20. New fascism: the reign of consensus

Ayn Rand

I’ll start with one very unpopular thing that does not meet today’s intellectual standards and thereby turns out to be “anti-consensus” - I’ll define my terms so that you understand what I’m talking about. Let me give the dictionary definitions of three political terms - socialism, fascism and statism.

Socialism - a theory or system of social organization that gives society as a whole the right of ownership of the means of production, capital, land, etc. and control over them.

Fascism- a form of government with a strong centralized power that does not allow any criticism or opposition and controls all areas of activity in the country (industry, trade, etc.)…

Statism- a principle or policy that allows full control over the economy, political life and related areas to be concentrated in the hands of the state at the expense of personal freedom.

It is obvious that “statism” is a broader, generic term, and the other two are its varieties. It is also obvious that statism is the dominant political trend of our days. Which of the two varieties determines the essence of current statism?

Note that both “socialism” and “fascism” are associated with property rights. The right to property is the right to use and dispose of it. Note that the two theories approach this differently: socialism denies private property altogether, giving " ownership and control» society as a whole, that is, the state; fascism leaves ownership to individuals, but transfers it to the government control over property.

Ownership without control is absurd, completely absurd; it is “property” without the right to use or dispose of it. In other words, citizens are responsible for owning property without any benefit, and the government receives all the benefit without incurring any responsibility.

In this respect, socialism is more honest. I say “more honest” and not “better” because on practice there is no difference between it and fascism. Both proceed from the collectivist-statist principle, both deny the rights of the individual and subordinate the individual to the collective, both place the livelihood and the very lives of citizens in the power of the omnipotent state, and the differences between them are only a matter of time, degree and superficial details, such as the choice of slogans with which rulers mislead their enslaved subjects.

Which of the two variants of statism are we heading towards - socialism or fascism?

To answer this question, we must first ask what ideological direction dominates modern culture.

The shameful and frightening answer is that there is no ideological direction now. No ideology. There are no political principles, theories, ideals, no philosophy. There is no direction, no goal, no compass, no vision of the future, no dominant intellectual factors. Are there any emotional factors governing modern culture? Eat. One. Fear.

A country without a political philosophy is like a ship adrift on the ocean, at the mercy of the chance wind, waves or current; a ship whose passengers shouted: “We’re sinking!” - they huddle in their cabins, afraid to find that the captain's bridge is empty.

It’s clear that such a ship is doomed, and it’s better to rock it harder, just in case it can get back on course. But in order to understand this, you need to quickly perceive the facts, reality, principles of action, and in addition, look ahead. This is exactly what those who shout, “Don’t swing!” are trying their best to avoid.

The neurotic believes that real facts will disappear if he refuses to acknowledge them; in the same way, cultural neurosis tells people that their urgent need for political principles and concepts will disappear if they can forget them. Since neither a person nor a nation can exist without some kind of ideology, this anti-ideology has become official and open, it dominates our bankrupt culture.

She has a new, very ugly name. It's called the "power of consensus."

Let's imagine that a demagogue offered us the following credo: truth should be replaced by statistics, principles by vote counting, rights by numbers, morality by public opinion polls; the criterion of the country's interests should be practical, today's benefit, and the criterion of the truth or falsity of this or that idea should be the number of followers; any desire in any area must be accepted as a legitimate demand if it is expressed by a sufficient number of people; the majority can do whatever they want with the minority; in short, everything is subject to the power of the group and the power of the crowd. If some demagogue proposed all this, he would not be successful. However, this is precisely what is contained - and hidden - in the concept of "consensus power."

This concept is now used, but not as an ideology, but as anti-ideology; not as a principle, but as a way to get rid of principles; not as an argument, but as a verbal ritual or magic formula designed to calm a national neurosis, like a pill or drug for frightened ship passengers, giving others the opportunity to run wild.

Our lethargic contempt for the words of political and ideological leaders prevents people from realizing the meaning, implications and consequences of the “power of consensus.” All of you have often heard this expression and, I suspect, have thrown it out of your heads as unnecessary political rhetoric, without thinking about its true meaning. It's about this is me and I encourage you to think about it.

An important clue here comes from Tom Wicker's article in New York Times(dated October 11, 1965). Describing what "Nelson Rockefeller called the 'mainstream trend in American thought,'" Wicker writes:

“This prevailing tendency is what political theorists have projected for many years as the “national consensus” and Walter Lippmann aptly called the “vital center”...At the heart of this consensus, almost by definition, is political moderation. The point is that consensus, as a rule, extends to all acceptable political views, that is, to all ideas that do not directly threaten or cause obvious hostility to a large part of the population. Therefore, acceptable political ideas must take into account the views of others; This is what is meant by political moderation.”

Let's figure out what this means now. “Consensus generally applies to everything acceptable political views..." Acceptable - for whom? For consensus. Since government must be guided by consensus, this means that political views must be divided into those that are “acceptable” and those that are “unacceptable” for the government. What will be the criterion of “acceptability”? Wicker calls this criterion. Note that it is not related to the mind, it is not a matter of truth or falsity. It is not connected with ethics, that is, with whether these views are fair or unfair. This criterion is emotional: Do the views cause “hostility”. Who? "The majority of the population." There are also additional condition: Views should not "directly threaten" that part.

What about small parts of the population? Are views that threaten them acceptable? What about least partly, with the individual? Obviously, the individual and minorities are not taken into account. It does not matter that an idea may be extremely unpleasant to a person and carry serious threat his life, work, future. It will go unnoticed or be sacrificed to the almighty consensus if there is no group, and big group that will support him.

What exactly does a “direct threat” to part of the population mean? In a mixed economy, any government action directly threatens someone and indirectly threatens everyone. Any government intervention in the economy consists in giving some an unfair advantage at the expense of others. What criterion of justice should a “government of consensus” be guided by? By how large the group supporting victims is.

Let's move on to Wicker's last sentence: “Acceptable political ideas must therefore take into account the views of others; This is what is meant by political moderation.” What is meant by “the views of others” here? Who exactly? Since these are neither the views of individuals nor the views of minorities, only one conclusion can be drawn: each “major part of the population” must take into account the views of other “large parts”. But imagine that a group of socialists wants to nationalize all factories, and a group of industrialists wants to retain their property. How can each of these groups “take into account” the views of the other? How will “moderation” be manifested? Where is this “moderation” in a conflict between a group of people demanding government subsidies and a group of taxpayers who can find other uses for their money, or in a conflict between a member of a minority, say a Negro in the southern states, who believes that he has an inalienable the right to a fair trial, and the representatives of the majority - racists, confident that the "common good" of the community allows them to lynch him? What is the “moderate position” in a conflict between me and a communist (or between our followers), if I am convinced that I have an inalienable right to life, liberty and happiness, and he is convinced that the “common good” of the state allows him to rob me, enslave and kill?

Between opposing principles There can be no “golden mean”, no compromise. In the realm of reason or morality there is no place for such a thing as “moderation.” But it is reason and morality that are the categories that were abolished by the ideology called “the power of consensus.”

Its defenders will answer that any idea that does not allow compromise is “extremism” or a version of “extremism”; that any uncompromising position is evil; that consensus "extends" only to those ideas that admit of "moderation", and "moderation" is the highest virtue, replacing reason and morality.

Here is the key to understanding the essence, the leitmotif, the true meaning of the doctrine under discussion. This is a cult compromise. A mixed economy simply cannot exist without it. The doctrine of "consensus" is an attempt to transform the brute facts of such an economy into an ideological - or anti-ideological - system and provide them with at least some justification.

A mixed economy mixes freedom and regulation without any principles, rules or theories. Since regulation presupposes and entails increased control, the mixture becomes explosive, and ultimately either regulation must be abandoned or it becomes a dictatorship. A mixed economy has no principles that define its strategies, objectives and laws or limit the power of government. The one principle that must necessarily remain unnamed and unrecognized is that no one's interests are protected. The interests are up for auction, and anything will go to whoever can make off with the loot. Such a system, or more precisely, an anti-system, divides the country into an ever-growing number of hostile camps. Economic groups fight each other for self-preservation, alternating protection And attack, as required by the law of the jungle. IN political In terms of the mixed economy, it retains the appearance of an organized society with a semblance of law and order, in economic is equivalent to the chaos that reigned in China for centuries, when bands of robbers plundered the country, draining its productive forces.

A mixed economy is the rule of powerful groups that exert pressure on politics. This is an immoral and legalized civil war of special interests and lobbies seeking to gain short-term control of the legislative apparatus and snatch some privilege for themselves at the expense of everyone else, making it a state power, that is, by force. Where there are no individual rights or any moral or legal principles, the only hope of the mixed economy is to preserve a faint semblance of order, to curb the ruthless, infinitely greedy factions that it has created, and to prevent legal theft from turning into illegal robbery, when everyone robs everyone, it becomes compromise, on all issues, in all spheres - material, spiritual, intellectual. It is assumed that it is he who prevents any group from going too far in its demands and collapsing the entire rotten structure. If this game continues, nothing can remain solid, unshakable, absolute, inviolable; everything and everyone will have to become flexible, malleable, indefinite, approximate. What will guide their actions? The benefit of the current moment.

The only danger to a mixed economy is any value, virtue or idea that does not compromise. It is threatened only by an inflexible person, an inexorable group, an inexorable movement. Only honesty is hostile to her.

Is it worth saying who will always be the winner and who will be the loser in such a game?

It is clear what kind of unity (consensus) is required here. This is the unity of silent agreement that All everything is bought, everything is sold (or “participates in the business”), and what cannot be sold falls into the jungle of exploitation, manipulation, lobbying, exchange, advertising, mutual concessions, extortion, bribery, betrayal, that is, blind chance, like in war , where they seek to gain the privilege of legally killing legally disarmed victims.

Note that this desire gives all players a common and basic property. Everyone is interested in a government with unlimited power, strong enough so that the current and future winners can get everything they want and get away with it. Such a government is not bound by any politics or ideology; it accumulates power for the sake of power, that is, for the sake of any “big” group that will temporarily come to power in order to impose the laws it needs on society. Therefore, “compromise” and “moderation” apply to everything except one thing - any attempt to limit government power.

Remember what streams of abuse, curses, and hysterical hatred the “moderates” bring down on the defenders of freedom, that is, capitalism. Remember that the terms “extreme centrist” and “militant centrist” are used seriously and without hesitation. Remember the unbridled viciousness of the smear campaign against Senator Goldwater, in which there were notes of panic that gripped the "moderates", "centrists", "populists" when they feared that a real pro-capitalist movement would end their game. This movement, by the way, does not exist yet; Goldwater did not defend capitalism, and his senseless, unphilosophical, unintellectual campaign only helped the supporters of the “consensus” strengthen their positions. But what is important here is the panic itself; it allows one to appreciate their vaunted “moderation,” their “democratic” respect for freedom of choice, their tolerance for dissent.

In a letter to The New York Times(June 23, 1964) One political science professor who fears that Goldwater will be nominated for election says:

“The real danger is the divisiveness his candidacy will generate...If nominated, the result will be a divided and bitter electorate...To be effective, the American government requires a high degree of consensus and bipartisan agreement on basic issues.”

When and who considered statism to be a fundamental principle of America? Who decided that he should be placed above discussion and differences of opinion, so that the most important questions would never be raised again? Doesn't this sound like a one-party government?

“Let the American people make their choice in November. If the overwhelming majority votes for Lyndon Johnson and the Democrats, then the Federal Government will be able, without needing any pretext, to continue the policies that millions of blacks, unemployed, elderly, sick and people with other problems and illnesses, not to mention ours, expect from it. international obligations.

If a nation chooses Goldwater, the question will arise whether such a nation is worth caring for any longer. Woodrow Wilson once said that you can be too proud to fight; he himself was then forced to fight. Let us settle this matter once and for all, while we can still fight with ballots and not with bullets.”

Did this gentleman mean that if we didn't vote the way he wanted, he would shoot? Here I know no more than you.

Newspaper The New York Times, who has been an outspoken supporter of the "power of consensus," made an interesting comment on President Johnson's victory. The November 8, 1964 editorial reads:

“It doesn’t matter how big the election victory was - and it was big. The government can't just ride the boat folk wave, in a sea of ​​banal generalizations and enthusiastic promises...Now that it has received broad popular support, it has both a moral and political duty not to try to be all things to all people, but to embark on a rigid, definite, focused course of action.”

Where is this course heading? If voters were offered nothing more than “banal generalizations and enthusiastic promises,” how can the results of the vote be called “broad popular support”? What “the people supported” - unnamed political course, political carte blanche? If Johnson has won a grand victory by trying to “be all things to all people,” what should he be now and to whom, which voters should he disappoint and betray, and what will be left of the broad public consensus?

From a moral and philosophical point of view, this article is highly ambiguous and contradictory, but it becomes understandable and consistent in the context of our anti-ideology. This ideology does not expect a special program or political course. He only asks voters carte blanche for power. What happens next depends on the game of influential groups, which everyone should understand and support, but not mention. What the president will be and for whom depends on the randomness of the game and on “large parts of the population.” His job is to maintain power and distribute benefits.

In the 1930s, the “liberals” had a program of sweeping social reform and a fighting spirit. They advocated a planned society, talked about abstract principles, put forward theories, mainly of a socialist nature, and were very upset if they were accused of increasing the powers of government. Almost all of them assured their opponents that government power was only a temporary means to achieve a “noble goal,” the liberation of the individual from the slavery of material needs.

Today in the “liberal” camp no one talks about a planned society anymore; long-term projects, theories, principles, abstractions and “noble goals” are no longer in fashion. Modern “liberals” ridicule politicians who think in such large-scale categories as society or the economy as a whole. They themselves deal with single, specific, time-limited projects and needs, without thinking about the cost, accompanying circumstances and consequences. When asked to define their position, they always define it as “pragmatic” rather than “idealistic.” They are extremely hostile to political philosophy; they scold political concepts, calling them “labels”, “labels”, “myths”, “illusions”, and resist any attempt to “label” them, that is, to somehow define their own views. They are aggressively opposed to theories, and although one can still barely discern the mantle of intellectuality on them, they are also opposed to reason. The only remnant of the former “idealism” is that they wearily, cynically, ritually repeat shabby “humanistic” slogans when circumstances require.

Cynicism, uncertainty and fear have become the hallmarks of the culture that these “liberals” still manage in the absence of better candidates. The only component of their ideological toolkit that has not become rusty, but on the contrary, becoming rougher and more obvious every year, is the passion for authoritarian, even totalitarian state power. This is not the burning of a fighter for an idea or the passion of a missionary fanatic, but rather the dim reflection in the glassy eyes of a madman. Numb despair has long drowned out his memories of his goal, but he clings to his secret weapon, stubbornly believing that “there must be some kind of law” and everything will be fine as soon as someone passes the law, and any problem can be solved by magical power brute force.

Such is now the intellectual state and ideological orientation of our culture.

And now I propose to return to the question I posed at the beginning of the discussion. Which of the two varieties of statism are we moving towards, socialism or fascism?

To answer, let me present for your consideration an excerpt from an editorial from Washington Star(for October 1964). This eloquent mixture of truth and misinformation is typical of modern political thought:

“Socialism is simply state ownership of the means of production. No presidential candidate has proposed anything like this, and Lyndon Johnson is not offering anything like this now. [ Right. - Here and further - A.R..]

However, in American legislation there are a number of acts that increase either state regulation of private business or state responsibility for the welfare of citizens. [ Right.] It is they who cause the warning cries of “Socialism!”

In addition to the Constitution's provision on federal regulation interstate commerce, this government intrusion into the marketplace begins with antitrust laws. [ Very true.] It is to him that we owe the fact that free competition capitalism still exists, but we do not have cartel capitalism. [ Wrong.] Since socialism, one way or another, is generated by cartel capitalism [ wrong], it is safe to believe that government intervention in business actually prevented socialism. [ Worse than wrong.]

As for social security legislation, it is light years away from the cradle-to-grave control of modern socialism. [ Not entirely true.] It looks more like simple human concern for one’s neighbor than an ideological program.” [ The second half of this phrase is correct; this is not an ideological program. As for the first, simple participation does not usually express itself in the form of a gun pointed at the wallet and savings of a neighbor.]

The article does not mention, of course, that a system in which the state does not nationalize the means of production, but seizes complete control over the economy, is called fascism.

Yes, supporters social security- not socialists, they never sought to socialize private property, but wanted to “preserve” private property with state control over its use and transfer from owner to owner. But this is the main characteristic of fascism.

We have one more source. He is not as naive as the previous one, his lies are more sophisticated. This is an excerpt from a letter to The New York Times(dated November 1, 1964), written by an economist professor:

“Whatever the criterion, the United States today is more closely associated with private enterprise than perhaps any other industrial power, and does not even remotely resemble a socialist system. In the understanding of scholars involved in the comparative study of economic systems, socialism is identified with global nationalization, dominance of the public sector, a strong cooperative movement, equalization of income distribution, total social security and central planning.

There was no nationalization in the United States; moreover, all government concerns have always been directed towards private enterprise...

Our country's income distribution is one of the most unequal among other developed countries; All kinds of tax evasion have blunted the moderate progressivity of our tax system. Thirty years after the New Deal, social security in the United States is very poor compared to the comprehensive social safety net and public housing plans of many European countries. No flight of fancy can present the issue of this campaign as an alternative between capitalism and socialism or between a free and a planned economy. The question is a choice between two different concepts of the role of the state within the framework of purely private enterprise.”

The role of the state in the private enterprise system is akin to the role of a policeman who protects individual rights (including the right to property) by protecting people from physical violence. In a free economy, the government should neither control, regulate, coerce citizens, nor interfere with their economic activities.

I do not know what political views the author of this letter adheres to; he may call himself a “liberal” or a supporter of capitalism. If the latter is true, I must say that his views, shared, by the way, by many “conservatives,” are more harmful to the idea of ​​capitalism than the views of its open opponents.

Such “conservatives” view capitalism as a system compatible with government regulation, which contributes to the most dangerous misunderstandings. Pure capitalism with complete state non-intervention has never existed anywhere; a modicum of (unnecessary) government control was allowed to dilute the original American system (more by mistake than by theoretical design) - and yet such control was a minor hindrance, the mixed economy of the 19th century was predominantly free, and this unprecedented freedom led to unprecedented progress. As the history of the previous two centuries has clearly shown, the principles, theory and actual practice of capitalism are based on a free, unregulated market. No defender of capitalism will allow himself to avoid the precise meaning of the term “laissez-faire”, as well as the precise meaning of the term “mixed economy”, in which the two opposing elements included in this mixture are clearly visible - economic freedom, that is, capitalism, and governmental control, that is, statism.

For many years the Marxist concept was persistently imposed on us, according to which all governments are instruments of class economic interests and capitalism is not a free economy, but a system of government control in the service of a privileged class. This concept was introduced to deform the economy, rewrite history and erase from memory the very possibility of a free country where the economy is not controlled. Because a system that allows nominal private ownership under total government control is not capitalism, but fascism, then the oblivion of a free economy will give us a choice between fascism and socialism (or communism). All the statists of the world, the most different types and stripes, are trying their best to convince us that there is no other alternative. (Their common goal is to destroy freedom, and then they can fight each other for power.)

Thus, the views of the economics professor and many "conservatives" are grist for the mill of the pernicious leftist propaganda that equates capitalism with fascism.

But there is bitter justice in the logic of events. This propaganda led to a result, perhaps beneficial for the communists, but directly opposite to the expectations of the “liberals”, apologists of the “welfare state” and socialists who share the blame for its spread. Leftist propaganda did not discredit capitalism, but whitewashed and disguised fascism.

Few people here are ready to support, defend or even understand capitalism; and yet there are still fewer who are willing to give up its benefits. If we are told that capitalism is compatible with specific regulations that serve our specific interests (whether we are talking about government handouts, or living wages, or price supports, or subsidies, or antitrust laws, or censorship of pornographic films), we will support these programs by convincing ourselves that what we will get is merely a “modified” capitalism. Through ignorance, confusion, prevarication, moral cowardice and mental bankruptcy, a country that has a true disgust for fascism is moving in imperceptible steps not towards socialism or any other altruistic ideal, but towards an open, cruel, predatory, power-hungry system that de -in fact, this is fascism.

No, we have not yet reached this stage, but it is quite obvious that we are no longer a “purely private enterprise system”. We are now a disintegrating, sick, dangerously unstable mixed economy, a jumbled mixture of socialist schemes, communist influences, fascist control and the dwindling remains of a capitalism that still pays all the bills; and this whole tangle is heading towards the fascist state.

Let's look at the current government. I think I won't be accused of bias if I say that President Johnson is not a philosopher. Of course, he is not a fascist, not a socialist or a supporter of capitalism. Ideologically he is a nobody. Based on his biography and the unanimity of his supporters, we can say that the very concept ideology does not apply to him. He is a politician, which is very dangerous, but very typical of today's situation. He is an almost literary, archetypal embodiment of the ideal leader in a country with a mixed economy: a ruler who loves power for power's sake, perfectly manipulates powerful groups, pits them against each other, dispenses smiles, frowns, favors, especially favors unexpected, and looking no further than the next election.

Neither President Johnson nor any of the influential groups will support the socialization of industry. Like his predecessors in the White House, Johnson understands that entrepreneurs are the cash cows of the mixed economy and does not want to destroy them. On the contrary, he wants them to prosper and fund his social welfare programs (which he needs to win the next election) while they eat out of his hand, which, by the way, they really like. The businessmen's lobby will undoubtedly receive its due share of influence and recognition, as well as the Trudovik lobby, or farmers, or any other “large part of the population,” but on the terms that the president sets. He will be especially successful in nurturing and supporting the type of entrepreneurs that I call “aristocracy by patronage.” This is not a socialist model, but a model typical of fascism.

Political, intellectual and moral aspects of Johnson's policy towards entrepreneurs are impressively summarized in one article published in New York Times(dated January 4, 1965):

“By diligently courting the business community, Mr. Johnson has shown that he is an out-and-out Keynesian. Unlike President Roosevelt, who enjoyed fighting entrepreneurs until the Second World War did not force him to agree to a truce, and President Kennedy, who also aroused hostility among the business community, President Johnson long and persistently sought to ensure that businessmen joined the ranks of his supporters and supported his projects.

The campaign to get closer to entrepreneurs may displease many Keynesians, but it is Keynes nonetheless clean water. After all, it was Lord Keynes, whom American businessmen initially considered a Machiavellian and generally a dangerous figure, who proposed several measures to normalize relations between the president and the business community.

He expressed his views in a letter to President Roosevelt, who was again attacked by entrepreneurs because economic downturn, which happened a year earlier (1937).

Lord Keynes, always looking for ways to transform capitalism to save it, recognized that business confidence was very important, and tried to convince Roosevelt of this.

He explained to the president that businessmen are not politicians and should be treated as such. “They are much softer than politicians,” he wrote, “they can be charmed and frightened at the same time by the prospect of fame, they are easily persuaded to become “patriots.” They are embarrassed, stunned, scared, but try their best to look cheerful. They are vain , but not at all self-confident and touchingly responsive to a kind word...” Lord Keynes was confident that Roosevelt would be able to tame and subjugate them if he followed simple Keynesian rules.

“You can do whatever you want with them,” he continued, “if you treat even the largest of them not as wolves and tigers, but as domestic animals, albeit poorly educated and not trained as you would like.” ".

President Roosevelt did not respond to Keynes's advice, nor did President Kennedy. And President Johnson, apparently, took note... With kind words and approving pats on the shoulder, he managed to tame the business community. One must think that Johnson agrees with Lord Keynes that hostility with entrepreneurs will lead nowhere. As Keynes wrote, “If you reduce them to the sullen, obstinate, frightened state of mistreated domestic animals, the market will not help bear the burden of the nation, and in the end public opinion will be inclined to favor their side."

The view that entrepreneurs are akin to “pets” who bear the “burden of the nation” and are “tamed” by the president is completely incompatible with the ideology of capitalism. It is also inapplicable to socialism, since there are no entrepreneurs in a socialist state. But it expresses the very essence of the fascist economy, that is, the relationship between the world of business and the government in a fascist state.

Whatever words you put it in, this is the true meaning of any kind of “transformed” (“modified”, “modernized”, “humanized”) capitalism. According to these doctrines, "humanization" consists of turning certain (the most useful) members of society into beasts of burden.

The formula of deception and taming of sacrificial animals is repeated today more and more often and more persistently; and it says that entrepreneurs should look at the government not as an enemy, but as a “partner.” The concept of "partnership" between private group and officials, between the world of business and government, between production and coercion - a linguistic lie ("anti-concept"), typical of fascist ideology, which considers force to be the essence and supreme judge of all human relations.

“'Partnership' is an obscene euphemism for 'government control.' There is no partnership between armed bureaucrats and defenseless private citizens who have no choice but to comply. What are the chances in a conflict with a “partner”? any whose word is law? He may listen to you (if your support group is large enough), but then turn his favor elsewhere and sacrifice your interests. He has the final word and the legal “right” to force you to submit at gunpoint, since your property, your job, your future, your very life are in his power. IN this Is there any point in “partnership”?”

However, both among businessmen and in any other professional group There are people who like this prospect. They fear the competition of the free market and happily welcome an all-powerful “partner” who will deprive their more capable competitor of all advantages; they want to make a career not by merit, but by patronage, to live not by right, but by mercy. Such businessmen are responsible for the fact that we pass antimonopoly laws and still support them.

Many Republican businessmen went over to President Johnson's side in the last election. Here are some interesting observations from a survey conducted by New York Times(from September 16, 1964):

“Polls in five cities in the industrial Northeast and Midwest reveal stark differences in political views between representatives of large corporations and small and medium-sized entrepreneurs... Among businessmen planning to vote for a Democrat for the first time in their lives, most work for large corporations... Most support for the president 40-50 year old businessmen express their opinion of Johnson... Many businessmen of this age say that they do not see the attitude of their younger colleagues towards Johnson improving. Surveys of 30-year-olds confirmed this observation...Young company employees themselves proudly say that their generation was the first to stop and reverse the trend towards liberalization of youth...Differences between small and large entrepreneurs became especially clear on the issue of the budget deficit. Representatives of giant corporations are much more likely to agree that budget deficits are sometimes necessary and even desirable. A typical representative of small business treats deficit spending with special contempt.”

These data allow us to understand whose interests the mixed economy takes into account and what it does to start-ups and young businessmen.

An important aspect of the predisposition to socialism is the desire to blur the line between earned and unearned and, therefore, to see no difference between businessmen like Hank Rearden and Orren Boyle. For the narrow-minded, short-sighted, primitive socialist mentality that demands the “redistribution of wealth” without thinking about its origin, the enemies are all rich people, no matter how they got rich. The aging, graying "liberals" who were "idealists" in the 1930s cling to the illusion that we are moving toward some kind of socialist state hostile to the rich and favorable to the poor, trying desperately not to see what we eradicate the rich and which remain and thrive in the system they themselves created. A cruel joke was made on them - their “ideals” paved the road not to socialism, but to fascism. All their efforts did not help the helplessly and brainlessly virtuous “little man”, the hero of their poor imagination and worn-out fantasy, but the worst representative of the rapacious rich, enriched by political privilege, who is always happy to profit from a collective “noble endeavour”. Under capitalism, such a rich man has no chance.

Special shape economic organization, which is manifesting itself more and more clearly in our country as a consequence of the dominance of influential groups, is one of the worst types of statism - guild socialism. It deprives talented youth of a future by freezing people in professional castes under the yoke of harsh rules. This is an open embodiment of the main idea of ​​​​most statists (although they prefer not to admit it): to support and protect mediocrity from more capable competitors, to fetter the more talented, to relegate them to an average level. This theory is not very popular among socialists (although it has supporters); the most famous example of its widespread implementation is fascist Italy.

In the 1930s, some astute people said that Roosevelt's New Deal was a form of guild socialism and most similar to Mussolini's regime. Then they did not pay attention to these words. Today the symptoms are obvious.

They also said that if fascism ever came to the United States, it would come under the guise of socialism. I advise you to read or re-read “It Can’t Be Here” by Sinclair Lewis, paying special attention to the character, lifestyle and ideology of the fascist leader Berzelius Windrip.

Now let me list (and refute) a few standard objections with which today's "liberals" try to disassociate themselves from fascism and disguise the true nature of the system they support.

"Fascism requires a one-party system." What does the “power of consensus” lead to in practice? “The goal of fascism is to conquer the whole world.” What do the globally oriented, bipartisan leaders of the UN want? And if they achieve their goal, what positions do they think they will take in the power structure of the “one world”?

"Fascism preaches racism." Not always. Germany under Hitler became racist, Italy under Mussolini did not.

"Fascism is against the welfare state." Check your premises and read the history books. The idea of ​​such a state was proposed by Bismarck, Hitler's political ancestor. It was he who tried to buy the loyalty of some groups of the population with the help of money received from other groups. Let me remind you that the full name of the Nazi party is the National Socialist German Workers' Party.

Let me also quote a few excerpts from the political program of this party, adopted in Munich on February 24, 1920:

“We demand that the government commit itself to, above all else, ensuring that citizens have the opportunity to get a job and earn a living.

Individual actions must not be allowed to conflict with the interests of society. The activities of an individual must be limited to the interests of society and serve the common good. In this regard, we demand... to put the end of the power of material interests.

We demand profit sharing in large enterprises.

We demand a significant expansion of elder care programs.

We demand... the maximum possible consideration of the interests of small entrepreneurs when purchasing for central, land and municipal authorities. To enable every capable and hardworking [citizen] to obtain higher education and achieve a leadership position, the government must comprehensively expand our system public education... We demand that talented children from poor families can receive education at public expense. ‹…›

The government must improve the health care system, protect mothers and children, ban child labor... support as much as possible all organizations aimed at the physical development of youth. [We] fight the mercantile spirit within and without and are convinced that the successful revival of our people is possible only from within and only on the basis of the principle: the common good comes before the personal good».

There is, however, one difference between the fascism we are moving towards and the one that destroyed Europe: our fascism is not militant. This is not an organized movement of loudmouth demagogues, murderous thugs, third-rate intellectuals and juvenile delinquents. For us, it is tired, worn out, cynical and does not resemble a raging element, but rather the quiet exhaustion of the body in lethargic sleep, death from internal decay.

Was this inevitable? No, it was not. Can this still be prevented? Yes, you can.

If you doubt that philosophy has the power to set the direction and shape the destinies of human communities, look at our mixed economy, the literal embodiment pragmatism, a direct product of this doctrine and those who grew up under its influence. Pragmatism asserts that there is no objective reality and eternal truth, absolute principles, meaningful abstractions and stable concepts. Everything can be changed arbitrarily, objectivity consists of collective subjectivity, truth is what people want to consider to be the truth; and what we want to see in reality really exists, if only consensus so decides.

Want to avoid ultimate disaster? Recognize and reject this particular type of thinking, each of its premises separately and all of them together. Then you will realize the connection of philosophy with politics and with your everyday life. Then you will understand and learn that no society can be better than its philosophical origins. And then, to paraphrase John Galt, you will be ready not to

Since one of the most important features of a democratic system is the institutional separation between the state, the economy and society, debates over the balance between the public and private spheres have taken the form of debates about the connections between the state and the economy, as well as the state and society. At its broadest, the debate on this issue has been framed in the conflicting but not mutually exclusive terms of efficiency and citizenship. These are also controversial concepts with different meanings. Thus, debates about citizenship include issues of equality, participation, social improvement, and human engineering. Debates about efficiency, in turn, are conducted within the framework of a number of antinomies such as capitalism and socialism; market and planning; capitalism and democracy, etc. From the point of view considered in this chapter, the interrelationship between the market, capitalism and democracy is of greatest interest.

A real expression of this interest is, in particular, the market theory of democracy, which has gained some popularity in the West. The main provisions of this theory were first formulated by J. Schumpeter: “The democratic method is an institutional tool for achieving political decisions, on the basis of which individuals receive power: to make decisions through competition, the object of which is the votes of voters.”

Continuing this line, E. Downes, E. Schatschneider, A. Wildavsky and others identified the political process with exchange in a competitive market. The goal of each participant in this case is to maximize profits while minimizing costs. At the same time, the “bargaining” itself is conducted according to certain generally accepted rules of the game. For example, voting was seen as an exchange of votes for a particular policy, and the activities of politicians were seen as the activities of entrepreneurs engaged in the market, gaining and strengthening positions through bargaining and building support in the search for coalitions.

In this context, the problem of the relationship between democracy and capitalism, or the market economy, has become particularly relevant. It should be noted that the founders of Marxism-Leninism also proceeded from the thesis according to which the principles of liberal democracy and capitalism and the capitalist socio-economic system are inseparable from each other. Moreover, liberal democracy was regarded as a special system of class domination of the bourgeoisie, which is doomed to disappear with the disappearance of capitalism and, accordingly, the bourgeoisie. This, as they say, is a negative interpretation of democracy. This paragraph is entirely about the positive assessment of its supporters.

Currently, there are two directions in the interpretation of this issue - neopluralists, who adhere to a liberal orientation, and the so-called “public choice” school, or neoclassics, who make up the conservative movement. Neoclassicists -F. Hayek, D. Escher, M. Olson and others are convinced that political democracy can survive and function only in a capitalist economy based on the principles of the free market. In their opinion, of all existing systems, only capitalism provides conditions for group competition and broad political participation of the masses, that capitalism is a necessary and only prerequisite for democracy. Moreover, in cases where political democracy in any way infringes on the principles of the free market and free competition, as well as the right of an entrepreneur to freely dispose of his property, with which capitalism is completely identified, priority is certainly given to these latter.

Indeed, there is an inherent connection between the principles of capitalism and pluralistic democracy. The latter is the guarantor of the existence and viability of capitalism as a socio-economic system. First of all, it provides the general population with the right to participate in the political process, guaranteeing the rules of the game between political parties and various kinds of interest groups, and provides conditions for the rotation of power in the process of general elections at all levels of government, as well as other principles and norms of parliamentarism. Thus, pluralistic democracy is designed to provide legitimacy to free market relations in both the social and economic spheres. The question of the relationship between private property, freedom, economic and personal, which constitute the comparative quintessence of the idea of ​​democracy, was raised in the chapter on civil society. It should be noted here that free market relations, under certain conditions, can create real obstacles to the effective implementation of the principles of pluralistic democracy, or even undermine them.

Convincing arguments for the validity of this conclusion are contained in the works of neopluralists R. Dahl, C. Lindblom and others. Perhaps, the position of neopluralists on this issue was most succinctly stated by R. Dahl: “Democracy is closely associated and has always been associated in practice with private ownership of the means of production. .. Even today, in any country ruled by a polyarchy, the means of production are for the most part "owned" privately. On the contrary, no country where the means of production are mainly in the hands of the state or ... "society" is ruled by a polyarchy." But it turns out that a market economy is a necessary, but not the only and not sufficient condition for democracy. Moreover, increasing the economic power of certain groups can increase political inequality and thereby weaken and undermine the power of unorganized citizens in the political process.

The group of political scientists under consideration demonstrates the validity of this thesis using the example of the relationship between business and democracy. If in the 50-60s. D. Truman, V.I. Key and R. Dahl himself portrayed business as one of many interest groups competing with each other for power and influence, then from the mid-70s. Many works have appeared that critically analyze “corporate capitalism” and its impact on the political system. Thus, R. Dahl and C. Lindblom, for example, wrote: “In our analysis of pluralism, we made another mistake ... considering that businessmen and business groups play the same role as other interest groups.” In reality, Dahl and Lindblom argued, business plays a role in a polyarchic or pluralistic system that is qualitatively different from that of other interest groups. In their opinion, “the generally accepted interpretations characterizing the American or any other market-oriented system as based on competition between (equals. - K.G.) interest groups are seriously mistaken because they do not take into account the obvious privileged position of businessmen in politics."

This is even more true for the largest business corporations, which do not always or necessarily operate in accordance with democratic rules and norms. Moreover, under certain conditions, the market is by no means presented as a place where equal and equal agents of purchase and sale exchange goods for mutual benefit. It is often an arena in which huge corporations overwhelm smaller firms and sprawling multinational corporations dominate the lives of individuals, regions and even entire countries. As historical experience shows, strengthening the position of certain stakeholders, especially large corporations or industrial and financial groups, from a political point of view can lead to negative consequences for the functioning of democracy, to undermining or at least weakening democratic norms and rules of the game .

We, our politicians and representatives of the humanities and social sciences, should listen very carefully to these arguments, especially those who believe that the establishment of market relations will automatically lead to the establishment of democratic principles in the political sphere. The entire world experience of the 20th century convincingly demonstrates that capitalism, although perhaps deformed, was often fully combined with truly tyrannical forms of government. It is no secret that under the Nazi regime in Germany, the fascist regime in Italy, the Franco regime in Spain, etc. dictatorial political machines were created on an essentially capitalist infrastructure, although it was subordinated to an omnipotent state. The most recent example of such an amalgam is provided by the Pinochet regime in Chile. As is known, in September 1973, General Pinochet came to power on the bayonets of a rebellious army, dissatisfied with the social transformations of the socialist S. Allende, which to a certain extent ran counter to the interests of the country's business circles. Pinochet and the military junta headed by him fully (as far as possible under Chilean conditions) restored these privileges. Moreover, they recruited one of the strongest supporters of market relations and strict forms of monetarism as the architect of the country's economy. The Pinochet regime is the most obvious example demonstrating that capitalism and market relations are insufficient conditions for the establishment of political democracy. But have there been and still exist many regimes in which authoritarianism in politics is organically combined with a market economy? But this does not mean at all that Russia can or should follow this path. But she should definitely take this possibility into account in order to avoid it.

The English left-wing historian Tony Judt, before his death in 2008, wrote a work in which he tried to rethink the role of Western social democracy. There was no doubt in his mind that neoliberalism had proven its failure. Judt believed that the way out of the current impasse was to return to redistributing wealth and increasing the role of the state.

Tony Judt had a typical biography of a Western left-wing intellectual. He was Jewish (his mother was from Russia, his father from Belgium), and graduated from Cambridge. He became interested in Marxism early on, then switched to left-wing Zionism and even lived for several years in the 1960s on an Israeli kibbutz. With age, he settled down and joined the camp of the Social Democrats (his political views corresponded to the left wing of the English Laborites and French Socialists). He died relatively young, from a stroke, at 62 years old - in 2010.

His last work was called "Ill Fares the Land", and its title refers to the words from the famous poems of the English poet Oliver Goldsmith (1730-1774), taken as the epigraph to the book:

“Unhappy is the country where thieves become impudent,

Where wealth is accumulated and people wither away.”

Judt's book had a great resonance in the West (as usual, in the Russian intellectual semi-desert they did not pay attention to it). Its appearance coincided with the initial phase of the deep crisis of 2007-2010, when the First World was undergoing a rethinking of neoliberal economics and politics, which had led Western civilization to a dead end. We present a short excerpt from Judt’s book, which shows the ways of establishing a “welfare” society, as well as reflections on what social democracy should become today.

(Tony Judt)

“The obsession with wealth accumulation, the cult of privatization, the growing polarization of wealth and poverty - everything that began in the 1980s is accompanied by an uncritical praise of the unbridled market, disdain for the public sector, and the deceptive illusion of endless economic growth.

You can't live like this anymore. The 2008 crisis reminded us that unregulated capitalism is its own worst enemy. Sooner or later he may collapse under the burden of his own excesses. If everything continues as before, then we can expect even greater shocks.

Inequality destroys society. Differences in financial status are transformed into competition over status and possession of goods. There is a growing sense of superiority among some and inferiority among others. Prejudice against those lower on the social ladder is growing stronger.

The manifestations of crime and social inferiority are becoming more and more noticeable. These are the bitter fruits of the unlimited pursuit of wealth. 30 years of growing inequality have led the British and especially Americans to believe that this is normal living conditions. That to eliminate social ills, it is enough to have economic growth: the diffusion of prosperity and privilege will be a natural consequence of the growth of the pie. Unfortunately, the facts indicate the opposite. The growth of aggregate wealth camouflages distributional imbalances.

(Tony Judt during the Six Day War in Israel, 1967)

Keynes believed that neither capitalism nor liberal democracy would survive long without the other. Since the experience of the interwar period has clearly revealed the inability of capitalists to protect their own interests, the liberal state must do this for them - whether one likes it or not.

The paradox is that capitalism had to be saved with the help of measures that were then (and since then) identified with socialism. From Roosevelt's New Dealists to West German social market theorists, from the British Labor Party to French indicative economic planning, everyone believed in the state. Because (at least in part) almost everyone feared a return to the horrors of the recent past and were happy to limit market freedom in the name of the public interest.

Although the principles of Keynesianism were adopted by various political forces, the leaders of European social democracy played the main role in their implementation. In some countries (the most famous example is Scandinavia), the creation of the “welfare state” was entirely the merit of the Social Democrats. The overall achievement has been significant success in curbing inequality.

The West has entered an era of prosperity and security. Social democracy and the welfare state reconciled the middle classes with liberal institutions. The significance of this is great: after all, it was the fear and discontent of the middle class that led to the rise of fascism. Reconnecting the middle class with the democratic order was the most important task facing postwar policymakers—and by no means an easy one.

The experience of two world wars and the crisis of the 1930s taught almost everyone to the inevitability of state intervention in everyday life. Economists and bureaucrats have come to understand that it is better not to wait for something to happen, but to anticipate it. They were forced to admit: to achieve collective goals, the market is not enough; the state must act here.

IN last years people are taught to think that the price for these goods was too high. This price, critics say, is a decrease in economic efficiency, an insufficient level of innovation activity, constraint on private initiative, and an increase in public debt. Most of this criticism is false. But even if this were true, it does not mean that the experience of European social democratic governments is not worthy of attention.

Social democracy has always been a kind of political conglomerate. Her dreams of a post-capitalist utopia were combined with the recognition of the need to live and work in a capitalist world. Social democracy took “democracy” seriously: in contrast to the revolutionary socialists of the early twentieth century and their communist followers, social democrats accepted the rules of the democratic game, including compromise with their critics and opponents, as the price of participating in the competition for access to power.

For social democrats, especially in Scandinavia, socialism was a distributive concept. They understood this as a moral problem. They wanted not so much a radical transformation for the sake of the future, but a return to the values ​​of a better life. Social insurance, or access to health care, was thought to be best provided by the government; therefore, it must do so. How, this has always been a matter of debate and has been carried out with varying degrees of ambition.

Common to different models of the “welfare state” was the principle collective defense workers from the blows of the market economy. In order to avoid social instability. The countries of continental Europe succeeded in this. Germany and France weathered the 2008 financial storm with far less human suffering and economic loss than the economies of England and the United States.

Social Democrats, while leading governments, have maintained full employment for almost three decades, as well as economic growth rates even greater than during the unregulated market economy. And on the basis of these economic successes, serious social changes were achieved, which began to be perceived as the norm.

By the early 1970s, it seemed unthinkable to think about downsizing social services, benefits, government funding of cultural and educational programs- everything that people are used to considering as guaranteed. Legislative costs social justice in so many areas were inevitable. As the post-war boom began to subside, unemployment again became a serious problem, and the tax base the “welfare state” is more fragile.

The generation of the 60s turned out to be, among other things, a by-product of the very “welfare state” upon which it poured out its youthful contempt. The consensus of the post-war decades was broken. A new consensus began to emerge around the primacy of private interest. What concerned the young radicals—the distinction between the freedom of private life and the frightening restrictions of the public sphere—was, ironically, characteristic of the re-entering the political arena of the right.

After World War II, conservatism was in decline: the pre-war right was discredited. The ideas of a “free market” and a “minimal state” did not enjoy support. The center of gravity of political disputes was not between left and right, but among the left itself - between communists and the dominant liberal-social-democratic consensus.

However, as the traumas of the 1930s and 1940s began to be forgotten, a revival of traditional conservatism began to emerge. The return of the right was facilitated by the emergence of the new left in the mid-60s. But it was not until the mid-70s that a new generation of conservatives decided to challenge the “statism” of their predecessors and talk about the “sclerosis” of overly ambitious governments that were “killing” private initiative.

It took more than 10 more years for the dominant “paradigm” of discussion of society to move from a fascination with state interventionism and a focus on the public good to a view of the world that Margaret Thatcher expressed in the words: “There is no such thing as society, there are only individuals and families.” . The role of the state was again reduced to an auxiliary one. The contrast with the Keynesian consensus could not be more stark.

The very concept of “wealth” cries out for redefinition. It is not true that progressive tax rates reduce wealth. If redistribution of wealth improves the long-term health of a nation, by reducing social tensions caused by envy, or by increasing and equalizing everyone's access to services previously reserved for the few, then isn't that good for the country?

What do we want? Reducing inequality must be a priority. In conditions of entrenched inequality, all other desirable goals are unlikely to be achieved. With such striking inequality, we will lose all sense of community, and this is a necessary condition for politics itself. Greater equality would mitigate the corrosive effects of envy and hostility. This would benefit everyone, including those who are prosperous and rich.

"Globalization" is an updated version of the modernist faith in technology and rational management. This implies the exclusion of politics as a choice. Systems of economic relations are interpreted as a natural phenomenon. And we have no choice but to live according to their laws.

It is not true, however, that globalization equalizes the distribution of wealth, as liberals claim. Inequality is growing – within and between countries. Continued economic expansion by itself does not guarantee equality or prosperity. She's not even a reliable source economic development. There is no reason to believe that economic globalization is smoothly transforming into political freedom.

Liberal reformers have previously turned to the state to cope with market failures. This could not have happened “naturally” because the failures themselves were a natural result of the functioning of the market. What could not happen on its own had to be planned and, if necessary, imposed from above.

Today we are faced with a similar dilemma. We are, in fact, already resorting to government action on a scale that last occurred in the 1930s. However, since 1989 we have congratulated ourselves on the final defeat of the idea of ​​the all-powerful state and are therefore not in the best position to explain why we need intervention and to what extent.

We must learn to think about the state again. The state has always been present in our affairs, but it has been vilified as the source of economic dysfunction. In the 1990s, this rhetoric was widely adopted in many countries. The prevailing opinion in the public consciousness was that the public sector should be reduced as much as possible, reducing it to the functions of administration and security.

In the face of such a widespread negative myth, how can we describe the true role of the state? Yes, there are legitimate concerns. One is due to the fact that the state is a coercive institution. Another objection to the activist state is that it can make mistakes. But we have already freed ourselves from the assumption, widespread in the mid-twentieth century, that the state is the best solution to any problem. Now we need to free ourselves from the opposite idea: that the state is – by definition and always – the worst possible option.

What can the left offer? We must remember how the generation of our grandfathers coped with similar challenges and threats. Social democracy in Europe, the New Deal and the Great Society in the United States were the answer. Few people in the West today can imagine the complete collapse of liberal institutions, the disintegration of the democratic consensus. But we know examples of how quickly any society can slide into a nightmare of boundless cruelty and violence. If we want to build a better future, we must start by recognizing how easily even the most entrenched liberal democracies can collapse.

It is doctrinaire market liberalism that for two centuries has maintained the unconditionally optimistic view that all economic change is for the better. It is the right that has inherited an ambitious modernist desire to destroy and renew in the name of a universal project. Social democracy is characterized by moderation. We need to be less apologetic about the past and more confident about our achievements. It shouldn't bother us that they were always incomplete.

From the experience of the twentieth century, we must at least learn that the more perfect the answer, the more terrible its consequences.”

(Quotes: “Alternatives” magazine, No. 1, 2013;

Joseph Schumpeter.

"Capitalism, socialism and democracy"

www.lekcii.at.ua

Part one. MARXIST DOCTRINE

Prologue
Chapter I. Marx - Prophet
Chapter II. Marx - sociologist
Chapter III. Marx - economist
Chapter IV. Marx - teacher
Part two. CAN CAPITALISM SURVIVE?
Prologue
Chapter V. Growth rate of total product
Chapter VI. The Possibility of Capitalism
Chapter VII. The process of "creative destruction"
Chapter VIII. Monopolistic practice
Chapter IX. Respite for the proletariat
Chapter X. Disappearance of investment opportunities
Chapter XI. Capitalist civilization
Chapter XII. Destroying walls
1. Withering away of the entrepreneurial function
2. Destruction of the protective layer
3. Destruction of the institutional structure of capitalist society
Chapter XIII. Growing hostility

1. The social atmosphere of capitalism

2. Sociology of Intellectuals
Chapter XIV. Decomposition
Part three. CAN SOCIALISM WORK?
Chapter XV. Starting positions
Chapter XVI. Socialist project
Chapter XVII. Comparative analysis of social structure projects
1. Preliminary remarks
2. Comparative analysis of cost-effectiveness
3. Justification of the advantages of the socialist project
Chapter XVIII. Human factor
Warning
1. Historical relativity of all argumentation
2. About demigods and archangels
3. The problem of bureaucratic management
4. Savings and discipline
5. Authoritarian discipline under socialism: a lesson taught by Russia
Chapter XIX. Transition to socialism
1. Two independent problems
2. Socialization in conditions of maturity
3. Socialization at the stage of immaturity
4. Socialist policy before the proclamation of socialism: the example of England
Part four. SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY
Chapter XX. Formulation of the problem
1. Dictatorship of the proletariat
2. Experience of socialist parties
3. Thought experiment
4. In search of a definition
Chapter XXI. Classic doctrine of democracy
1. The common good and the will of the people
2. The will of the people and the will of the individual
3. Human nature in politics
4. Reasons for the survival of the classical doctrine
Chapter XXII. Another theory of democracy
1. The struggle for political leadership
2. Application of our principle
Chapter XXIII. Conclusion
1. Some conclusions from the previous analysis
2. Conditions for the success of the democratic method
3. Democracy under a socialist system
Part five. SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF SOCIALIST PARTIES
Prologue
Chapter XXIV. The youth of socialism
Chapter XXV. The conditions in which Marx's views were formed
Chapter XXVI. From 1875 to 1914
1. Events in England and the spirit of Fabianism
2. Two extremes: Sweden and Russia
3. Socialist groups in the United States
4. Socialism in France: analysis of syndicalism
5. Social Democratic Party of Germany and revisionism. Austrian Socialists
6. Second International
Chapter XXVII. From the First World War to the Second
1. "Gran Rifiuto" (Great betrayal)
2. The influence of the First World War on the socialist parties of European countries
3. Communism and the Russian element
4. Managed communism?
5. The current war and the future of socialist parties
Chapter XXVIII. Consequences of the Second World War
1. England and Orthodox Socialism
2. Economic Opportunity of the United States
3. Russian Imperialism and Communism
MOVEMENT TOWARDS SOCIALISM

The "Untimely" Thoughts of Joseph Schumpeter

B.C. Avtonomov
The book brought to the attention of the reader was published more than fifty years ago. This period in itself should not confuse us. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy is often listed as one of the greatest economic works of all time, and Schumpeter's Harvard student Paul Samuelson declared that the great book is better read forty years after its publication than it was in 1942 or 1950 ( years of publication of the book and death of its author). However, in the ten years that have passed since this statement, so much has changed in the world and especially in our country that the problem of perceiving Schumpeter’s masterpiece is now completely different.
In pre-perestroika times, Schumpeter’s book, along with Hayek’s “The Road to Serfdom,” Milton and Rosa Friedman’s “Freedom of Choice,” and other “capitalist manifestos,” adorned the shelves of the special depositories of our scientific libraries. Now they seem to be standing on opposite sides of the barricades. The destruction of the socialist system on a global scale and the destruction of the Marxist system in the minds of the majority of Soviet social scientists caused a powerful movement of the pendulum of intellectual fashion towards private capitalism and the ideology of classical liberalism. In Western economic literature, our reader began to look, first of all, for evidence of the optimality of free enterprise and the impossibility of building any kind of socialism. Hayek and Friedman, at least in university classrooms and on book stands, have taken the place of the debunked prophet Karl Marx.
From this point of view, "Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy" looks somewhat suspicious. Schumpeter does not skimp on his praise of Marx, interspersing them, however, with sharp criticism. The question was: “Can capitalism survive?” - answers: “No, I don’t think so.” To the question: “Is socialism viable?” - assures: “Yes, definitely.” It seems like it’s time to put such “untimely” thoughts back into special storage. (However, here, which we will talk about below, there is nothing for supporters of socialist ideals to profit from either.)
Still, we urge the reader to be patient. Conclusions about the fate of capitalism and socialism (as Schumpeter himself noted) are of little value in themselves. Much more important is who and on what basis they were made. We will try to briefly answer these questions in this preface.
Joseph Schumpeter's books in Russian translation are already known to our readers. In 1982, the Progress publishing house published The Theory of Economic Development, and in 1989-1990. publishing house "Economics" - the first chapters of the "History of Economic Analysis" in the collection "Origins: Questions of the History of the National Economy and Economic Thought" (Issue 1, 2). Finally, in 1989, the INION of the USSR Academy of Sciences published a collection of abstracts containing an abstract of the book “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy”, several reviews dedicated to this book and a biographical sketch about the author. Nevertheless, short essay socio-political views and the biography of J. Schumpeter, in particular points related to the problems of the historical destinies of capitalism and socialism, we consider it necessary to place here.
Joseph Alois Schumpeter was born on February 8, 1883 in the Moravian city of Trisch (Austria-Hungary) in the family of a small textile manufacturer and the daughter of a Viennese doctor. Soon his father died, and his mother remarried the commander of the Vienna garrison, General von Köhler, after which the family moved to Vienna and ten-year-old Joseph entered the Theresianum Lyceum there, which provided an excellent education to the sons of Viennese aristocrats. From Theresianum, Schumpeter took away an excellent knowledge of the ancient and modern languages ​​of ancient Greek, Latin, French, English and Italian (this gave him the opportunity to read economic - and not only - literature of all times and many countries in the original, to form an independent opinion about it, which is amazing any reader of the "History of Economic Analysis") - and what may be even more important - a sense of belonging to the intellectual elite of society, capable and called to manage society in the most rational way. This elitist attitude is very noticeable on the pages of Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, in particular when describing the advantages of big business over small business, as well as the determining role of the intelligentsia in the possible collapse of capitalism and the building of a socialist society.
Typical of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy of those times was the separation of the bourgeoisie from power (higher officials were recruited from the nobles), which, according to Schumpeter, contributed to the development of capitalism due to the inability of the bourgeoisie to govern the state.
In 1901, Schumpeter entered the Faculty of Law University of Vienna, whose curriculum also included economic disciplines and statistics. Among Schumpeter's economist-teachers, the luminaries of the Austrian school E. Boehm-Bawerk and F. Wieser stood out. A special place was occupied by the Böhm-Bawerk seminar, in which Schumpeter first encountered the theoretical problems of socialism. He studied the works of Marx and other theorists of socialism (as is known, Böhm-Bawerk was one of the most profound critics of Marx’s economic theory). It is interesting that the outstanding critic of socialism L. Mises and equally outstanding socialists R. Hilferding and O. Bauer. We will talk about Schumpeter's original position in this debate below.
Schumpeter's originality and independence, his desire and ability to go against the grain were also evident in other moments. As is known, the Austrian school fundamentally rejected the use of mathematics in economic analysis. But, while studying at the University of Vienna, Schumpeter independently (without listening to a single special lecture) studied mathematics and the works of mathematical economists from O. Cournot to K. Wicksell to such an extent that in the year of defending his dissertation for the title of Doctor of Law (1906) he published a profound article " ABOUT mathematical method in theoretical economics", in which, to the great displeasure of his teachers, he concluded that mathematical economics was promising, on which the future of economics would be based. His love for mathematics remained throughout his life: Schumpeter considered every day lost when he did not read books on mathematics and ancient Greek -sky authors.
After graduating from university, Schumpeter worked for two years “in his specialty” at the International Court of Justice in Cairo, but his interest in economic theory prevailed. In 1908, his first big book, “The Essence and Main Content of Theoretical National Economy,” was published in Leipzig, in which Schumpeter introduced the German scientific community to the theoretical achievements of the marginalists, and primarily his favorite author L. Walras. But perhaps more importantly, here the 25-year-old author raised the question of the limits of static and comparative-static analysis of marginalists, which he then tried to overcome in his theory of economic development. The book met with a very cool reception from German economists, among whom at that time the new historical school of Schmoller almost reigned supreme, denying economic theory in general and the marginalist theory of the Austrian school in particular. Viennese economists, who were skeptical about the use of mathematical techniques in economic analysis, did not like it either, although Schumpeter, especially for a German-speaking audience, presented the entire theory of general equilibrium in words, practically without using formulas (by the way, the Russian reader has the opportunity to get acquainted with this presentation in the first chapter " Theories of economic development"). Schumpeter's good genius remained his teacher Böhm-Bawerk, through whose efforts the book was credited to Schumpeter as a second dissertation (Habilitationsschrift).
But one way or another, the Viennese university professorship did not want to have a dissident in its ranks, and Schumpeter had to go to teach on the outskirts of the empire in distant Chernivtsi for two years. Only with the help of the same Böhm-Bawerk, who occupied the highest government positions in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, did Schumpeter manage to get a professorship at the University of Graz in 1911, despite the fact that the faculty voted against his candidacy.
Here, in inhospitable Graz, in 1912 he published the famous book “The Theory of Economic Development”. It introduced for the first time ideas that are important for understanding the second part of Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, especially the famous chapter on “creative destruction,” so it seems worth mentioning them in this preface. Schumpeter created a theory of economic dynamics based on the creation of “new combinations”, the main types of which are: the production of new goods, the use of new methods of production and commercial use of existing goods, the development of new markets, the development of new sources of raw materials and changes in industry structure. All this economic innovation is carried out in practice by people whom Schumpeter called entrepreneurs. Economic function entrepreneur (implementation of innovation) is discrete and is not permanently assigned to a specific carrier. It is closely related to the personality characteristics of the entrepreneur, specific motivation, unique intelligence, strong will and developed intuition. From the innovative function of the entrepreneur, Schumpeter derived the essence of such important economic phenomena as profit, interest, and the business cycle. “The Theory of Economic Development” “brought the 29-year-old author worldwide fame - in the 30s and 40s it was already translated into Italian, English, French, Japanese and Spanish.
During the Graz period, Schumpeter published other works that marked the range of his scientific interests throughout his life: the book “Eras in the History of Theories and Methods” (1914) and a large article on the theory of money in the journal “Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik” (1917).
In 1918, a seven-year period of “going into practical activity” began in Schumpeter’s life. The First World War ended with the collapse of three empires: German, Russian and Austro-Hungarian. In all these countries, socialists or communists came to power. Socialist parties also grew stronger in other European countries. Discussions at the Böhm-Bawerk seminar took on flesh before our eyes. Former colleagues also recalled their presence: in 1918, Schumpeter was invited by the socialist government of Germany to work as an adviser to the Socialization Commission, which was supposed to study the issue of nationalization of German industry and prepare appropriate offers. The commission was headed by Karl Kautsky, and Schumpeter's Viennese comrades Rudolf Hilferding and Emil Lecherer were members. The fact that Schumpeter accepted this proposal was obviously due not only to fatigue from the extremely intense scientific work of the previous decade and the hostility of his university colleagues. Schumpeter was never a member of any socialist parties or groups and did not adhere to socialist views. In The Theory of Economic Development, he brilliantly described the role of the private entrepreneur who gives dynamism to the capitalist economy. According to G. Haberler, when asked why he advised the Commission on Socialization, Schumpeter answered: “If someone wants to commit suicide, it is good if a doctor is present.” But clearly not the whole truth is told here. First, Marxism as a scientific theory undoubtedly had intellectual appeal for Schumpeter. Secondly, it was quite natural for him to think that the collapse of the old system would finally give power into the hands of the intellectual elite, to which Schumpeter rightfully counted himself, and thirdly, what economic theorist would not think of trying to implement his ideas and knowledge in practice? It is enough to recall at least the young doctors and candidates of economic sciences who play an active role in Russian reforms. But Schumpeter was 33 years old at that time!
Our guesses are also confirmed by the fact that in 1919, having returned from Berlin, Schumpeter took the post of Minister of Finance in the Austrian socialist government (the Minister of Foreign Affairs was another student of Böhm-Bawerk, Otto Bauer). As is known, every social revolution, breakdown, perestroika, etc., not to mention a lost war, is accompanied by destruction financial system. In this situation, the decision to take the post of Minister of Finance was suicidal, and it is not surprising that seven months later Schumpeter, who was not trusted by either the socialists, the bourgeois parties, or his own subordinates - the ministerial bureaucrats, was forced to resign An academic career in Vienna was still not available to him; naturally, the famous scientist, honorary doctor of Columbia University, did not want to look for a place in the province, and Schumpeter decided to apply his knowledge in the field of finance as president of the private bank Biederman Bank. . The results were quite disastrous: in 1924 the bank went bankrupt, and its president lost all his personal fortune and had to pay off his debts for several more years.
Failures in the political and business fields were apparently natural. As Schumpeter himself wrote in The Theory of Economic Development: “Sound preparation and knowledge of the matter, depth of mind and the ability to logical analysis in certain circumstances can become a source of failure.” Of the not very numerous scientific works of this period, the most interesting for us is the brochure “The Crisis of the State Based on Taxes,” in which Schumpeter first raised the question of the historical fate of the capitalist market economy and the possibility, or rather, the impossibility of a practical transition to the “true” Marx socialism.
Schumpeter was brought out of a state of severe personal crisis by an unexpected invitation to the University of Bonn - unexpected, since for several decades German universities were closed to economic theorists, remaining in the undivided possession of adherents of the historical school. True, in Bonn Schumpeter was not entrusted with a theoretical course: he read finance, money and credit, and the history of economic thought. During this period, he was especially concerned about the problems of monopoly and oligopoly and their impact on the instability of capitalism. The results of Schumpeter's thoughts on this matter can be found in Chap. VIII "Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy". At the same time, through the efforts of Schumpeter, R. Frisch, I. Fischer, F. Divisia, L. von Bortkiewicz and several other like-minded people, the international Econometric Society and the journal "Econometrika" were founded, which were supposed to fulfill Schumpeter's long-standing dream - to unite economic theory, mathematics and statistics.
In 1932, Schumpeter moved overseas and became a professor at Harvard University (courses in economic theory, theory of conjuncture, history of economic analysis and theory of socialism). The largest works of this period were the two-volume book “Economic Cycles” (1939), in which the ideas of the “Theory of Economic Development” were developed, i.e. the cause of the cycles was declared to be unevenness innovation process in time, and a systematization of cyclical fluctuations of the economy of different durations is given: the Juglar, Kuznets and Kondratiev cycles; “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy” (1942) and the unfinished work “The History of Economic Analysis” (published after the author’s death in 1954), which still remains unsurpassed in scope and depth of penetration into the material. In 1949, Schumpeter was the first foreign economist to be elected president of the American Economic Association.
Shortly thereafter, on the night of January 7–8, 1950, Joseph Schumpeter passed away. On his desk lay an almost completed manuscript of the article “Movement towards Socialism,” which the reader will also find in this book.

The book “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy” became a bestseller almost immediately, which, however, cannot be surprising. According to the author, it was written for a non-professional reader, relatively in simple language(with a discount for the German heaviness inherent in Schumpeter’s English, which the reader of the Russian translation will also feel), and the moment of its publication coincided with another grandiose disruption of the world order - the Second World War, which raised the question of the fate of capitalist civilization (and civilization in general) in practical plane. But even for a reader experienced in economic and sociological theory, the book was and is of great interest. In his assessment of the prospects of capitalism and socialism, Marxist teaching, the phenomenon of democracy and the policies of socialist parties, Schumpeter consistently adheres to objective, strictly scientific arguments, carefully excluding his personal likes and dislikes. Therefore, his premises and arguments, even if we do not agree with them, are much more useful for the researcher than the emotional, ideology- and politics-laden discussions of our days about market economics and socialism.

As the author himself warns the reader in the preface to the first edition, the five parts of the book are, in principle, self-sufficient, although interconnected. The first part contains a brief critical sketch of Marxism. This text, equally unacceptable for both the faithful followers of Marx and his unscrupulous subverters, should, in our opinion, be studied by anyone who wants to understand the real significance of Marx in the history of world social thought. The author of the preface can only regret that in his student years, Schumpeter’s book “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy” (and especially the first part) could not be included in the list of literature for special seminars on “Capital”.
Nobody forces current commentators on Western economists to argue with the author in every place where he speaks disrespectfully about this or that “sacred thing,” and to oppose him everywhere with the “correct point of view.” The reader will be able to compare Schumpeter's criticism with the content of Marxist economic and sociological theory. Let us only pay attention to the undoubted similarity of the general “vision” of Schum-Peter and Marx of the object of their study - the capitalist system - as a continuously developing and changing organism according to its own laws, as well as to their desire to consider economic and social factors in interrelation, although the nature They understood this relationship, as the reader will see, in different ways.
The second, central and perhaps the most interesting part of the book is directly devoted to the fate of the capitalist system. When reading it, you must remember that it was written hot on the heels of the Great Depression, i.e. at a time when the survival of capitalism in its traditional form seemed doubtful not only to some Soviet economists, who decided that it had entered a period of permanent crisis, but also to such authors as J.M. Keynes, as well as the economists who substantiated the New Deal F .Roosevelt. However, Schumpeter showed originality here too (his genius can safely be called a “friend of paradoxes”). He did not connect the unviability of capitalism with economic barriers, in particular with restrictions on competition and the dominance of monopolies. On the contrary, both on a purely theoretical level (Chapters VI, VII) and on a practical level (Chapter VIII) he argued that restriction of competition, if understood in the spirit of the static model of perfect competition, cannot be an essential fact. tor of a slowdown in economic growth, since a much larger role in a capitalist economy is played by the process of “creative destruction” - dynamic competition associated with the introduction of new combinations (see above). Monopoly barriers cannot interfere with it, and even vice versa. In ch. VIII Schumpeter unfolds before the eyes of the astonished Western reader, accustomed to the fact that only losses in social welfare are associated with a monopoly, a wide panorama of advantages (from the point of view of dynamic efficiency, i.e. creating conditions for the process of “creative destruction”) of a large monopoly -istic business over an economy close to the model of perfect competition. (In the context of an active antitrust policy in the United States, this idea sounded, and still sounds, as a challenge to public opinion.)
The Great Crisis of 1929-1933 and the protracted depression that followed also did not make much of an impression on Schumpeter, since they fit well into his concept of business cycles.
So, according to Schumpeter, the danger to capitalism is not from the economic side: low growth rates, inefficiency, high unemployment - all this can be overcome within the framework of the capitalist system. The situation is more complicated with other, less tangible aspects of capitalist civilization, which are destroyed precisely because of its successful functioning. Some of these instruments: family, labor discipline, romance and heroism of free enterprise, and even private property, freedom of contracts, etc. - become victims of the process of rationalization, depersonalization, "deheroization", the main engine of which is large concerns - joint-stock companies with bureaucratic management mechanism, succeeding in the field of “creative destruction”. Thus, the development of capitalism weakens capitalist motivation everywhere; it loses its “emotional” appeal. Ch. IX and XII are excitingly interesting from the point of view civilizational approach to the capitalist system, which is becoming increasingly widespread in our literature. This, in fact, is the very theory of the superstructure and its reverse influence on the base, the need for which F. Engels spoke about in his last letters.

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Capitalism and democracy

Historical networks of interactions

In The Political Class, philosophers Valentina Fedotova and Vladimir Kolpakov published a series of articles on capitalism. The authors revealed the nature of capitalism in its correlation with ethics, nationalism, the state, and traced the features of its genesis and dynamics. In continuation of this topic, it seems relevant to touch upon the problem of interaction between capitalism and democracy.

Originating in the West, capitalism and democracy were universal phenomena capable of working in various conditions. Currently, they represent a special kind of metasystems that have drawn most countries and regions of the world into their metagame. The analysis of these phenomena is associated with paradoxes of their interpretation in modern social thought. At first glance, they are incompatible: democracy strives for an equal distribution of political power (“one person, one vote”), while capitalism operates on the principle of “survival of the fittest.” As is known, Karl Marx discovered a fundamental gap between formal democracy, which proclaims the values political rights, equality, freedom, and the reality of capitalism, built on oppression and exploitation. In the Marxist tradition, the “conquest of democracy” is thought of outside the framework of bourgeois society and means the transformation of the proletariat into the ruling class (“dictatorship of the proletariat”) as a result of the socialist revolution.

On the contrary, liberal thought insists that capitalism and democracy need each other. According to supporters of liberalism, democracy adapts the injustice of capitalism to existing social conditions, ensures its status quo, while capitalism creates the material conditions for democracy. Indeed, capitalism and democracy are characterized by similar ethical and behavioral principles: inequality, the ability to take risks, participation in competition, maximization of personal preferences, the ability to take advantage of the given chance, chance, free choice, to show independence, initiative, calculation.

The main thing that unites them is freedom. Social freedom is the guarantor of the existence of both capitalism and democracy; it creates the conditions for both economic and political inequality. At the same time, freedom gives capitalism and democracy a timeless and indefinite nature. Instead of solving social problems, both phenomena turn out to be complex problems themselves. Evgeniy Yasin rightly characterizes the relationship between democracy and a market economy as “inherent uncertainty,” which is associated with known risks, but these risks are the price of freedom, competition, and development. The connection between them is due to a similar “flexible network structure social interactions"1. It is not surprising that their historical dynamics are represented not by forward movement, progress, but by a series of separate breakthroughs: each of its periods corresponds to a new type of capitalist and democratic relations, new ways of limiting them (subsistence farming, feudal relations, monopoly in the market and monopolization of power, various forms of discrimination, government intervention, etc.). Let's try to move away from the extremes of Marxist and liberal interpretations of these phenomena and analyze their relationship through historical retrospective. Following the periodization of transformations of Western European democratic institutions proposed by political scientist Robert Dahl 2, we will trace the features of the interaction of capitalism and democracy from ancient city-states (where capitalism was still absent, but the market and property relations had already appeared) and medieval city-states through the nation-states of the New Age to the modern era of globalization.

City-states of Antiquity and the Middle Ages: direct democracy and merchant capitalism

Following the ancient Greek tradition, democracy is often defined as the rule of the people. The first manifestations of democracy as a legitimate form of government

dates back to the 5th century BC. and is associated with the reforms of Cleisthenes in Athens. Later, democracy emerged in other Greek cities, such as Corinth, Miletus, Syracuse, and Rhodes. In ancient times, polis meant not only a “city” or “state,” but also a “civil community,” a “collective of citizens.” And a good citizen was considered one who, in common affairs, strived for the common good. Aristotle wrote in Politics that the polis as a “community of free people” arose out of natural necessity, so that man could simply exist as a political being.

For the Greeks, the city was not the center of economic and commercial life; it was primarily a political and religious center. Nevertheless, already in the ancient world, political status was largely determined by economic status. It is no coincidence that Aristotle called democracy a kind of final phase in the evolution of the polis (oikos - community - tribe - polis). This fact clearly indicates the genetic connections of the policy with the rural community that gave birth to it. The equality of the citizens of the polis is initially nothing more than the equality of individual households (oikos) within the community. Membership in the polis was carried out through the oikos principle, according to which the vote in the national assembly belonged only to the head of the household.

The polis was also based on the ideal of autarky - self-sufficiency and self-sufficiency, independence and autonomy. For example, a person who sold oikos land always aroused disapproval, since only an individual economically independent of others could be considered truly free. Autarky was a principle that ensured the citizen freedom in both the political (democratic) and economic (oikos) organization of the polis.

Polis autarky was possible due to the fact that the bulk of the population lived off income from agriculture, while trade was the customary actions of traders according to status. Man was considered to be self-sufficient by nature, so trade, according to Aristotle, arose from the “unnatural desire to make money.” Foreign (administrative, military) trade was considered natural, because it served the survival of the community and supported its autarky. Trade, which pursued personal gain, was an ignoble occupation, and therefore it was engaged in by metics (less than full citizens, foreigners, as well as slaves who were freed) 3 . As we see, ancient democracy limited the development of the market, since it followed the principles of autarky and was focused on achieving the common good of the citizens of the polis.

So, in the Greek polis as an agrarian society of households there was a “direct aristocratic democracy”: full citizens - heads of households - directly took part in political life, and there were also significant restrictions on democracy: slavery, lack of rights for women and foreigners, infanticide, the institution of ostracism.

Roman polis (civitas) unlike the Greek, it represented a different form of political and socio-economic organization. A more clearly defined government system, based on the power of the Senate and individual magistrates, which significantly limited the functions people's assembly. During the era of the dictatorship of Caesar and the Principate of Augustus, republican traditions increasingly turned into a facade, behind which a military monarchy was visible, and the slave-owning oligarchy became stronger. Ultimately, democratic principles

The economic and political life of ancient society was destroyed during the Roman Empire and appeared only a thousand years later in the city-states of Italy.

The Italian city-states of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance represented a unique case of the development of capitalism and democratic institutions. They formed a “geopolitical locus of balance of power” between the main players of the medieval system - the Pope and the Emperor. For the first time, “considerations of wealth” became the most important for “considerations of strength” throughout Europe 4 . Of course, we must not forget that it was in feudal Europe that the English Parliament, the French States General, and the Spanish Cortes arose. And yet, these estate-representative bodies were under the control of the king and were meetings of large aristocrats (prelates, barons, counts, bishops) who did not participate in the political government of the state: the original function of parliament was to approve taxes, the states general were judicial-administrative institutions.

Italian cities (Florence, Venice, Genoa, Milan, Bologna, Padua, etc.), as well as the northern cities of the Netherlands (Ghent, Ypres, Bruges, Tournai), achieved the greatest independence both in economic terms (reduction of lord's fees, achievement of trade

privileges) and politically (gaining city self-government). The rights of Italian communes were recorded in constitutions - statutes. Members of the councils and consuls were elected at a general meeting of the commune (arengo, parliament) for several months. The laws provided for measures that prevented the strengthening of individual power, and the frequent rotation of administrative positions made it possible for hundreds of citizens to participate in government. Political and electoral rights were enjoyed only by citizens, who were city residents who owned property and paid taxes. Like the ancient polis, the Italian city was an autarkic entity. But unlike the polis, where political autarky was supported by nobility and aristocratic origin, the isolation of the commune was determined by the economic situation. For example, the right to vote was often limited by mandatory membership in a guild or company of traders and merchants. This fact gives the right to talk about the existence in Italian cities of “Popolans democracy”, which expressed the interests of the trade and craft population (Popolans).

Unlike the ancient city policies - the centers of political life - the Italian republics were centers of developing commercial capitalism. Such major researchers as Henri Pirenne, Werner Sombart, Fernand Braudel, Giovanni Arrighi note the manifestations of the first signs of capitalism in the Italian city-states. The military campaigns of the Crusaders played a significant role in the expansion of trade relations between the cities of Italy, during which the cities provided assistance to the feudal crusaders with money, weapons, and ships. As a reward, Italian cities received military spoils and trade privileges. Trade associations of merchants were created - societies based on shares (commenda, colleganza), joint-stock companies (compagnia), which were active in the Renaissance. Paradoxically, in fact, the feudal crusades contributed to the activity of commercial and financial capitalism; for city-states they were “self-paying wars.”

Mediterranean trade was not subject to feudal-aristocratic control, and therefore

could function only in the conditions of the existence of a civil society of city-states. Spirit pax urbana("urban world" lat.) made a person free both politically and economically. The intensive spread of capitalist relations led to rapid social stratification in cities. “Popola democracy” provided access to power for the moneyed elite. Already in the 15th century, large Italian city-states embarked on the path of strengthening the financial oligarchy. The flexible network of social interactions between capitalism and democracy in medieval Italy collapsed under the weight of capitalism.

The early forms of capitalist and democratic manifestations were by their nature uncontrollable, spontaneous, born from the “nature of things” depending on circumstances. Early capitalism originated within feudal relations. The democratic principles of the Italian republics made a timid breakthrough beyond the then dominant forms of government of a few (empires, monarchies, theocracies). Both democracy and capitalism arose under contradictory conditions that limited their dynamics. They were a truly European miracle; their appearance was possible only within the framework of Western civilization with its special geographical location, developed urban culture, social mobility, traditions of citizenship, rationalism, values ​​of autonomy, freedom and individuality.

Nation-states: historical balance "capitalism - welfare state - labor democracy"

The continued expansion of capitalism contributed to the creation of the Westphalian system of sovereign states in Europe, which abolished the old forms of political integration (empires, city-states). The nation state turned out to be an extremely suitable form for the development of a capitalist economy on a global scale.

In Europe of the 16th-18th centuries, what Marx called the “primitive accumulation of capital” took place: the manufacturing industry developed, a factory appeared, the process of forced land dispossession of peasants (enclosure) accelerated, and a world colonial economy was formed. The Protestant Reformation led to the emergence of the "entrepreneurial ethic." The transition to capitalist forms of economy in social terms was accompanied by a wave of bourgeois-democratic revolutions in the Netherlands, England, France, America, and Germany.

Capitalism attacked all spheres of modern society. The traditionalism of the city-states of Antiquity and the Middle Ages held back the capitalist movement against the tide. On the contrary, 16th-century capitalism carved out its own channel. Democratic civil society could no longer control capitalist dynamics, democracy turned into oligarchy. A new strong player needed to emerge. The emerging nation state largely determined the relationship between capitalism and democracy. During the 16th-18th centuries, nation-states pursued a policy of mercantilism, which was aimed at providing the state with capital (import of precious metals), exporting industrial products outside their own country (through state regulation of export and import, monopolizing the production of domestic goods, expanding and exploiting colonial possessions), encouraging the development of capitalism within the country and protectionism of the national economy.

The nation state was interested in the activity of capitalism, but it also restrained this activity. Braudel is right when he notes that “capitalism triumphs only when it identifies itself with the state, when it itself becomes a state” 5 . In the era of mercantilism, capitalism merges with the state. Governments used every means to promote the development of already existing capitalist interests. Among them: the provision of industrial and trade monopolies to large corporations (such as the East India Trading Company), the regulation of trade policy through legal norms (for example, the famous Cromwell's Navigation Act or Colbert's Industrial Charter, as well as the Homestead Act, which granted land to Americans, those who wanted to move to the west of the continent), issuing state bonuses to active entrepreneurs, etc.

Let us note that the state of this period, which so actively encouraged the development of capitalist relations, was not democratic at all, but rather absolutist. For example, in Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan we see a model of a new state emerging in a society of property owners. Such a state is an artificial "collective man" created by aspirations and relationships" economic people" (homo economicus). If the polis for the ancient Greeks was a natural formation, just as the Christian state was for medieval Europeans, then for the “economic men” of Hobbes’s time the stateless state of “war of all against all” was natural. The political and legal sphere, which controlled bourgeois competitive life,

was created artificially. Those who enter into a social contract remain private individuals and are politically incompetent, and their state of nature is limited and regulated by the iron hand of the sovereign. As Boris Kapustin emphasizes, “capitalism became possible under the hand of absolutist power.” Moreover, in the economic sense, Leviathan was not totalitarian; it was smaller than a “minimal state”: once it had established the inviolability of private property, it did not interfere in economic life at all. Hobbes's Leviathan, according to Kapustin, represents “liberalism without democracy” - “economic liberalism ensured by political unfreedom” 6. The state guaranteed security, and therefore the combination of absolutism and capitalism was characteristic of the period of formation of bourgeois society.

The absolutist state was not the source of modern democracy, but it did promote citizen participation in political and economic life. Democracy, like capitalism, originates not at the state level, but in civil society. In Europe and the USA, “worker democracy” or “taxpayer democracy” is emerging. The “spirit of democracy” was possible only in a “labor society” where the “spirit of capitalism” also developed. Sociologist Ulrich Beck notes that democracy rests on participation in work: “Only those citizens who have housing, secure work and, therefore, a financially secure future are or can become citizens capable of establishing democratic rules of behavior and filling democracy with life.” 7 . Capitalism, as we see, provided material security for democratic institutions, which, in turn, absorbed the social tension caused by capitalism.

The social contract was not considered a means of direct participation of citizens in the political life of the state; it primarily regulated social antagonism and protected private property, thereby ensuring the possibility of capital accumulation. Democracy was a “protective democracy”, a mechanism that ensured the equality of citizen-owners and protected them from the arbitrariness of the authorities. In mass

In a working society, direct democracy, which supported the life of the ancient polis and the republican system of the city-states of the Middle Ages, is simply impossible. The scale of a nation-state requires democratic institutions that function effectively on a large scale - representative democracy, or polyarchy (Robert Dahl), or “rule of politicians” (Joseph Schumpeter). That is, democracy was the rule of a minority elected and controlled by the majority.

The national state, which has formed the institutional form of representative democracy, takes on social functions, it becomes a social state. Already since the 16th century, the European state has been trying to soften the social tension caused by capitalism: statutes on artisans, acts of settlement against vagrancy, laws on the poor, hospitals, charitable works funds, etc. were created. The welfare state plays the role of arbiter in the dialectical struggle between democracy, which advocates legal equality, and capitalism, based on actual socio-economic inequality.

The historical balance of “capitalism - social state - democracy” was in danger of destruction when economic liberalism replaced mercantilism in the 19th century. The intensive growth of free trade led to what Karl Polanyi called the “great transformation” of socio-economic relations: there was a commodification (transformation into goods) of objects,

which were not previously goods. Objects such as labor and land now received their price and began to be bought and sold more and more freely. The “society of labor” itself, which ensured capitalist and democratic efficiency, was under threat. The Industrial Revolution led to the mechanization of labor. There have been changes in the organization of production. Taylor's management system, which emerged at the beginning of the 20th century, was built on the principles of selection and specialization of worker abilities, focused on directed and timed work, it did not provide for collective interests and emphasized the individual effort of the worker.

The philosopher José Ortega y Gaset notes that until the 19th century, the main value of human activity was considered to be work born of compulsion - a duty to culture and tradition imposed on a person the need to perform certain actions, it was performed with a specific purpose and effort, and was of a creative nature. The 19th century “brought the bitterness of the working day to its extreme.” What becomes important is not creative, but spontaneous effort - sport, a sporting or festive sense of life, the spirit of joy, generosity, buffoonery. In this regard, the understanding of freedom has also changed. If in previous eras freedom was a value of life for a person, now freedom is a scheme, a form, an instrument of life 8 .

So, “naked” capitalism has shown its social ineffectiveness. A self-regulating market could become not only self-destructive, but also lead to a crisis of social relations. Growing public unrest within European countries (revolutions, labor movements) necessitated the social “taming” of capitalism. Already in the second half of the 19th century, the idea of ​​a “welfare state” appeared: Napoleon III legalized the activities of trade unions, Disraeli expanded suffrage, Bismarck introduced state old-age pensions and health insurance, Churchill in 1911 established the first large-scale system of social insurance against unemployment. In the 1930s, Franklin Delano Roosevelt designed the welfare state, which, based on Keynesian principles, helped bring American capitalism out of the Great Depression.

In the first half of the 20th century, alternative welfare state programs also emerged, based on the suppression of democratic and capitalist initiatives: socialism in Russia, the authoritarian regimes of Nazi Italy, fascist Germany, Francoist Spain. Nevertheless, the project of a social state in the West and in the United States, balancing between capitalism and democracy, turned out to be more effective than alternative totalitarian projects. The post-World War II Bretton Woods system (1944) also effectively promoted a balance between national policies and liberal world trade through its institutions (the World Bank and the IMF). Within this system, most industrialized countries have implemented welfare state policies.

The methods of the Western-style welfare state turned out to be effective because they were carried out on the scale of nation states at the stage of industrialization or during the so-called first (“organized”) Modernity. In the conditions of modern globalization (or “liberally expanded” Modernity) and the transition of the developed countries of the world to the post-industrial stage of development, “Keynesianism in one single country” is no longer possible. The welfare state is losing its relevance, which, in turn, raises the question of the methods of functioning of both capitalism and democracy.

Capitalism and democracy in the context of globalization

Modern processes of globalization are changing the nature of interaction between capitalism and democracy. Following the wave of post-war recovery and the scientific and technological revolution in the early 1970s, global crisis capitalism, manifested in a prolonged economic decline, rising world oil prices, overproduction, worsening environmental hazards, and stagflation (a combination of economic stagnation and high inflation). In the context of this crisis, an awareness of the interdependence of different countries of the world on each other arose, and the process of globalization began. Let us note that this crisis was not opportunistic (cyclical), but structural and therefore very long-term. Its manifestations, according to many experts, are still observed today. The social consequences of decades of crisis were very noticeable in developed capitalist countries: poverty, mass unemployment, instability, demographic crisis, increased socio-economic inequality.

In the new conditions, the Keynesian experience of state regulation of the economy could not ensure stability. Instead of the doctrine of the “welfare state,” the ideology of neoliberalism was proclaimed, based on the principles of open borders and free enterprise (laissez-faire). The acceleration of economic liberalization has exacerbated the contradiction between the interests of capital and nation states. The Bretton Woods system turned out to be ineffective. Under the pressure of the crisis, internal contradictions of the world capitalist system arose: military, de-

mographic, national, ideological, environmental, North-South problem.

The national democratic state has become too small to solve these important global problems. However, attempts to create a “cosmopolitan democracy” or “world government” are failing. Moreover, the intense spread of democracy that occurred after the crisis of the 1970s was only possible within the framework of nation-states. It was the global crisis of capitalism, according to political scientist Samuel Huntington, that significantly contributed to the beginning of the “third wave” of democratization (1974 - 1990s).

According to Huntington, there is no direct relationship between economic growth and the spread of democracy: major oil exporting countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United States United Arab Emirates, are not democratic, and some developing countries like India or Turkey are steadily moving towards democracy. In the short term, very rapid economic growth and a sharp economic crisis can destroy authoritarian regimes 9 . This trend manifested itself in the “third wave” of democratization: a combination of the rapid pace of post-war economic development (in the 1950s - 1960s) with the crisis

1970s. The “third wave” of democratization covered a significant part of authoritarian states: Portugal, Spain, a number of countries in Latin America (Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, El Salvador, Guatemala), Asia (India, Taiwan, the Philippines), Africa ( Papua New Guinea, Namibia). In the late 1980s, multi-party systems developed in the countries of the former Soviet bloc: in the Baltic republics, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Mongolia. The triumph of the “third wave” was the collapse of the USSR and the formation of democratic states on its territory.

Of course, democratization listed countries was not carried out according to the Western or American model; its economic prerequisite was decades of crisis. Perhaps this is why the “third wave” of democratization was not as progressive as its predecessor, the “second wave” (1943 - 1962), which created not only “new democracies”, but also “new industrial countries”, such as West Germany and Japan , South Korea. After the “third wave,” significant “reversals” were observed: “illiberal democracies” emerged (Farid Zakaria), hybrid political regimes, called “managed democracy” or “competitive authoritarianism”. Political scientist Francis Fukuyama, predicting the victory of liberal democracy in the world by the end of the 20th century, rightly emphasized that this victory would be won not so much by liberal practice as by the liberal idea: “Even a non-democrat will have to speak the language of democracy in order to justify his deviation from a single universal standard” 10 .

Yet the global spread of democracy has not led to a qualitative improvement in the modern world. On the contrary, many Western researchers today talk about a crisis of democracy, which is

is in the authoritarian methods of conducting the foreign policy of the United States and some Western European countries (armed interventions in the affairs of Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, the active advance of NATO to the east), as well as in the inability of these countries to counter the threat of international terrorism through democratic procedures. Sociologists Daniel Bell and Anthony Giddens talk about the "paradox of democracy": national democratic government has become too small to respond to important global problems; at the same time, it has become too important to understand small issues at the city and regional level 11 . Thus, globalization does not destroy national democratic states, but changes and complicates their tasks.

The pressure of flexible global economic networks transforms the nation-state into a “corporation-state” or “market-state” (Andrey Fursov), which leads to a weakening of the importance of politics, ideology, civil society and the welfare state. Modern global capitalism is also becoming significantly more complex, with several levels emerging. On international level there are institutions such as the WTO, OECD, and many transnational corporations; at the regional level - supranational capitalist world-economies like the European Union or the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). At the same time, “autochthonous capitalisms” 12 are actively developing within nation-states, which, taking into account the logic of global capitalism, are based on their own political and sociocultural specifics.

Naturally, national democracies are finding it increasingly difficult to adapt to such a multi-level capitalist system. They must become more flexible and have a keen sense of balance.

between openness and closedness towards it. Modern democracy of the Western type is no longer the polis democracy of the times of Antiquity or the mass democracy of the “labor society” of the 18th-19th centuries. According to Schumpeter, capitalist society was only well suited in its heyday to ensure the success of democracy, which in turn protected the private interests of the bourgeoisie. Bourgeois democracy was not able to function for long, since the bourgeoisie did not give birth to its own leading political class, but was part of a political class of non-bourgeois origin 13: “the feudal lords exploited the bourgeoisie,” “the military aristocratic society fed on capitalism.”

All this leads to the fact that the ability of politicians to express the general will is destroyed. There is a “demassification of political life” (Alvin Toffler), an alienation of power from the people and the people from power. Political scientist Christopher Lash believes that in the context of globalization, there is an internationalization and virtualization of political elites that have lost patriotism and a point of contact with the people. The place of democracy, according to Lash, is in modern world meritocracy is a parody of democracy (“artificial democracy”), the power of the most gifted, which justifies the division into the elite and the controlled masses. At the same time, technocratic elites use power irresponsibly and are unfit to bear the burden of leadership. They are interested not so much in a leadership role as in escaping from common fate 14 . Global capitalism promotes the strengthening of meritocracy and the transformation of democracy into aristocracy.

In the context of the manifestation of modern contradictions between capitalism and democracy, the problem arises of finding new points of their relationship. So, for example, in developed countries Various variants of new labor democracy are emerging - “workplace democracy”, or “equitable cooperation”, or “employee capitalism” 15. We are talking about the formation of new principles for organizing the labor of workers and employees in a post-industrial society. In the last three decades in America, Western Europe and Japan, the place of automated labor organization based on the principles of Taylorism and Fordism has been replaced by a “post-Fordist” flexible production system. Teams are created to solve problems and develop creative projects, initiative is encouraged, learning occurs on the job, workers themselves participate in the management of companies (economic self-management), perceive their goals, make important decisions, which promotes solidarity and mutual trust between them.

As we see, in modern post-industrial countries, capitalism and democracy do not disappear at all, but acquire other forms of interaction. Newly industrialized countries, including Russia, will have to develop a national strategy for the relationship between capitalism and democracy in the context of globalization that is adequate to their society.

Our country needs a similar strategy. The reforms of the 1990s, on the one hand, brought democracy and capitalism to Russian soil, and on the other, created a gap between them. The relationship between both phenomena was hampered by the lack of conditions for their effective functioning - the welfare state and civil society, business ethics and democratic political culture. The modern Russian political elite has taken a significant step towards creating these conditions - they have proposed the concept of sovereign democracy, designed to establish a dialogue between government and society and legitimize the existing government. At the same time, this concept should not become just a doctrine that consolidates the ruling elite and the ruling party. This could lead to even greater "sovereignty" of the political class from the citizens. Sovereign democracy first needs to function as a national strategy to strike a balance between capitalism and democracy, designed to mobilize Russian civil society and raise the level of its political culture.

It is important to remember that it is too late to make mistakes. In the context of globalization, the state is shifting its priorities from the “ruler of the territory” to the “master of speed”, and the “clock

Western civilization set the pace for the forced simultaneity of the non-simultaneous" 16. Any delays and inaccuracies can lead to negative consequences. This is evidenced by the dynamics of the networks of interaction between capitalism and democracy traced in this article. In Antiquity, democracy was an end in itself for the development of the polis; to the market, on the contrary, treated with contempt, which led to the emergence of a slave-owning aristocracy. The medieval city-states of Italy functioned as centers of merchant capitalism, while democracy was only a mechanism that provided access to the distribution of goods among the citizens of the communes, which caused the dominance of the oligarchy. In modern times, nation-states arose, creating to ensure a balance between capitalism and democracy, a social state. The changing role of nation-states in the modern world makes the social functions they perform less effective. Capitalism and democracy today need the emergence of a new “arbiter” on a new field of their game.

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Capitalism and democracy // Kyiv: Library of Ukraine (ELIBRARY.COM.UA). Update date: 11/14/2014..02/2020).