. That is, on the one hand, the population felt a taste for normal life, and this, of course, was connected with Putin.

The most important thing that emerged then was an elite consensus around Putin. In the context of the curtailment of democratic procedures, the role of the head of the mafia clan grew, because he was the decisive and guarantor of balance. Putin coped with this role. It was clear that he was the guarantor not so much of the Constitution as of elite enrichment. At the same time, the country had enough funds to maintain the level of social apathy. Putin also guaranteed that all capital under 2 trillion. dollars withdrawn abroad are located in secure safe places. Therefore, the indispensable role of Putin, as a strong leader capable of ensuring the security of capital, houses, yachts, wives, lovers, children, was at a high level.

The origins of the problems in Russia and the buildup of tensions have caused this scheme to start to falter. Sanctions that are elsewhere are beginning to really undermine this very established consensus.

There is not enough money for everyone. Therefore, in order to maintain the intra-elite peace of his accomplices, Putin must take funds from the social sphere

People already understand that they have to pay for Putin's adventures. This explains a lot about Crimea. Yes, it was good to take the Crimea, we become cool, we look stronger, we rise from our knees. But who will pay for all this?

It is pointless to even talk about the hypothetical possibility of regime restructuring and reforms from above. The trend of the development and evolution of the Putin regime from soft authoritarianism to one-man dictatorship indicates that changes can happen in one case - if there is no Putin. His retention in power can only take place in the paradigm of further tightening of the domestic policy while building up foreign policy aggression. All recent events indicate that this course is decisive. The survival strategy is connected with the growth of chaos on the border of Russia and around the world, wherever this chaos can be spread.

How ordinary Russians live

A significant part of the Russian population must take care of survival. The amount of money collected at the top has no effect on improving the lives of citizens. After all, no matter how much money is in the treasury, they must still be distributed somehow. The level of corruption will hinder any social reforms.

The answer to change is obvious. Unlike previous years, the mode no longer uses the tools to play simultaneously on several tables. There is a maximum simplification, which creates the illusion of strength. But the loss of flexibility always poses a mortal danger to the regime.

If we take historical parallels, then we are already witnessing the agony of the Kremlin's power. Another thing is that this agony, firstly, can be quite long, and secondly, very terrible and bloody

It remains to be seen what price both Russia and the rest of the world must pay for the collapse of a regime that for the first time has begun to face real international isolation. The recent vote for the head of Interpol showed that the regime is faced with a different alignment of forces in the world and the only answer to this will be further tightening.

West and sanctions

Finally, Western politicians, American and British, have come to the conclusion that it is impossible to reach an agreement with Putin. Finally, they heard Putin that he is their enemy, and agreed with this. And his latest actions have made new sanctions inevitable.

2006, the murder of Alexander Litvinenko is, in principle, nuclear terrorism. And what? Nothing. Then there was aggression in Georgia, when Western politicians tried to share the responsibility and avoid calling Russia the aggressor. There were also reset events, attempts to ignore Russia's violation of various treaties related to the deployment of troops in Europe. By 2013, there was not a single one in Europe american tank. In its purest form, NATO was a paper tiger. Everyone said that after Crimea they would understand everything. But no, they did not understand anything. After the aggression in Ukraine, Germany doubled the supply of Russian gas. And Holland increased the supply of Russian oil by 6 times. And before that, there was a Malaysian Boeing - 283 passengers died, of which 192 were Dutch citizens. And what? Nothing.

It is quite obvious that from the point of view of Western politicians, any actions in this direction run into a simple dilemma - and if Russia is recognized as an aggressor, a country that carried out a nuclear attack against Great Britain, then a chemical one, committed an act of international banditry by shooting down a Malaysian Boeing, it is necessary to demand punishment criminals. In case of refusal, it is not even necessary to impose sanctions, it is actually recognition of hostilities.

Putin felt that he could behave so aggressively and impudently, because he would get nothing for it.

But any dictator makes some mistake, crossing some red line. He believes that Western democracies will always follow the path of appeasement. But there comes a point when it becomes obvious that it is no longer possible to do this. It seems to me that a series of recent events, including in the Kerch Strait, convinced the world that it is impossible to agree on anything. Putin's goal is the destruction of the international order. Therefore, the work on sanctions went much faster. Sanctions are an attempt to punish the aggressor, and if the sanctions are tough enough, it is the prevention of new aggressive actions. Yes, many say that the sanctions do not work, you have introduced them, but what happened? But Putin's policy could be more aggressive if there were no sanctions at all.

Now there is such a consensus in America that we need to move to a tougher policy. It seems to me that today the sanctions potential is not used by more than 15%. Much more can be done. Russia's integration into the Western world is limitless. They call the number 2 trillion. dollars Putin's elite is facing serious problems and it is clear to them that there will be no turning back. Putin is not going to change anything, so the sanctions pressure will only increase.

The most effective sanctions are those that concern specific people. And not only the oligarchs. There are many people working in the system, including propagandists, who play a colossal role in inflating hatred and preparing for further aggression. It is because of these people that most Russians feel the deterioration of their lives. Therefore, sanctions are currently the only non-forceful way to stop Putin's Russia.

Of course, no one wants the outbreak of hostilities and bloodshed. But how else can you send a signal? Therefore, the stronger and tougher the sanctions are today, the less blood will be shed tomorrow. And now, when Putin is preparing for new aggressive actions, the tightening of sanctions and the determination of confrontation can stop Putin in a wrong way, who has already crossed all boundaries.

Any dictator needs colonels, generals, executors, and just at this level sabotage can begin

After all, the desire to continue this activity, when the prospects are extremely gloomy, may diminish.

How sanctions affect Russians

Putin's unsinkability was a consequence of general economic well-being. Well, yes, we lost some civil liberties, confrontation with the West, but that was somewhere far away. And today, all these seemingly distant events, some kind of forums, political battles are beginning to come to the house of every Russian. The power block of power and the bureaucracy as a whole have grown so terribly that they can no longer help but get into private life.

If earlier there was a fairly clear boundary between the authorities and society, that we do not get into your private life, and you do not get into politics, now it has begun to blur. They intrude into private life on all issues, frankly getting into people's pockets and limiting social benefits. Life is becoming difficult for ordinary Russians.

The country is slipping into outright archaism, obscurantism, and this, it seems to me, is also rejected by people

It is quite obvious that those points that form a consensus, both ideologically and socio-economically, are simply blurred. Putin's role is diminishing, he ceases to play the role of a guarantor that allowed this system to function. This means that the process from within will grow, largely due to the fact that Putin has lost the opportunity to guarantee the necessary economic potential.

Once the system was distinguished by increased flexibility, but now it is losing it. Putin's actions are more direct. Accordingly, this will only lead to a worsening of the situation. And according to the latest polls, elections and people's reactions, we see that no one is ready to sacrifice their own well-being and their own quiet life for the sake of some ephemeral imperial ambitions.

Like, it’s good, of course, for the empire to expand, if we feel better at the same time. But not vice versa.

What is the Russian opposition capable of and is it capable of at all?

The authorities do not allow real candidates for elections, so people choose from scratch. The appearance of some empty place instead of the Kremlin appointee does not change anything in essence. It's still the government's decision. It offers a choice between one zero and many other zeros.

We can spend a lot of time debating what opposition generally means. The opposition is not those who give the authorities space to maneuver. Only the collapse of the Putin regime gives Russia a chance for a normal present future. Therefore, it is necessary to consider all your actions in terms of whether this helps to ensure that the regime collapses as soon as possible. After all, the prolongation of Putin's power will mean new trials not only for Ukraine, but also for the whole world. We are talking about a crazy maniac with a nuclear button, who is ready to do anything to maintain his own power.

Many famous people in Russia, including the arts and sports, are a huge support for the Putin regime. And many ordinary Russians are instructively guided by them. Well, start boycotting their performances. There are many things where you can show your civic position. Resistance does not always have to be aggressive. It is clear that going out into the street is a colossal risk of detention and, perhaps, a long line. But those people who should have done this are beginning to offer models that, for some reason, suit the authorities.

Let's stop the theoretical debate where there is practical evidence. I have been saying since 2006 that power in Russia will not change during elections. They pointed fingers at us, called us radicals, crazy people, and so on. And who was right? Russia has traveled a consistent path from mild authoritarianism to a one-man dictatorship.

And all those who allow the regime to launder its name, both in Russia and abroad, are helping it prolong its agony. Accordingly, prolong the suffering of people, both in Russia and in the world as a whole.

Vilnius hosted the sixth Free Russia Forum. Over the course of two days, about four hundred participants debated at various thematic venues. New participants join the Forum, all more people comes from Russia. In addition, a cultural platform appeared at the Forum. At the end of the Forum, we met with Garry Kasparov to sum up the results, but we could not resist and touched on other topical issues.

- Garry Kimovich, are you satisfied with the results of the Free Russia Forum?

Yes. The main result is that it is already a Forum and that it continues to expand its territory. And not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively. This Forum has clearly fixed the connection between the Free Russia Forum and what is happening today in Putin's Russia.

The shrinking of the remnants of the territory of freedom in Russia makes many people look for an outlet. The appearance here of Marat Gelman and a large cultural program are the result of the fact that in today's Russia persecution of non-radical opposition subcultures has begun. A parallel can be drawn between the change in policy towards non-political cultural organizations in Russia and the emergence of iconic people from this area here. Also, from the first conversations with the Forum participants, one gets the impression that the general influx of the security forces, the change in the social and political climate in Russia is forcing people to look for some kind of alternative. One of the Forum participants told me that there is a need to speak out.

- Why do people come to the Forum?

At this Forum, it is clear that some kind of community has developed. Even after the section, people gather and discuss something. In fact, the Forum lives its own life. Its uniqueness, when compared with other opposition projects, lies in the fact that the success of the Forum depends on the reaction from below. There is no pressure from above. Even the election of a standing committee at the V Forum was the result of numerous requests. They came from the II Forum, but we consciously refrained from doing so, because there was no need to organize ourselves into some kind of political entity. Now such a need has arisen.

- What is the reason for this?

The agenda of the Forum is largely dictated by the coming people and the creation of the atmosphere. Then the permanent committee tries to transform all this into some kind of political statements. It seems to me that in critical moments that have emerged recently - connected with the history of Interpol and the Kerch Strait, the Free Russia Forum turned out to be the only political entity of the Russian opposition that took a clear and principled position. Moreover, this is not just a position that we have taken, but a position that has yet to be heard in the world. In this case, the Forum has established itself as a real political entity. It is no coincidence that the Ukrainian delegation of Interpol at the congress of the organization disseminated precisely the statement of the Forum. This shows that there is still a political force in Russia that opposes making Interpol Putin's fiefdom.

- What does the standing committee do outside the Forum?

The main projects that the Forum is engaged in and that are being implemented by the Standing Committee were announced. They are associated with sanctions, the creation of the "Baza" project. The Forum has a very voluminous work. For example, I am in charge of the international section and I think it is very important to convey to the Western public and politicians point of view, different from Putin's. It is clear that there are other opposition organizations in Russia, but still the Forum is the only political entity that consistently stands for Ukrainian sovereignty. There is no ambiguity about Crimea, the war in Donbass, the situation in the Kerch Strait and other fundamental issues where the Russian opposition has traditionally tried to find a middle ground. That is, "but the sanctions should not affect such and such people." A comma and "but" always appear after a statement.

In my opinion, this indicates an attempt to find some third way. This greatly weakens any anti-regime rhetoric. Exactly this is used by Russian propaganda. One of the arguments of Deripaska's lobbyists in America is the constant mention that sanctions against him will hurt Russian workers. This argument is constantly used in America. Interestingly, we hear similar arguments from the Russian opposition, who do not want to unnecessarily anger the Kremlin, or, as is often the case, potential voters of the future.

In our opinion, the Forum takes a radical position. Today, thinking about who positions themselves and how in post-Putin Russia is counterproductive, because it inevitably lowers the degree of confrontation with the regime. Dismantling the Putin regime is task number one. Because its prolongation is a continuation of the aggressive course. And what's more, this aggressive course is already beginning to slip more and more towards direct military aggression.

- In connection with the situation in Kerch, only Lithuania imposed sanctions. What other countries do you think can do it?

The situation in the Kerch Strait is rather strange, because the country that became the victim of aggression - Ukraine - commented rather vaguely on this episode. We do not hear clear calls. Yes, Ukraine has begun to request to close the straits, but Ukraine has not yet given us a clear definition of aggression. It can be seen that on the eve of the elections, the Ukrainian authorities are trying to maneuver. The recognition of Russia as an aggressor will mean some drastic measures. It appears to be maneuvering.

In my opinion, Russia's actions in the Kerch Strait played an important role in the final change in the minds of the political establishment in the West. Now, according to my feelings, all the talk about the possibility of reaching an agreement with Putin is over. Now analyze the most effective method counteraction to Putin's aggression, realizing that it is necessary to set ourselves a specific task - curbing the aggressor. Any attempts at appeasement and demonstration of weakness will only work to worsen the situation.

New sanctions are inevitable. The problem is that there are many and they are diverse. There is a serious problem of coordinating US and European sanctions. It is clear that America is ready to go much further, but some sanctions still need to be coordinated, because they depend on the actions of the Europeans. This issue of coordination will take some time. After the Kerch events, the question of whether sanctions are needed, and in their rather harsh form, was closed.

- What other tools can the West have in putting pressure on the Putin regime, apart from sanctions?

Sanctions are a comprehensive description of economic measures. They can be sectoral and personal. With all their diversity, these are economic measures. Naturally, the harsh version of sanctions creates maximum problems for the development of the country's economy, because it limits the inflow of capital. Accordingly, it creates problems for the sale of any export goods. In this case, there is also a gradation: you can introduce sanctions gradually and try to find a compromise. But the total amount of (current) sanctions is unlikely to exceed 10-15 percent of the total potential of sanctions that can be used if we start hitting sectors. If the free world is ready to sharply limit energy purchases, then the situation will change dramatically. Of course, this will be a big problem for Europe. To date, Europe buys (from Russia) 35 percent. Russia, in turn, sends more than 80 percent to Europe. Obviously, Europe has much more opportunities to cause irreparable damage to the Russian economy. At the same time, you need to understand that there are voters in Europe who will not want to freeze even one day. It's a matter of balancing interests. If the threat of Putin's interference in the life of a free society becomes unbearable, then the West has a very large arsenal of means.

- What else?

There are means of diplomatic influence and there are means of military influence, which, I hope, will not have to come. Although it must be said that the Russian military learned a lesson in Syria when they tried to take oil fields "with a bang - it all ended tragically for Prigozhinsky's fighters" PMC Wagner"Although it is possible that Putin's provocations in Syria and Libya could lead to this kind of clashes. But, of course, the main danger exists on the Ukrainian front. There can be full-scale clashes, a real war can happen.

Coming back to sanctions, it's a matter of containment. Often we say that the sanctions did nothing - not noticing that, fortunately, nothing happened. The effect of sanctions should be assessed by how much the dictator's progress has slowed down. If he did not do something, then this is already a positive result. But this is harder to assess. That's why people always say: "We don't see a direct effect." Now it is very important to make an announcement from the countries of the free world about the most severe sanctions that will be introduced in case of crossing the Ukrainian border. It is clear that they have already crossed it and are crossing it many times, nevertheless, the continuation of aggression must be stopped.

It seems to me that this may have an impact. If Putin is planning to cross the border, then nothing will stop him. But the automatic imposition of tough sanctions against the Russian economy and against Putin's cronies could have an effect. Putin's entourage may think about the consequences.

It is time, finally, to demonstrate the price of Putin's aggression. Of course, many of them already understand that their life has become less comfortable. And for the annexation of Crimea, and for the crimes in Syria and Donbass, they have to answer with their assets in Miami, Great Britain, on the Cote d'Azur and other pleasant places where they are used to placing their money.

- What do you think, what is the probability that the declining ratings will increase the new military conflict?

I always say that reading historical books helps to understand the dynamics of the process. Any actions of the dictator still end in such adventures. He has no other choice. We have now come to the moment, on the one hand, to the beginning of the agony of dictatorship, on the other hand, this moment is extremely dangerous. The dictator does everything to maintain his rating, to maintain his image of invulnerability - in the mafia, it is important to maintain your image of invulnerability. Unlike democratic institutions, one cannot check the popularity rating and how strong the dictator is. The interests of the dictator - showing his invulnerability - come into conflict with the entire system.

A dictator does a thing that demonstrates his toughness, but in doing so makes a fatal mistake. Putin's interests in his self-preservation come into conflict with the interests of a system that demands more flexible relations with the West. This system is not as dictatorial as it used to be. It depends largely on the ability to integrate stolen capital into the free world.

The interests of a significant number of the elite are clearly in flagrant conflict with Putin's demonstration of his own exclusivity. How long this will continue, we do not know. But it is clear that the system has entered a period of agony.

Returning to the question, it is almost certain that military adventure becomes the only way for the dictator to maintain his own reputation.

- How do you assess the state of the opposition in Russia?

From my point of view, the opposition is a group of people who hold different views than the government, those who are in power, and, accordingly, are trying to change this state of affairs. Ta political activity that is happening in Russia today, without exception, is happening with the permission of the authorities. We cannot have a single political action that the authorities would like to stop and could not. What is happening in the gubernatorial elections is a demonstration of the absence of opposition. Because empty seats win there. This is a reaction to the Putin regime. This is not the result of the fruitful activities of the opposition, but the sanctions that have weakened the Putin regime - there is not enough money for adventures and robbery. All attempts to present the political activity of various groups, both systemic and non-systemic, look unconvincing.

I don't want to disappoint people who are trying sincerely to run for the legislature or municipality - tailwind. But it is quite obvious that they act in a situation where the authorities can put up a barrier in a minute.

As for systemic liberals: if you look at the leaders of Russian parties, you can see that they have been in their places much longer than Putin. The ossification of the Russian political system- it's not only " United Russia", this is the whole structure that allows you to simulate the opposition.

Now we must proceed from the fact that any actions of the Russian opposition should be considered from the point of view of one criterion - whether it helps to keep the path of the Putin regime or not. In a dictatorship, the only criterion for evaluating our activities is the reaction of the authorities. It is quite obvious, after watching Channel One, to notice who the authorities are reacting to. The total mention of the entire Russian opposition in a year is less than what will be said about the Forum in two days. We really do what threatens the authorities. For the first time, an opposition structure has appeared that cannot be infiltrated in any way.

- When will Russia be free not only at the Free Russia Forum?

I am often asked when Putin's rule will end. I answer: "I have two news: one is bad, the other is good. Bad - I don't know, good - he doesn't know either." One of the problems is that the end of Putin's rule does not mean the immediate construction of a free Russia. Much will depend on the people who will participate in this, and on the general circumstances. The main thing is that you cannot entrust the construction of the new to people who are connected with the old.

This is a matter of Russian survival. Russia can survive only by becoming free. If she fails to go this way, then a fate much worse than the Soviet Union awaits her. In the USSR, the borders were nevertheless recognized and it was more or less clear which ethnic groups were going where. There is no such thing in Russia, therefore, in the event of chaos, very serious consequences await us. The only way to solve this without bloodshed, without civil strife, is a federal republican structure. It is important to preserve that significant part of the country that would like to live according to general rules, according to general laws. As an optimist, I think this is feasible.

In my opinion, the collapse of the Putin regime in this stage of agony is inevitable. At the same time, we are constantly accused that you have been talking about this for several years, but nothing happens. At the same time, there are significant differences from the events of 2011-2012 or 2007-2008. When the crisis of 2007-2008 began, when it seemed that something could really change, it turned out that world system aimed at maintaining the status quo at all costs. It is clear that if mass money printing began in the West, which would allow oil prices to rise again to a certain height, the regime would have serious problems. In 2011-2012, Western countries were also aimed at minimizing any conflicts and unrest. At that time, no one had any desire to support protest activities in Russia.

On the one hand, they said "State Department, cookies," but in fact there was no request for change, but now the situation is different. The world is in wild turbulence, and Russia cannot fall out of this process. It is a common irony that the Putin regime created this turbulence, but it inevitably captures everyone. Today, if events similar to the events of the crisis of 2007-2008 or 2011-2012 begin in Russia (or, most likely, they may coincide), then the demand in the world will be different. From the point of view of the countries of the free world, the collapse of the Putin regime is a boon, no matter what the consequences. This is already threatening their well-being. If earlier in the choice between the collapse of the regime and chaos it was potentially made in favor of the regime, today it is being done in the other direction.

It seems to me that the chances that the situation will change dramatically in the next few years are very high, I would rate them above fifty percent. What happens next largely depends on how we, including at the Forum, and other representatives of the Russian opposition manage to shape our agenda and staff. It is very important to find people in Russia and abroad who are ready to participate in building a new Russia.