The final figures were achieved by the United States not only thanks to real arms reductions, but also due to the re-equipment of some of the Trident-II SLBM launchers and B-52H heavy bombers, the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement. At the same time, the Russian department clarifies that it cannot confirm that these strategic weapons have been rendered unusable, as provided for by the treaty.

How many charges are left

- 527 units for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers;

- 1,444 warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers;

— 779 units for deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed and non-deployed launchers of SLBMs, deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.

The United States, according to the State Department on September 1 last year, had:

- 660 units for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers;

- 1,393 warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers;

— 800 units for deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed and non-deployed launchers of SLBMs, deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.

Invitation to Negotiate

State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert, in a statement on the implementation of the START treaty, noted that "the implementation of the new START increases the security of the United States and its allies, makes the strategic relations between the United States and Russia more stable,<...>critical at a time when trust in relationships has declined and the risk of misunderstandings and miscalculations has risen.” The United States, Nauert said, will continue to fully comply with New START. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its statement also confirmed its commitment to the treaty.

However, politicians and experts draw attention to the fact that it is time to start discussing the future of the treaty. “We must now decide what to do with the treaty,<...>it seems to be ending soon. We must think about how to extend it, what to do there,” Russian President Vladimir Putin drew attention to on January 30 this year at a meeting with proxies. There was no direct answer from US President Donald Trump to this question.

The current START expires in 2021, by agreement of the parties, as indicated in the text, it can be extended for five years. If the treaty is not extended or a new document is not signed instead, the United States and Russia will lose a unique instrument of mutual control, American experts draw attention. According to the State Department, since the beginning of the agreement, the parties have exchanged 14.6 thousand documents on the location and movement of weapons, conducted 252 on-site inspections, and 14 meetings within the framework of the commission on the agreement.

In order to extend START-3 for another five years, as the text of the agreement implies, it is enough for Moscow and Washington to exchange diplomatic notes. Chairman of the Council of the PIR Center, Lieutenant General of the Reserve Evgeny Buzhinsky, told RBC that due to the current political differences between Russia and the United States, it will be extremely difficult for the parties to agree on a fundamentally new agreement, so the extension of START-3 for five years looks like a much more possible scenario. .

The preparation of a new agreement is a realistic and even desirable option if there is political will in Moscow and Washington, but if there is no such will, the parties will agree to extend the current version, the head of the Center assures international security IMEMO RAS Alexey Arbatov.

What to negotiate

Russia and the United States have been reducing strategic weapons for three decades, but the implementation of the terms of the START treaty is likely to put an end to the process of reducing nuclear arsenals, writes The New York Times. Development priorities outlined in the Feb. 2 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review nuclear weapons and the creation of new low-yield nuclear charges will lead to a new nuclear arms race, but countries will now compete not in their number, but in performance characteristics, writes the edition.

The new American nuclear doctrine proclaims the concept of electoral nuclear strikes and the introduction of systems of reduced explosive power and high accuracy, potentially setting the stage for an escalation of a nuclear conflict, Arbatov warns. That is why, the expert believes, a new, comprehensive agreement is needed that would address the problems of developing high-precision non-nuclear systems.

Even during the preparation of the current treaty, experts from both sides pointed out that the treaty base between Russia and the United States should be expanded to include non-strategic nuclear weapons, missile defense and other sensitive issues.

Until now, she is in charge of arms reduction issues in the State Department with the rank of acting. Assistant Secretary of State Anna Friedt said back in 2014 that the United States, together with NATO, should in the future, when political conditions allow, develop and propose to Russia its position on non-strategic nuclear weapons. Non-strategic (tactical) weapons are characterized by low power, such weapons include aerial bombs, tactical missiles, shells, mines and other local range ammunition.

For Russia, the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons is as fundamental as the issue of missile defense for the United States, Buzhinsky notes. “There are mutual taboos here, and none of them is ready to give in in areas where one of the parties has an advantage. Therefore, in the foreseeable future, we can only talk about further quantitative reduction. Discussion of the qualitative characteristics of weapons in the negotiation process is an old proposal, but in the current conditions it borders on fantasy,” he says.

Former US Secretary of Defense William Perry told RBC that the next START treaty should introduce restrictions on all types of nuclear weapons - not only strategic, but also tactical: “When people talk about what a nuclear arsenal is today, they mean about 5,000 warheads in service, which is already pretty bad. But we have a couple of thousand more nukes in stock in the US that can be used as well. And there are such shells not only in the United States, but also in Russia, the so-called tactical nuclear weapons.”

The expansion of the number of parties participating in the reduction of nuclear arsenals, according to Buzhinsky, is unlikely, since other nuclear powers - Great Britain, France, China - will logically require Moscow and Washington to first reduce the number of warheads to their level before entering into any agreements. .

The new agreement, according to Arbatov, should take into account topics that the drafters of START-3 bypassed. First of all, these are missile defense systems and the development of high-precision long-range non-nuclear systems. “Three years is enough for diplomats to prepare a new agreement on the basis of an existing one: START-3 was agreed upon in a year, START-1 was signed in 1991 after three years of work practically from scratch,” Arbatov sums up.

In 1991 and 1992 the presidents of the United States and the USSR/Russia put forward unilateral parallel initiatives to decommission a significant part of the tactical nuclear weapons of both countries and their partial elimination. In Western literature, these proposals are known as "Presidential Nuclear Initiatives" (PNI). These initiatives were of a voluntary, non-legally binding nature and were not formally linked to the response steps of the other side.

As it seemed then, on the one hand, this made it possible to fulfill them fairly quickly, without getting bogged down in a complex and lengthy negotiation process. Some of the initiatives were drafted by experts in Voronezh on the basis of a research institute, which required employees to rent a one-room apartment in Voronezh for several months. On the other hand, the absence of a legal framework made it easier, if necessary, to withdraw from unilateral obligations without legal procedures for the denunciation of international treaty. On September 27, 1991, US President Bush nominated the first UNT. Soviet President Gorbachev announced "reciprocal steps and counter-proposals" on 5 October. His initiatives were further developed and concretized in the proposals of Russian President Yeltsin dated January 29, 1992.

The decisions of the President of the United States provided for: the withdrawal of all tactical nuclear warheads intended to arm ground-based delivery vehicles (nuclear artillery shells and warheads for tactical missiles"Lance") to the United States, including from Europe and South Korea, for subsequent dismantling and destruction; decommissioning of surface warships and submarines all tactical nuclear weapons, as well as naval aviation depth charges, their storage in the United States and the subsequent destruction of about half of their number; the termination of the program for the development of a short-range missile of the Sram-T type, designed to arm tactical strike aircraft. Counter steps from the side Soviet Union, and then Russia, were as follows: all tactical nuclear weapons in service with the Ground Forces and Air Defense will be redeployed to the pre-factory bases of the enterprise for the assembly of nuclear warheads and to centralized storage warehouses;

all warheads intended for ground-based assets are subject to elimination; a third of warheads intended for sea-based tactical carriers will be destroyed; it is planned to eliminate half of the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles; it is planned to halve the stocks of aviation tactical nuclear munitions by liquidation; On a reciprocal basis, it was proposed to remove nuclear munitions intended for strike aircraft together with the United States from combat units of front-line aviation and place them in centralized storage depots 5 . It is very difficult to quantify these reductions, because, unlike information on strategic nuclear forces, Russia and the United States have not published official data on their stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons.

According to unofficial published estimates, the United States was to eliminate at least about 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons (1,300 artillery shells, more than 800 Lance missile warheads, and about 900 naval weapons, mainly depth charges). They were armed with bombs. free fall intended for the Air Force. Their total number in the early 1990s was estimated at 2,000 units, including about 500-600 air bombs in warehouses in Europe 6 . The overall assessment of US tactical nuclear arsenals is currently given above.

According to a Russian authoritative study, Russia had to reduce 13,700 tactical nuclear warheads under the UNP, including 4,000 warheads for tactical missiles, 2,000 artillery shells, 700 engineer munitions (nuclear land mines), 1,500 warheads for anti-aircraft missiles, 3,500 warheads for frontline aviation, 1,000 warheads intended for ships and submarines of the Navy, and 1,000 warheads for naval aviation. This amounted to almost two-thirds of the tactical nuclear warheads in service with the former USSR in 1991. 7 The scale of the UNT can hardly be overestimated. First, for the first time, a decision was made to dismantle and dispose of nuclear warheads, and not just their delivery vehicles, as was done in accordance with agreements on strategic offensive arms reductions. Several classes of tactical nuclear weapons were subject to complete liquidation: nuclear projectiles and mines, nuclear warheads of tactical missiles, and nuclear bombs. Second, the scale of the cuts far exceeded the indirect limits laid down in the START agreements. Thus, under the current START Treaty of 1991, Russia and the United States were to decommission 4-5 thousand nuclear warheads each, or 8-10 thousand units together. The reductions within the framework of the UNT opened up prospects for the elimination of more than 16,000 warheads in total.

However, the implementation of the UNT encountered serious difficulties from the very beginning. At the first stage, in 1992, they were associated with the withdrawal of tactical nuclear warheads by Russia from the territory of a number of former Soviet republics. The withdrawal of this type of weapon was agreed in the fundamental documents on the termination of the existence of the USSR, signed by the leaders of the new independent states in 1991. However, some of the former Soviet republics began to obstruct these measures. In particular, in February 1992, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk banned the export of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. Only the joint demarches of Russia and the United States forced him to resume the transportation of this type of weapon. In the spring of 1992, all tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn. The redeployment of nuclear weapons for strategic delivery vehicles was completed only in 1996.

Another difficulty was that in the extremely difficult economic situation of the 1990s, Russia experienced serious difficulties in financing the disposal of nuclear weapons. Disarmament activities have been hampered by the lack of adequate storage facilities. This led to the overflow of warehouses, violations of the adopted safety regulations. The risks associated with unauthorized access to nuclear warheads during their transportation and storage forced Moscow to accept international assistance to ensure nuclear security. It was provided mainly by the US under the well-known Nunn-Lugar program, but also by other countries including France and the UK. For reasons of state secrecy, Russia refused to accept assistance directly in the dismantling of nuclear weapons. However, foreign assistance was provided in other, less sensitive areas, for example, through the provision of containers and wagons for the safe transportation of nuclear warheads, protective equipment for nuclear storage facilities, etc. This freed up the funds needed for the destruction of ammunition.

Providing foreign aid provided partial one-way transparency not provided for by the UNT. The donor states, primarily the United States, insisted on their right to access the facilities they provided assistance in order to verify the intended use of the supplied equipment. As a result of long and difficult negotiations, mutually acceptable solutions were found, on the one hand, guaranteeing the observance of state secrets, and, on the other hand, the necessary level of access. Such limited transparency measures also covered such critical facilities as nuclear disassembly and assembly facilities run by Rosatom, as well as nuclear weapons storage facilities, subordinated to the Ministry defense. The latest officially published information on the implementation of UNTs in Russia was presented in the speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Ivanov at the Conference to Review the Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on April 25, 2000.

According to him, “Russia ... continues to consistently implement unilateral initiatives in the field of tactical nuclear weapons. Such weapons have been completely removed from surface ships and multi-purpose submarines, as well as land-based naval aviation and placed in centralized storage areas. One third of the total number of nuclear munitions for sea-based tactical missiles and naval aviation has been eliminated. The destruction of nuclear warheads of tactical missiles, artillery shells, and nuclear mines is nearing completion. Half of the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles and half of the nuclear aircraft bombs" 10 . Assessments of Russia's implementation of UNTs are given in Table. 9. Thus, as of the year 2000, Russia has largely complied with the UNT. As planned, all naval munitions were withdrawn to centralized storage facilities, and a third of them were destroyed (however, significant ambiguity remains regarding the withdrawal of all such items from naval bases to centralized storage facilities due to inconsistencies in official wording). A certain number of tactical nuclear warheads still remained in service with the Ground Forces, Air Force and Air Defense. In the case of the Air Force, this did not contradict the PNR, since, according to the January 1992 initiatives of President Yeltsin, it was envisaged to withdraw tactical ammunition from combat strength and destroy it, together with the United States, which did not. As regards the liquidation of the Air Force warheads, by 2000 Russia's obligations had been fulfilled. By means of air defense, UNTs were carried out in terms of liquidation, but not in the sphere of complete withdrawal from the anti-aircraft missile forces.

Thus, during the 1990s, Russia carried out UNTs in the field of warheads for the Air Force and, possibly, the Navy, as well as partly for air defense. IN ground forces Some of the tactical nuclear munitions still remained in service and were not eliminated, although the UNP provided for their complete withdrawal to centralized storage facilities and complete elimination. The latter was attributed to financial and technical difficulties. Implementation of UNTs became one of the requirements of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. integral part Plan "13 steps" to fulfill the obligations of nuclear powers in accordance with Art. VI Treaty. The 13 Steps plan was adopted at the Review Conference by consensus, i.e., both representatives of Russia and the United States voted for its adoption. However, 19 months later, Washington announced a unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Russian-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, which was considered the cornerstone of strategic stability. This decision was taken contrary to the obligations of the United States under the 13 Step Plan, which required compliance with this treaty.

The US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in June 2002 upset the very delicate balance of mutual obligations between Russia and the United States in the area of nuclear disarmament, including in relation to TNW. Obviously, the violation by one of the NPT members of its obligations on a number of points of the decisions adopted by the 2000 Review Conference (including the 13 Steps Plan) made it unlikely that the other parties would fully comply with these decisions. During the work of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, no provisions on the 13 Steps Plan were adopted, which in fact indicates that it has ceased to be valid. This could not but affect the implementation of the UNT. Thus, on April 28, 2003, in a speech by the head of the Russian delegation at the session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference, the following was stated: “The Russian side proceeds from the fact that consideration of issues of tactical nuclear weapons cannot be carried out in isolation from other types of weapons. It is for this reason that the well-known unilateral Russian disarmament initiatives of 1991-1992 are of a complex nature and, in addition, affect tactical nuclear weapons and other important questions that have a significant impact on strategic stability.

Russia's official reference to the fact that, in addition to tactical nuclear weapons, UNTs also touch upon other important issues affecting strategic stability is clearly based on the idea of ​​the interconnection between the implementation of the 1991-1992 initiatives. with the fate of the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability. In addition, the assertion that the issue of TNW cannot be considered in isolation from other types of weapons is obviously an allusion to the situation that has developed with the entry into force of the adapted version of the CFE Treaty. This treaty was signed back in 1990 and provided for maintaining the balance of power in Europe on a bloc basis in five types of conventional weapons (tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters and aircraft). After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR itself, with the expansion of NATO to the east, it is completely outdated.

In order to preserve the system of limiting conventional arms, the parties held negotiations on its adaptation, which culminated in the signing in Istanbul in 1999 of an adapted version of the CFE Treaty. This option to a greater extent took into account the military-political realities that had developed in Europe after the end of the Cold War and contained certain security guarantees for Russia, limiting the possibility of deploying NATO troops near its borders. However, the NATO countries refused to ratify the adapted CFE under very far-fetched pretexts. In the context of the admission of the Baltic states to NATO, an increase in the imbalance in conventional weapons to the detriment of Russia, and in the absence of ratification of the adapted Treaty by the West, Russia in December 2007 announced a unilateral suspension of compliance with the basic CFE Treaty (despite the fact that the adapted Treaty, as an add-on to the basic one, did not enter into force ).

In addition, Russia faced with new urgency the question of the role of nuclear weapons, primarily tactical ones, as a means of neutralizing such an imbalance. Obviously, the fears associated with the advancement of NATO to the East in the absence of adequate international legal security guarantees, in the eyes of Russia, cast doubt on the expediency of implementing the UNT in full, especially given the political and legally non-binding nature of these obligations. As far as one can judge from the absence of further official statements about the fate of UNTs, they have not been fully implemented.

This fact illustrates both the advantages and disadvantages of informal arms control regimes. On the one hand, within the framework of the UNT, significant reductions in tactical nuclear weapons were carried out, including the destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons. However, the absence of verification measures does not allow the parties to assume with certainty which reductions actually took place. The lack of a legally binding status made it easier for the parties to effectively back out of the initiatives without announcing it at all.

In other words, the advantages of an "informal" approach to disarmament are tactical, but in the long run it does not have sufficient stability to serve as a stabilizer for the changing political and military relations of the parties. Moreover, such initiatives themselves become easy victims of such changes and can turn into a source of additional distrust and tension. Another thing is that after the end of the Cold War, former adversaries could afford much more radical, faster, less technically complex and less burdensome economic disarmament agreements.

Based on the fact that Russian Federation is the legal successor of the USSR, then it is a full participant in the international treaties ratified by the USSR.

At the end of July 1991, the START-1 Treaty was signed in Moscow. We can boldly say that in terms of its scope, the degree of detail, the complexity of the problems solved in it, this is the first and last Treaty of its kind. Subject of the agreement: ICBMs, SLBMs, launchers of ICBMs, launchers of SLBMs, TBs, as well as warheads of ICBMs, SLBMs and nuclear weapons of TBs. The parties agreed to reduce their strategic weapons to the level of 1,600 deployed carriers and 6,000 warheads on them. At the same time, the number of our heavy ICBMs should be reduced by half. Restrictions were also imposed on non-deployed funds. For the first time, a limit was set on the total cast weight ballistic missiles. It should not exceed 3600 tons.

It turned out to be very difficult to agree on the procedure for offsetting strategic offensive weapons, especially TB weapons. Without dwelling on this issue in detail, it should be emphasized that, in the end, a conditional count was adopted here - a heavy bomber was counted as one unit in the number of carriers, and all nuclear bombs and short-range missiles on it - as one nuclear warhead. As for ALCMs, they were counted as follows: for the USSR, within 180 TB, 8 warheads per bomber; for the USA, within 150 TB, 10 warheads; which he is actually equipped with.

Reductions in armaments must be carried out in stages within 7 years from the date the Treaty enters into force. It should be noted right away that the Treaty entered into force three and a half years after its signing in December 1994. There were reasons for such a long delay (unfortunately, there is no way to dwell on them). In December 2001, the parties completed the reduction of their armaments to the agreed levels stipulated by the START-1 Treaty. Reductions in armaments were carried out by their elimination or re-equipment according to detailed procedures. Lukashuk, I.I. International law. General part: textbook. for law students fak. and universities; 3rd edition, revised. and additional / I.I. Lukashuk. - M.: Volters Kluver, 2005. - 432 p.

Monitoring compliance with obligations under the START-1 Treaty includes the use of NTSC; 14 various kinds inspections; continuous surveillance at mobile ICBM production facilities; providing access to telemetry information transmitted from ballistic missiles during their launches, including the exchange of magnetic tapes with recorded telemetry information; confidence building measures that contribute to the effectiveness of control. To promote the implementation of the goals and provisions of the START-1 Treaty, the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCCI) was created and is still functioning.

It must be said that in the future, important shifts took place in the negotiation process.

Even before the entry into force of the START-1 Treaty, was signed (in January 1993) the Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of START, called the START-2 Treaty. This Treaty is ninety percent, if not more, based on the provisions of the START-1 Treaty, and therefore it was prepared in an extremely short time frame, approximately within six months. Tolstykh, B.JI. Well international law: textbook / B.JI. Tolstykh. - M.: Wolters Kluver, 2009. - 1056 p.

The START-2 Treaty provided for the reduction of the strategic offensive arms of the parties to the level of 3000-3500 warheads, with a sublevel of 1700-1750 warheads on SLBMs. The advantage of this Treaty can be considered an agreement on a real count of weapons for all TB. At the same time, its features, and many experts considered it shortcomings, were the requirements for the elimination of ICBMs with MIRVs, as well as the complete elimination of all our heavy ICBMs. The possibility of reorientation (without any mandatory procedures) up to 100 TB for non-nuclear tasks was envisaged. In essence, they were withdrawn from the count. Essentially, all restrictions on the possibility of reducing the number of warheads on ballistic missiles were removed.

All this, it was believed, gave clear advantages to the United States and, as a result, predetermined very heated discussions during the ratification of this Treaty in the State Duma. In the end, The State Duma ratified the START-2 Treaty, but the US Congress did not complete this procedure (the Protocol to the START-2 Treaty, signed on September 26, 1997 in New York, on the extension of the arms reduction period was not ratified). With the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the question of putting the START-2 Treaty into effect was finally removed. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia June 14 this year issued a formal statement that we no longer consider ourselves bound by this Treaty.

With the coming to power of the US administration of George W. Bush Jr., there has been a sharp change in the attitude of the American side to the development of agreements in the field of arms control. A line was proclaimed to carry out arms reductions unilaterally, without the development of legally binding documents, without appropriate control. It is clear that such an approach, if adopted, would lead to the destruction of the negotiating process. This could not be allowed.

Under such conditions, the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials of Russia and the United States was born, which was prepared in record time and signed on May 24 of this year in Moscow. This treaty immediately sparked heated debate. The supporters of the Treaty see the reductions envisaged in it to the level of 1700-2200 deployed warheads as a step aimed at further strengthening strategic stability. It is also considered an achievement that it is legally binding. Opponents of the SORT Treaty emphasize that it is essentially only a document of intent. It does not define the subject of the agreement, there are no rules for counting nuclear warheads, reduction procedures, and control provisions. The reductions under the new Treaty should be completed in 2012. At the same time, it keeps in force the START-1 Treaty, which expires 3 years earlier - in 2009. And it is not clear how the new Treaty will function during these three years?

Of course, all these questions are valid. But one cannot ignore the fact that the reduction in the level of warheads on deployed launchers from 6000 units. (under the START-1 Treaty) to 1700-2200, this is a step that contributes to strengthening security and stability.

By the end of the 1990s. the process of nuclear disarmament between countries has significantly slowed down. main reason-- the weakness of the Russian economy, which could not maintain the quantitative parameters of the strategic forces at the same level as the Soviet one. In 2002, the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials (SOR Treaty) was concluded, which entered into force on June 1, 2003. The Treaty consists of 5 articles, strategic delivery vehicles are not mentioned in it. According to the agreement, the parties undertook by December 31, 2012 to increase the number of strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200 units. However, the treaty does not have a clear concept of what is meant by the term "strategic nuclear warhead", and therefore it is not clear how to count them. When signing the SOR Agreement, the parties did not agree on what they were going to reduce, and therefore this agreement does not provide for control measures. After the signing of this treaty, a long period of stagnation in the disarmament sphere began, and finally, in 2009-2010. certain positive trends began to emerge. Tolstykh, B.JI. Course of international law: textbook / B.JI. Tolstykh. - M.: Wolters Kluver, 2009. - 1056 p.

On April 5, 2009 in Prague (Czech Republic), the President of the United States announced an initiative on a future without nuclear weapons and possible ways to achieve it. During his speech, Barack Obama not only noted the existing challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, including the presence of thousands of nuclear weapons, ongoing testing of nuclear weapons, the black market for trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials, the threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists, etc., but and outlined the trajectory to be followed in order to build a world without nuclear weapons. First, it is the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in the national security strategies of states. It is necessary to begin work in this direction with the reduction of strategic arms. To implement a global nuclear test ban, the Obama administration will immediately and aggressively push for US ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and encourage other countries to join the process. To block the channels through which the elements necessary to create nuclear bombs, it is necessary to push for a new treaty that would prohibit, in a controlled manner, the production of fissile materials for use in the state's nuclear weapons arsenals.

Second, in order to strengthen the NPT, a number of principles need to be adopted:

• 1. It is urgently necessary to find additional resources to strengthen the powers of international inspections;
• 2. Real and immediate consequences need to be identified for countries that break the rules or attempt to withdraw from the NPT without good reason.

NPT violators must be punished. On April 6, 2010, a new US nuclear doctrine was adopted, which allows the US to use nuclear weapons against a number of states, in particular those that do not comply with obligations under the NPT. Moreover, these countries are named specifically - North Korea and Iran;

3. A new framework for civil nuclear cooperation must be created, including an international nuclear fuel bank, so that all countries that have renounced nuclear weapons have access to peaceful energy without increasing the risk of proliferation. Paramuzova, O.G. Nuclear safety in the conditions of modern international law and order / O.G. Paramuzov. - St. Petersburg: Publishing House of St. Petersburg. un-ta, 2006. - 388 p.

At the same time, the US President stated that his administration would strive to interact with Iran on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect. The US supports Iran's right to peaceful nuclear activities subject to rigorous IAEA scrutiny. However, until these checks are carried out in full, Iran's activities pose a threat to Iran's neighbors, the United States, as well as American allies. As long as the threat from Iran persists, the US will continue to pursue plans to build an effective missile defense system (ABM). If the Iranian nuclear threat is eliminated, the US will terminate the missile defense program; 5. It is imperative that we work together to ensure that terrorists never acquire nuclear weapons. In this regard, B. Obama announced new international efforts aimed at ensuring the protection of all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world for four years. All countries must develop partnerships to secure these potentially dangerous materials and step up their efforts to destroy the black market, detect and intercept materials in transit, and use financial instruments to eliminate the channels of this dangerous trade. We need to start with a global nuclear security summit.

The United States, as the only nuclear power to use nuclear weapons, has no moral right to remain idle, which is why the President of the United States has clearly and with conviction proclaimed America's commitment to the cause of peace and security in a world without nuclear weapons. At the same time, the President of the United States emphasized that he is well aware that this goal will not be achieved quickly, perhaps this will not happen while he is alive, but the entire world community will need patience and perseverance in resolving this complex issue.

For its part, the Russian Federation has always supported and interacted with the authors of initiatives aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament (the Hoover Initiative, the Evans-Kawaguchi Commission, etc., which are based on proposals aimed at strengthening the NPT, solving problems of global security on a multilateral basis) . Russia views the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as the ultimate goal of a gradual, stage-by-stage process of general and complete disarmament. This goal can only be achieved through an integrated approach under favorable international conditions, i.e. while maintaining strategic stability and observing the principle of equal security for all states without exception, taking into account the existing inextricable relationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons, as was said by the President of the Russian Federation D.A. Medvedev at the 64th session of the UN General Assembly. On February 5, 2010, a new Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation was approved by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, which directly states that the creation and deployment of strategic missile defense systems that undermine global stability and violate the existing balance of forces in the nuclear missile sphere, as well as an increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons, are the main external military threats to Russia.

The Russian Federation also believes that in order to strengthen international security, it is necessary to formulate specific parameters under which further advancement along the path of nuclear disarmament is possible. We are talking about such conditions as the settlement of regional conflicts, the elimination of incentives that push states to acquire or retain nuclear weapons, a controlled cessation of the buildup of conventional weapons and attempts to “compensate” with them the reduction of nuclear systems, reliable maintenance of the viability of key disarmament and non-proliferation tools, prevention of the deployment of weapons in space. The Russian initiative to concentrate nuclear weapons within the national territories of nuclear states does not lose its relevance either. Its implementation would lead to the maximum expansion of the territory of regions where nuclear weapons are completely absent. Russia believes that in the foreseeable future, all states possessing nuclear weapons, including nuclear states, should smoothly join the Russian-American efforts to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals.

outside the scope of the NPT.

An important step in the process of nuclear disarmament should be the early entry into force of the CTBT. Russia welcomes the changed position of the United States in relation to this treaty and persistently urges all states, and in the first place those on which the entry into force of this Treaty depends, to sign and ratify it without delay. Compliance with a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, while important as this measure, cannot replace legal obligations in this area. An important step towards strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime should be the early launch at the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on the development of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Sidorova EA International legal regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and legal problems of its strengthening. Diss. c.yu. n. -M., 2010.

The tasks of preventing nuclear materials and related technologies from falling into the hands of non-state actors, primarily terrorists, remain in the foreground. It is necessary to build up multilateral cooperation in this matter, based on UN Security Council Resolution 1540 of April 28, 2004.

In view of the fact that the world's demand for energy is rapidly growing, which can be satisfied by a peaceful atom, Russia believes that the movement towards "global zero" is impossible without building a modern proliferation-resistant architecture international cooperation in the peaceful nuclear realm, based on the rigorous verification of non-proliferation obligations under the 1968 NPT, as well as multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. The Russian Federation considers it an important task to achieve an increase in the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system and the universalization of the Additional Safeguards Protocol, which should become mandatory norms for verifying compliance with the obligations assumed under the NPT and a universal standard in the field of nuclear export control. Today, Russian* initiatives to develop a global nuclear energy infrastructure and establish international centers for the provision of nuclear fuel cycle services are being implemented at full speed. A serious step forward was the approval by the IAEA Board of Governors of the Russian proposal to create a guaranteed stock of low-enriched uranium under the auspices of the IAEA.

On March 29, 2010, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN V.I. Churkin, who detailed Russia's official position on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and on May 4, 2010, at the next Review Conference to review the NPT, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S.A. Ryabkov, who gave a detailed account of the work done by Russia within the framework of the NPT. In particular, it was noted that the Russian Federation is consistently working to reduce its nuclear arsenal. Commitments under such disarmament agreements as the 1987 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and the 1991 Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms have been fully realized. The Russian Federation considers it necessary to systematically move forward along the path of real nuclear disarmament, as required by Art. VI NPT. Realizing the special responsibility as a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia, in the spirit of good will continues deep, irreversible and verifiable reductions in strategic offensive arms. One of the important steps along this path was the signing on April 8, 2010 of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States on measures to further reduce and limit strategic

offensive weapons.

The provisions of the new Treaty provide that each of the parties reduces and limits its strategic offensive arms in such a way that seven years after its entry into force and thereafter, their total numbers will not exceed: 700 units for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and HBs; 1,550 units for warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and HBs; 800 units for deployed and non-deployed launchers (PUs) of ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as TBs (Articles I and II of the Treaty). This level fixes deployed and non-deployed launchers, as well as TBs, in the legal field of the Treaty, which allows limiting the "return potential" of the parties (the possibility of a sharp increase in the number of deployed warheads in a crisis situation) and creates an additional incentive to eliminate or re-equip the reduced strategic offensive weapons. At the same time, the Treaty provides that each of the parties has the right to independently determine the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.

Thus, the Russian Federation once again clearly demonstrated its desire for large-scale reductions in strategic offensive arms. Now it is necessary to ensure the earliest possible ratification of the Treaty and its entry into force, as well as to guarantee the consistent and unswerving fulfillment of all the obligations laid down in the Treaty without exception. Paramuzova, O.G. Nuclear safety in the conditions of modern international law and order / O.G. Paramuzov. - St. Petersburg: Publishing House of St. Petersburg. un-ta, 2006. - 388 p.

According to experts in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as soon as the START-3 Treaty enters into force, non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSW) and anti-missile defense (ABM) should become the next subject of negotiations between the parties. It seems that in isolation from them, further progress along the path of reductions in strategic offensive arms will be extremely difficult.

For NSNW, there is no international legal mechanism requiring their control and reduction. Carried out in the early 1990s. NSNW reductions were carried out by the USSR / RF and the USA on a voluntary basis unilaterally. There is no official data on the number of non-strategic nuclear warheads. According to non-governmental experts, the United States currently has about 1,300 nuclear warheads of this class, and Russia about 3,000. changes in the field of disarmament; secondly, stockpiles of nuclear weapons will make it difficult to involve other nuclear states in the process of controlled reduction of nuclear weapons; and thirdly, the lack of control over NPT will be a source of doubt among non-nuclear countries about the commitment of the US and Russia to their obligations under the NPT. Sidorova EA International legal regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and legal problems of its strengthening. Diss. c.yu. n. -M., 2010.

However, the establishment of control over NSNW is impossible without its complete withdrawal from the territory of Europe due to the fact that the deployed NSNW in Europe is considered by the Russian military as strategic, since it is located in sufficient proximity to the borders of the Russian Federation. Therefore, Russia will seek to link its readiness to consider NSNW issues with the agreement of the NATO countries and the EU to accept for consideration the Russian proposal to develop a European Security Treaty. In addition, there are technical difficulties in establishing control, which is due to the fact that it must be established directly over nuclear weapons, and not delivery vehicles.

The implementation of further steps to reduce nuclear weapons will inevitably lead to the issue of missile defense. The unilateral actions of the United States to create a missile defense system raise Russia's fears about its impact on the survival of Russian strategic forces. When signing the START-3 Treaty, Russia issued a Statement on Missile Defense, in which it was noted that the new Treaty could be effective and viable only in the absence of a qualitative and significant quantitative build-up of the capabilities of US missile defense systems, which could ultimately lead to threaten the Russian strategic forces. The fact is that the replacement by the United States of the plans adopted by the previous administration for the deployment of missile defense elements in the Czech Republic and Poland removed the acuteness of the issue only for a while, since the new four-story adapted plan for building a US missile defense system in Europe provides for the deployment by 2020 of a system capable of intercepting ICBMs . Therefore, today it makes sense to take advantage of the current positive situation to resume efforts to strengthen confidence-building measures and develop cooperation in the field of missile defense. The first step in this direction, according to the Russian Federation, could be work on a joint assessment of the capabilities of "third" countries in the field of creating ballistic missiles in order to develop a common point of view on emerging threats. This, in particular, would be facilitated by the opening of the Data Exchange Center for Early Warning Systems (DPC). On June 4, 2000, the Russian Federation and the United States signed a corresponding memorandum regarding the creation of a joint data center, which was supposed to take effect from the moment of signing until 2010, but work on the creation of the data center faced organizational problems, and as a result, the data center did not start working despite its importance for cooperation and the formation of relations between Russia and the United States.

Cooperation between Russia and the United States in the search for comprehensive solutions to the problems outlined above will make it possible to create real conditions for a further stage in the reduction of nuclear weapons.

Serious concerns of the world community in connection with the existing challenges related to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the need international action on their prevention, were reflected in UN Security Council Resolution 1887, adopted unanimously on September 24, 2009. The resolution contains two main conclusions: firstly, modern challenges in the field of nuclear proliferation can and should be addressed on the basis of the NPT, which has stood the test of time and approved as the only universal basis for engagement in this sensitive area; secondly, the danger of nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorists is causing serious concern, which means that it is necessary to strengthen the international "safety net" that makes it possible to stop such risks at distant approaches.

On April 12-13, 2010, Washington (USA) hosted a nuclear security summit, which was attended by representatives of 47 countries, including Russia. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss ways to improve physical nuclear protection and prevent the danger of nuclear terrorism. At the summit, it became known that Canada had abandoned significant reserves of highly enriched uranium. Chile and Mexico abandoned all uranium reserves. President of Ukraine V. Yanukovych expressed the same intention when he announced that all stocks of highly enriched uranium would be exported to the Russian Federation by 2012. President of the Russian Federation D. Medvedev announced the closure of the weapons-grade plutonium producing reactor in Zheleznogorsk.

During the summit, US Secretary of State H. Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov signed the Protocol to the 2000 bilateral intergovernmental agreement on the disposition of plutonium, declared as plutonium no longer necessary for defense purposes, its handling and cooperation in this area. This agreement was signed by the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation and the Vice President of the United States on August 29 and September 1, 2000. In accordance with Art. XIII of the Agreement, it was to be applied temporarily from the date of its signing and enter into force from the date of receipt of the last written notification of the completion by the parties of their domestic procedures necessary for its entry into force. Unfortunately, the agreement was never implemented for some technical reasons. The protocol signed by H. Clinton and S. Lavrov should eliminate these technical obstacles, as a result of which the practical implementation of the agreement will become possible. The agreement itself is a specification of the joint Statement of the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States on the principles of handling and disposition of plutonium, declared as plutonium no longer necessary for defense purposes, dated September 2, 1998.

In accordance with the principles for the disposition of such plutonium agreed in the Statement, the Agreement provides for its disposition as nuclear fuel for existing nuclear reactors, reactors that may appear in the future, as well as through immobilization with highly radioactive waste or any other mutually agreed methods (Article III of the Agreement). The agreement does not provide for any restrictions on the type of mixed uranium-plutonium fuel. In accordance with Art. II of the Agreement, each party must dispose of at least 34 metric tons of disposable plutonium. The implementation of this Agreement will also clearly demonstrate the commitment of the Russian Federation and the United States further development process of nuclear disarmament, since in addition to the actual limitation and reduction of nuclear strategic offensive weapons, something must be done with regard to plutonium, which is released as a result of this process, which is an important contribution to the implementation of Art. VI NPT.

The Washington summit ended with the signing of a joint declaration, which stipulates further actions for disarmament. The next summit is scheduled for 2012, which will be held in South Korea.

Iran was not invited to the nuclear security summit in Washington, and as an alternative, on April 17-18, 2010, Tehran hosted a conference on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, held under the motto - "Nuclear energy for everyone, nuclear weapons for none." The conference was attended by representatives from more than 50 countries, including the Russian Federation, who outlined their national approaches and priorities in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear disarmament. In addition, representatives of the expert community and specialized non-governmental organizations made presentations.

As a result of the conference, a document was adopted, which sets out the main provisions of the discussions. In particular, it was said about the need for nuclear disarmament as the main priority of human society, as well as the complete destruction of these inhuman weapons within a certain period of time; implementation of the disarmament commitments assumed by the nuclear states on the basis of the NPT and the final documents of the 1995 and 2000 NPT review conferences, the full implementation of the 13 Steps to Disarmament program; conclusion of a universal Convention and adherence to a non-discriminatory and legal approach to the problem of a complete ban on the distribution, production, transfer, stockpiling, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in order to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, taking into account the experience of concluding two conventions: the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and the stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction of 1972 and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of 1993, as well as the provision of security guarantees to non-nuclear countries until general disarmament is achieved; the implementation of further programs to create areas free of nuclear weapons in various regions of the world, especially in the Middle East; observance of the principles of immutability, openness and truthfulness in the exercise of international control over the implementation of bilateral and multilateral agreements on the reduction of nuclear weapons.

The document also emphasizes the right of states to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the need to develop international cooperation in this area on the basis of the obligations formulated in Art. IV NPT; serious concern was expressed regarding the weakening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime due to the use of double and discriminatory standards by some nuclear powers and, especially, the cooperation of these nuclear countries with states that are not parties to the NPT and ignoring the fact that they have a nuclear arsenal.

Taking into account the importance of this Conference and the results achieved at it, Iran proposed to send the final document of the forum to the UN Secretary General, as well as other international bodies and organizations. Taking into account the attention shown by the participants of the Conference to the topic discussed at it, as well as in order to monitor the implementation of the tasks set by the Conference, in accordance with the wishes of the majority of its participants, it was decided to hold the second meeting of the Conference on Disarmament and International Security in the second half of April 2011. in Tehran.

Thus, on the basis of the above initiatives and the real steps taken by nuclear countries, it can be assumed that building a nuclear-free world is not a utopia. Progress towards it is possible if effective, systematic, consistent legal measures are taken in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If global community will not jointly strive for a world without weapons, then he will forever remain out of reach. Paramuzova O.G. Nuclear safety in the conditions of modern international law and order / O.G. Paramuzov. - St. Petersburg: Publishing House of St. Petersburg. un-ta, 2006.

Reducing the number of nuclear warheads does not improve the security situation in the world. Experts from the Swedish International Peace Research Institute found that the reduction in the number of nuclear weapons has led to a significant increase in the quality of the remaining arsenals. The fear of observers caused the emergence of a new type of military conflicts.

Despite the countries' declared desire for nuclear disarmament, the reduction in the number of weapons of mass destruction is successfully offset by an increase in their quality.

Such conclusions are contained in the annual report released on Monday by the International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 19,000 nuclear weapons, which is about 1,500 less than in 2011.

At the same time, 4,400 nuclear weapons are ready for use, half of which are on high alert.

Quantitative and Qualitative Parameters of Limitations on Strategic Offensive Arms of Russia and the United States in the START-1 and START-3 Treaties

The institute's analysts see the main reasons for the reduction of nuclear warheads in the steps taken by Russia and the United States under the START treaty. Recall that the treaty provides that each of the parties reduces strategic offensive weapons in such a way that seven years after its entry into force and in the future, their total numbers will not exceed: 700 units for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and HBs; 1550 units for warheads on them; 800 units for deployed and non-deployed ICBM, SLBM and HB launchers.

According to official data as of April this year, Russia had 1,492 nuclear warheads deployed, while Washington had 1,737. destroyed 45 warheads, and the United States - 63. However, the reduction in the number of warheads, SIPRI experts state, only led to the improvement of the remaining arsenals. The five officially recognized nuclear powers - China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States - are either deploying new nuclear delivery systems or have announced similar programs, the report says.

India and Pakistan continue to develop new nuclear delivery systems. According to the Stockholm Institute, the former has 80 to 110 nuclear warheads, in Pakistan their number may vary from 90 to 110, and about 80 more units are in Israel.

The latter, in particular, as the German media wrote the other day, intends to place nuclear warheads on submarines bought in Germany.

"Despite the world's renewed interest in disarmament efforts, no nuclear-weapon state has so far shown more than rhetorical readiness to give up its nuclear arsenals," Shannon Kyle, one of the report's authors, said.

However, both Russia and the United States, when signing the START treaty in 2010, made no secret of their intentions to modernize their nuclear potential. In particular, this right was assigned to Moscow during the ratification of the document in the State Duma. Moreover, as Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov noted at the time, after the entry into force of the treaty de facto, Russia will not eliminate a single missile, since the country will not be able to reach the level of warheads indicated in the treaty until 2018. launchers, we will only reach the level set out in the treaty by 2028. As for warheads, by 2018 we will reach the level of 1.55 thousand units. Once again I say that we will not cut a single unit, ”he emphasized.

Another point that SIPRI specialists pay attention to in their report was the emergence of a new type of military conflicts in general. Experts made this conclusion on the basis of recent events in the Middle East and North Africa.

The Arab Spring, the report notes, demonstrated the growing complexity of armed conflict. “The events of the past year are not isolated, if we talk about the tendencies of the modern conflict. In fact, they echoed the changes that have taken place during armed conflicts for decades. All these changes allow us to talk about the emergence of a new type of conflict that is increasingly complicating international intervention,” explained Neil Melvin, program director of the Institute for Armed Conflicts, in this regard.