If you believe the textbooks, the USSR entered the Second world war June 22, 1941, because it was attacked by Germany. But if you believe the myth-makers, then Stalin sought to conclude an alliance with Hitler, pushed him with all his might to start the war, involved the USSR in World War II already in 1939 and agreed with Hitler on the division of the world. Two “related” totalitarian regimes, in theory, should act together, and their quarrel on June 22, 1941 is a historical misunderstanding.

Let's try to figure out how and why the rapprochement between Germany and the USSR began in 1939, what goals Stalin pursued in his foreign policy, and whether the USSR participated in Germany's war with Great Britain, France, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway, that is, in the initial stage of the Second World War. world war?

Out of convenience or out of love? Chronicle of the diplomatic game

In 1989, the former Soviet intelligence officer and then English writer V. Suvorov shocked Western and then Russian readers with the statement: Stalin started the Second World War, deliberately provoking it with a pact with Hitler. If it were not for the journalistic sharpness of this conclusion, there would not be much novelty in it. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact has long been compromising evidence on Stalin. But the leaders of Great Britain and France also concluded a pact with Hitler and Mussolini in Munich. However, an important question remains: Stalin agreed to a rapprochement with Hitler under the pressure of circumstances, or did he strive for an alliance with Germany and planned this rapprochement as desirable, as part of his diabolical plan?

The authors who believe that “Moscow took the initiative in raising the issue of creating a new political basis for relations between the USSR and Germany” refer to rather late documents dating back to May 1939. Of course, the issue of whether what benefits and disadvantages will the USSR receive if relations with Germany are normalized. There was no talk of allied relations. In 1933–1938 Relations between the two countries were at their worst.

For every step towards rapprochement or away from it taken by the Soviet and German sides, an equally symmetrical one can be found. Foreign policy in its daily routine resembles an intricate dance. The parties come together and separate, take steps towards and to the side, then ceremoniously leave. But ideologically it is important to proclaim “who started it first.” If they are Germans, then Stalin’s policy is pragmatic. He gave in to Hitler's "persecutions." If Stalin took the initiative, he is a criminal, an accomplice of Hitler in starting the Second World War, and even its initiator.

German researcher I. Fleischhauer writes: “The majority of German authors, both before and now, when describing the circumstances of the emergence of the pact, express the opinion that Stalin, who with relative constancy sought an agreement with the National Socialists, since the autumn of 1938, having recovered from the shock caused by the Munich agreement, so intensified his attempts at rapprochement with Germany that Hitler, who was preparing the invasion of Poland in the summer of 1939, could only respond to repeated proposals in order to conclude the agreement so desired by the Soviet side.” The ideological subtext of this position of the German authors is clear.

The history of the “diplomatic dance” of 1939 has been studied in detail. Since it is so important to discover the first initiative, we will give a chronicle of events.

December 1937 - Goering invited Soviet Ambassador J. Surits and during the conversation said: “I am a supporter of development economic relations with the USSR and as a manager of a farm, I understand their importance.” They talked about German economic plan, and then Goering started talking about foreign policy issues, Bismarck’s covenants not to fight with Russia and the mistake of Wilhelm II, who violated these covenants.

September 30, 1938 - Munich Pact between Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France on the division of Czechoslovakia. The same solution of others is being discussed international problems from Spain to Ukraine. The USSR found itself in foreign policy isolation, in the face of a hostile Europe. Policy " collective security" failed.

On December 16, at a working meeting dedicated to the routine extension of the Soviet-German trade agreement, the head of the Eastern European reference department of the political and economic department of the German Foreign Ministry, Schnurre, informed the deputy Soviet trade representative Skosyrev that Germany was ready to provide a loan to the USSR in exchange for expanding Soviet exports of raw materials. These proposals became the starting point for Soviet-German rapprochement - so far unstable and not guaranteed by anything. The German credit initiative was economically beneficial and resonated. It was agreed that on January 30 a small delegation led by Schnurre would go to Moscow. The Soviet side even prepared a list of what would be useful for the USSR to purchase from Germany with this loan.

On January 12, 1939, at a New Year's reception for heads of diplomatic missions, Hitler suddenly approached Soviet Ambassador A. Merekalov, “asked about living in Berlin, about family, about a trip to Moscow, emphasized that he knew about my visit to Schulenburg in Moscow, wished success and said goodbye." This has never happened before. The Fuhrer's affection for the Soviet ambassador caused a furor in the diplomatic corps: what does this mean!? But Hitler considered such a demonstration to be the maximum publicity of his intentions. Hitler could not do more without a reciprocal expression of sympathy from the Soviet side. But they weren’t there. Therefore, when reports about Schnurre’s trip leaked to the world press, Ribbentrop banned the visit, the negotiations broke down, which for some time convinced Stalin that the Germans’ economic intentions were not serious (there was no talk of a “political basis” yet).

On March 8, Hitler announced to his inner circle his intention to first deal with the West, and only then with the USSR.

On March 10, at the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin delivered a report in which he outlined a picture of the world struggle: “Warmongers” are pitting the USSR and Germany against each other, trying to “rakes in the heat with the wrong hands,” that is, to restrain the aggressor at the cost of sacrifices on the part of the USSR, and by themselves stay safe. Of course, the USSR, true to its policy of “collective security,” is still ready to help victims of aggression, but only on the condition that Western countries also do this. Stalin believes that supporters of appeasement in England and France would not want to prevent “Germany from getting bogged down in European affairs, getting entangled in a war with the Soviet Union, allowing all participants in the war to sink deeply into the mire of war, encouraging them in this on the sly, allowing them to weaken and exhaust each other.” friend, and then, when they are sufficiently weakened, to appear on stage with fresh forces, to act, of course, in the “interests of peace,” and dictate their terms to the weakened participants in the war. Both cheap and cute!” The invasion of the USSR will be the beginning of the end for Hitler, the West will use him in its own interests and throw him into the dustbin of history.

There are no calls for rapprochement with the Nazis in the speech; there is only an attempt to dissuade them from attacking the USSR. There is an analysis of Hitler's intentions, which would be beneficial to Stalin. There is an intention to “consolidate” the Fuhrer’s anti-Western intentions, which were only rumored. There is an attempt to pit the “imperialists” against each other.

On March 31, British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain provided Poland with guarantees that Great Britain would enter the war if the country was subjected to “direct or indirect aggression.”

In 1939, Hitler planned to unite the territories inhabited by the Germans into a single whole. To do this, it was necessary to take away part of the Polish territory between the two parts of Germany and annex Danzig. Poland did not agree to this, since Germany promised compensation at the expense of the USSR, but in the future. And she demanded territorial concessions right now. Under these conditions, Poland preferred guarantees from Great Britain and France. Hitler planned an attack on Poland at the end of August. But he feared a war on two fronts and sought to negotiate either with Poland's senior allies or neutrality with the USSR.

Britain and France hoped to avoid being drawn into a war similar to the First World War. To do this, it was necessary to direct German aggression to the east. But German expansion had to be controlled, directed against the USSR. Great Britain and France did not want to give the east of Europe to Hitler's undivided control, so that this would not lead to his uncontrollable strengthening. Under these conditions, Poland was supposed to play the role of an instrument of the Entente in eastern Europe. At the same time, Great Britain did not exclude the possibility of reaching an agreement with Germany at the expense of Poland. But Hitler could not agree to an agreement with Great Britain on Chamberlain's terms.

The USSR sought to avoid a military clash with Germany, supported by Great Britain, France and Italy (which resulted from the Munich policy). To do this, it was necessary either to come to an agreement with Great Britain, France, Poland and, if possible, Romania on joint military actions against the aggressor, or to come to an agreement with Germany to direct its aggression against Great Britain and France.

Despite the fact that Great Britain preferred rapprochement with Germany rather than the USSR, the USSR with France rather than Germany, and Germany with Great Britain rather than the USSR, rapprochement gradually went in a different direction. All three forces sought to intimidate the partner by negotiating with his rival and thus extract concessions from him. These contacts, initiated by mid-level officials, created opportunities that only on August 11–19, 1939 led to Stalin's decision to agree to Hitler's rapprochement initiatives.

On April 1, the Spanish Republic fell, which meant the collapse of the policy " Popular Front”, closely related to the policy of “collective security”.

On April 1, Hitler attacked in his public speech those who were “pulling chestnuts out of the fire” with the wrong hands. This was a repetition of an image from Stalin’s speech, but only in translations into Western European languages. Stalin condemned those who like to rake in the heat with the hands of others. This meant the British and French. This idea was reported to Hitler, and he decided to use Stalin’s passage to blackmail the West.

On April 17, the USSR put forward a counterproposal: “England, France and the USSR enter into an agreement among themselves for a period of 5–10 years with a mutual obligation to immediately provide each other with all kinds of assistance, including military assistance, in the event of aggression in Europe against any of the contracting states.” The same assistance should be provided to “Eastern European states located between the Baltic and Black Seas and bordering the USSR, in the event of aggression against these states.”

On April 17, Soviet Ambassador A. Merekalov visited the State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry (Ribbentrop's first deputy) E. Weizsäcker. The reason was quite good: after the capture of Czechoslovakia, there remained an unresolved issue about Soviet military orders that were placed at the Czech Skoda factories. Now the factories have become German. Will the Germans do the work for which money is paid? Weizsäcker responded that the current political climate was not the best for resolving such issues, but the parties spoke in favor of improving relations in the future. According to the German researcher I. Fleischhauer, by this time Weizsäcker had already become imbued with Schnurre’s ideas. From his recording of the conversation “it is clear that the conversation was skillfully directed by the Secretary of State, and that Weizsäcker’s psychological state prompted him to give this conversation the character of a political breakthrough.” The German researcher concludes: “Weizsäcker’s revelations actually represented the first official step towards rapprochement with the USSR.”

On May 3, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M. Litvinov resigned. Stalin needed a People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs who was less inclined to cooperate with France. After Litvinov’s resignation, arrests were made in the NKID (remember that this “trace” was also knocked out of Koltsov). V. Molotov combined the posts of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Replacing Litvinov with Molotov was Stalin's choice in favor of greater freedom of hand in maneuvering between the West and Germany. The USSR continued to look for an opportunity to conclude a pact with Great Britain and France, but due to Molotov's harshness and his overload with other matters, negotiations did not go any easier. Stalin hoped that Molotov would be more assertive in putting pressure on his partners than Litvinov, and this hope was justified. Molotov's assertiveness quickly led to a logical result - the negotiations reached a dead end. With the courteous Litvinov, movement in this direction would have been slower.

On May 5, the adviser of the Soviet embassy, ​​G. Astakhov, came to K. Schnurre (again about the Skoda - the Germans declared their readiness to fulfill the Soviet order), and the conversation turned to changes in the Soviet People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Schnurre reported: “Astakhov touched upon the removal of Litvinov and tried, without asking direct questions, to find out whether this event would lead to a change in our position towards the Soviet Union.”

Conversations between Astakhov and Schnurre became more frequent. Now there was something to discuss - both Skoda and big politics. On May 17, Schnurre reported: “Astakhov explained in detail that in matters of international politics there are no contradictions between Soviet Russia and Germany and therefore there are no reasons for friction between the two countries.”

On May 20, Molotov told the German Ambassador W. Schulenburg that for the rapprochement of the two countries there was no political basis(returning Weizsäcker’s remark to the Germans). In Berlin the phrase was considered “mysterious.”

On May 23, at a meeting, the military told Hitler that in the event of a simultaneous war with Great Britain, France and the USSR, Germany would lose.

On May 27, Great Britain and France responded to Soviet proposals by agreeing to the idea of ​​a military alliance. This cooled Moscow down to the “German game.” It seemed that they had already managed to scare the “collective security” partners.

On June 28, Schulenburg mentioned in a conversation with Molotov that Hitler himself approved of the rapprochement between the countries. Molotov told Schulenburg that it looked as if Germany was playing a political game with the USSR under the pretext of economic negotiations. The Kremlin remembered the failure of Schnurre’s January mission. Now the leaders of the USSR demanded economic benefits ahead. Molotov spoke about this meeting: “I recently had Schulenburg and also spoke about the desirability of improving relations. But I didn’t want to offer anything concrete or intelligible.”

On June 29, Hitler decided: “The Russians must be informed that from their position we have concluded that they make the question of the continuation of future negotiations dependent on our acceptance of the principles of our economic discussions with them as they were formulated in January. Since this basis is unacceptable to us, we are currently not interested in resuming economic negotiations with Russia.” Hitler, according to Weizsäcker, “feared that a refusal would follow from Moscow amid loud laughter” if they were to propose a rapprochement. The “rapprochement” ended before it began. However, this "sniffing" stage had great importance. Channels were created through which negotiations could be resumed almost immediately without attracting the attention of the “world community.”

On June 6–7, the leaders of Great Britain and France adopted the Soviet draft treaty as a basis. Negotiations could begin. Molotov invited his colleagues Chamberlain and Daladier to come to the negotiations. For the sake of Hitler, they easily made such a journey. At worst, there would be enough foreign ministers. But London and Paris replied that only ambassadors would conduct negotiations.

It became known that Poland “does not want to be fourth, not wanting to give arguments to Hitler.” Poland's refusal to participate in the agreement ruled out the transfer Soviet troops to the place of probable aggression at the beginning of a future war. In the event of the defeat of Poland, the USSR could be drawn into a war in eastern Europe alone with Germany. As the later experience of the German-Polish war showed, Great Britain and France did not intend to provide active support to their eastern ally.

On May 19, Chamberlain declared in Parliament that he would “rather resign than enter into an alliance with the Soviets.” On June 8, Halifax stated in Parliament that Great Britain was ready for negotiations with Germany.

On June 14, W. Strang, head of the Central European Bureau of the British Foreign Office, arrived in Moscow, who was sent as an expert to assist Ambassador W. Seeds. But Strang, representing the Forrin office, looked like the head of the delegation. This is how he was perceived by the Kremlin. Such a low level of the representative of the British Foreign Office insulted the Soviet side and convinced that Great Britain’s intentions were not serious.

On July 12, Chamberlain admitted that the USSR was ready to conclude an agreement. This was a problem - they agreed too quickly, without scaring Hitler with the negotiations.

On July 9, Molotov introduced the Soviet definition of “indirect aggression.” This is a situation in which the “victim” state “agrees, with or without the threat of force from another power,” to carry out an action “which entails the use of the territory and forces of that state for aggression against it or against one of the contracting parties.” . The words “indirect aggression” were taken from the British guarantees to Poland. Indirect aggression meant what Hitler did with the Czech Republic - he did not attack this country, but forced it to capitulate under the threat of attack and provoked the secession of Slovakia. It would seem that there should have been no objections from the British regarding the term “indirect aggression”. But Molotov’s definition was too broad and made it possible to occupy any Eastern European country under the pretext of a German threat. However, it was important for Soviet leaders that the Baltic states did not become German satellites and were not used as a springboard for invasion. The negotiations have reached a dead end. In a telegram to his plenipotentiaries in Paris and London, Molotov called the negotiating partners “swindlers and swindlers” and made a pessimistic conclusion: “Apparently, there will be no sense in all these endless negotiations.”

On July 18, Molotov gave the command to resume consultations with the Germans on concluding an economic agreement.

On July 21, Goering's employee H. Wohlthat, who arrived in London for a meeting of the International Refugee Committee, was invited to consultations with Chamberlain's adviser G. Wilson and the Minister of Commerce R. Hudson. Wilson's plan, which he outlined to Wohlthat and the German ambassador Dirksen on August 3, envisaged the conclusion of a German-British non-aggression pact, which would absorb the system of guarantees given by Great Britain to the countries of Eastern Europe. The spheres of interest of the two countries in Europe would be delimited, and Hitler would be recognized as hegemony in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Agreements were also envisaged on armament levels, the settlement of Germany's colonial claims and the provision of a large loan to it. Wilson believed that “an agreement must be concluded between Germany and England; if it were considered desirable, it would, of course, be possible to involve Italy and France in it.” Munich composition, new horizons. When Wohlthat inquired to what extent Chamberlain shared these ideas, Wilson invited the German guest to go to the next office and get confirmation from the prime minister himself. Not having the authority to negotiate at such a high level, Wohlthat refused, but he conveyed everything he heard to the embassy and to his superiors.

On July 23, the British and French agreed to the Soviet proposal to simultaneously negotiate a political agreement and military issues. Molotov considered the development of a specific plan for joint military action against Germany to be a more important issue than even the definition of indirect aggression. If it is possible to agree on a plan to attack Germany, then its invasion of the Baltic states is unlikely to take place.

At the end of July, Schnurre received instructions from his superiors to meet with Soviet representatives and resume consultations on improving Soviet-German relations. Schnurre invited Astakhov (due to Merekalov’s departure, he became Charge d’Affaires of the USSR in Germany) and Deputy Soviet Trade Representative E. Babarin (the representative was also on vacation at that time) to dinner. In the informal atmosphere of the restaurant, Schnurre outlined the stages of a possible rapprochement between the two countries: the resumption of economic cooperation through the conclusion of credit and trade agreements, then the “normalization and improvement of political relations,” including the participation of officials in cultural events each other, then the conclusion of an agreement between the two countries or a return to the neutrality agreement of 1926, that is, to the “Rappal” times. Schnurre formulated a principle that his superiors would then repeat: “In the entire region from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea and Far East There are, in my opinion, no insoluble foreign policy problems between our countries.” In addition, Schnurre developed his thought, “there is one common element in the ideology of Italy, Germany and the Soviet Union: opposition to capitalist democracies... Communism in Germany has been eradicated... Stalin postponed the world revolution indefinitely.” The Soviet interlocutors diplomatically did not object. They also did not know Stalin's indefinite deadlines. Agreeing with the need to improve relations, Soviet diplomats clarified that because of the previous mistrust, “one can only expect a gradual change.” Convincing his superiors of the profitability of this situation, Astakhov proposed to “draw the Germans into far-reaching negotiations” in order to “keep a trump card that could be used if necessary.” At first, Molotov was cautious, telegraphing Astakhov: “By limiting yourself to listening to Schnurre’s statements and promising that you would convey them to Moscow, you did the right thing.” But getting a “trump card” in the game with the West, and at the same time bargaining for economic benefits from Germany, was tempting. And Molotov, after consulting with Stalin, sent a new telegram to Astakhov: “Between the USSR and Germany, of course, with the improvement of economic relations, political relations can also improve. In this sense, Schnurre, generally speaking, is right... If now the Germans are sincerely changing the milestones and really want to improve political relations with the USSR, then they are obliged to tell us how they specifically imagine this improvement... The matter here depends entirely on the Germans. We would, of course, welcome any improvement in political relations between the two countries.” The leaders of the USSR had no sympathy for Nazism, but were ready to treat Germany in the same way as their unreliable partners in Western Europe.

Astakhov was received by Ribbentrop. The German minister presented the Soviet representative with an alternative: “If Moscow takes a negative position, we will know what is happening and how to act. If the opposite happens, then from the Baltic to the Black Sea there will be no problems that we together cannot resolve among ourselves.”

On August 5, the Allied mission slowly boarded the ship (it’s not possible to fly by plane) and arrived in the USSR on August 11. What's the hurry? The composition of the military delegation also did not impress the Soviet side, which nominated People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov for negotiations. The French were represented by Brigadier General J. Doumenc. The English delegation was headed by the king's adjutant and head of the naval base in Portsmouth, Admiral R. Drake, a man very far from strategic issues, but sharply critical of the USSR. Air Marshal C. Barnett was supposed to compensate for Drax's incompetence, but he knew little about ground operations. The British delegation was instructed to move slowly, skip political negotiations ahead, and give as little information as possible. Dumenko was recommended to act according to circumstances in contact with the British, but also to listen more than to report.

Military negotiations in Moscow, which, as it seemed to Molotov, could break the deadlock in political negotiations with the allies, reached a dead end due to the problem of the passage of troops through Poland. As with the political negotiations, the focus was on the Czechoslovak experience. In 1938, the USSR was ready to provide assistance to the victim of aggression, but the Red Army could not enter the battlefield. At that time Poland was part of the pro-German coalition. Maybe things will be different now? No, the Poles firmly stood up to defend their borders against the USSR. Polish commander-in-chief E. Rydz-Smigly stated: “Regardless of the consequences, not a single inch of Polish territory will ever be allowed to be occupied by Russian troops.” “The military meeting soon failed due to the refusal of Poland and Romania to let Russian troops through,” U recalls sadly. Churchill. - Poland’s position was as follows: “With the Germans we risk losing our freedom, and with the Russians our soul” (phrase of Marshal Rydz-Smigly). The situation with Poland was extremely dangerous for the USSR. A simple combination followed: Germany attacks Poland and defeats it. Great Britain, France and the USSR declare war on Germany. After this, the French and British hover around the German Siegfried defensive line, and the main battles unfold on the eastern front. After all the combinations of pacification, such a strategic trap seemed most likely. In fact, Poland fell into it just a month later.

On August 11, Stalin, having discussed the current situation at the Politburo, gave the go-ahead to strengthen contacts with Germany. He needed to stimulate his Western partners in this way. Let the allies know that they must hurry.

On August 14, Astakhov informed Schnurre that Molotov agreed to discuss improving relations and even the fate of Poland. Astakhov emphasized that “the emphasis in his instructions is on the word “gradually.”

On August 15, Ambassador Schulenburg received instructions from Ribbentrop to invite the Soviet side to accept a visit from a major German leader in the near future. This proposal should have been read to Molotov, but not given into his hands. If the case fails, the enemy should not receive the papers.

After listening to this proposal, Molotov agreed that speed was needed in this matter.

On August 17, Molotov told Schulenburg: “The Soviet government takes note of the statement of the German government about its real desire to improve political relations between Germany and the USSR...” But what followed was a list of past grievances. However, “since the German government is now changing its previous policy,” it must first prove the seriousness of its intentions and conclude economic agreements: allocating a loan of 200 million marks to the Soviet Union for seven years (no one will remember about it in 1946), supply of valuable equipment. First - contracts, then - everything else. But the next step is to conclude a non-aggression pact or confirm the old neutrality treaty of 1926. And, finally, the most delicious thing: “with the simultaneous signing of a protocol that will determine the interests of the signatory parties in a particular foreign policy issue and which will be an integral part of the pact.” . In this protocol, everything can be stipulated, including the attitude towards Poland, for which the Germans fenced the whole garden. Less than two weeks remained before the planned German attack on Poland. But there was no talk about the division of spheres of influence and the secrecy of the protocol.

Despite the cool and arrogant tone of the Soviet statement, the ice continued to melt. Molotov was pleased with the Germans' proposal to send not a minor official, like the British, but a minister.

The minister himself immediately sent Schulenburg to Molotov again, this time with a draft pact, simple to the point of primitiveness: “The German state and the USSR undertake under no circumstances to resort to war and to refrain from any violence against each other.” The second point provided for the immediate entry into force of the pact and its long life - 25 years. The USSR and Germany were not supposed to fight until 1964. In a special protocol (there was no talk about secrecy), Ribbentrop proposed to carry out “coordination of spheres of interests in the Baltic, the problems of the Baltic states,” etc. This was the first time the topic of “delimitation of spheres” was heard from Ribbentrop’s mouth interests” (formula borrowed from G. Wilson). But so far it’s completely vague.

Appearing to Molotov, Schulenburg received another answer: if economic agreements are signed today, then Ribbentrop can arrive in a week - on August 26 or 27. It was too late for the Germans - just these days they planned to attack Poland. In addition, Molotov was surprised by the amateurishly drawn up draft of the pact. Soviet statesmen, who have already moved far from their revolutionary youth, are accustomed to working more solidly. They suggested that the Germans take one of the already concluded pacts as a basis and draw up a draft as expected, with several articles adopted in diplomatic terms. To Schulenburg’s proposal to move up the dates of Ribbentrop’s visit, “Molotov objected that even the first stage - the completion of economic negotiations - had not yet been completed.” It was three o'clock in the afternoon on August 19, 1939.

Half an hour passed, and Schulenburg was called to Molotov again. Clearly something happened. It turns out that after the meeting with the ambassador, Molotov had the opportunity to make a report to the “Soviet government.” Probably, we are talking not only about Stalin, but also about the Politburo, with whose members Stalin discussed the new situation: Western partners continue to play appeasement and lead the USSR by the nose, while the Nazis offer lasting peace and almost an alliance. It is impossible to delay any further; Nazi Germany is about to attack Poland. It's time to somehow decide.

At the second meeting with Molotov on August 19, Schulenburg received a draft non-aggression pact, drawn up according to all the rules of diplomatic science. There was only one thing missing - the usual indication for the “Litvinov’s” pacts that the document loses force in the event of aggression by one of the parties against a third state. Stalin and Molotov understood perfectly well why Hitler needed the pact. But they also knew that Great Britain and France were pushing Hitler east, that they had surrendered their ally Czechoslovakia to Hitler, and that Poland had recently discussed joint action with Germany against the USSR.

That same evening, Soviet diplomats received orders not to slow down economic negotiations.

On the night of August 20, trading - loan agreement was signed. The USSR received 200 million marks, with which it could buy German equipment and pay off debts with supplies of raw materials and food.

On 20 August, Hitler, risking his prestige, sent a personal message to Stalin to encourage his new partner to accept Ribbentrop on 22 or 23 August. In his letter, Hitler accepted the Soviet draft pact and warned his colleague about the impending clash between Germany and Poland - there was little time left.

If Stalin had rejected the rapprochement, Hitler had a different foreign policy strategy in reserve.

“On August 21, London was asked to receive Goering on August 23 for negotiations, and Moscow - Ribbentrop to sign a non-aggression pact. Both the USSR and England agreed,” writes historian M.I. Meltyukhov. Hitler chose the USSR, canceling Goering's flight on August 22 (in London, this trouble became known only after the signing of the Soviet-German Pact).

Having received Hitler's letter, Stalin gave the command to Voroshilov, and on August 21 he read a statement to the Western military missions, which stated that negotiations could be resumed as soon as the issue of allowing troops through the territory of Poland and Romania was resolved.

Since Poland, with its disagreement on the passage of troops, blocked military negotiations in Moscow, the conclusion of an Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance in the near future became impossible.

On 21 August, Stalin thanked Hitler for the letter, expressed hope that the pact would be "a turning point in the improvement of political relations between our countries", and agreed to Ribbentrop's arrival on 23 August. This day was destined to become historic.

When Hitler learned that Ribbentrop could go to Moscow on August 23, he exclaimed: “This is one hundred percent victory! And although I never do this, now I will drink a bottle of champagne!”

Hitler said on August 22 that he was now afraid of only one thing: that “at the last moment some bastard will propose a mediation plan.” This meant Chamberlain.

If we consider the history of the diplomatic game of the end of 1938 - 1939 “step by step”, it is obvious that the three European centers - Germany, the USSR and the Entente - found themselves at an equal distance from each other. Each side tried to solve its problems by using one side against the other. The British calculation was based on the fact that Hitler could come to an agreement with Great Britain but could not with the USSR, the French calculation was based on the fact that Stalin could come to an agreement with Great Britain and France, but not with Hitler. Hitler's calculation was that the West would not decide to go to war, and therefore an agreement with Stalin was more important. If at the end of 1938 - the first half of 1939, the proposals of German officials to begin rapprochement with the USSR did not receive sufficient progress, then in July Germany began to persistently seek the conclusion of a Soviet-German pact. Stalin's calculation was based on the contradictions between two groups of imperialists. An agreement can be concluded with those who will give more for the USSR. Stalin knew very well what the alternative to the Soviet-German Pact was. Anglo-German Pact.

How to divide Europe?

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact does not paint Stalin's political biography. Hitler is the enemy of humanity, and Stalin divides Europe with him. Not good. An ideal event for myth-making. Stalin, therefore, is Hitler's accomplice in starting the Second World War. Even in textbooks you can now read that secret protocols provided for the division of Poland between Germany and the USSR and the seizure of the Baltic countries by the Soviet Union. However, this version needs, to put it mildly, clarification.

On August 23, arriving in Moscow, Ribbentrop received a cool reception, but at a very high level. Stalin personally participated in the negotiations, who did not support conversations about the “spirit of brotherhood” of the two peoples, but busily bargained.

The Soviet side accepted the German amendments to the draft pact, except for the pompous preamble about friendship.

In its final form, the pact provided:

“Both Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any violence, from any aggressive action and from any attack against each other, either individually or jointly with other powers.”

“In the event that one of the Contracting Parties becomes the object of military action by a third power, the Other Contracting Party will not support that power in any form.” The Germans corrected the Soviet project so that it did not matter who initiated the war.

Article 3 provided for mutual consultation on issues of mutual interest. Article 4 effectively annulled the Anti-Comintern Pact: “Neither of the Contracting Parties will participate in any grouping of powers that is directly or indirectly directed against the other party.” After this, the Anti-Comintern Pact had to be replaced by the Tripartite Pact, which was concluded in 1940. But the military convention of the USSR with Great Britain and France also became impossible.

Article 5 provided for commissions to settle disputes and disagreements. At the insistence of the Germans, the wording about a “friendly” exchange of views was included. At the proposal of the Germans, the agreement was concluded for 10 years and was supposed to come into effect immediately. As you can see, there is nothing criminal. This pact was ratified, entered into force and had legal consequences - until June 22, 1941.

Then the parties began dividing spheres of influence. Ribbentrop proposed a line west of the Curzon Line (declared the border of ethnic Poland in 1919), beyond which German troops did not intend to go in the event of war. The territory east of this line was recognized as the sphere of interests of the USSR. Ribbentrop suggested that the USSR control the fate of Finland and Bessarabia. It was decided to divide the Baltic states into spheres of interest: Estonia (the most dangerous direction of a possible attack on Leningrad) - the Soviet Union, Lithuania - Germany. A controversy has erupted over Latvia. Ribbentrop tried to “recapture” Libau and Vindava into the German sphere of influence, but these ports were needed by the Soviet Union, and Stalin knew that the agreement was more valuable to Hitler than the two ports and all of Latvia in addition. And so the Soviet sphere of influence was smaller than the possessions of the Russian Empire. Hitler did not become stubborn and gave up Latvia, informing Ribbentrop of his decision in Moscow.

However, if Stalin insisted on other demands, Hitler was ready to give in “right up to Constantinople and the straits.”

The secret protocol provided:

"1. In the event of territorial and political transformations in the areas belonging to the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania will be the line dividing the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR. In this regard, Lithuania’s interest in the Vilna region is recognized by both parties.” It follows from this phrase that we are not talking about eliminating the statehood of the listed countries.

"2. In the event of territorial and political transformations in areas belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR will be delimited approximately along the line of the Narev, Vistula and San rivers.

The question of whether it is desirable in the interests of both Parties to maintain the independence of the Polish state, and the boundaries of such a state, will only be finally decided by the course of future political events.

In any case, both Governments will resolve this issue through friendly agreement.” And this does not yet speak of the complete liquidation of the Polish state.

Germany's concessions in the Balkans were limited to the USSR's return of Bessarabia, which it already considered illegally occupied by Romania.

"3. Regarding South-Eastern Europe, the Soviet side indicated its interest in Bessarabia. The German side has clearly stated its complete political disinterest in these territories.”

After the signing of the documents, a weight was lifted from the shoulders of the negotiating participants - failure of the meeting would mean a strategic failure for both sides. The conversation went much more friendly.

During the conversation with Ribbentrop, “Stalin and Molotov made hostile comments on the behavior of the British military mission in Moscow, which had never told the Soviet government what it really wanted.” Ribbentrop, supporting the anti-English theme that was valuable to him, said that “England is weak and wants others to support her arrogant claims to world domination. Mister Stalin readily agreed with this... England still dominates the world... thanks to the stupidity of other countries, which always allowed themselves to be deceived. It is ridiculous, for example, that only a few hundred British rule India... Stalin further expressed the opinion that England, despite its weakness, would wage the war deftly and stubbornly.”

Talking to Ribbentrop, Stalin said that “there is a limit to his patience with Japanese provocations. If Japan wants war, it can have it." This was a signal for Tokyo, and it was heard there, especially since, coupled with the defeat of the 6th Japanese Army at Khalkhin - Gol, Stalin’s words sounded especially convincing. The command of the Kwantung Army, which allowed the operation, was removed.

Ribbentrop stated that "the Anti-Comintern Pact was in general directed not against the Soviet Union, but against the Western democracies." He even joked: “Stalin will still join the Anti-Comintern Pact.” It was a probe. In a year this possibility will be discussed more seriously.

Toasts at the banquet regarding the success of the event also played an important role. Stalin said: “I know how much German nation loves his leader, and that’s why I want to drink to his health.” Molotov and Ribbentrop drank to Stalin, and the Soviet premier specifically emphasized that the current change in the international situation began with Stalin’s speech at the congress, “which was correctly understood in Germany.” Molotov then developed this idea: “T. Stalin hit the nail on the head, exposing the machinations of Western European politicians seeking to pit Germany and Soviet Union" Now that the deed was done, it was possible, in order to praise the Leader, to interpret in this way a passage from Stalin’s speech about inter-imperialist contradictions. During the conversation, Stalin showed Ribbentrop that he was well aware of the German-British negotiations. When the minister mentioned another probe from the British, Stalin said: “We are apparently talking about Chamberlain’s letter, which Ambassador Henderson presented to the Fuhrer in Obersalzberg on August 23.”

The Soviet-German non-aggression pact, known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, was signed on the night of August 24, 1939 (the official date of its signing is considered to be the day the negotiations began - August 23).

This date has become one of the milestones in world history, and disputes about the Pact divide historians, and educated people in general, by ideological barriers. For some, the Pact is a necessary measure to protect the country from Hitler’s attack: “The Soviet-German non-aggression treaty helped strengthen security not only on the western borders of the USSR, but also led to the stabilization of the situation on the eastern borders of the country.” I am deliberately quoting a monograph that was published not in 1947 or 1977, but in 1997.

For others, the Pact is a crime that doomed the peoples of Europe to be divided between two totalitarian regimes. According to a typical assessment expressed by S.Z. Incidentally, the Pact “gave the aggressor complete freedom of action,” and in the secret protocol “recorded an agreement between the two aggressive states on territorial and political reorganization and division of spheres of interests in Eastern Europe, the first victim of which was to be Poland.”

Summing up the conclusion of the Pact between the USSR and Germany, Churchill asserts that “only totalitarian despotism in both countries could decide on such an odious unnatural act.” The politician here clearly prevailed over the historian, as often happens in Churchill's narrative. He “forgot” that just a year earlier the states of the West, which Churchill did not at all consider totalitarian and despotic, committed an even more “odious and unnatural act” in Munich.

Today, at the beginning of the 21st century, it is already possible to emerge from the captivity of the ideological battles of the mid-century and look at the pre-war period with a calmer look. How do we judge the Napoleonic wars, which did not interfere with the development of Soviet-French relations in the second half of the 20th century? This was in the last century. A calm look will help you more accurately assess the logic of events, which is necessary so as not to repeat history as a new tragedy.

First of all, the question arises: did the Pact predetermine the division of Eastern Europe? I. Fleischhauer, with her usual scientific meticulousness, proposes to draw a “distinction between the legitimate interest of the Soviet side in achieving a (defensive) non-aggression agreement, on the one hand, and actual entry into an (offensive in its consequences) alliance with the aim of dividing (by military means) the spheres of political influence - on the other." If we separate these concepts, then Stalin agreed to the first on August 19 (four days before the signing of the pact), and to the second - after the start of the German-Polish war, when it became clear that Great Britain and France did not provide effective assistance to allied Poland, dooming it to defeat This was already a new situation compared to August 23. When concluding a pact with Germany, Stalin had to take into account the various possibilities that flowed from it. A German-Polish agreement could have taken place under pressure from Great Britain and France, a new Munich with the participation of the USSR. After the German attack on Poland, the effective offensive on the Western Front at the time of the German attack on Poland, which would have pulled Hitler’s forces to the west and saved the Poles from quick defeat. Each of these options was more beneficial to the USSR than the situation in July and especially March 1939, and it was not excluded at all by the Pact.

Based on the multivariate nature of events, M.I. Meltyukhov believes: “As for the secret protocol to the Soviet-German Pact, this document is also quite amorphous in nature. It does not record any anti-Polish agreements between the parties... As we see, the entire “anti-Polish” content of the document consists of endless reservations - “if only” and abstract concepts of “sphere of interests”, “territorial and political reorganization”. In any case, the Soviet-German agreement did not provide for any real territorial changes or occupation of “spheres of interest.” This is, of course, not true. The anti-Polish agreements were recorded at least by the fact that demarcation lines were drawn across the territory of Poland. But we can agree with M.I. Meltyukhov, that non-specificity is the fundamental difference between the Soviet-German Pact and the Munich Pact. But the concept of “sphere of interests” meant the USSR’s use of methods of colonial diplomacy familiar to Great Britain, France and Germany. It is true that the Pact left Hitler open to both military and Munich solutions. But all these decisions (including those that could have been taken together with the USSR and Great Britain) were anti-Polish. The pact closed the possibility of German-Polish rapprochement at the expense of the USSR. But by doing this, he made inevitable the reduction of the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, “territorial and political reorganization,” which in no way corresponded to its interests.

Trying to protect the USSR from accusations of aggressive intentions, V.Ya. Sipols states: “the USSR did not lay claim to any sphere of interests in Poland.” Here's your time! But this is directly written down in the protocol. According to V.Ya. Sipols, Stalin was forced to accept Nazi formulations because there was no time to redo them. As we have seen, the negotiators had enough time not only to agree on numerous formulations, but also to thoroughly bargain over areas of interest that were not “claimed” by the USSR.

From the very beginning of the existence of the Bolshevik dictatorship, it, like any bureaucratic dictatorship, was concerned with expanding its “sphere of influence,” even if this sphere extended to the formally independent Mongolia or the territory of China or Spain occupied by unreliable allies. In this respect, the USSR differed from Great Britain in its smaller scope, and from Germany in its less cynicism. But both gradually came with the growth of the military-industrial power of the communist bureaucracy. The pact allowed the USSR to enter the circle of “great powers” ​​that controlled the destinies of Europe.

Was there an alternative to the Pact and what exactly was it? There are almost always alternatives in history. But not all of them lead to better consequences.

The Soviet powers insist that there is no alternative to the Pact. Liberal-Western literature proves the possibility of continuing negotiations on the Anglo-Franco-Soviet union. As we have seen, the success of these negotiations was impossible in the days remaining before Hitler's planned attack on Poland. Chamberlain, in fact, blocked rapprochement with the USSR.

M.I. Semiryaga offers three alternatives to the Pact. The first way: delaying negotiations with Germany while continuing negotiations with the British and French. We saw that this was fraught, first of all, with an Anglo-German agreement or the involvement of the USSR in a German-Polish clash without the possibility of providing Poland with effective assistance in the first days of the war (and then this would push the USSR into the strategic trap described above). The second way: if Great Britain, France and Poland would not agree to a reasonable compromise with the USSR, still conclude an agreement with Germany, including in it the right to annul the agreement in the event of German aggression against a third country. But what does “if” have to do with it? Poland was not going to change its position. Consequently, negotiations with Germany are proposed on terms that are unacceptable to it (why would Hitler need a pact that would be broken on September 1?). This is the same first way of “delaying”. Both first paths lead to the third path - do not enter into agreements with anyone. In this case, according to M.I. Semiryagi, “The Soviet Union would maintain a truly neutral status, gaining as much time as possible to better prepare for a future inevitable war.” This logic is strikingly reminiscent of the justifications of Soviet ideologists regarding the Pact. He helped delay the war. Only the Semiryagi option is obviously weaker, since it leaves ample opportunity for an anti-Soviet Anglo-German rapprochement at the expense of the USSR, a new Munich and with the full force of German aggression turning to the east. However, M.I. himself Semiryaga crosses out all three of his alternatives to the Pact with the following statement: “Of course, one could count on such alternative solutions only if one was confident that Germany, in the absence of an agreement with the USSR, would not attack Poland.” Obviously, no one could give such guarantees. But if Germany had not attacked Poland, it could have come to an agreement with the West, which would have been no better for the USSR. Thus, the reasoning of M.I. Semiryags in support of “alternatives” rather convince of the justification of the Pact.

There was an alternative to signing the Pact. But, as we have seen, this was not the conclusion of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance. Before Germany attacked Poland there was no chance of this. And after the attack by the USSR, it was unprofitable to enter into a war that begins with the defeat of one of the allies. The USSR could remain neutral and not take part in the division of Poland. This meant a return to the foreign policy situation of 1927–1933. and the end of 1938, going on the defensive in anticipation of the clash of “imperialist predators” leading to revolutions. But in the first years of the war, nothing conducive to revolutions happened. Therefore, the “silent defense” strategy was very risky. The timing of the attack on the USSR was left to the enemy. The moment of the outbreak of the Soviet-German war could be postponed for several years - until Hitler dealt with France and Great Britain. And then the USSR would be left alone with fascist Europe and Japan united by Hitler, relying on the resources of China and India.

Stalin preferred another option, which stemmed from traditional European policy - participation in the partitions, strengthening his strategic positions before a future clash. The specificity of the 20th century was that the struggle was not just for the Polish or even French inheritance, but for the inheritance of the global market and the global system of colonial domination of the European powers. The fate of the entire world was at stake in the struggle of several bureaucracies, strengthened as a result of the exit industrial society to the state-monopoly level of development.

Did the Pact predetermine the outbreak of war in Europe?

Both Mussolini, Weizsäcker, and Schulenburg believed that the Pact would help achieve a new Munich. Now the British will become more accommodating. And the Poles have nothing to hope for. According to Weizsäcker, after the Pact, even Hitler “believes that the Poles will give in and again talks about a step-by-step solution. After the first stage, he believes, the British will refuse to support the Poles.” But the fascist leaders underestimated the self-confidence of Polish politicians. The Ambassador in Paris, J. Lukasiewicz, asserted: “It is not the Germans, but the Poles who will burst into the depths of Germany in the very first days of the war!”

Modern authors never cease to argue about the responsibility of the USSR for the start of the war. But very often the statements of the authors say more about them than about the situation in 1939. The statements that “the USSR sought to prevent the Second World War” are just as dictated by the ideology of the authors as the statement that “Stalin started the Second World War.” The first statement completely ignores the communist ideology to which Stalin was personally committed. For him, the war between the imperialists was a positive factor, since it weakened the enemy. It is important that the USSR is not drawn into war until the imperialists weaken each other. Already at the XVIII Congress it was calmly said that a new world war was already underway. At the same time, Stalin (unlike Chamberlain) perfectly understood the danger of Hitler's expansion and preferred, until August 1939, to restrain it by all possible methods, including force. When the actions of the heroes of Munich showed Stalin that it would not be possible to prevent Hitler’s seizure of Poland, the leader of the USSR chose to isolate himself from Hitler’s expansion at least for a while. Whether there will be a war outside his sphere of influence or not is a matter for Hitler and Chamberlain. Hitler and Chamberlain preferred war, which did not upset Stalin, although he was not the initiator of this decision. It was necessary to develop our strategy in the face of the inevitable prospect of a clash with Hitler.

Great Britain and Germany continued to seek peace with Germany not only after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, but also after they declared war on Germany on September 3. This explains their deception of the Polish allies. Promising that an Anglo-French offensive would begin that would crush Germany, the French limited themselves to maneuvers and took cover behind the Maginot Line. The French and English valued the lives of their compatriots too much to put them in danger.

A stab in the back or a liberation campaign?

We know that on September 17, the USSR intervened in the German-Polish war. The Poles repelled the blow of Hitler's aggression, and the Red Army struck the Polish Army in the rear. This is what predetermined Hitler's victory. The “fourth partition of Poland” was completed.

The answer to this is: nothing to worry about. Everything is fine. There was no Soviet aggression against Poland. There was a “liberation campaign,” or, in other words, a “peacekeeping operation.”

However, Stalin attached great importance to not interfering in the Second World War. Moreover, the Germans were not confident that the Soviet invasion of Poland would take place, since it was not directly provided for by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, but only implied.

On September 3, Ribbentrop ordered Schulenburg to inform Molotov: “it is clear that for military reasons we will then have to act against those Polish military forces that by that time will be in Polish territories within the Russian sphere of influence.” It was important to find out “whether the Soviet Union would not consider it desirable for the Russian army to move at this moment against the Polish forces in the Russian sphere of influence and, for its part, to occupy this territory.” For Germany, the USSR's attack on Poland in the first week of the war was extremely important. This could drag the USSR into a war against Great Britain and France, and at the same time deprive Poland of hopes for long-term resistance. In the face of a Soviet invasion, the Allies would not attack the Siegfried Line, and as a last resort it would be possible to quickly transfer Wehrmacht units from Poland to the west, ceding the honor of storming Warsaw to the Russians. Ribbentrop did not yet know that Poland's allies would not make any attempts to help her anyway, and Germany had nothing to fear.

However, Stalin was in no hurry to get his piece of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and thus reunite Belarus and Ukraine.

On September 7, in a conversation with leaders of the Comintern, Stalin characterized the conflict that had begun as a war between two groups of imperialist powers. Stalin spoke of Poland as a fascist state, which was no better than the Germany that attacked him. Hence the conclusion: “What would be bad if, as a result of the defeat of Poland, we extended the socialist system to new territories and populations.” The Cominternists had to not only intensify the fight against Western governments, but be ready in due time to intensify the fight against the Nazis. “We wouldn’t mind them having a good fight and weakening each other... Hitler, without knowing it, is frustrating and undermining the capitalist system.”

In order not to be drawn into a war of two blocs on the side of Germany, Stalin decided to wait for now, citing the unpreparedness of the Red Army: “The Red Army was counting on several weeks, which have now been reduced to several days,” Molotov explained to Schulenburg the delay in bringing Soviet troops into the “sphere” interests of the USSR." In fact, with the introduction of the law on universal conscription on September 1, the USSR could carry out unlimited mobilization. On September 6, 2.6 million people were called up in the western military districts. The concentration of Soviet troops was scheduled for September 11.

While there was no clarity with the position of the USSR, the German command was considering the option of creating a puppet Ukrainian state in the Soviet sphere of influence with the help of the OUN.

The USSR was also going to play the Ukrainian card (together with the Belarusian one), and in a way that was offensive to Germany. Molotov told Schulenburg: the Soviet government intends to declare “that Poland is falling apart and that as a result the Soviet Union must come to the aid of the Ukrainians and Belarusians who are “threatened” by Germany. This pretext will make the intervention of the Soviet Union seem plausible in the eyes of the masses and will enable the Soviet Union not to look like an aggressor.” It turned out that the USSR still considered Germany an aggressor. Under pressure from the Germans, the statement about the threat on their part had to be replaced with a pacifist thesis about the threat of war for the civilian population of Ukraine and Belarus.

When everything was ready for a strike from the east, on September 14, Pravda issued a programmatic article on the reasons for Poland’s defeat, where it exposed the oppressive policy of the Polish leadership towards national minorities. And the conclusion: “ Multinational state“, not sealed by the bonds of friendship and equality of the peoples inhabiting it, but, on the contrary, based on the oppression and inequality of national minorities, cannot represent a strong military force.”

Subsequently, official propaganda will declare the last Soviet-Polish war a “peaceful liberation campaign.” But the troops who were preparing for the “peaceful campaign” had no illusions - a “revolutionary, just war” was ahead.

On September 16, the German pincers closed in at Brest, Poland was defeated. At the same time, a Soviet-Japanese agreement was concluded to resolve the border dispute at Khalkhin-Gol. Now Stalin decided that the time had come to get “his part” of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. On September 7, the USSR army crossed the border. The Polish ambassador in Moscow was handed a note with an official explanation of Soviet actions: “Warsaw as the capital of Poland no longer exists. The Polish government has collapsed and shows no signs of life. This means that the Polish state and its government have virtually ceased to exist.” In reality, the government continued to live and work in Kolomyia near the Romanian border. The arguments used were those introduced into diplomatic circulation by Chamberlain after the collapse of Czechoslovakia. If the state has collapsed, then the agreements with it are no longer valid: “Thereby, the agreements concluded between the USSR and Poland ceased to be valid.” This was the main thesis for the sake of which it was necessary to report the “disappearance” of the Polish government. Next, the key security motives for Soviet foreign policy propaganda came into force: “Left to itself and left without leadership, Poland turned into a convenient field for all sorts of accidents and surprises that could pose a threat to the USSR. Therefore, being hitherto neutral, the Soviet government cannot be more neutral in its attitude towards these facts.” This meant that the USSR was leaving the regime of neutrality, that is, in fact, entering the war. “The Soviet government cannot also be indifferent to the fact that half-blooded Ukrainians and Belarusians living on the territory of Poland, abandoned to the mercy of fate, remain defenseless.” “In view of this situation, the Soviet government ordered the High Command of the Red Army to order the troops to cross the border and take under their protection the lives and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus.” This was an important turn in Soviet ideology, which became a new stage in the long evolution from international to national priorities. If earlier the USSR planned to “liberate” and “protect” all peoples, now only those that already had their own territorial entities within the USSR. This emphasis does not fit into the myth that Stalin sought above all to restore the Russian Empire. It is important for Stalin to take Galicia, inhabited by Ukrainians, which was not part of the Russian Empire, but he will easily give up the Polish lands themselves, which were previously part of the Russian Empire. Stalin did not become a greater nationalist because of this, but was guided by pragmatic considerations. Divided nations are sources of conflict. So it is better to liberate them entirely (as the Poles would see in 1944–1945). In 1939, the ideological transition took place gradually, especially since part of the territories populated predominantly by Poles remained in the Soviet sphere of influence: “At the same time, the Soviet government intends to take all measures to rescue the Polish people from the ill-fated war into which they were plunged by their foolish leaders, and give him the opportunity to live a peaceful life.”

Speaking on the radio, Molotov argued even more harshly: “The Polish ruling circles have gone bankrupt... the population of Poland has been abandoned by its hapless leaders to the mercy of fate.”

The Soviet group entered Poland - 617 thousand soldiers and 4,736 tanks. It was then increased to 2.4 million people with 6096 tanks. Such an army could resist not only the Poles, but, if something happened, also the Germans.

"Political and military leadership Poland never expected open military intervention from the USSR.” For some time it was not even clear on which side the Soviet troops were going to act - the tank columns marched in marching order, the tankers sat on the towers with open hatches, greeting the population.

Rydz-Smigly gave the order: “The Soviets have invaded. I order the withdrawal to Romania and Hungary by the shortest routes. Do not conduct hostilities with the Soviets, only in the event of an attempt on their part to disarm our units. The task for Warsaw and Modlin, which must defend themselves from the Germans, remains unchanged. Units approached by the Soviets must negotiate with them in order to withdraw garrisons to Romania or Hungary.”

General W. Anders believed that the Red Army struck “when we could still resist for some time and give the Allies the opportunity to strike at Germany’s open borders.” This point of view has become practically official in Poland. Responding to her supporters, Russian historian M.I. Meltyukhov writes: “Particularly “convincing” are the statements regarding the intentions of Poland’s Western allies, who did not lift a finger to help her even when the Polish Army was still a significant force, let alone in mid-September, when the Polish front collapsed? .. By September 17, the Wehrmacht not only defeated the main groups of the Polish Army, but also surrounded almost all combat-ready units... Of course, if the Red Army had not entered Poland, the Germans would have needed some time to occupy its eastern voivodeships, but there was no real stable front there could not have arisen,” says M.I. Meltyukhov.

Could the Poles resist? In the end, of course not. But the front in the southwest of the country, which Rydz-Smigly planned, could be created. This would have made a big difference if the Allies did hit the Germans. But, as we know today, they did not intend to do this. Therefore, Poland was doomed in any case.

But in September 1939, the Polish leadership did not know that their struggle was doomed. Therefore, the Soviet blow finally destroyed the deceptive hopes for long-term resistance and caused such bitterness among the direct participants in the events.

Further Polish resistance became pointless. Late in the evening of September 17, the Polish government left the country.

Belarusian and Ukrainian fronts, covering the territory of the east of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from the north and south, met disproportionately less resistance than the Germans from the weak Polish forces still remaining in this region. The Polesie group chose to avoid the collision and went to the West. There is a real, albeit hopeless, war there. Here - it is unclear what and also without a chance of success.

Only in a few places did serious clashes take place - near Vilna, Grodno, Kozhan-Gorodok, Krasne, Sutkowice (where the Reds were confronted by General W. Anders, the future commander of the USSR-allied Polish army, who fought on the side of the British). Lviv found itself under attack from two armies - German and Soviet. There was obvious rivalry between them. It got to the point that on September 19, Soviet troops found themselves under crossfire between Poles and Germans. The Germans explained this as a misunderstanding. On September 20, the German command gave the order to withdraw troops from Lvov, which was in the Soviet sphere of influence, but German officers persuaded the Poles to the last: “If you surrender Lvov to us, you will remain in Europe, if you surrender to the Bolsheviks, you will become Asia forever.”

In the city of Brest, although it was in the Soviet sphere, but which was occupied by the Germans, when the German troops were replaced by Soviet ones, a parade of these two armies was held.

The Ukrainian and Belarusian population, dissatisfied with the policies of the Polish government, took to the streets in droves, demonstrating joy at the arrival of the Red Army. Some residents, of course, were not happy, but did not protest. On September 20, during the storming of Grodno, the local population helped the Soviet troops.

On September 19, a Soviet-German communique was published, in which the USSR was forced to put its armed forces on the same level as the Wehrmacht: “The task of these troops ... is to restore order and tranquility in Poland, disturbed by the collapse of their own state, and to help the population of Poland reorganize the conditions of its state existence." The fourth partition of Poland, in a word. But Stalin would like to partition not Poland itself, but the multinational Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth - to separate areas inhabited by Poles from areas inhabited by Belarusians and Ukrainians. Schulenburg was informed about this on September 19. On September 25, Stalin personally explained his motives to Schulenburg. The division of the Polish population itself could cause friction between the USSR and Germany. Therefore, it is possible to exchange the Polish part of the Soviet sphere of influence up to the Vistula for Lithuania.

Stalin kept silent about other motives. Without claiming to seize part of Poland, Stalin skillfully evaded accusations of aggression. The aggression was committed by Germany, and the USSR simply took under protection the peoples, most of whom live in the USSR. The Soviet Union is not making an attempt on the Poles. No oppression. The initial inclusion of part of Poland into the Soviet sphere of influence was necessary for Stalin in case events led to the preservation of Poland within reduced borders. Then this state would be dependent on both Germany and the USSR. Now such a need had disappeared, and Hitler could receive the laurels of the conqueror of Poland in full and with all the ensuing international consequences. Stalin's calculation turned out to be correct. Western countries chose not to consider the USSR an aggressor.

On September 28, Warsaw fell. On this day, Germany and the USSR entered into an agreement on friendship and borders. The parties proclaimed their desire to ensure “peace and order”, “peaceful coexistence of peoples” and divided the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth along a new line. Ribbentrop, who arrived in Moscow, received a warmer welcome than before, but bargaining continued for a long time. The stumbling block was the areas of Suwałki, the lower reaches of the San River and the Augustow Forests. The Germans needed timber and oil fields. Stalin referred to the fact that the territories were “promised to the Ukrainians.” In the end, they agreed to cut the disputed area of ​​the Augustow Forests in half. But the border in this place turned out to be very intricate. Since the Lithuanian territories of the Vilna region, occupied by Poland in 1920, were now transferred to Lithuania, they decided to cut off a small piece of Lithuanian territory in favor of Germany to straighten the border. Later, when the USSR became the patron of Lithuania, Soviet diplomacy did its best to delay the fulfillment of this promise, so as not to hurt the national feelings of the Lithuanians. In 1941, the USSR managed to resolve this issue by purchasing the “disputed” Lithuanian territory. And in September 1939, all of Lithuania “by exchange” fell into the Soviet sphere of influence.

The agreement excluded the intervention of third countries in deciding the fate of Poland. This concerned primarily Great Britain and France, who were still “fighting” on the side of Poland, although almost without firing shots. On September 29, a joint statement was published by the Soviet and German governments, which tied the USSR even more closely to Germany in confrontation with Western countries: “The elimination of a real war between Germany on the one hand and England and France on the other hand would meet the interests of all peoples.” If Germany and the USSR cannot persuade the West to agree to peace, then “the fact will be established that England and France are responsible for the continuation of the war...”.

The results of the Soviet-Polish war of 1939 and the Soviet-German Treaty of Friendship and Border still live on today - within the borders of the united Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania. There are no legal grounds for overturning these results - they were confirmed by agreements concluded after World War II. The results of World War II wrote off all the sins of the victors and their heirs, which are the former republics of the USSR.

When the deed was done, Molotov spoke on September 31 at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: “It turned out that a short blow to Poland, first from the German army, and then from the Red Army, was enough for nothing to remain of this ugly brainchild of the Versailles Treaty, which lived off the oppression of non-Polish nationalities." Thus, Molotov accepted the responsibility of the Red Army for the destruction of the Polish state. It is not surprising that the USSR gradually shifted from an equidistant position relative to the two warring coalitions towards the German side.

Molotov explained to the Soviet people: “Over the past few months, such concepts as “aggression”, “aggressor” have received new specific content and acquired a new meaning. It is not difficult to guess that now we cannot use these concepts in the same sense as, say, 3-4 months ago. Now, if we talk about the great powers of Europe, Germany is in the position of a state striving for a speedy end to the war and for peace, while England and France, which only yesterday stood up against aggression, stand for the continuation of the war and against the conclusion of peace. The roles, as you can see, are changing.”

Molotov’s “dialectical” reasoning is easily explained - the USSR easily fell under the old definition of an aggressor. Indeed, can the Soviet Union be considered an aggressor? Was there even a war? These questions are still controversial.

V. Sipols supports the traditional point of view of the CPSU that there was simply “the liberation of Ukrainian and Belarusian lands seized by Poland in 1920.” The word “liberation” in relation to these events is a purely ideological rudiment of the era of the Second World War. The residents of the “liberated” territories did not receive any additional freedom; they moved from the jurisdiction of one authoritarian state to the jurisdiction of another - a totalitarian one. Political oppression has become stronger, national oppression has weakened somewhat. Something similar happened in 1920, when Poland received its share during the division of the Russian Empire. Most of the boundaries that have existed from ancient times to the present day were drawn by force of arms. The word “liberation” in force actions of this kind symbolizes the triumph of one or another principle that is shared by the “liberator”. If earlier the Red Army understood by “liberation” primarily the overthrow of the capitalist system, then the national principle prevailed in ideology. Territories are “liberated” in favor of the Soviet Union because “consanguineous” residents live there.

In 1944–1945 the concept of “liberation” will again become international (up to the liberation of the Germans by the Red Army). For Stalin, this was a matter of principle.

The opposite “power”, but also ideologically driven point of view, is defended by those authors who claim that since September 1939, the USSR participated in the Second World War on the side of Germany. If the basis for such a conclusion were the participation of the USSR in the German-Polish war, then there would be reasons for their statement, but the participation of the USSR in the war would have to be considered as having ceased with the defeat of Poland. After all, the war was going on de facto, not de jure. Great Britain and France did not consider that the USSR entered their war with Germany in September 1939. Therefore, to confirm this ideological concept, it is necessary to prove that the USSR was a participant in the war in 1940. Here, supporters of the “military version” have much more difficulty with the facts. They propose to consider the USSR a participant in the war already due to the fact that it provided “aid” to Germany, which was expressed primarily in trade. But then Sweden (on the side of Germany), Finland (first on the side of Great Britain, and then Germany from the beginning of 1941), the USA and almost all countries of Latin America (on the side of Great Britain) will have to immediately be declared participants in the war. All of them traded with the warring parties, provided one or another military-technical support, although they did not send their soldiers to war and did not break off diplomatic relations with their friend’s enemy.

Participation in war is recorded either legally (declaration of war) or through the open participation of troops in hostilities. The rest is scholasticism.

The USSR struck a blow at the Polish state when its death was already a foregone conclusion. As a result of the division of the Polish state, the USSR included territories populated mainly by Ukrainians and Belarusians. Great Britain and France did not regard the actions of the USSR as interference in their war with Germany. If we remain on the basis of historical science, the USSR entered the world war on June 22, 1941.

June 22, 1941 fascist Germany, treacherously violating the non-aggression treaty, without declaring war, attacked the Soviet Union. This is how the USSR found itself drawn into World War II. To strengthen this date, the so-called “pre-war period” (1939 – 1941) was invented. But the USSR entered the war much earlier.

The "pre-war period" never existed. Suffice it to remember that since 1939, all nearby countries became victims of Soviet aggression. In September 1939, the USSR declared itself neutral and during the “pre-war period” captured a territory with a population of more than 20 million. But the Red Army did not intend to stop its “liberation campaigns” there. After all, its goal is to establish the power of the proletariat throughout the world. The workers of capitalist countries saw their reliable support in the Red Army.

Let's figure it out. On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland. This date is considered the beginning of World War II, and Germany is considered to be the culprit in starting the war. The USSR did the same in the same month (September 17), but it is not considered to have entered World War II. What does it mean? Two countries attack a third, but only one is considered the aggressor. There is an answer to this: the Soviet Union did not start a war, it only took under its protection the lives and property of the inhabitants of Western Belarus, which Poland captured during the war of 1920-1921. An interesting point of view, but let's remember that the territory of Belarus has always been a bargaining chip during negotiations. First, in 1918 in Brest, Germany received a significant part of Western Belarus, while no one took into account the interests of the Belarusian people. Then in 1921, in Riga, the western territory of the BSSR was ceded to Poland, again without any agreement with the Belarusians. As we see, the Bolsheviks were not at all interested in the fate of these lands. In 1939, the head of the Soviet Union is Stalin, the same Stalin who went down in history as a bloody dictator, on whose orders millions of people were repressed (many of them never returned). It was he who doomed millions of his fellow citizens to starvation. Do you think this person could be concerned about the fate of the inhabitants of Western Belarus? Of course not. The seizure of these territories in 1939 had a completely different meaning.

But even if we do not take this into account, aggression against Poland was still carried out on September 17. Soviet troops entered the territory where Poles already lived, captured officers and privates, and destroyed local government bodies. The following situation arises: a Polish soldier killed by a Russian is considered a victim of the Second World War and a participant in it, but a Soviet soldier is not. If a Soviet soldier died in the same battle, then he was considered killed in the “pre-war period,” that is, in peacetime.

Germany captures Denmark in one day and fights in Norway and France. These actions are acts of World War II. The USSR without a fight seizes the Baltic states: Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, demands and receives a piece of the territory of Romania: Bessarabia and Bukovinia, sheds rivers of blood in Finland. But the Soviet Union is not considered a participant in World War II. Why? In the fierce battles of the “pre-war period,” the USSR lost more soldiers than Germany, even the Nazis had a better chance of declaring themselves neutral. The actions of the Soviet Union are called the term “strengthening the security of the western borders” (it was under this slogan that the war against Finland began). Of course this is not true. The borders of the USSR were safe as long as it was surrounded by neutral states, as long as there were no common borders with aggressive and warlike Germany. In addition, we can apply this term in relation to Germany: it also strengthened its borders.

So, June 22 is not the date of entry into the war. The true date must be considered the moment when the Second World War became inevitable.

On September 1, 1939, Germany began the war against Poland. On September 1, 1939 in Moscow, the 4th extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the Law on General Military Duty.

The law established: “All men - citizens of the USSR, without distinction of race, nationality, religion, educational qualifications, social origin and position, are obliged to serve military service as part of armed forces THE USSR". Those who had reached the age of 19 were called up for active service (those who graduated from high school - from the age of 18). The terms of service for privates and junior command personnel increased in the ground forces and aviation to three years, and in the navy to five years. At the same time, the terms of service for middle and senior command personnel were significantly reduced to accumulate a reserve of command personnel. By law of 1939, the period of stay in the reserve was increased by 10 years.

Amazing thing. While they were fighting the fascists in Spain and Hitler was considered one of the main opponents, the law was not needed. But once the Pact “On Friendship and Mutual Assistance” is signed, universal conscription is indispensable.

When asked why the Soviet Union needed universal conscription, they answer: “On this day the Second World War began.” Allegedly, the USSR did not intend to take part in the war, but took precautionary measures. Strange: in 1939 the war was foreseen, but in 1941 it came as a complete surprise But let's go back to 1939 and try to get an answer to the question: “Who knew that World War II began on September 1, 1939?”

What Britain and France didn't know that day was that they would declare war on Germany on September 3rd. They didn’t know this in the USA either: newspapers of those years wrote only about the German-Polish war and did not consider it a world war even after Great Britain and France entered it. Hitler himself did not know that World War II had begun. By attacking Poland, he was counting on a local conflict, as in the case of Czechoslovakia. A war with Great Britain requires a powerful fleet, but this did not exist in Germany. German leaders expected to be ready for war in the mid-forties. But the war broke out earlier, in 1939, and the Nazis did not have time to do practically anything to strengthen their fleet.

On September 1, Western countries did not know that World War II had begun, but the deputies of the Supreme Council were sure: it was not a provocation, not a conflict, not a Polish-German or even a European war. And therefore they urgently need to gather in Moscow and take appropriate measures. But not everyone lives close by. Some need one to two weeks to get to Moscow. This means that someone even before September 1 gave them the signal to gather, someone already knew then that the Second World War would begin. This someone is famous.

We can say that the Soviet Union started an undeclared war on August 19, 1939. And that's why.

During the Civil War, the Red Army grew. Some divisions were killed, others were created, but the total number was constantly increasing. The Red Army reached the peak of its power by the beginning of 1920: 64 rifle and 14 cavalry divisions.

After the Soviet-Polish War, the size of the Red Army decreased sharply (from 5.5 million in 1920 to 516 thousand in 1923, that is, more than ten times), but the number of rifle divisions increased. This is quite understandable: there are divisions, but the soldiers were sent home: in 1928, about 70 percent of the rifle troops consisted of Red Army soldiers, who were in their units only for short periods, and the rest of the time they lived at home and did ordinary work. Such parts were called territorial millionths. Under these conditions, the creation of a new division did not mean large expenses: assigning a number, receiving a banner and creating a headquarters.

In 1923, the 100th division was formed, with its number it seemed to emphasize the upper limit: both in peacetime and in war time so many rifle divisions were quite enough. In the 20s and 30s, there were no divisions with a higher number in the Red Army.

September 1, 1939 German army attacked Poland, and this date is officially considered the beginning of the Second World War. This event is so terrible and tragic that everything else that happened that day was overshadowed. Meanwhile, it was from that day that the process of filling and forming new divisions with numbers 101, 102, 103, 120, 130 and so on began.

Example: 1 Proletarian Rifle Division. In September 1939, the division headquarters was reorganized into the corps headquarters. Two regiments from the division were converted into the 115th and 126th rifle divisions and transferred to the western border. And another regiment was left in Moscow and a new 1st Proletarian Rifle Division was formed on its base. There was one division - now there are three, and also the administration of the rifle corps. This is exactly what was done in other places: regiments turned into divisions, divisions into corps.

But in September the divisions had already been created, and before they were created it was necessary to issue an order for the formation of new combat units. Studying the history of the creation of units of the Red Army, we discover one amazing fact: all the newly appeared Soviet divisions were formed in accordance with the order of August 19, 1939. Here are some examples:

Colonel N.I. Byuryukov (later Major General) on August 19, 1939 became commander of the 186th Infantry Division.

Brigade commander P. S. Pshennikov (later lieutenant general) on August 19 became commander of the 142nd Infantry Division.

Colonel J. G. Keyser (later an army general) became commander of the 172nd Infantry Division that day.

Brigade commander I.F. Dashichev (later major general) became commander of the 47th Rifle Corps, included in the 9th Army.

Colonel S.S. Biryuzov (later Marshal of the Soviet Union) on August 19 became commander of the 132nd Infantry Division.

Brigade commander A.D. Berezkin (major general since 1940) was appointed commander of the 119th Infantry Division 2 that day.

Komkor F.I. Golikov (later Marshal of the Soviet Union) in August 1939 received an order to form the 6th Army. Not only divisions and corps, but also armies were formed at that time. By September 17, the 6th Army was completed and participated in the liberation of Western Ukraine.

These examples are enough to understand: on August 19, 1939, Stalin ordered the doubling of the number of rifle divisions. There were already more of them than in any other army in the world. Doubling meant that the pre-mobilization period was completed and mobilization had begun. Simultaneously with the increase in rifle divisions, they were fully manned. Until 1939, all divisions turned into personnel divisions (unlike territorial police, soldiers were permanently in the divisions).

About five years ago, a unique document was declassified and published in Moscow - the text of Stalin’s speech at a Politburo meeting on August 19, 1939. Quote from the speech: “The question of peace or war is entering a critical phase for us,” said the leader. “If we conclude a treaty of mutual assistance with France and Great Britain, Germany will abandon Poland and begin to look for a way to coexist with the Western powers. War will be averted, but V further events may take on a dangerous character for the USSR... Western Europe will be subject to serious unrest and disorder. Under these conditions, we will have many chances to stay out of the conflict, and we can hope to enter the war at a favorable moment for us". The experience of the last five decades, Stalin further said, teaches that in peaceful conditions the seizure of power by the Communists in Western Europe is impossible. Quote: "The dictatorship of the Communist Party becomes possible only as a result of a big war... We must accept the German proposal (on sending Ribbentrop to Moscow) and politely send back the Anglo-French mission. We will make our choice, and it is clear. The first advantage we will gain will be the destruction of Poland right up to the very approaches to Warsaw, including Ukrainian Galicia... Germany gives us complete freedom of action in the Baltic countries." The Germans also have nothing against the return of Bessarabia to the USSR. Germany is ready to provide the Soviet Union with spheres of influence in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Only the question of Yugoslavia remains open. One should think about the consequences of a German victory or German defeat in the coming war, Stalin continued. A German defeat will inevitably lead to the "Sovietization" of Germany, and in the event of a German victory, Germany will be forced to control a huge territory and suppress both England and France. At the same time, Moscow will turn the peoples subordinate to Germany into its allies, and thereby provide a wide field of activity for the world revolution. And finally, quote: " Comrades! It is in the interests of the USSR that war breaks out between the Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French bloc. Everything must be done to ensure that this war lasts as long as possible in order to exhaust the two sides."Stalin repeats this thesis several times in his speech.

This was the main outline of the speech. As we can see, it is permeated with two main ideas: about the possibility of external expansion provided by the treaty (and not a word is said about the fact that changing borders is necessary to strengthen the country’s defense capability), and especially the idea of ​​​​the need to contribute in every possible way to the outbreak of a European war. Available evidence suggests that the Soviet Union's invasion of Europe would have begun in the summer of 1941.

June 22 is simply the day the German armed forces began their offensive against the armed forces of the Soviet Union, already during a war in which both states have been participating for a long time.

On August 19, 1939, Europe was still living a peaceful life, and Stalin had already made a decision and launched the mobilization machine into an irreversible movement, which in any case and in any international situation made the Second World War completely inevitable.

“I would like to remind you once again that the Soviet Union entered World War II not on June 22, 1941, but on September 17, 1939. It seems to me that we should not forget this,” writes Tamara Natanovna Eidelman, a history teacher at one of the Moscow schools.

The old song is that the USSR was the aggressor in World War II, Stalin was “Hitler’s ally,” and that means we got June 22 rightly so. In propaganda publications, one can, of course, write anything, even that Luna was founded by the first hetmans of Ukraine in the 10th millennium BC. But what is allowed to a careless schoolchild or teacher is still a little indecent.

The Second World War was a war of two coalitions, one of which is traditionally called the “Axis”, the core of which was Nazi Germany, which was gradually joined by Italy, Japan and other countries. The other in our and world historiography is traditionally called the “Allies” - the basis of this coalition was the Anglo-French alliance, which in September 1939 declared war on Germany after its attack on Poland. These allies were also gradually joined by other countries, of which by 1945 there were very, very many.

The Second World War was a war of these two coalitions - the Allies and the Axis. And to enter this war it was necessary to be in a state of war with one of the sides and join the other. In order to enter the war on September 17, 1939, the Soviet Union had to be at war with either Germany or England-France-Poland. But neither one nor the other happened.

Yes, the USSR sent its troops into Polish territory (most of it, however, was captured from Russia after the Soviet-Polish war of 1920, according to the Riga Peace Treaty). But the Soviet government justified these actions by the collapse of Polish statehood and the cessation of the functioning of the Polish government, which by that time had moved to Romania. Neither the Soviet Union declared war on Poland, nor Poland, although its officials called the USSR's actions an act of violence and a violation international law, did not declare war on the USSR. Moreover, many Poles viewed the actions of the USSR as an attempt to limit the area occupied by Germany and, at least at first, welcomed the actions of the Soviet government.

Moreover, the British and French did not plan to declare war on the USSR. The pragmatic motivation for the actions of the Soviet government after the defeat of Poland by Germany was obvious and did not in any way dispose the allies to push the Soviet Union to the Axis side by declaring war or making any unfriendly steps. On September 18, 1939, the British cabinet stated that British guarantees for Poland apply only to the threat from Germany and there are no reasons to aggravate Soviet-British relations. Therefore, not even a protest was sent to the Soviet Union. Moreover, part of the allied press began to express the opinion that the establishment of a line of contact between the Soviet Union and Germany would inevitably bring the clash of these powers closer and objectively contribute to the entry of the USSR into the Allied camp.

Of course, the Allied camp at that moment did not know about the secret agreements between the USSR and Germany attached to the non-aggression pact, but it is extremely doubtful that these agreements, even if they were known, would have pushed the British and French to declare war on the USSR.

Thus, no entry of the USSR into World War II on September 17, 1939 occurred. The Soviet Union did not find itself in a state of war either with Germany, with which it maintained secret agreements on a number of issues (but there was no general alliance between the countries), nor with the Allies, who did not consider the actions of the USSR towards Poland a casus belli, or even with Poland itself , which, having been defeated, had neither the desire nor the ability to complicate its position by declaring war on the USSR.

Not being at war with any of the parties to the world conflict, the USSR was, of course, not a participant in World War II, regardless of what military actions it carried out separately. Just like Japan, although continuously fighting in China, did not become a participant in World War II until December 7, 1941, when it attacked the United States and Great Britain. And no matter how monstrous a crime the Nanjing Massacre was, it cannot be considered “one of the crimes of the Second World War.”

It would make sense for a history teacher to remember this, without accustoming either schoolchildren or readers to arbitrary interpretations of dates and facts. Moreover, if we leave chronological boundaries to the imagination of the creative imagination, then there is no reason to start the Second World War on September 1, 1939. Why not start it with the Anschluss of Austria? Or from the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia? And then, for example, Poland has been a participant in this war since September 30, 1938, when it annexed the Cieszyn region from Czechoslovakia? You can move the historical framework for a long time and with passion, although all this will have very little relation to science.

World War II began on September 1, 1939, and ended on September 2, 1945. And the USSR joined it on June 22, 1941, when Germany declared war on us and the Great Patriotic War began.

The Soviet Union entered World War II as an ally of Germany. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact helped to regain what was lost due to the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of 1918. If you read the recording of Molotov’s conversation with Schulenburg, it becomes clear that Hitler was ready to go to great lengths to “appease” the Soviet Union. The pact itself, in its original version, consisted of only two points.

• 1) the German government and the Soviet government undertake in no case to resort to war or other methods of using force;
• 2) this agreement comes into force immediately and is valid without denunciation for 25 years.

Molotov, having heard this option, was very surprised by its brevity. Schulenburg said that Hitler was ready to take into account everything the USSR wanted. Molotov asks whether the desire of the German government to speed up real negotiations can be explained by the fact that the German government is interested in issues of German-Polish relations, in particular Danzig. Schulenburg answers in the affirmative, adding that these are the questions that are the starting point if one wants to take into account the interests of the USSR before the onset of events. The draft text of the agreement, which was signed, looked like this.

TEXT OF THE DRAFT SOVIET-GERMAN PACT TRANSMITTED TO V.M. MOLOTOV TO F. SCHULENBURG AUGUST 19, 1939

USSR government and

German government

Guided by the desire to strengthen the cause of peace between peoples and based on the basic provisions of the neutrality treaty concluded between the USSR and Germany in April 1926, we came to the following agreement:

Both Contracting Parties undertake to mutually refrain from any kind of non-aggressive violence against each other or attacks on each other, either separately or jointly with other powers.

In the event that one of the Contracting Parties becomes the object of violence or attack by a third power, the other Contracting Party will not support in any form such actions of such power.

In the event of disputes or conflicts between the Contracting Parties on certain issues, both Parties undertake to resolve these disputes and conflicts exclusively peacefully through mutual consultation or by creating, if necessary, appropriate conciliation commissions.

This Treaty is concluded for a period of five years, so that unless one of the Contracting Parties denounces it one year before its expiration, the validity of the Treaty will be considered automatically extended for a further five years.

This Treaty is subject to ratification as soon as possible, after which the Treaty comes into force.

P.S

This pact is valid only with the simultaneous signing of a special protocol on the points of interest of the Contracting Parties in the field of foreign policy. The protocol forms an organic part of the pact.

Please pay attention to the postscript. A special protocol, the text of which has not been found anywhere, delimited the zones of interest of Germany and the USSR in Europe. The zone of interests of the Soviet Union included Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.

In general, this “conspiracy” between two old enemies was unnatural and everyone understood this. But in 1939, Germany was not ready to attack the USSR. Hitler needed the resources of Europe.

On September 17, 1939, the USSR entered Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. The Polish army by this time was defeated and could not provide significant resistance. According to official data, the Soviet Union lost 795 killed, 2,019 wounded, and 59 missing. Immediately after the end of hostilities, these territories were annexed to the Ukrainian and Belarusian republics. The USSR moved its border to the west and received good agricultural areas.

Let's look at the reasons for the USSR attack on Finland.

As you know, Finland was part of the Russian Empire. Immediately after the Bolsheviks came to power, the Finnish Senate declared independence. On December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918), the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decided to recognize the independence of Finland.

Because of this, the border was located too close to Leningrad and the Baltic Navy needed normal bases. On October 5, 1939, Finnish representatives were invited to Moscow for negotiations. They also discussed the border. Here is the proposal of the Soviet government.

Finland transfers part of the Karelian Isthmus to the USSR.

Finland agrees to lease the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for a period of 30 years for the construction of a naval base and the deployment of a four-thousand-strong military contingent there for its defense.

The Soviet navy is provided with ports on the Hanko Peninsula in Hanko itself and in Lappohja.

Finland transfers the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Moshchny), Tytjarsaari and Seiskari to the USSR.

The existing Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact is supplemented by an article on mutual obligations not to join groups and coalitions of states hostile to one side or the other.

Both states disarm their fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.

The USSR transfers to Finland territory in Karelia with a total area twice as large as the Finnish one received (5,529 km²).

The USSR undertakes not to object to the armament of the Åland Islands by Finland's own forces.

Due to the position of the parliament, the Finnish government did not fully accept these proposals. The Soviet Union was offered the cession of the islands of Suursaari (Gogland), Lavensari (Moshchny), Bolshoy Tyuters and Maly Tyuters, Penisaari (Small), Seskar and Koivisto (Berezovy) - a chain of islands that stretches along the main shipping fairway in the Gulf of Finland, and those closest to Leningrad territories in Terijoki and Kuokkala (now Zelenogorsk and Repino), deep into Soviet territory. This did not suit the Soviet side. The Finnish government also did not want to lose the already completed “Mannerheim Line” on the Karelian Isthmus. The Soviet Union offered more lenient terms. But they were not accepted either, since the issue had already received publicity and Finnish society was categorically against any territorial concessions to the Soviet Union. On November 28, the USSR terminated the non-aggression pact with Finland and on November 30, the order to attack was given.

My position is that both sides are guilty in this conflict. The USSR did not show due patience. The then government of the Soviet Union did not take into account the mood of the Finnish people. Although, this could not be expected from a totalitarian system. But, if you think about it, he didn’t have time to wait. The Finnish government was simply afraid to take an “unpopular” step; the people were against concessions for the USSR. And stinginess also played a role here. Considerable amounts of money were spent on the construction of the Mannerheim Line. I will provide an excerpt from Stalin’s speech at a meeting of the commanding staff on April 17, 1940.

Did the Government and Party do the right thing by declaring war on Finland? This question specifically concerns the Red Army. Could it be possible to do without war? It seems to me that it was impossible. It was impossible to do without war. The war was necessary, since peace negotiations with Finland did not produce results, and the security of Leningrad had to be ensured unconditionally, because its security is the security of our Fatherland. Not only because Leningrad represents 30-35 percent of the defense industry of our country and, therefore, the fate of our country depends on the integrity and safety of Leningrad, but also because Leningrad is the second capital of our country.

Here is the chronology of the fighting.

Conducting heavy fighting, the 7th Army advanced 5-7 km per day until it approached the “Mannerheim Line,” which happened in different sections of the offensive from December 2 to 12. In the first two weeks of fighting, the cities of Terijoki, Fort Inoniemi, Raivola, Rautu (now Zelenogorsk, Privetninskoye, Roshchino, Orekhovo) were taken.

During the same period, the Baltic Fleet captured the islands of Seiskari, Lavansaari, Suursaari (Gogland), Narvi, and Soomeri.

At the beginning of December 1939, a special group of three divisions (49th, 142nd and 150th) was created as part of the 7th Army under the command of Corps Commander V.D. Grendal for a breakthrough across the river. Taipalenjoki and reaching the rear of the Mannerheim Line fortifications.

Despite crossing the river and heavy losses in the battles of December 6-8, the Soviet units failed to gain a foothold and build on their success. The same thing was revealed during attempts to attack the “Mannerheim Line” on December 9-12, after the entire 7th Army reached the entire 110-kilometer strip occupied by this line. Due to huge losses in manpower, heavy fire from pillboxes and bunkers, and the impossibility of advancing, operations were suspended virtually along the entire line by the end of December 9, 1939.

The Soviet command decided to radically restructure military operations.

The Main Military Council of the Red Army decided to suspend the offensive and carefully prepare to break through the enemy’s defensive line. The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The front section of the 7th Army was reduced from 100 to 43 km. The 13th Army was created on the front of the second half of the Mannerheim Line, consisting of a group of corps commander V.D. Grendal (4 rifle divisions), and then a little later, by the beginning of February 1940, the 15th Army, operating between Lake Ladoga and the Laimola point.

Troop control was restructured and command was changed.

The main task during this period was the active preparation by the troops of the theater of operations for the assault on the “Mannerheim Line”, as well as the preparation by the command of the troops better conditions for the offensive.

To solve the first task, it was necessary to eliminate all obstacles in the forefield, covertly clear the mines in the forefield, make numerous passages in the rubble and wire fences before directly attacking the fortifications of the “Mannerheim Line” itself. Over the course of a month, the “Mannerheim Line” system itself was thoroughly explored, many hidden pillboxes and bunkers were discovered, and their destruction began through methodical daily artillery fire.

In a 43-kilometer area alone, the 7th Army fired up to 12 thousand shells at the enemy every day.

Aviation also caused destruction to the enemy's front line and depth of defense. During preparation for the assault, bombers carried out over 4 thousand bombings along the front, and fighters made 3.5 thousand sorties.

To prepare the troops themselves for the assault, food was seriously improved, traditional uniforms (budenovkas, overcoats, boots) were replaced with earflap hats, sheepskin coats, and felt boots. The front received 2.5 thousand mobile insulated houses with stoves.

In the near rear the troops were practicing new technology assault, the front received the latest means for blowing up pillboxes and bunkers, for storming powerful fortifications, new reserves of people, weapons, and ammunition were brought up.

As a result, by the beginning of February 1940, at the front, Soviet troops had double superiority in manpower, triple superiority in artillery firepower, and absolute superiority in tanks and aviation.

The front troops were given the task of breaking through the Mannerheim Line, defeating the main enemy forces on the Karelian Isthmus and reaching the Kexholm - Antrea station - Vyborg line. The general offensive was scheduled for February 11, 1940.

It began at 8.00 with a powerful two-hour artillery barrage, after which the infantry, supported by tanks and direct-fire artillery, launched an offensive at 10.00 and broke through the enemy’s defenses by the end of the day in the decisive sector and by February 14 had wedged 7 km deep into the line, expanding the breakthrough up to 6 km along the front. These successful actions of the 123rd Infantry Division. (Lieutenant Colonel F.F. Alabushev) created the conditions for overcoming the entire “Mannerheim Line”. To build on the success of the 7th Army, three mobile tank groups were created.

The Finnish command brought up new forces, trying to eliminate the breakthrough and defend an important fortification site. But as a result of 3 days of fighting and the actions of three divisions, the breakthrough of the 7th Army was expanded to 12 km along the front and 11 km in depth. From the flanks of the breakthrough, two Soviet divisions began to threaten to bypass the Karkhul resistance node, while the neighboring Khottinensky node had already been taken. This forced the Finnish command to abandon counterattacks and withdraw troops from the main line of fortifications Muolanyarvi - Karhula - Gulf of Finland to the second defensive line, especially since at that time the troops of the 13th Army, whose tanks approached the Muola-Ilves junction, also went on the offensive.

Pursuing the enemy, units of the 7th Army reached the main, second, internal line of Finnish fortifications by February 21. This caused great concern to the Finnish command, who understood that another such breakthrough and the outcome of the war could be decided.

Commander of the Karelian Isthmus troops in the Finnish army, Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman was suspended. In his place was appointed on February 19, 1940, Major General A.E. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps. Finnish troops tried to firmly gain a foothold on the second, fundamental line. But the Soviet command did not give them time for this. Already on February 28, 1940, a new, even more powerful offensive by the troops of the 7th Army began. The enemy, unable to withstand the blow, began to retreat along the entire front from the river. Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay. The second line of fortifications was broken through in two days.

On March 1, the bypass of the city of Vyborg began, and on March 2, the troops of the 50th Rifle Corps reached the rear, internal line of enemy defense, and on March 5, the troops of the entire 7th Army surrounded Vyborg.

The Finnish command hoped that by stubbornly defending the large Vyborg fortified area, which was considered impregnable and, in the conditions of the coming spring, had a unique system for flooding the forefield for 30 km, Finland would be able to prolong the war for at least a month and a half, which would make it possible for England and France to deliver Finland with a 150,000-strong expeditionary force. The Finns blew up the locks of the Saimaa Canal and flooded the approaches to Vyborg for tens of kilometers. The chief of the main staff of the Finnish army, Lieutenant General K.L., was appointed commander of the troops of the Vyborg region. Esh, which testified to the Finnish command’s confidence in its abilities and the seriousness of its intentions to hold back the long siege of the fortress city.

The Soviet command carried out a deep bypass of Vyborg from the north-west with the forces of the 7th Army, part of which was supposed to storm Vyborg from the front. At the same time, the 13th Army attacked Kexholm and Art. Antrea, and the troops of the 8th and 15th armies advanced in the direction of Laimola,

Part of the troops of the 7th Army (two corps) was preparing to cross the Vyborg Bay, since the ice could still withstand tanks and artillery, although the Finns, fearing an attack by Soviet troops across the bay, set up ice-hole traps on it, covered with snow.

The Soviet offensive began on March 2 and continued until March 4. By the morning of March 5, the troops managed to gain a foothold on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay, bypassing the defenses of the fortress. By March 6, this bridgehead was expanded along the front by 40 km and in depth by 1 km.

By March 11, in this area, west of Vyborg, Red Army troops cut the Vyborg-Helsinki highway, opening the way to the capital of Finland. At the same time, on March 5-8, the troops of the 7th Army, advancing in a north-eastern direction towards Vyborg, also reached the outskirts of the city. On March 11, the Vyborg suburb was captured. On March 12, a frontal assault on the fortress began at 11 p.m., and on the morning of March 13 (at night) Vyborg was taken.

At this time, a peace treaty had already been signed in Moscow, negotiations on which the Finnish government began on February 29, but dragged on for 2 weeks, still hoping that Western help would arrive in time, and counting on the fact that the Soviet government, which had entered into negotiations, would suspend or weaken the offensive and then the Finns will be able to show intransigence. Thus, the Finnish position forced the war to continue until the last minute and led to huge losses on both the Soviet and Finnish sides.

USSR losses.

Killed, dead, missing 126,875 people.

Of these, 65,384 people were killed.

Wounded, frostbitten, shell-shocked, sick - 265 thousand people.

Of these, 172,203 people. was returned to service.

Prisoners - 5567 people.

Finnish losses.

Killed - 48.3 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 85 thousand people).

The Finnish Blue and White Book of 1940 indicated a completely underestimated figure of those killed - 24,912 people.

Wounded - 45 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 250 thousand people). Prisoners - 806 people.

This war showed the weakness of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. This was especially evident at the beginning of hostilities. Let's start with the fact that the soldiers did not have normal warm clothes. There were a lot of people frozen and frostbitten. There were big problems with food. Soldiers were often given just bread, and it was ice cream. There weren't enough tents. There were no modern small arms. There were very few trained junior and middle-level command staff. The “purges” of 1936-1937 affected this. The senior management, in the initial period, also left much to be desired. The entire army required reorganization and rearmament. But, despite all this, the USSR achieved everything it wanted.

1940 This year the Berlin Treaty was signed between Germany, Italy and Japan. The USSR also appears in it. I'll give you the text.

Article 1. Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in creating a new order in Europe.

Article 2. Germany and Italy recognize and respect Japan's leadership in creating a new order in the great East Asian space.

Article 3 Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate on the above basis. They further undertake to support each other by all political, economic and military means in the event that one of the three contracting parties should be attacked by any power not currently participating in the European war and the Sino-Japanese war. conflict.

Article 4. For the implementation of this pact, general technical commissions will be immediately created, the members of which will be appointed by the governments of Germany, Italy and Japan.

Article 5. Germany, Italy and Japan declare that this agreement does not in any way affect the political status currently existing between each of the three parties to the agreement and the Soviet Union.

Article 6. This pact shall enter into force immediately upon its signature and shall remain in force for a period of 10 years from the date of its entry into force.

We pay attention to the fifth article. The question arises: What is this? The height of cynicism or an offer to join? I found this in the recording of the conversation between Hitler and Franco on October 23, 1940. He (the Fuhrer) believes that England was in vain to place its bet on Russia. If she (Russia) ends her passivity, she will come out on the side of Germany. Therefore, there is a great misunderstanding on the part of England. But already on December 7th of this year, the USSR plenipotentiary representative in Germany wrote a note to Molotov. Here is her text.

Note from USSR Plenipotentiary Representative in Germany Dekanozov

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov

with the forwarding of an anonymous letter about German military preparations

Secret

At the same time, I am sending an anonymous letter in German, which I received by mail on 5.XII.40, and a translation from it made by us.

Military attache comrade Skornyakov, whom I familiarized with this letter, gave the following feedback:

Regarding point 1 - Over the past two or three weeks, indeed, a significant amount of empty vehicles has been sent to the East.

Regarding paragraph 2 - The construction of barracks for German troops in Norway is confirmed from other sources.

Regarding point 4 - The Germans, as you know, have an agreement with Sweden on the transit of troops. According to the Swedish military attache in Berlin, the Germans have the right to transport 1 train per day without weapons.

According to paragraph 5 - On the formation of a new army specifically from those conscripted in 1901-1903. he knows nothing.

Among those newly drafted, indeed, there are ages 1896-1920. According to Comrade Skornyakov, by spring the Germans can increase their army to 10 million. The figure about the presence of 2 million due to the SS, SA, labor reserves and police is quite realistic. In general, in his opinion, this point deserves attention as being quite close to reality.

APPLICATION:

Mentioned.

Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR in Germany

V. Dekanozov

APPLICATION

Translation from German

Dear Mr. Plenipotentiary!

Hitler intends to attack the USSR next spring. The Red Army must be destroyed by numerous powerful encirclements.

The following is evidence of this:

• 1. Most of the freight transport was sent to Poland under the pretext of a lack of gasoline.
• 2. Intensive construction of barracks in Norway to accommodate the largest number German troops.
• 3. Secret agreement with Finland. Finland is advancing on the USSR from the north. There are already small detachments of German troops in Finland.
• 4. The right to transport German troops through Sweden is forced by the latter force and provides for the fastest transfer of troops to Finland at the time of the offensive.
• 5. Formed new army from the draft of 1901-1903. Under arms are those liable for military service from 1896-1920. By the spring of 1941, the German army will number 10-12 million people. In addition, the labor reserves of the SS, SA and police amount to another 2 million who will be drawn into the war effort.
• 6. The High Command is developing two plans for encircling the Red Army.
• a) Attack from Lublin along Pripyat (Poland) to Kyiv.

Other parts from Romania in the space between Basi and Bukovina in the direction of Teteriv.

b) From East Prussia along Memel, Willig, Berezina, Dnieper to Kyiv. Southern advance, as in the first case, from Romania. Bold, isn't it? Hitler said in his last speech: “If these plans succeed, the Red Army will be completely destroyed. The same as in France. Encircle and destroy along river beds.”

They want to cut off the USSR from the Dardanelles from Albania. Hitler will try, as in France, to attack the USSR with forces three times greater than yours. Germany - 14 million, Italy, Spain, Hungary, Romania - 4 million. Total 18 million. How much should the USSR have then? 20 million at least. 20 million by spring. The state of highest combat readiness includes the presence of a large army.

The year 1941 has arrived. I won’t say that the lessons of the Finnish war were in vain. Changes have begun. The troops were undergoing reorganization and rearmament. I will show how things were using the example of the Air Force, this is closer to me.

The number of aircraft increased. They became more perfect. But there were not enough airfields. To a greater extent, this concerned the regions that were annexed to the territory of the USSR in the 39-40s. The airfields available there were clearly insufficient to accommodate arriving and forming air units and formations. In addition, many airfields did not have the necessary equipment, fuel and lubricant warehouses, communications, communications and access roads. Most airfields could not accept new types of aircraft. There were very few paved runways. This means that most airfields could not operate during muddy times. As of June 22, 1941, of the 626 airfields available in the western border military districts, 135 had been reconstructed. In addition, 141 airfields were under construction, which was planned to be completed that same year.

The basing depth of aviation units and formations averaged: for fighter and attack aircraft - 60-110 km, for bomber aircraft - 120-300 km. But individual fighter units were based at a depth of 400-450 km from the state border, while a number of airfields for them were located in close proximity to the state border. Thus, the Dalubovo airfield was located 10 km from the border, Chunev - 15 km, and Chernivtsi - 20 km, and most of the new types of aircraft were located at advanced airfields. Such an organization of an airfield network for front-line aviation, on the one hand, doomed a significant part of our aviation in advance to its obvious destruction from the very beginning of hostilities, and on the other hand, it could not provide timely and effective support for the defending ground forces.

Of the 7,133 available combat aircraft, the share of new types (Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3, Pe-2, Il-2) accounted for only 1,448 units, which amounted to only 20.3 percent. The bulk of the aircraft fleet is 79.7 percent. in five front-line aviation formations located near the western borders, it was represented by obsolete types: I-15, I-153, I-16 fighters, TB-3, SB bombers, R-5, R-Z, R-10, Sr reconnaissance aircraft .

The aviation of all five districts had 5,937 combat-ready crews, which was 1,196 less than the total number of combat aircraft they had. This situation developed not only among the flight personnel - there was also a catastrophic shortage of aviation specialists in other fields. For example, in the Air Force of the Western OVO, staffing barely reached 85 percent. At the same time, the number of flight personnel reached 76, observer pilots and air gunners-radio operators - 100, engineering and technical staff- 81, special equipment technicians - 75 percent. This led to the fact that about 450 aircraft, or more than 30 percent. aircraft fleet, found themselves without crews. It is necessary to add to this that the level of training of the flight personnel to perform combat missions was low. Only 1062 crew, or 21 percent. of the entire combat personnel of the Air Force of the border military districts, could carry out combat missions during the day in difficult weather conditions. The situation was even worse with preparations at night. 1080 crews (18.2 percent) were trained in simple weather conditions, and only 44 crews in difficult weather conditions.

The situation was also the same in the ground army. The problem of lack of trained junior and mid-level commanders remained acute. There were very few new types of tanks. There were even fewer crews trained for them. And the quality of training of people for existing equipment was not at a very high level.

It's all about memory. Without a clear memory, a person is not a person, and society is not a society. Memory is needed to avoid mistakes and misconceptions in the future, to avoid what you are ashamed of. But historical memory, people’s memory, is formed not like a person’s, but much more complex, and most often it is clogged with myths, legends, and even outright lies.
We have lived in a lie for too long, we are so mired in it that we now lack the courage to look at history soberly. But we have to. At least on Memorial Day.
WAR IS NOT A NATURAL DISASTER, NOT A RAG OF NATURE. They are to blame for the war that happened specific people, specific political forces. "What's the question? - they will tell me, - It is known that the war was started by fascist Germany, Hitler. It was impossible to avoid war, they simply attacked us and forced us to defend ourselves.”
So let's discuss this question: could the war have been avoided?
To begin with, let us remind ourselves that the Great Patriotic War – component Second World War. (By the way, most of the population of our country, when asked when the Second World War began, answers - June 22, 1941).
...In the summer of 1939, the British and German delegations sat in Moscow without meeting, of course, without meeting each other. Molotov delayed negotiations with England in every possible way, each time starting all over again. At this moment, Stalin still had the opportunity to enter a bloc with democratic countries - England, France. This was a chance to contain the notorious aggressor. Fyodor Raskolnikov directly wrote about this in his letter to Stalin, for which he was thrown out of the window.
But a different choice was made. On August 23, a non-aggression pact was signed between the USSR and Germany. The treaty caused shock in democratic countries, but this shock would have been even greater if the secret part of the treaty had become known. But that was the whole point, and it was revealed quite quickly.
A week later, on September 1, 1939, the Second World War began with Hitler's invasion of Poland.
DID THE USSR PARTICIPATE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, SINCE 1939? It would seem - no. It was Hitler who participated, capturing half of Poland, then Denmark and Norway, and only then launching a wide offensive through Belgium and the Netherlands into France.
But at the same time, Stalin, in exactly the same way and at the same time, seized the territories of neighboring states by military force.
Poland was divided equally by Hitler and Stalin along a predetermined border.
War with Finland was even declared and ended with the capture of the Karelian Isthmus and Pechenga.
It was absolutely clear even then that the Baltic states could not be captured without Hitler's consent, given the traditional German influence and the significant German population, especially in Latvia and Estonia.
We generally talk about the seizure of Bessarabia casually, but it is clear that it was also conditioned by the very agreement that determined the division of Europe between Stalin and Hitler.
THE ENTIRE WESTERN BORDER OF THE USSR WAS MOVED TOWARDS EUROPE OVER A YEAR. THIS WAS A MILITARY EXPANSION. How was all this supposed to be perceived by, say, the English taxpayer and voter?
During this period there was no real resistance to the aggressors, there were no front lines, artillery cannonade, destruction of cities, and the bloodshed that would take place later. European countries, unable to resist, were quickly conquered by Hitler and Stalin. That is why it seems to us that we did not yet participate in the war.
But the war dates back to September 1, 1939, and our troops entered foreign territory immediately after that.
And is it necessary to explain who was our ally during this period of the war... With whom we agreed on the division of Europe, to whom we supplied oil for the tanks rushing across the fields of France and bread right up to June 22, 1941.
Dictators were allies.
IT WAS ALREADY INVOLVED INTO US AFTER THE WAR THAT WE ALWAYS SAW THE ENEMY IN HITLER. Meanwhile, Stalin and Ribbentrop were kissing very friendly in front of the movie camera. And in our newspapers of that time the Germans appeared as best friends. Check it out if you don't believe me. Even German names were in vogue among us at that time.
Hitler bluffed big, and Stalin believed him as a friend. That is why his will was paralyzed in the first days after June 22. But Churchill immediately sent a telegram: “From this day on, we are allies.”

Stalin’s monstrous guilt also lies in the fact that the USSR turned out to be completely unprepared for war.
The army was beheaded. Massive repressions in the army - from marshals to battalion commanders - led to the fact that at the beginning of the war, regiments were sometimes commanded by lieutenants.
The previous border fortifications were dismantled, but new ones were not built.
The best designers were destroyed or imprisoned in camps military equipment, their achievements were not adopted in a timely manner.
A false strategy dominated military training.
Repressions in new territories gave rise to hostile sentiments among the population.
All this was too tempting for Hitler, who was looking forward to easy prey.
All this predetermined the development of events in the first months of the war, the loss of territories, resources, and human losses.
That's why the Great Patriotic War lasted four years, that's why we gave up twenty-seven million lives.
It’s almost blasphemy to do arithmetic, but seven and a half million Germans died, such a victory.
In history, as we know, there is no subjunctive mood “if”. But this does not mean that solutions politicians are not subject to evaluation and judgment of history. THE WAR COULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED, or the war would not have had such a catastrophic character, if the USSR had made a choice in favor of the DEMOCRATIC states of Europe back in 1939.
There is only one radical remedy against war - democracy. Non-democracy, i.e. dictatorship is always fraught with war.
We should think about this, and not frivolously sing along with veterans on May 9: “When Comrade Stalin sends us into battle.” There is no need to be embarrassed to remind you of the truth every time. It is precisely to talk, as in school, SO THAT THE TRUTH BECOME THE PROPERTY OF EVERYONE, and not just the notorious intellectual layer. So that at least the younger generation can correctly answer the question: “When did the Second World War begin?”