In 1958, in response to the launch of the first artificial Earth satellite in the USSR, the Americans founded DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) - an agency of advanced defense research projects. The main task of the new agency was to maintain the primacy in US military technology.

Today, as it was half a century ago, this agency, subordinate to the Pentagon, is responsible for maintaining the world's technological superiority. armed forces USA. Among the concerns of DARPA is the development of new technologies for use in the armed forces.

In February 2013, the agency's specialists began to actively prepare for a nuclear war. Was project launched on protection against radiation damage, including with the help of techniques that directly affect human DNA. We are talking about new methods of treatment, devices and systems that can mitigate the effects of radiation exposure. The main goal of the agency's project is to develop technologies that will radically reduce the susceptibility human body to high doses of radiation. Those who are treated with the latest technology have a high chance of survival.

Today, the efforts of scientists are directed in three directions: a) prevention and treatment after exposure to radiation; b) reducing the level of negative consequences and preventing lethal outcome and development of oncological complications; c) modeling the impact of radiation on the human body through research at the molecular and systemic levels.

The agency took up a new project because the level of nuclear threat in the world has increased and has not decreased. Today, any country may face the threat of nuclear terrorism, a catastrophe at a nuclear power plant or a local conflict with the use of nuclear weapons.

This project, of course, did not come out of nowhere. It is known that Barack Obama positions himself as a peacemaker. Atomic bombs like Truman, he on foreign states on dumped. And in general, he constantly talks about reductions in nuclear arsenals - not only Russian, but also native, American.

It was his peacemaking that reached the point where very influential misters turned to him with a written petition in which they tearfully asked not to reduce the nuclear weapons of the long-suffering homeland of the Republicans and Democrats.

The appeal to the president was signed by 18 people: former CIA director James Woolsey, former US representative to the UN John Bolton, former commander of the Marine Corps, General Karl Mundy and others. International Analyst Kirill Belyaninov ("Kommersant" ) believes that such an appeal was a confirmation that the White House is indeed working on plans to reduce nuclear arsenals.

According to some secret report, among the authors of which are individuals from the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, intelligence services and the US strategic command (in a word, a complete military secret set), the number of nuclear warheads in service with the country today "far exceeds the number needed to ensure nuclear deterrence", while in modern conditions an arsenal of 1-1.1 thousand warheads is quite enough. But a group of influential politicians who, of course, know these data, still demand that Obama abandon the "rash step."

What were the 18 misters afraid of?

The authors of the petition are confident that "the growing cooperation between Pyongyang and Tehran" can lead to "catastrophic changes." And the aspirations of Iran and North Korea can be restrained by "the American nuclear triad, which guarantees strategic stability," and only that, and nothing else.

The signatories of the document believe that the threshold set by the new START treaty is critical: by 2018, the Russian Federation and the United States must leave no more than 1,550 warheads on combat duty.

However, the Obama administration intends to continue talks with Moscow to reduce its stockpile of nuclear weapons.

The concern of eighteen people is based more on the interests of the US military-industrial complex than on the real situation. What "catastrophic changes" can Iran cause in the world? It is absurd to assume that gentlemen American politicians and military men, who signed the letter to their president, were frightened by Ahmadinejad's recent words that Iran is a "nuclear power." Or is 1550 warheads not enough to defeat the DPRK?

The reduction in stockpiles of nuclear weapons, which Obama is sure to enforce this time, is by no means a "debriefing" Nobel Prize peace. The President of the United States faces the fact of collapse national economy: a huge public debt is also complemented by a large budget deficit, the issue of which is being resolved through sequestration, cuts, layoffs, cuts in military programs and an extremely unpopular tax increase among any class of the population. Reducing nuclear stockpiles is a road to savings: after all, maintaining arsenals costs a lot of money.

Tom Vanden Brook (USA Today) ) recalls that the US military budget will be reduced by $ 500 billion over 10 years through sequestration - the so-called "automatic reduction". The Pentagon assumes that before the end of the current fiscal year (September 30), it will have to "cut off" spending by $46 billion. former minister Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said the cuts would make America a minor military power.

The cuts will also affect military contractors. For example, the economic losses of Texas will amount to a gigantic sum of $2.4 billion. A whole army of civil servants - 30,000 people - will lose their jobs. Their personal financial loss in earnings will be $180 million.

In terms of maintenance, those states with large warehouses will suffer here, as they will be closed in the coming months due to upcoming budget cuts. Pennsylvania, for example, has two main maintenance depots where complex weapon systems are upgraded, including, for example, the Patriot. Texas and Alabama will be hit hard. The closure of the depot here will stop the repair of weapons, communication devices and vehicles. The reduction in the flow of orders will affect 3,000 companies. Another 1,100 companies will face the threat of bankruptcy.

The latest data on the estimated losses of contractors directly for nuclear services are not yet available. But that they will be is beyond doubt. Obama will look for any reserves in order to cut budget spending.

As for the calls to Russia, everything is clear here: it is somehow not convenient for America to reduce nuclear weapons alone. That's why we started talking about negotiations with the Russians. Moreover, Obama swung at a large reduction: either by a third, or by half. However, these are only rumors, albeit coming from the United States.

Vladimir Kozin ("Red Star") recalls that regarding information about further reductions in START, White House spokesman Jay Carney said that he does not expect new announcements about this in the next presidential address to Congress. Indeed, in his message on February 13, the American president only indicated Washington's readiness to involve Russia in the reduction of " nuclear weapons”, without specifying any quantitative parameters. Nevertheless, the fact remains: the reduction is planned. Another thing is how and in what ways.

V. Kozin believes that the United States “still intends to follow the path of selective reduction of nuclear weapons, focusing only on the further reduction of strategic offensive weapons. But at the same time, they completely exclude from the negotiation process such important types of non-nuclear weapons as anti-missile systems, anti-satellite weapons and high-precision means of delivering a "lightning strike" at any point. the globe... "According to the analyst, the United States" is trying to obscure, behind various "new proposals and ideas" in the field of arms control, its far-reaching plans to deploy forward-based means in the form of tactical nuclear weapons and missile defense, destabilizing the global military-political situation and undermining the fragile military- strategic parity between Moscow and Washington, which has been established over the course of several decades.”

That is, nuclear weapons will be reduced selectively, and in parallel, the European missile defense system will be created, and the first will serve as a distraction for the second. And at the same time, it will probably free up money for this very second one. With budgetary sequestration, this is a very hot topic.

It is useless to accuse the Americans of slyness or double standards: politics is politics. Sergey Karaganov, Dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Founder of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Chairman of the Editorial Board of Russia in global politics», speaks that "the idea of ​​freeing the world from nuclear weapons is slowly fading away."

“Moreover,” he continues, “if we trace the dynamics of the views of such famous people like Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, Sam Nunn and William Perry, who played a role in launching the idea of ​​nuclear zero, you will find that these famous four in the second article, published two years after their first article, already talked about the reduction and even the destruction of nuclear weapons as a good goal, but really required an increase in efficiency and strengthening of the existing US military nuclear complex. They realized that the United States of America could not ensure its security without nuclear weapons. Understanding perfectly well this whole situation, our leadership - both Putin and Medvedev - announced without batting an eyelid that they also stand for full nuclear disarmament. To say otherwise would be to admit to bloodlust. But at the same time, we are building up and modernizing our nuclear potential.”

The scientist's confession is also interesting:

“Once I studied the history of the arms race, and since then I sincerely believe that nuclear weapons are something sent to us by the Almighty in order to save humanity. Because, otherwise, if there were no nuclear weapons, the deepest ideological and military-political confrontation in the history of mankind, the Cold War, would have ended with World War III.

Russians should be thankful for their current sense of security, says Karaganov, Sakharov, Korolev, Kurchatov and their associates.

Let's go back to the USA. Under the 2010 nuclear doctrine, America retained the right to launch a nuclear strike first. True, it narrowed down the list of situations that lead to such use of the nuclear arsenal. In 2010, Obama announced the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against states that do not possess such weapons - on one condition: these countries must comply with the nonproliferation regime. Also in the strategic document it was stated: "... the United States is not ready to pursue a policy according to which the deterrence of a nuclear strike is the only goal of nuclear weapons." This speaks of a possible preventive use of nuclear weapons, albeit with the reservations cited above.

Both during the Cold War and after its conditional end, the United States and NATO did not rule out the option of using nuclear weapons against their opponents - and be the first to use them. The 2010 doctrine narrowed the list, but did not change the right of application.

Meanwhile, China almost half a century ago announced on a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. Then India took the same position. Even North Korea— and she takes a similar position. One of the main objections to the adoption of the doctrine of no first use, writes the American magazine " Foreign policy”, is based on the fact that the enemy can “act dishonestly” and strike first. However, there is no answer to the simple question of retribution. Why would an enemy arrange a nuclear catastrophe for himself? After all, the threat of guaranteed retaliatory destruction remains a very strong deterrent.

One can, of course, call Obama's policy logical. The same doctrine of 2010 was adopted at a time of growing concerns about terrorism. Well, if nuclear bombs fall into the hands of terrorists? President of the United States in 2010 said : “The Concept recognizes that the greatest threat to the United States and global security is no longer nuclear war between states, but nuclear terrorism carried out by extremists and the process of nuclear proliferation…”

Therefore, the current proposed reduction in nuclear arsenals is logically combined with the "taming" of what was called 3 years ago "the greatest threat to the United States and global security." The fewer nuclear weapons, as Foreign Policy magazine rightly notes, the less likely they are to fall into the hands of terrorists.

To create a perfectly clear logical picture to the white house only one item is missing. By declaring its right to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the United States is likening its artificially nurtured enemy, Al-Qaeda. The latter does not declare nuclear rights for obvious reasons. But, for even more understandable reasons, in case of "need" and with the appropriate opportunity, it will be the first to explode (it is not necessarily about a bomb: there is also a nuclear power plant). The right to the first, albeit "preventive", nuclear strike puts America precisely in the ranks of those who threaten the world. Like Al Qaeda.

In 1991 and 1992 the presidents of the United States and the USSR/Russia put forward unilateral parallel initiatives to decommission a significant part of the tactical nuclear weapons of both countries and their partial elimination. In Western literature, these proposals are known as "Presidential Nuclear Initiatives" (PNI). These initiatives were of a voluntary, non-legally binding nature and were not formally linked to the response steps of the other side.

As it seemed then, on the one hand, this made it possible to fulfill them fairly quickly, without getting bogged down in a complex and lengthy negotiation process. Some of the initiatives were drafted by experts in Voronezh on the basis of a research institute, which required employees to rent a one-room apartment in Voronezh for several months. On the other hand, the absence of a legal framework made it easier, if necessary, to withdraw from unilateral obligations without legal procedures for the denunciation of international treaty. On September 27, 1991, US President Bush nominated the first UNT. Soviet President Gorbachev announced "reciprocal steps and counter-proposals" on 5 October. His initiatives have received further development and concretization in the proposals of Russian President Yeltsin dated January 29, 1992.

The decisions of the President of the United States provided for: the withdrawal of all tactical nuclear warheads intended to arm ground-based delivery vehicles (nuclear artillery shells and warheads for tactical missiles"Lance") to the United States, including from Europe and South Korea, for subsequent dismantling and destruction; decommissioning of surface warships and submarines all tactical nuclear weapons, as well as naval aviation depth charges, their storage in the United States and the subsequent destruction of about half of their number; the termination of the program for the development of a short-range missile of the Sram-T type, designed to arm tactical strike aircraft. Counter steps from the side Soviet Union, and then Russia, were as follows: all tactical nuclear weapons in service with the Ground Forces and Air Defense will be redeployed to the pre-factory bases of the enterprise for the assembly of nuclear warheads and to centralized storage warehouses;

all warheads intended for ground-based assets are subject to elimination; a third of warheads intended for sea-based tactical carriers will be destroyed; it is planned to eliminate half of the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles; it is planned to halve the stocks of aviation tactical nuclear munitions by liquidation; On a reciprocal basis, it was proposed to remove nuclear munitions intended for strike aircraft together with the United States from combat units of front-line aviation and place them in centralized storage depots 5 . It is very difficult to quantify these reductions, because, unlike information on strategic nuclear forces, Russia and the United States have not published official data on their stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons.

According to unofficial published estimates, the United States was to eliminate at least about 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons (1,300 artillery shells, more than 800 Lance missile warheads, and about 900 naval weapons, mainly depth charges). They were armed with bombs. free fall intended for the Air Force. Their total number in the early 1990s was estimated at 2,000 units, including about 500-600 air bombs in warehouses in Europe 6 . The overall assessment of US tactical nuclear arsenals is currently given above.

According to a Russian authoritative study, Russia had to reduce 13,700 tactical nuclear warheads under the UNP, including 4,000 warheads for tactical missiles, 2,000 artillery shells, 700 engineer munitions (nuclear land mines), 1,500 warheads for anti-aircraft missiles, 3,500 warheads for frontline aviation, 1,000 warheads intended for ships and submarines of the Navy, and 1,000 warheads for naval aviation. This amounted to almost two-thirds of the tactical nuclear warheads in service with former USSR in 1991. 7 The scale of UNTs cannot be overestimated. First, for the first time, a decision was made to dismantle and dispose of nuclear warheads, and not just their delivery vehicles, as was done in accordance with agreements on strategic offensive arms reductions. Several classes of tactical nuclear weapons were subject to complete liquidation: nuclear projectiles and mines, nuclear warheads of tactical missiles, and nuclear bombs. Second, the scale of the cuts far exceeded the indirect limits laid down in the START agreements. Thus, under the current START Treaty of 1991, Russia and the United States were to decommission 4-5 thousand nuclear warheads each, or 8-10 thousand units together. The reductions within the framework of the UNT opened up prospects for the elimination of more than 16,000 warheads in total.

However, the implementation of the UNT encountered serious difficulties from the very beginning. At the first stage, in 1992, they were associated with the withdrawal of tactical nuclear warheads by Russia from the territory of a number of former Soviet republics. The withdrawal of this type of weapon was agreed in the fundamental documents on the termination of the existence of the USSR, signed by the leaders of the new independent states in 1991. However, some of the former Soviet republics began to obstruct these measures. In particular, in February 1992, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk banned the export of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. Only the joint demarches of Russia and the United States forced him to resume the transportation of this type of weapon. In the spring of 1992, all tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn. The redeployment of nuclear weapons for strategic delivery vehicles was completed only in 1996.

Another difficulty was that in the extremely difficult economic situation of the 1990s, Russia experienced serious difficulties in financing the disposal of nuclear weapons. Disarmament activities have been hampered by the lack of adequate storage facilities. This led to the overflow of warehouses, violations of the adopted safety regulations. The risks associated with unauthorized access to nuclear warheads during their transportation and storage forced Moscow to accept international assistance to ensure nuclear security. It was provided mainly by the US under the well-known Nunn-Lugar program, but also by other countries including France and the UK. For reasons of state secrecy, Russia refused to accept assistance directly in the dismantling of nuclear weapons. However, foreign assistance was provided in other, less sensitive areas, for example, through the provision of containers and wagons for the safe transportation of nuclear warheads, protective equipment for nuclear storage facilities, etc. This freed up the funds needed for the destruction of ammunition.

Providing foreign aid provided partial one-way transparency not provided for by the UNT. The donor states, primarily the United States, insisted on their right to access the facilities they provided assistance in order to verify the intended use of the supplied equipment. As a result of long and difficult negotiations, mutually acceptable solutions were found, on the one hand, guaranteeing the observance of state secrets, and, on the other hand, the necessary level of access. Such limited transparency measures also covered such critical facilities as nuclear disassembly and assembly facilities run by Rosatom, as well as nuclear weapons storage facilities, subordinated to the Ministry defense. The latest officially published information on the implementation of UNTs in Russia was presented in the speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Ivanov at the Conference to Review the Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on April 25, 2000.

According to him, “Russia ... continues to consistently implement unilateral initiatives in the field of tactical nuclear weapons. Such weapons have been completely removed from surface ships and multi-purpose submarines, as well as land-based naval aviation and placed in centralized storage areas. One third of the total number of nuclear munitions for sea-based tactical missiles and naval aviation has been eliminated. The destruction of nuclear warheads of tactical missiles, artillery shells, and nuclear mines is nearing completion. Half of the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles and half of the nuclear aircraft bombs" 10 . Assessments of Russia's implementation of UNTs are given in Table. 9. Thus, as of the year 2000, Russia has largely complied with the UNT. As planned, all naval munitions were withdrawn to centralized storage facilities, and a third of them were destroyed (however, significant ambiguity remains regarding the withdrawal of all such items from naval bases to centralized storage facilities due to inconsistencies in official wording). A certain number of tactical nuclear warheads still remained in service with the Ground Forces, Air Force and Air Defense. In the case of the Air Force, this did not contradict the PNR, since, according to the January 1992 initiatives of President Yeltsin, it was envisaged to withdraw tactical ammunition from combat strength and destroy it, together with the United States, which did not. As regards the liquidation of the Air Force warheads, by 2000 Russia's obligations had been fulfilled. By means of air defense, UNTs were carried out in terms of liquidation, but not in the sphere of complete withdrawal from the anti-aircraft missile forces.

Thus, during the 1990s, Russia carried out UNTs in the field of warheads for the Air Force and, possibly, the Navy, as well as partly for air defense. IN ground forces Some of the tactical nuclear munitions still remained in service and were not eliminated, although the UNP provided for their complete withdrawal to centralized storage facilities and complete elimination. The latter was attributed to financial and technical difficulties. Implementation of UNTs became one of the requirements of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. integral part Plan "13 steps" to fulfill the obligations of nuclear powers in accordance with Art. VI Treaty. The 13 Steps plan was adopted at the Review Conference by consensus, i.e., both representatives of Russia and the United States voted for its adoption. However, 19 months later, Washington announced a unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Russian-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, which was considered the cornerstone of strategic stability. This decision was taken contrary to the obligations of the United States under the 13 Step Plan, which required compliance with this treaty.

The US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in June 2002 upset the very delicate balance of mutual obligations between Russia and the United States in the field of nuclear disarmament, including in relation to TNW. Obviously, the violation by one of the NPT members of its obligations on a number of points of the decisions adopted by the 2000 Review Conference (including the 13 Steps Plan) made it unlikely that the other parties would fully comply with these decisions. During the work of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, no provisions on the 13 Steps Plan were adopted, which in fact indicates that it has ceased to be valid. This could not but affect the implementation of the UNT. Thus, on April 28, 2003, in a speech by the head of the Russian delegation at the session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference, the following was stated: “The Russian side proceeds from the fact that consideration of issues of tactical nuclear weapons cannot be carried out in isolation from other types of weapons. It is for this reason that the well-known unilateral Russian disarmament initiatives of 1991-1992 are of a complex nature and, in addition, affect tactical nuclear weapons and other important questions that have a significant impact on strategic stability.

Russia's official reference to the fact that, in addition to tactical nuclear weapons, UNTs also touch upon other important issues affecting strategic stability is clearly based on the idea of ​​the interconnection between the implementation of the 1991-1992 initiatives. with the fate of the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability. In addition, the assertion that the issue of TNW cannot be considered in isolation from other types of weapons is obviously an allusion to the situation that has developed with the entry into force of the adapted version of the CFE Treaty. This treaty was signed back in 1990 and provided for maintaining the balance of power in Europe on a bloc basis in five types of conventional weapons (tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters and aircraft). After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR itself, with the expansion of NATO to the east, it is completely outdated.

In order to preserve the system of limiting conventional arms, the parties held negotiations on its adaptation, which culminated in the signing in Istanbul in 1999 of an adapted version of the CFE Treaty. This option to a greater extent took into account the military-political realities that had developed in Europe after the end of the Cold War and contained certain security guarantees for Russia, limiting the possibility of deploying NATO troops near its borders. However, the NATO countries refused to ratify the adapted CFE under very far-fetched pretexts. In the context of the admission of the Baltic states to NATO, an increase in the imbalance in conventional weapons to the detriment of Russia, and in the absence of ratification of the adapted Treaty by the West, Russia in December 2007 announced a unilateral suspension of compliance with the basic CFE Treaty (despite the fact that the adapted Treaty, as an add-on to the basic one, did not enter into force ).

In addition, Russia faced with new urgency the question of the role of nuclear weapons, primarily tactical ones, as a means of neutralizing such an imbalance. Obviously, the fears associated with the advancement of NATO to the East in the absence of adequate international legal security guarantees, in the eyes of Russia, cast doubt on the expediency of implementing the UNT in full, especially given the political and legally non-binding nature of these obligations. As far as one can judge from the absence of further official statements about the fate of UNTs, they have not been fully implemented.

This fact illustrates both the advantages and disadvantages of informal arms control regimes. On the one hand, within the framework of the UNT, significant reductions in tactical nuclear weapons were carried out, including the destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons. However, the absence of verification measures does not allow the parties to assume with certainty which reductions actually took place. The lack of a legally binding status made it easier for the parties to effectively back out of the initiatives without announcing it at all.

In other words, the advantages of an "informal" approach to disarmament are tactical, but in the long run it does not have sufficient stability to serve as a stabilizer for the changing political and military relations of the parties. Moreover, such initiatives themselves become easy victims of such changes and can turn into a source of additional distrust and tension. Another thing is that after the end of the Cold War, former adversaries could afford much more radical, faster, less technically complex and less burdensome economic disarmament agreements.

On February 5, 2018, the deadline for fulfilling the main restrictions that were imposed on Russia and the United States by the START-3 treaty signed by them expired. The full name of the signed document is the START-III Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. This bilateral treaty regulated the further mutual reduction of the arsenal of deployed strategic nuclear weapons and replaced the START-I treaty, which expired in December 2009. The START-3 Treaty was signed on April 8, 2010 in Prague by the presidents of the two countries, Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama, and entered into force on February 5, 2011.

question

It is worth noting that the countries began thinking about reducing strategic offensive weapons as early as the late 1960s. By that time, both the USSR and the United States had accumulated such nuclear arsenals that made it possible not only to turn each other's territory into ashes several times, but also to destroy all human civilization and life on the planet. In addition, the nuclear race, which was one of the attributes of the Cold War, seriously hit the economies of the two countries. Huge amounts of money were spent on building up the nuclear arsenal. cash. Under these conditions, negotiations began in Helsinki in 1969 between the Soviet Union and the United States in order to limit nuclear stocks.

These negotiations led to the signing of the first treaty between the countries - SALT-I (restriction strategic weapons), which was signed in 1972. The agreement signed by the USSR and the USA fixed the number of nuclear delivery vehicles for each of the countries at the level at which they were at that time. True, by that time both the United States and the USSR had already begun to equip their ballistic missiles with multiple reentry vehicles with individual targeting units (they carried several warheads at once). As a result, it was precisely during the period of relaxation of relations that a new, previously unseen, avalanche-like process of building up nuclear potential began. At the same time, the treaty provided for the adoption of new ICBMs deployed on submarines, strictly in the same quantity in which land-based ballistic missiles were previously decommissioned.

The continuation of this agreement was the SALT-II agreement, signed by the countries on June 18, 1979 in Vienna. This treaty forbade the launch of nuclear weapons into space, it also set limits on the maximum number of strategic launchers: ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, strategic aircraft and missiles (but not nuclear warheads themselves) below the existing level: up to 2400 units (including up to 820 multiple reentry vehicle ICBM launchers). In addition, the parties pledged to reduce the number of carriers to 2,250 by January 1, 1981. Of the total number of strategic systems, only 1,320 carriers could be equipped with warheads with individual targeting warheads. Imposed a treaty and other restrictions: it forbade the design and deployment ballistic missiles based on watercraft (with the exception of submarines), as well as on seabed; mobile heavy ICBMs, MIRVed cruise missiles, limited the maximum throw-weight for submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

The next joint treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms was the indefinite Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of 1987. He banned the development and deployment of ballistic missiles with a range of 500 to 5500 km. In accordance with this treaty, countries were to destroy not only all ground-based ballistic missiles of these types within three years, but also all launchers, including missiles in both the European and Asian parts of the Soviet Union. The same treaty for the first time introduced a universal classification of ballistic missiles by range.

The next treaty was START-1, signed by the USSR and the USA on July 31, 1991 in Moscow. It came into force after the collapse of the Soviet Union - December 5, 1994. The new contract was designed for 15 years. The terms of the signed agreement forbade each of the parties to have more than 1,600 units of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, strategic bombers) on combat duty. The maximum number of nuclear charges themselves was limited to 6,000. On December 6, 2001, it was announced that the countries had fully fulfilled their obligations under this treaty.

Signed back in 1993, the START-2 treaty first long time could not ratify, and then it was simply abandoned. The next agreement in force was the treaty on the reduction of the offensive potentials of the SOR, which limited the maximum number of warheads by another three times: from 1,700 to 2,200 units (compared to START-1). At the same time, the composition and structure of the weapons that fell under the reduction were determined by the states independently, this moment was not regulated in the treaty. The agreement entered into force on June 1, 2003.

START-3 and its results

The Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-3) entered into force on February 5, 2011. He replaced the START-1 Treaty and canceled the 2002 SORT Treaty. The treaty provided for further large-scale reductions in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States. According to the terms of the agreement, by February 5, 2018 and thereafter, the total number of weapons did not exceed 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic missile-carrying bombers, 1550 charges on these missiles, as well as 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers (TB) . It was in the START-3 treaty that the concept of "non-deployed" carriers and launchers, that is, not in combat readiness, was first introduced. They can be used for training or testing and do not have warheads. The treaty also separately recorded a ban on the deployment of strategic offensive weapons outside the national territories of the two states.

The START-3 Treaty, in addition to directly limiting nuclear weapons, implies a two-way exchange of telemetry data that were obtained during test launches. The exchange of telemetric information on missile launches is carried out by mutual agreement and on a parity basis for no more than five launches per year. At the same time, the parties are obliged to exchange information on the number of carriers and warheads twice a year. Inspection activities were also prescribed separately, up to 300 people can take part in the inspection, whose candidacies are agreed within a month, after which they are issued visas for two years. At the same time, the inspectors themselves, members of inspection delegations and flight crews, as well as their aircraft, enjoy complete immunity during inspections on the territory of the two countries.

In 2018, the extension of the START-3 treaty is expected, since its term expires only in 2021. As US Ambassador to Russia John Huntsman noted in January 2018, trust between states on the issue of arms reduction has not been lost at present - Washington and Moscow are successfully working on the implementation of START-3. “We are working in a positive direction regarding START-3, I call it a “moment of inspiration”, after February 5, the work will not stop, the work will be more intense. The fact that we are approaching this date of achieving the goals inspires confidence,” the ambassador said.

According to TASS, as of September 1, 2017, the Russian Federation had 501 deployed nuclear weapons carriers, 1,561 nuclear warheads, and 790 deployed and non-deployed ICBM, SLBM, and HB launchers. The US had 660 deployed launchers, 1,393 warheads, and 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers. From the published data, it followed that for Russia, in order to fit into the START-3 limit, it was necessary to reduce 11 warheads.

Nuclear arsenal of Russia and the USA

To date, the basis of modern strategic weapons continues to be nuclear weapons. In some cases, it also includes precision-guided weapons with conventional warheads that can be used to destroy strategically important objects enemy. According to its purpose, it is divided into offensive (shock) and defensive weapons. The composition of strategic offensive weapons (START) includes all ground-based ICBM systems (both silo and mobile), strategic nuclear missile submarines (ARPL), as well as strategic (heavy) bombers that can carry strategic air-to-air missiles. surface" and atomic air bombs.

Topol M mobile version

Russia

The following ICBMs fall under the START-3 treaty as part of the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN): RS-12M Topol; RS-12M2 "Topol-M"; RS-18 (according to NATO codification - "Stiletto"), RS-20 "Dnepr" (according to NATO codification "Satan"), R-36M UTTKh and R-36M2 "Voevoda"; RS-24 "Yars". According to TASS, there are currently about 400 ICBMs with warheads in the Russian grouping of the Strategic Missile Forces. various types and different power. Thus, more than 60 percent of the weapons and warheads of the strategic nuclear forces are concentrated here. Russian Federation. A noticeable difference from the United States is the presence in the ground component of the nuclear triad - mobile complexes. If in the United States ICBMs are located exclusively in stationary mine installations, then in the Strategic Missile Forces, along with mine-based, mobile ground missile systems based on multi-axle chassis MZKT-79221.

In 2017, the Strategic Missile Forces were replenished with 21 new ballistic missiles. Further plans include the decommissioning of the Topol ICBMs and their replacement with more modern and advanced Yars ICBMs. At the same time, Moscow expects to extend the service life of the heaviest R-36M2 Voyevoda ICBMs in service with the Strategic Missile Forces until at least 2027.

The maritime component of the Russian nuclear triad is represented, as of March 1, 2017, by 13 nuclear submarines with intercontinental ballistic missiles on board. The basis is 6 Project 667BDRM Dolphin submarine missile carriers, which are armed with R-29RMU2 Sineva ballistic missiles and their Liner modification. Also in service are still three nuclear submarines of the earlier project 667BDR "Kalmar" and one boat of project 941UM "Akula" - "Dmitry Donskoy". It is also the largest submarine in the world. It was on the Dmitry Donskoy that the first tests of the new Russian ICBM, falling under the START-3 treaty, were carried out - the R-30 Bulava missile, which is produced in Votkinsk. In addition to the listed submarines, three nuclear submarines of the new Project 955 Borey, armed with Bulava, are currently on combat watch, these are boats: K-535 Yuri Dolgoruky, K-550 Alexander Nevsky and K-551 Vladimir Monomakh ". Each of these submarines carries up to 16 ICBMs on board. Also, according to the modernized Borey-A project, 5 more such missile carriers are being built in Russia.

Nuclear submarine of project 955 "Borey"

The basis of the air part of the nuclear triad in Russia is made up of two strategic bombers that fall under the START-3 treaty. These are the Tu-160 supersonic strategic missile-carrying bomber with a variable-swept wing (16 units) and the honorary veteran, the Tu-95MS turboprop strategic missile-carrying bomber (about 40 deployed). According to experts, these turboprop aircraft can be successfully used until 2040.

The modern US nuclear arsenal consists of Minuteman-III silo ICBMs (there are 399 deployed ICBM launchers and 55 non-deployed), Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (212 deployed and 68 non-deployed), as well as cruise missiles and aerial bombs with a nuclear warhead, carried by strategic bombers. The Minuteman-III missile has long been the backbone American forces nuclear deterrent, it has been in service since 1970 and is the only land-based ICBM in service with the US Army. All this time, the missiles were constantly modernized: the replacement of warheads, power plants, control and guidance systems.

Test launch of the Minuteman-III ICBM

The carriers of Trident II ICBMs are Ohio-class nuclear submarines, each of which carries 24 such missiles on board, equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (no more than 8 warheads per missile). In total, 18 such submarines were built in the United States. At the same time, 4 of them have already been converted into carriers of cruise missiles, the modernization of missile silos made it possible to place up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles on them, 7 in each silo. 22 mines have been converted, two more are used as lock chambers for docking mini-submarines or special modules for the exit of combat swimmers. Since 1997, this is the only type of American SSBN in service. Their main armament is the Trident II D-5 ICBM. According to American experts, this missile is the most reliable weapon in the US strategic arsenal.

The Pentagon also included 49 vehicles in the number of deployed strategic bombers, including 11 Northrop B-2A Spirit stealth strategic bombers and 38 Boeing B-52H "old men", another 9 B-2A and 8 B-52H are listed as non-deployed. Both bombers can use both cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, as well as free-fall atomic bombs and guided bombs. Another American B-1B strategic bomber, developed in the 1970s specifically for the application of missile strikes on the territory of the Soviet Union, since the 1990s it has been converted into a carrier of conventional weapons. By the time the START-3 expires, the US Army does not plan to use it as a carrier of nuclear weapons. As of 2017, the US Air Force had 63 B-1B Lancer bombers.

Stealth strategic bomber Northrop B-2A Spirit

Mutual claims of the parties

US Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan told what condition must be met for the United States to comply with the treaty on measures to further reduce and limit START (we are talking about the START-3 treaty) and the treaty on the elimination of intermediate and short-range missiles of the INF Treaty. According to Sullivan, the United States “wants to comply with arms control agreements, but for this their “interlocutors” must be “set up in the same way,” Interfax reports him as saying. It is worth noting that in January 2018, the State Department confirmed Russia's compliance with the terms of the START-3 treaty signed in 2010, but the United States continues to accuse Russia of violating the INF Treaty. In particular, Washington believes that in Yekaterinburg, the Novator Design Bureau created a new ground-based cruise missile - a land-based modification of the famous Caliber. The Russian Foreign Ministry, in turn, notes that the ground-based cruise missile 9M729, cited as an example, complies with the terms of the agreement.

At the same time, according to Vladimir Shamanov, chairman of the RF State Duma Defense Committee, Moscow has serious doubts about Washington's fulfillment of its obligations under START-3. Shamanov noted that Russia has not received confirmation of the conversion of Trident II missile launchers and B-52M heavy bombers. The main questions of the Russian side relate to the re-equipment of part of the American strategic offensive weapons. As Vladimir Putin noted during a meeting with the leaders of leading Russian media On January 11, 2018, the US must verify ongoing changes so that Russia can verify that there is no return potential on some carriers. Moscow's lack of such evidence is cause for concern. According to the Russian Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Antonov, a dialogue with the American side continues on this issue.

Information sources:
http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/4925548
https://vz.ru/news/2018/1/18/904051.html
http://www.aif.ru/dontknows/file/chto_takoe_snv-3
Materials from open sources

On May 26, 1972, Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements (SALT). In connection with the anniversary of this event, the newspaper Le Figaro brings to your attention an overview of the main Russian-American bilateral agreements.

Disarmament or limiting the buildup of strategic arms? The policy of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War led to a frenzied arms race between the two superpowers that could have led to disaster. That is why 45 years ago the US and the USSR signed the first strategic arms reduction treaty.

Treaty 1: the first bilateral arms reduction agreement

On May 26, 1972, US President Richard Nixon and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev signed an agreement on the limitation of strategic arms. The signing took place in front of television cameras in the Vladimir Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow. This event was the result of negotiations that began in November 1969.

The treaty limited the number of ballistic missiles and launchers, their location and composition. An addendum to the treaty in 1974 reduced the number of missile defense areas deployed by each side to one. However, one of the clauses of the agreement allowed the parties to terminate the agreement unilaterally. This is exactly what the United States did in 2001 in order to start deploying a missile defense system on its territory after 2004-2005. The final date for US withdrawal from this agreement was June 13, 2002.

The 1972 treaty includes a 20-year temporary agreement that bans the production of land-based ICBM launchers and limits submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers. Also, according to this agreement, the parties undertake to continue active and comprehensive negotiations.

This "historic" agreement was to be especially helpful in restoring the balance of the forces of deterrence. And this does not apply to the production of offensive weapons and restrictions on the number of warheads and strategic bombers. The striking forces of both countries are still very large. First of all, this treaty allows both countries to moderate costs while maintaining the ability of mass destruction. This prompted André Frossard to write in a newspaper on May 29, 1972: “To be able to arrange about 27 ends of the world - I don't know the exact number - gives them a fair sense of security and allows them to spare us many additional ways of destruction. For this we need to thank their good heart.”

Treaty 2: easing tensions between the two countries

After 6 years of negotiations, a new treaty between the USSR and the USA on the limitation of strategic offensive arms was signed by American President Jimmy Carter and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18, 1979. This complex document includes 19 articles, 43 pages of definitions, 3 pages listing the stockpiles of military arsenals of the two countries, 3 pages of a protocol that will enter into force in 1981 and, finally, a declaration of principles that will form the basis of negotiations on SALT-3 .

The treaty limited the number of strategic nuclear weapons of both countries. After the signing of the treaty, Jimmy Carter stated in his speech: "These negotiations, which have been going on continuously for ten years now, give rise to the feeling that nuclear competition, if it is not limited by common rules and restrictions, can only lead to disaster." At the same time, the American president clarified that "this treaty does not take away the need for both countries to maintain their military power." But this treaty was never ratified by the United States due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles

On December 8, 1987 in Washington, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan signed the indefinite Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which came into force in May 1988. This "historic" treaty for the first time provided for the elimination of armaments. It was about medium and short-range missiles with a range of 500 to 5.5 thousand km. They represented from 3 to 4% of the entire arsenal. In accordance with the agreement, the parties, during three years from the moment it came into force, were to destroy all medium and short-range missiles. The treaty also provided for procedures for mutual inspections "on the spot".

During the signing of the treaty, Reagan emphasized: "For the first time in history, we have moved from a discussion of arms control to a discussion of their reduction." Both presidents have been particularly pushful of cutting 50% of their strategic arsenals. They focused on the future START treaty, the signing of which was originally scheduled for the spring of 1988.

START-1: the beginning of real disarmament

On July 31, 1991, US President George W. Bush and his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in Moscow. This agreement was the first real reduction in the strategic arsenals of the two superpowers. According to its terms, the countries had to reduce the number of the most dangerous species weapons: intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles.

The number of warheads was to be reduced to 7,000 for the USSR and 9,000 for the United States. A privileged position in the new arsenal was assigned to bombers: the number of bombs was to increase from 2.5 to 4 thousand for the United States and from 450 to 2.2 thousand for the USSR. In addition, the treaty provided for various control measures and finally entered into force in 1994. According to Gorbachev, it was a blow to the "infrastructure of fear."

START II: radical cuts

On January 3, 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his American counterpart George W. Bush signed the START-2 treaty in Moscow. It was a big deal because it called for a two-thirds reduction in nuclear arsenals. After the entry into force of the agreement in 2003, American stocks were to decrease from 9,986 warheads to 3,500, and Russian stocks from 10,237 to 3,027. That is, to the level of 1974 for Russia and 1960 for America .

The contract included one more important point: elimination of multiple warhead missiles. Russia has abandoned precision weapons, which formed the basis of its deterrence force, while the US removed half of the missiles installed on submarines (virtually undetectable). START II was ratified by the US in 1996 and by Russia in 2000.

Boris Yeltsin saw him as a source of hope, and George W. Bush saw him as a symbol of "the end of the Cold War" and "a better future free from fear for our parents and children." Be that as it may, the reality is not so idyllic: both countries can still destroy the entire planet several times.

SNP: Point in the Cold War

On May 24, 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SOR) in the Kremlin. It was about reducing the arsenals by two-thirds in ten years.

However, this small bilateral agreement (five short articles) was not precise and did not contain any screening measures. Its role in terms of the image of the parties was more important than its content: it was not the first time that the reduction was discussed. Be that as it may, it nevertheless became a turning point, the end of military-strategic parity: lacking the economic capabilities necessary for this, Russia abandoned its claims to the status of a superpower. In addition, the treaty opened the door to a "new era" because it was accompanied by a declaration of a "new strategic partnership." The United States relied on conventional military forces and understood the uselessness of most of its nuclear arsenal. Bush noted that the signing of the SNP allows to get rid of the "legacy of the Cold War" and hostility between the two countries.

START-3: protection of national interests

On April 8, 2010, US President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev signed another agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive arms (START-3) in the Spanish drawing room of the Prague castle. It was intended to fill the legal vacuum that arose after START I expired in December 2009. According to it, a new ceiling was set for the nuclear arsenals of the two countries: the reduction of nuclear warheads to 1.55 thousand units, intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missiles of submarines and heavy bombers - to 700 units.

In addition, the agreement provides for verification of the figures by a joint team of inspectors seven years after its entry into force. It is worth noting here that the installed slats are not too different from those that were indicated in 2002. It also does not talk about tactical nuclear weapons, thousands of deactivated warheads in warehouses, and strategic aviation bombs. The US Senate ratified it in 2010.

START-3 was the last Russian-American agreement in the field of nuclear weapons control. Days after taking office in January 2017, US President Donald Trump announced that he would offer Vladimir Putin the lifting of sanctions on Russia (imposed in response to the annexation of Crimea) in exchange for a treaty to reduce nuclear weapons. According to the latest data from the US State Department, the US has 1,367 warheads (bombers and missiles), while the Russian arsenal reaches 1,096.

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In 1958, in response to the launch of the first artificial Earth satellite in the USSR, the Americans founded DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), an agency for advanced defense research projects. The main task of the new agency was to maintain the primacy in US military technology.

Today, as it was half a century ago, this agency, subordinate to the Pentagon, is responsible for maintaining the global technological superiority of the US military. Among the concerns of DARPA is the development of new technologies for use in the armed forces.

In February 2013, the agency's specialists began to actively prepare for a nuclear war. A project was launched to protect against radiation damage, including using methods that directly affect human DNA. We are talking about new methods of treatment, devices and systems that can mitigate the effects of radiation exposure. The main goal of the agency's project is to develop technologies that will radically reduce the susceptibility of the human body to high doses of radiation. Those who are treated with the latest technology have a high chance of survival.

Today, the efforts of scientists are directed in three directions: a) prevention and treatment after exposure to radiation; b) reducing the level of negative consequences and preventing death and the development of oncological complications; c) modeling the impact of radiation on the human body through research at the molecular and systemic levels.

The agency took up a new project because the level of nuclear threat in the world has increased and has not decreased. Today, any country may face the threat of nuclear terrorism, a catastrophe at a nuclear power plant or a local conflict with the use of nuclear weapons.

This project, of course, did not come out of nowhere. It is known that Barack Obama positions himself as a peacemaker. Atomic bombs, like Truman, he did not drop on foreign countries. And in general, he constantly talks about reductions in nuclear arsenals - not only Russian, but also native, American.

It was his peacemaking that reached the point where very influential misters turned to him with a written petition in which they tearfully asked not to reduce the nuclear weapons of the long-suffering homeland of the Republicans and Democrats.

The appeal to the president was signed by 18 people: former CIA director James Woolsey, former US representative to the UN John Bolton, former commander of the Marine Corps, General Karl Mundy and others. International analyst Kirill Belyaninov (Kommersant) believes that such an appeal was a confirmation that the White House is indeed working on plans to reduce nuclear arsenals.

According to some secret report, among the authors of which are individuals from the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, intelligence services and the US strategic command (in a word, a complete military secret set), the number of nuclear warheads in service with the country today "far exceeds the number needed to ensure nuclear deterrence", while in modern conditions an arsenal of 1-1.1 thousand warheads is quite enough. But a group of influential politicians who, of course, know these data, still demand that Obama abandon the "rash step."

What were the 18 misters afraid of?

The authors of the petition are confident that "the growing cooperation between Pyongyang and Tehran" can lead to "catastrophic changes." And the aspirations of Iran and North Korea can be restrained by "the American nuclear triad, which guarantees strategic stability," and only that, and nothing else.

The signatories of the document believe that the threshold set by the new START treaty is critical: by 2018, the Russian Federation and the United States must leave no more than 1,550 warheads on combat duty.

However, the Obama administration intends to continue talks with Moscow to reduce its stockpile of nuclear weapons.

The concern of eighteen people is based more on the interests of the US military-industrial complex than on the real situation. What "catastrophic changes" can Iran cause in the world? It is absurd to assume that gentlemen American politicians and military men, who signed the letter to their president, were frightened by Ahmadinejad's recent words that Iran is a "nuclear power." Or is 1550 warheads not enough to defeat the DPRK?

The reduction in stockpiles of nuclear weapons, which Obama is sure to enforce this time, is by no means a "working off" of the Nobel Peace Prize. The President of the United States is facing the fact of the collapse of the national economy: a huge public debt is also complemented by a large budget deficit, the issue of which is being solved through sequestration, cuts, layoffs, cuts in military programs and an extremely unpopular tax increase among any class of the population. Reducing nuclear stockpiles is a road to savings: after all, maintaining arsenals costs a lot of money.

Tom Vanden Brook (USA Today) recalls that the US military budget will be reduced by $ 500 billion over 10 years through sequestration - the so-called "automatic reduction". The Pentagon assumes that before the end of the current fiscal year (September 30), it will have to "cut off" spending by $46 billion. Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said the cuts would make America a minor military power.

The cuts will also affect military contractors. For example, the economic losses of Texas will amount to a gigantic sum of $2.4 billion. A whole army of civil servants - 30,000 people - will lose their jobs. Their personal financial loss in earnings will be $180 million.

In terms of maintenance, those states with large warehouses will suffer here, as they will be closed in the coming months due to upcoming budget cuts. Pennsylvania, for example, has two main maintenance depots where complex weapon systems are upgraded, including, for example, the Patriot. Texas and Alabama will be hit hard. The closure of the depot here will stop the repair of weapons, communication devices and vehicles. The reduction in the flow of orders will affect 3,000 companies. Another 1,100 companies will face the threat of bankruptcy.

The latest data on the estimated losses of contractors directly for nuclear services are not yet available. But that they will be is beyond doubt. Obama will look for any reserves in order to cut budget spending.

As for the calls to Russia, everything is clear here: it is somehow not convenient for America to reduce nuclear weapons alone. That's why we started talking about negotiations with the Russians. Moreover, Obama swung at a large reduction: either by a third, or by half. However, these are only rumors, albeit coming from the United States.

Vladimir Kozin ("Red Star") recalls that regarding information about further reductions in strategic offensive arms, White House spokesman Jay Carney said that he does not expect new announcements on this matter in the next presidential message to Congress. Indeed, in his message on February 13, the American president only indicated Washington's readiness to involve Russia in the reduction of "nuclear weapons", without specifying any quantitative parameters. Nevertheless, the fact remains: the reduction is planned. Another thing is how and in what ways.

V. Kozin believes that the United States “still intends to follow the path of selective reduction of nuclear weapons, focusing only on the further reduction of strategic offensive weapons. But at the same time, they completely exclude from the negotiation process such important types of non-nuclear weapons as anti-missile systems, anti-satellite weapons and high-precision means of delivering a "lightning strike" anywhere in the world ... "According to the analyst, the United States is proposals and ideas" in the field of arms control, its far-reaching plans for the deployment of forward-based means in the form of tactical nuclear weapons and missile defense, destabilizing the global military-political situation and undermining the fragile military-strategic parity between Moscow and Washington, which has been established for several decades.

That is, nuclear weapons will be reduced selectively, and in parallel, the European missile defense system will be created, and the first will serve as a distraction for the second. And at the same time, it will probably free up money for this very second one. With budgetary sequestration, this is a very hot topic.

It is useless to accuse the Americans of slyness or double standards: politics is politics. Sergei Karaganov, Dean of the Faculty of World Economy and World Politics at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, founder of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, chairman of the editorial board of Russia in Global Affairs magazine, says that "the idea of ​​a world free of nuclear weapons is slowly fading away."

“Moreover,” he continues, “if you trace the dynamics of the views of such famous people as Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, Sam Nunn and William Perry, who played a certain role in launching the idea of ​​nuclear zero, you will find that these famous four in the second article, published two years after their first article, already talked about the reduction and even elimination of nuclear weapons as a good goal, but really demanded more efficiency and strengthening of the existing US military nuclear complex. They realized that the United States of America could not ensure its security without nuclear weapons. Understanding perfectly well this whole situation, our leadership - both Putin and Medvedev - announced without batting an eyelid that they also stand for complete nuclear disarmament. To say otherwise would be to admit to bloodlust. But at the same time, we are building up and modernizing our nuclear potential.”

The scientist's confession is also interesting:

“Once I studied the history of the arms race, and since then I sincerely believe that nuclear weapons are something sent to us by the Almighty in order to save humanity. Because, otherwise, if there were no nuclear weapons, the deepest ideological and military-political confrontation in the history of mankind, the Cold War, would have ended with World War III.

Russians should be thankful for their current sense of security, says Karaganov, Sakharov, Korolev, Kurchatov and their associates.

Let's go back to the USA. Under the 2010 nuclear doctrine, America retained the right to launch a nuclear strike first. True, it narrowed down the list of situations that lead to such use of the nuclear arsenal. In 2010, Obama announced the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against states that do not possess such weapons - on one condition: these countries must comply with the nonproliferation regime. Also in the strategic document it was stated: "... the United States is not ready to pursue a policy according to which the deterrence of a nuclear strike is the only goal of nuclear weapons." This speaks of a possible preventive use of nuclear weapons, albeit with the reservations cited above.

Both during the Cold War and after its conditional end, the United States and NATO did not rule out the option of using nuclear weapons against their opponents - and be the first to use them. The 2010 doctrine narrowed the list, but did not change the right of application.

Meanwhile, China announced a no-first-use policy almost half a century ago. Then India took the same position. Even North Korea - and she adheres to a similar position. One of the main objections to adopting the no-first-use doctrine, writes the American Foreign Policy magazine, is that the enemy can "act dishonestly" and strike first. However, there is no answer to the simple question of retribution. Why would an enemy arrange a nuclear catastrophe for himself? After all, the threat of guaranteed retaliatory destruction remains a very strong deterrent.

One can, of course, call Obama's policy logical. The same doctrine of 2010 was adopted at a time of growing concerns about terrorism. But what if nuclear bombs fall into the hands of terrorists? The President of the United States in 2010 said: “The Concept recognizes that the greatest threat to the United States and global security is no longer nuclear war between states, but nuclear terrorism carried out by extremists and the process of nuclear proliferation ...”

Therefore, the current proposed reduction in nuclear arsenals is logically combined with the "taming" of what was called 3 years ago "the greatest threat to the United States and global security." The fewer nuclear weapons, as Foreign Policy magazine rightly notes, the less likely they are to fall into the hands of terrorists.

To create a perfectly clear logical picture, the White House lacks only one point. By declaring its right to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the United States is likening its artificially nurtured enemy, Al-Qaeda. The latter does not declare nuclear rights for obvious reasons. But, for even more understandable reasons, in case of "need" and with the appropriate opportunity, it will be the first to explode (it is not necessarily about a bomb: there is also a nuclear power plant). The right to a first, albeit “preventive,” nuclear strike puts America precisely in the ranks of those who threaten peace. Like Al Qaeda.